WESTERN FRONT
London
Thames
Sheerness
Rochester
Croydon
Chatham
Margate
Ramsgate
Maidstone
Canterbury
ENGLAND
Tunbridge Wells
Folkestone
Dover
Rye
Battle
Hastings
Dungeness
Beachy Head
Strait of Dover
Gravelines
Calais
C. Gris Nez
Boulogne
North Sea
Middelburg
Flushing
Goes
Zeebrugge
Blankenberghe
Ostend
Bruges
Nieuport
Furnes
Dunkirk
Roulers
Thourout
Aeltre
Ghent
Courtrai
Renaix
Roubaix
Lille
Tournai
Audenarde
Grammont
Soignies
Ath
Mons
Valenciennes
Denain
Quesnoy
Hautmont
Cambrai
Le Cateau
Landrecies
Fourmies
Avesnes
Guise
St. Quentin
Vervins
Laon
La Fère
Rozoy
Chauny
Noyon
Compiègne
Soissons
Villers Cotterets
Creil
Senlis
Beauvais
Clermont
Ribecourt
Montdidier
Roye
Ham
Nesle
Péronne
Bapaume
Albert
Doullens
Amiens
Abbeville
Dieppe
Blangy
Aumale
Fécamp
Neufchâtel
Yvetot
Bolbec
Lillebonne
Le Havre
Rouen
Honfleur
Pont Audemer
Sotteville
Elbeuf
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Les Andelys
Forges-les-Eaux
Chaumont-en-Vexin
Pontoise
Beaumont
Milly
Estrées St. Denis
Bernay
Evreux
Vernon
Seine
Mantes
Poissy
St. Germain
Versailles
Paris
St. Denis
Meaux
La Ferté-sous-Jouarre
Montmirail
Coulommiers
Château Thierry
Dormans
Epernay
Marne
Reims
Fismes
Soissons
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Brimont
Malmaison
Craonne
Laffaux
Chemin des Dames
Juvincourt
Corbeny
Pinon
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Soupir
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Dreux
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Laigle
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Melun
Provins
Romilly
Etampes
Fontainebleau
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Estissac
Troyes
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Joigny
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Glen
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Armançon
Serain
Cure
Yonne
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Ypres
Poperinghe
Zonnebeke
Passchendaele
Houthulst Forest
Langemarck
Staden
Thielt
Cruyshautem
Oudenarde
Courcelles
Binche
Le Quesnoy
Solesmes
Le Preux
Monchy-le-Preux
Arras
Vimy Ridge
Carency
Neuville St. Vaast
Souchez
Lens
Liévin
Hénin-Liétard
Carvin
Loos
Festubert
Givenchy
Estaires
Bailleul
Hazebrouck
Cassel
St. Omer
Aire
Lillers
Béthune
La Bassée
Wytschaete
Messines
Ploegsteert
Armentières
Nieppe Forest
Hill 63
Wytschaete
Ypres
Zillebeke
Hooge
Gheluvelt
Becelaere
Zandvoorde
Oostnieuwkerke
Wervicq
Menin
Comines
Warneton
Ploegsteert
Le Gheir
Ploegsteert Wood
Messines
Wytschaete
Kemmel
Neuve Eglise
Wulverghem
Dranoutre
Locre
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Merris
Strazeele
Meteren
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Bergues
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Deinze
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
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Arnsberg
Krefeld
Ratingen
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Plettenberg
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Lüdenscheid
Finnentrop
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Mönchengladbach
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Maeseyck
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Spa
Sinzig
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Andernach
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Mayen
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Vielsalm
Stadtkyll
Frankfort
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Gerolstein
Boppard
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Givet
Houffalize
Manderscheid
Hochst
Bastogne
Wittlich
Mayence
Mainz
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Saarburg
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Bischweiler
Nancy
Baden
Ligny-en-Barrois
Renchen
St. Dizier
Toul
St. Nicolas
Luneville
Strasbourg
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Oppenau
Wassy
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Kenzingen
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Remiremont
Freiburg
Saulxures
Hartmannsweiler Kopf
Langres
Gebweiler
Sulzburg
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Steinbach
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GENERAL COUNT CADORNA

Cadorna commanded victorious Italian armies during the first two and a half years that Italy was a belligerent. After the battle of Caporetto, he became the Italian member of the Inter-Allied War Council at Versailles

THE LITERARY DIGEST
History of the World War

Compiled from Original and Contemporary Sources: American, British, French, German, and Others

BY

FRANCIS WHITING HALSEY

Author of "The Old New York Frontier," Editor of "Great Epochs in American History," "Seeing Europe with Famous Authors," "Balfour, Viviani, and Joffre, Their Speeches in America," etc.

IN TEN VOLUMES—ILLUSTRATED

VOLUME IX

ITALY AGAINST AUSTRIA IN THE TRENTINO AND ON THE ISONZO—THE FALL OF GORIZIA AND THE CARSO FIGHTING—THE ITALIAN DEFEAT AT CAPORETTO FOLLOWED BY AUSTRIA'S DÉBÂCLE ON THE PIAVE —THE FOUR YEARS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE—THE "LUSITANIA" CASE—GERMANY'S WAR ZONE DECREE—MERCANTILE LOSSES FROM SUBMARINES—THE ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND EXPLOITS

August, 1914—November 11, 1918

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1919

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CONTENTS—VOLUME NINE

IN THE EAST, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH—*Continued*

PART VII—IN THE ALPS AND ON THE ADRIATIC

PAGE

I. The Seizure of Valona and the Declaration of War Against Austria (November, 1914—May 25, 1915) . . 3

II. The First Year of War in the Trentino and on the Isonzo (May 23, 1915—November 15, 1915) 18

III. Austrians Repulsed in the Trentino and Gorizia Taken —The War in the Dolomites (May 14, 1916—December 31, 1916). 50

IV. Austrians East of Gorizia Lose Monte Santo and Monte St. Gabrielle (May 12, 1917—October 1, 1917) . . . 79

V. The Italian Disaster at Caporetto, and the Retreat Across the Tagliamento to the Piave (October 23, 1917 —February 1, 1918) 93

VI. Austria's Débâcle on the Piave—Italian Naval Exploits (May 1, 1918—November 3, 1918) 120

IN THE GERMAN COLONIES AND ON THE SEA

PART I—THE WAR IN THE COLONIES

I. The Colonies that Germany Had 153

II. The Siege and Fall of Tsingtau in Kiaochow and the Taking of Samoa (September 18, 1917—November 7, 1917) 164

III. The Boer Rebellion Quelled and German Southwest Africa, Togoland and Kamerun Taken (October 13, 1914 —November 30, 1914) 181

IV. Germany's Loss of East Africa, Her Last Colony (August, 1914—1918) 193

PART II—SUBMARINE WARFARE AND WAR ZONE DECREES

I. German Successes and Failures in the First Year— British Successes in Scandinavian Waters (September 22, 1914—October 10, 1915) 209

CONTENTS—VOLUME NINE

PAGE

II. British and German War Zone Decrees—Von Tirpitz Threatens Savage Submarine Warfare (December 8, 1914—April 15, 1915) 235

III. Sinkings That Involved American Rights—The "Lusitania" and "Arabic" Cases (May 1, 1915—September 15, 1915) 248

IV. American Munition Plant Explosions and the Anglo-French Loan (July 1, 1915—April 6, 1916) . . . 283

V. Increased Submarine Activity, British, German, and Austrian—The Coming of the "Deutschland," and the Case of Captain Fryatt (October 14, 1915—May 31, 1916) 298

VI. The "Ancona" and "Sussex" Cases and Germany's Conditional Promise to the United States (November 8, 1915—October 28, 1916) 321

VII. Germany's First Year of "Frightfulness" and the American Declaration of a State of War (February 1, 1917—February 1, 1918) 335

VIII. In the Second Year of "Frightfulness"—The Zeebrugge and Ostend Exploits—Net Losses of Ships and Submarines (February 1, 1918—November 11, 1918) . . . 367

ILLUSTRATIONS—VOLUME NINE

FULL PAGES

General Count Cadorna . . . . . *Frontispiece*
Mountain Difficulties Overcome by the Italians. . . . 2
Italian Troops Maneuvering on Skis 45
An Italian Trench on the Isonzo 87
Italian Anti-Aircraft Gun 103
A Scene in the Dolomites 111
The Colleoni Statue in Venice . . . . *facing page* 112
Rome Celebrating in the Coliseum . . . *facing page* 120
Austrian Prisoners from the Battle of the Piave. . . . 125
Italians Behind a Barrage on the Piave Front . . . 133
The Bridge of Sighs in Venice 141
General Diaz . . . . . *facing page* 144
General Louis Botha. 152
Japanese Infantry in Action 173
A German *U*-Boat of the Later Type 208
Three British Warships Sunk in the North Sea . . . 213
Sir John Fisher. . . . . *facing page* 232
Grand Admiral von Tirpitz . . . . . *facing page* 240
Where American Ordnance Was Made. 289
Admiral Viscount Jellicoe . . . . . *facing page* 304
Admiral Sims. 351
The "Leviathan" Arriving in New York . . *facing page* 368
The "Mauretania" Camouflaged 373
The French Decorating American Naval Officers . . 385

TEXT ILLUSTRATIONS

A Group of Italian Officers 7
Italian Coastal Defenses on the Upper Adriatic . . . 11
Prince and Princess von Bülow 17

ILLUSTRATIONS—VOLUME NINE

PAGE

An Italian Mobilization Scene 19
Italian Bersaglieri on the March 23
The King of Italy Leaving for the Front 27
The City of Ancona on the Adriatic 31
Italian Troops Marching to the Front 33
Italians Laying Mines in Lake Garda 35
Italian Cavalry Officers 37
Bombing Positions of Italians on the Asiago Front . . 41
An Austrian Shelter in the Alps 53
An Austrian Field-Bakery 61
A Suburb of Gorizia 65
Gorizia with the Isonzo in the Distance 69
Italian Artillery in Action 73
An Italian Armored Train 85
Bersaglieri on the Carso Plateau 91
Italian Guns on a Barge in the Lower Piave . . . 129
Gabrielle D'Annunzio 137
An Italian Trench on the Piave 143
American Troops in Fiume 147
Japanese Soldiers Landing Near Tsingtau 165
At the Siege of Tsingtau 169
Japanese Red Cross Nurses and Surgeons 171
Boer Soldiers Serving Under General Botha . . . 183
British South African Troops Leaving Durban . . . 185
Natives Crossing a Bridge in British East Africa . . 201
Otto Weddigen, Commander of the *U*-9 217
Officers and Crew of the *U*-9 219
British Undersea-Boat *B*-11 221
German Submarines at Wilhelmshaven 227
Captain Karl Boy-Ed 253
The "Gulf Star," a Sister-Ship of the "Gulflight" . . 257
The "Falaba" 261
William Jennings Bryan 265
The White Star Liner "Arabic" 279
J. P. Morgan 285
Captain Franz von Papen 292

ILLUSTRATIONS—VOLUME NINE

PAGE

Proving Grounds at Bethlehem 295
The American Soixante-Quinze 297
The German Submarine "Deutschland" 308
Captain Paul König, Who Commanded the "Deutschland" 310
The Italian Ship "Ancona" 322
Passenger-Ship "Persia" Sunk in the Mediterranean . 325
The "Sussex" After She Was Torpedoed 329

MAPS

The Trentino, Trieste and Fiume Territory 5
The Isonzo Front . . . . . *facing page* 24
Approximate Racial Distribution of the Former Austrian Emperor's Subjects 49
The Carso Plateau and the Gulf of Trieste 67
Farthest Italian Advance Against Austria . *facing page* 80
Italian Territory Taken by Teutonic Armies After Caporetto . . . . . *facing page* 104
Germany's Southwestern African Colony 157
Two German Colonies in Western Africa 159
Germany's Possessions in the Western Pacific . . . 161
The Japanese Operations at Tsingtau 167
German East Africa 195
"All Ships Met Within That Zone Will Be Sunk" . . 337
The Mole and Canal Entrance at Zeebrugge . . . 377

IN THE EAST, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH

Part VII

IN THE ALPS AND ON THE ADRIATIC



MOUNTAIN DIFFICULTIES THE ITALIANS OVERCAME WHEN THEY ACTUALLY GOT INTO THE WAR

I

THE SEIZURE OF VALONA AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST AUSTRIA

November, 1914—May 25, 1915

THREE months after the war began, but seven months before she herself declared war on Austria, Italy committed an act which, in a time of European peace, would have precipitated something like an international crisis; she landed Italian marines at Valona on the eastern side of the Adriatic. In the presence of desperate battles going on in Flanders and Poland, the act at the time was almost ignored. When thought of at all, it was recognized, however, as promising another complication, another major change in European conditions when at last peace should be restored.

At the lower end of the Adriatic both shores—the Italian and the Albanian—are visible in good weather from the deck of a steamer in midchannel. On the Albanian side lies Valona (or Avlona) with its wide bay. Only forty miles here separate Italy from Albania. In capable hands Valona commands the Adriatic, in Austrian hands it was a menace to Italy. All the good harbors in the Adriatic are found on the eastern shore, and most of them were under Austro-Hungarian flags—Trieste, Sebenico, Gravosa, Fiume, and Cattaro, the last the finest of all. Each had belonged to the Hapsburgs since the Congress in Vienna in 1814, but without exception they bore Italian names and were splendid monuments of the ancient Venetian supremacy, of which Freeman and Jackson have written charming books.

Out of territory formerly Turkish a kingdom of Albania had been created at the Conference of London at the close of the Balkan wars in 1913. It was a direct consequence of conflicting rivalries. None of the Great Powers cared for Albania in herself, but Austria was resolved that the

Serbs should not have a "window on the sea" such as Albania might have given her, while Italy was determined that the Austrian Empire should not descend the Adriatic, touch the Greek frontier and so possess herself of Valona. Italy and Austria were agreed, however, on one point; they were determined to keep Serbia, the Slav protégé of the Czar, from acquiring an Adriatic littoral which might become a base for Russian fleets. So the Albanian Kingdom was created, but only to crumble when the World War began. Albania did not comprise a nationality striving for unity; it was not another Serbia or a second Bulgaria, but the number of warlike tribes, separated by religions and the rivalries of semi-barbaric princes. It was a country somewhat comparable to Scotland in the ancient days of the clansmen. From the fall of the Roman Empire to the Peace of Bucharest in 1913, Albanian conditions for fifteen eventful centuries had not essentially changed.

Italian occupation of Valona became therefore a long step toward an alliance with the enemies of Austria and Germany. In any European congress after the war the Italian voice was now likely to be raised in accord with those of Great Britain, France, and Russia, rather than with those of Germany and Austria, and any prospect of an Austro-German victory was more than likely to force Italy to join in the war. A victorious Germany and Austria might forgive Italy for her desertion of them in August, 1914, but it was unthinkable that they would permanently permit Italy to profit at their expense by taking home and keeping Valona, the greatest naval prize a Mediterranean power could desire.

Italy also still desired the Trentino and meant to have it, but she could get it only at Austria's expense. She longed for Trieste, and this too was Austrian territory; but she had actually taken Valona, and her influence in Albania, henceforth, would increase. In her own peninsula she had thousands of Albanian subjects; Crispi, her former Prime Minister, was of Albanian descent. Hereafter her voice would prevail about Valona, and later at Durazzo and Skutari. All this meant Austro-Italian rivalry and quarreling, but it also meant growing Franco-Italian friendship.

At the outset of the war, Austria and Germany were said to have offered Italy the French provinces of Algeria, Tunis, Corsica, Savoy and Nice for her adherence to the Triple Alliance. Austria was also said to have been willing to cede to Italy some parts of the Trentino territory and of the Trieste neighborhood. These tempting offers failed to entice her, because Anglo-French fleets were bound to control the Mediterranean, and Austria and Germany could give her no protec-

THE TRENTINO, TRIESTE AND FIUME TERRITORY

These were lands governed by Austria which Italy had long claimed as hers for racial and other reasons. Austria, in the winter of 1914-1915, was understood to have been willing to cede to Italy some considerable parts of them, provided Italy would enter the war on the Teutonic side

tion against them. Beyond this, the natural sympathy of Italians was with France and Great Britain, and not with Austria and Germany. In the 20th century, as in the 19th, the real enemy of Italy was Austria.

While Italian influence was bound to be exerted against Austria, there were certain perils in using it. The plans of Serbia and Montenegro included the annexation of Dal-

matia, as well as of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Slavonia, and Dalmatia was *Italia Irredenta*. Ragusa, Spalato, and Zara are ancient Venetian towns, and the islands of the Dalmatian coast are Italian, at least in name. Italy was, therefore, likely to oppose a Slav advance along the Adriatic. Here the Slav was a rival of Italy and had long been pushing Italians out of the coast cities. These Slav ambitions were sure to have Russian support, so that differences between Italy and Russia were only less likely than differences between Italy and Austria. But the Italian occupation of Valona was unmistakably a step toward that closer relation between Italy and the enemies of Germany and Austria which came with an actual declaration of war by Italy against Austria seven months after Valona was taken.

Two months after landing marines at Valona, Italy formally took possession of the harbor city. From that moment, and possibly for many future years, Valona was to be as much an Italian city as Naples was. It was declared by the *Tribuna* of Rome that the landing of Italian troops was not a "simple demonstration." Italy's pretext was the activity of Moslem rebels in massacring adherents of Italy's friend, Essad Pasha, and in looting outside the walls. An official despatch from the Italian warship *Misurata*, at Durazzo, said Albanian rebels at Tirana were threatening to move against the government of Essad, who, after the fall of William of Wied, had been elected provisional President by the Albanian Senate. After William's fall, a rebel force had been concentrated at Dibra, forty miles in the interior, so that there was no longer any doubt that a revolutionary movement was spreading. Austria's jealousy of Italy was understood to be back of the revolt. It was believed that Austria had armed the rebels and supplied them with funds, in the hope that Italy would be prevented from gaining control of Albania while Austria was engaged in war. It was the contrary that happened, for Austria's diplomacy and interference gave Italy her excuse for seizing Valona, and so gaining a foothold in Albania. The people of Italy, as early as that, were eager for war, fiercely anxious to fight Austria. Italy had in fact become a powder-magazine which might be exploded any day by a chance spark.

Four weeks before taking actual possession, Italy had thought it necessary to occupy Saseno, a barren rock outside, three miles long, which commands the harbor. She also landed a small force at Valona, but did not then attempt to occupy it, being content to raise the flag of Italy over the Italian hospital. The marines were withdrawn, but Italian warships remained in the harbor. From the *Masurata*, one of these ships, a force of occupation finally landed on December 24. This step came as the decisive act in a diplo-

A GROUP OF ITALIAN OFFICERS

matic game that had long been played in regard to Albania.

So it was that less than a month after the first landing of the Marines, Italian soldiers were pouring into Valona, following a proclamation of Admiral Patris, Commander-in-chief of the Italian squadron, that Italy was determined to protect her interests and preserve order in Albania. The inhabitants of Valona made no opposition. Seven hundred Italian sailors, with artillery and machine-guns, had landed, of whom 500 were garrisoning the city, while 200 others oc-

cupied the village of Arta, which was threatened with attack by rebels. Bersaglieri from Palermo were sent to relieve the bluejackets and form the nucleus of a garrison of occupation. In view of conditions prevailing at Durazzo, it was then thought Italy might soon feel compelled to take over all Albania in order to forestall the Austrians.

The character and general conditions of the two shores of the Adriatic are very different. The western coast is an almost uniform line of sandy beach, with broad stretches of shallow water and with few natural harbors. At the northern and western ends are wide plains spreading far inland before they reach mountain-barriers, while in the middle section, the rugged Apennines are always near the sea and sometimes reach its shores. At the head of the Venetian gulf is a flat marshy district formed by the alluvial deltas of many rivers flowing down from the Alps. The eastern coast, on the other hand, is indented and cut up into innumerable bays and inlets, some as deep as Norwegian fiords, and others so large as almost to form inland seas, and with mountains almost as frowning. Chains of rocky islands run parallel to the mainland from the southernmost point of Istria as far as Ragusa. Steep, stony mountains reach down to the water's edge almost the whole distance and rise up again from the islands. The soil is bare and stony. The cypress, the olive, and patches of juniper often give the only relief to long stretches of sterile coast. In a few favored spots only are there tracts of good land, as in southern Dalmatia, a semi-tropical land, where the climate is mild and the vegetation luxuriant, so that Diocletian, after his abdication, boasted in Rome of the cabbages he could raise at Salona. Inland the stony Karst belt stretches far back, but beyond are broad fertile plains watered by mighty rivers, lands whose peoples have forever been striving to reach the sea. Yet, in spite of these differences there is, even geographically, some connection between the two shores, for both the Apennines and the Karst are offshoots of the Alps.

If the western coast labors under many natural drawbacks, from a lack of seaports, in other respects it enjoys advantages over the eastern. In the first place, the whole Italian peninsula is inhabited by people of a homogeneous race, speak-

ing one language and united under the same civilized government. The soil at the head of the Adriatic and for about a third of the way down, as well as a great deal of the province of Apulia, is extremely fertile. Even in the mountainous central zone of the Marches and the Abruzzi there are very productive districts. A line of railway follows the Adriatic coast from the Austrian frontier to the extreme "heel" of Italy, with many branches connecting with the rest of the country and with north and central Europe. The Venetian and Lombard plains, besides having a highly developed agriculture, are to a large extent industrialized. Even in the less progressive south industries are rising.

On the eastern, or Illyrian, shore there was great difference in political conditions, divided as it is between several Governments of varying degrees of civilization. The territory from the Italian frontier to the Bocche di Cattaro was under a single State, Austria, whose rule varied in its different provinces, but was not really popular with any of its subjects, and bitterly disliked by some of them. Nor are the inhabitants in this territory all of one race. Italians, Slavs, Magyars, Germans, and Albanians scattered along the coast struggle for mastery of land and water. The districts of Gorizia and Gradisca, Trieste and Istria, when united under a single Austrian governor, had separate local assemblies or diets, but they did not enjoy any real autonomy. Dalmatia was another Austrian province with its own governor and diet. Croatia-Slavonia was an autonomous province dependent on Hungary, with a Hungarian governor and a local parliament, while Fiume was a *corpus separatum,* with a Hungarian governor, and was represented in the parliament at Budapest. Bosnia and Herzegovina were provinces administered jointly by the Austrian and Hungarian Governments, with a local assembly having very little autonomy.[1]

With Italy thus once more established in authority at a point on the eastern shore, many minds turned back to those long past centuries in which an Italian, or a Roman, power was dominant there. This shore for ages received its civilization entirely from the west. Its periods of greatest

[1] *The Quarterly Review* (London).

prosperity were those in which it was under the rule of some western Government. From the east, however, it had received hordes of barbarians who came to devastate and destroy it. Only in quite recent times did any people come to the Adriatic from the east who were endowed with the arts, laws, and customs of civilization. The ancient Greeks created a chain of colonies on the Apulian coast, but along the eastern shores of the Adriatic they occupied only a few points and some adjacent islands. They never settled there as they did in southern Italy, and so contributed little to the civilization of the country.

The Romans achieved far more. Their first enterprise beyond Italy was an invasion of Istria and Dalmatia. Thereafter, until the 5th century, A.D., the Adriatic continued to be a Roman lake. The splendor and importance of the settlements Rome founded on its shores may be gaged by the magnificent remains of them that have survived at Pola, Spalato (the favorite residence of the Dalmatian emperor, Diocletian), Salona (the capital of Roman Dalmatia) and elsewhere. They created a number of first-class ports on both shores—at Pola, Salona, and Durazzo, on the eastern, at Brindisi, Rimini, and Ravenna on the western, and at Aquileia in the north.

Of all these the most famous was Brundusium, now called Brindisi, which at one time was the chief war-port of Rome. Here soldiers sailed away to make conquests of Macedonia, Syria, and Northern Africa. In the Middle Ages, Crusaders made it one of their ports, but it was not until the rise of modern Italy as a naval power that Brindisi revived something of its old-time importance. It is situated on the Italian "heel," opposite Valona, where the Adriatic narrows into the Strait of Otranto, and is about 45 miles east-northeast of Taranto and 346 miles southeast of Ancona. Built on a rocky promontory, which almost encloses its roomy bay, its harbors—an inner and an outer harbor—the inner almost completely landlocked, are excellent. In the inner harbor alone there is room for the largest fleets, sheltered from every wind and easily defended. A channel, 565 yards long and 165 feet broad, connects the inner and outer basins. But its former commercial importance has never

been regained. Small mail-boats, however, carrying express and passengers, leave weekly, connecting with large Peninsular and Oriental steamers at Port Said.

Durazzo, where in old days Roman legions debarked, as did other soldiers in this war, to join their Allies in the Balkan campaigns, has barely preserved a shadow of the Adriatic seaport which flourished there from before the time of Christ and during the Roman Empire. Merchants from Durazzo have traded to points in the remote quarters of the known world. Durazzo, then called Dyrrachium, was the



BRITISH OFFICIAL PHOTO.

ITALIAN COASTAL DEFENSES ON THE UPPER ADRIATIC

starting-point for land expeditions going out eastward from conquering Rome. The great military road—the Via Egnatia, led from it to Saloniki, then called Thessalonica, and thence north and east. The legions that subdued the Grecian lands and brought Rome into contact with the Slav races passed first through Dyrrachium.

In spite of Austria's long political supremacy, the northeastern Adriatic littoral remained distinctly Italian in race, customs, and speech. Italian remained the official language

at Trieste as it was at Venice, and at Cattaro as it was at Milan. Its Slav population, altho large, was primitive and ignorant, its only vestiges of culture having been acquired under Italian influence. With the war of 1859, Austria lost Lombardy, and altho after the creation of the Italian kingdom in 1861, she lost all authority over the western shore of the Adriatic south of the Po, and ceased to be the sole naval power in that sea, her influence and position predominated in Adriatic waters.

Of the four peoples who long had struggled for mastery, Italians, Slavs, Magyars, and Germans—the Italians had tradition and culture on their side, but they formed a numerical majority only on the coast and in the northern territories, where the people were in close sympathy with Italian culture and were ready to fight to uphold the Italian influence even when in a minority. The southern Slavs, in their territory, might be regarded as one people who aspired to union under a single national Government with a considerable seaboard. The Magyars of Hungary were a wholly inland people, who could retain access to the coast only by riding roughshod down to Fiume over a wide tract of non-Magyar lands. The Germans, who had their natural seaboard in the north, aspired also to a window on the Adriatic and looked upon Trieste as their heritage, regardless of the wishes of its inhabitants who were determined to be Italians.

Among the Allies the formal adhesion of Italy to their cause in May, 1915, after having declared her neutrality in August, 1914, was welcome for many reasons. It showed, for one thing, that, except for Turkey, the Teutonic Empires stood alone, and for another that Italy's adhesion might hasten materially the termination of the struggle. In Tripoli Italy had had recent experience of military operations, in which from having command of the sea, she was able to prevent the Turks from sending into Tripoli large reinforcements. There was only a Turkish garrison in the province, with a few experienced and enterprising Turkish officers who were able to make use of the native population. While the fighting was never formidable, it had enabled Italy not only to conquer the country, but to learn what

weak places existed in her military organization. After that was ended she had had abundance of time in which to improve her army. Moreover, since the World War broke out almost ten months had elapsed, and she had used those months still more in making good her deficiencies. Italy was believed now to have, in round figures, a million and a quarter of trained troops and about an equal number of untrained, or two and a half million men to supply a fighting force, make good wastage, and send forward reinforcements—a formidable reinforcement for the Allies.

Beside the large military force that Italy could put into the field she had a powerful navy. Next to France she was the second naval Power in the Mediterranean. As the British and the French fleets had already maintained command of the sea for ten months, the adhesion of Italy did not appear at first sight to make much difference; but it was recalled that the Italian mind is one of the finest in Europe, and that Italian aid in fighting the submarine might prove of greater value than at first sight it promised to be. The really weak spot in regard to Italy was its finances. The country is singularly wanting in what are called rich natural resources. The Valley of the Po—the old Gallia Cis-Alpina, the real cradle of the Populus Romanus—is, as it always has been, by far the richest part of Italy agriculturally, and since the unification of the peninsula it had made great strides commercially and industrially. But taxes were heavy in Italy; the debt constituted a serious burden; education was very backward; and there was not much accumulated capital. It was believed, however, that Italy would not find difficulty in getting financial assistance.

First and foremost of Italy's national aspirations was to get back her two lost northern provinces—Trent in the west, and the rich country northeast of Venice, sweeping around the head of the Adriatic to and beyond Trieste. These two provinces were the Alsace and Lorraine of Italy, and were essentially Italian. Italy had deeply resented loss of them ever since they passed under the political control of Austria, and always aspired to get them back; but it remained for the World War to mold this sentiment into an irresistible movement of national aspirations. Just across the Adriatic

lies Istria, that great stretch of country which used to be a Roman province and later was part of the Venetian republic. Italy did not forget that this valuable shore-land was once Italian, and national aspirations felt that it should again be Italian. Beyond that was the route to the East, with Italy the great power lying nearest to that dazzling field and with the largest coast-line on the Mediterranean. Italy could not forget that Rome was once mistress of the East and West and that a Roman Emperor, Constantine, founded Constantinople and gave it his own name.

On the outbreak of the war the most notable feature of this national movement was the sudden disappearance from Italy of German prestige and influence. For years Germany had been building up a commanding position in the commercial, financial, and industrial affairs of Italy. While the Triple Alliance was the political bond, German business men were doing in Italy more than the politicians. Practically the entire import of foreign goods, except coal, was controlled by Germany. German capital established great banks, built and operated railways, electric-light plants, factories and hotels that had German managers and German waiters. Some of the most influential capitalists of Italy were of German origin, or had German backing. Gradually German influence had become little short of predominant. Even in political and international affairs that influence was felt. But with Italy in the war, this Teutonic fabric was demolished almost in a day by a movement for a realization of Italy's national aspirations.

What Italy demanded from Austria before she declared war and what Austria refused to grant, except in part, fell into three categories, the Trentino, Trieste, and the Istrian Littoral, with the Dalmatian Islands. As to the Trentino, meaning the Italian-speaking community on Lago di Garda and in the middle valley of the Adige, there was every reason why it should be Italian. The people are Latin by race, language, and sympathy, and the Trentino was lost to Italy only by accident. Austria in possessing it held the key to northern Italy and Milan, and so the valley of the Po became indefensible. Italy also demanded Meran, Bozen, the upper valley of the Adige and the whole valley of the Esak,

where the population is German. Geographically this region belongs to Italy, being south of the Alps, and strategically it would have fortified Italy and given her a "scientific" frontier. Trieste, however, was quite as Italian as Genoa, and so were Pola and the shore-towns of Istria, but the inland regions were peopled by Slovenes, who were not Latins but Slavs and preferred to remain subjects of Austria rather than of Italy. All the lands of the Dalmatian coast bear Italian names, and formerly belonged to the Adriatic empire of Venice. While a portion of the Slav population has been Latinized, in the main the people are Slavs. Their natural alinement politically was with the Slavs of the eastern mainland, and not with the Latins of the remoter shore.

Save about Trent and in Trieste, however, it could not be said that Italy was seeking to redeem Italian lands and liberate Italian-speaking populations, who had become reluctant subjects of the Hapsburgs. She was rather seeking to extend her frontiers in ways that would include races as hostile to her as Austrian Italians were hostile to Austria. To have ceded the Austrian Tyrol south of the crest of the Alps would have been for Austria an unimportant sacrifice—a price she could well afford to have paid for Italian neutrality. But to part with Trieste, Fiume, and the Istrian Littoral—this would have been almost to sign her own death warrant, for it would have deprived her of a door on the sea, her only seaport, and so would have left the Empire land-locked. Austria-Hungary simply could not cede Trieste, Fiume, and the Istrian peninsula. The question was really one of life and death to her. For her existence Trieste was vital, while Fiume was Hungary's only seaport. The Trentino Austria could cede, the islands of the Adriatic conceivably, but more she could not give and still exist. She naturally chose to perish fighting.

It was the Italian people who in 1915 made war on Austria. Deep down in the mind of the nation, and more especially among the Northerners, was a gnawing desire to get at Austria, to avenge the martyrs of Bellfiori, to cancel the memory of Custozza and of Lissa. Further, there was a lively hope of demonstrating the value of Italian arms and winning the Trentino and Trieste, not by negotiation, but

by the sword. But deeper still, was a revolt against the arrogance of the Teutonic Powers in their conduct thus far of the war. The Belgian atrocities, as confirmed by the Bryce Commission's report, the sinking of the *Lusitania,* and in lesser degree the use of poisonous gases, roused the Italian populace and made them demand that Rome, the great "Latin Mother" of Western civilization, should not stand aside when that civilization was threatened by Prussia, to whose principles and domination all Germany had submitted herself. To Italians Germany was a great world force, but "all head and no heart," with much cunning, little chivalry and dominated by the most "soulless polity" known to the modern world. Germany before the war was dominating Italian industries and commerce more and more—in the main to the profit of Italy, but not to liking for German dominance.

The relations between Italy and the Teutonic League remained curiously vague long after Italy had declared war on Austria; she remained definitely at war only with Austria. While it was a war supported by the full weight of racial aversion and traditional grievances, Italy was not-for many months at war with Germany, nor was Germany at war with her, altho diplomatic relations between the two were suspended. It was assumed that Germany was opposed to a rupture with Italy, and hoped after the war to placate her—perhaps at Austria's expense. Germany having been engaged for forty years in building up great commercial interests in Italy, had no desire to lose the financial control she possest over some of the chief Italian industries. Except for this condition it is doubtful if Italy could have won so often as against Teutonic forces. It was only when Germany finally became a belligerent against Italy that Austria had any real successes—notably the success at Caporetto which, however, was more distinctly a German victory.

During the winter following the outbreak of war, Germany had kept in Rome the astute and accomplished Prince von Bülow, a former Chancellor of the Empire, well known in Italy, where he had married his wife and had served as Ambassador, the purpose of his stay in 1914-1915 being to keep Italy in the defensive alliance she had formed with

Germany and Austria. It was understood that, in the course of his endeavors, certain attractive offers of territory from Austria were made to Italy, these being largely in the direction of Italy's traditional ambitions. Nothing, however, came of Bülow's negotiations. It was all too obvious that the Italian people, as a mass, were opposed to going to war in cooperation with their hereditary enemy, Austria, and favored cooperation with the Entente Allies.[2]

[2] Principal Sources: The *Statist* (London); The *Tribune,* "Bulletins" of the National Geographic Society, New York; The *Daily Chronicle,* The *Times,* London; Associated Press dispatches; The *Evening Sun, The Sun,* New York; *The Quarterly Review* (London).

PRINCE AND PRINCESS VON BÜLOW

Prince von Bülow, who spent several weeks in Italy in the winter and spring of 1914-1915 in a fruitless endeavor to prevent Italy from entering the war on the side of the Entente, had formerly been the German Ambassador to Italy and the German Chancellor. The Princess is an Italian woman

II

THE FIRST YEAR OF WAR IN THE TRENTINO AND ON THE ISONZO

May 23, 1915—November 15, 1915

WHEN Italy came definitely into the war, on May 23, 1915, she had to overcome modern fortresses on mountains round about Trent and outlying places. It was a prime necessity for her to overcome them before Austria could call masses of her troops back from Galicia and send them against her. Unless Italy could close the Trentino gateway—that is, the Adige Valley—to a Teutonic advance, all the progress she might make eastward toward the Isonzo and Trieste would be as futile as was the French foray into Alsace-Lorraine in the first weeks of August, 1914. Strategically, much the same kind of campaign was in prospect. Teutonic troops in descending toward Italy by the Brenner Pass to the Adige Valley would be in the same relative position to Italian masses sent eastward to the Isonzo as were the Germans who came through Belgium to those French masses who in August poured against the frontier between Metz, Strassburg, and Belfort. On both these fronts, for two and one-half years, Italy maintained herself successfully and advanced well toward Trieste, her armies commanded all that time by Count Cadorna. It was often remarked in 1917 how Cadorna, who was one of the oldest generals in the war on either side, had kept his command so long, fully justifying Italian faith in him. Other Entente generals—for instance, Sir John French, the Grand Duke, and perhaps a score of men who served immediately under Joffre—had lost their original commands, each going into other service; while among the Germans, Moltke and Falkenhayn, both of whom had been chief of staff, had been retired, and Kluck and others had lost commands. Cadorna never failed until November, 1917, when (more perhaps from

circumstances outside himself than from faults of his own) he lost almost a decisive day at Caporetto, but even then Italian faith in him was not lost, for Cadorna was sent to Paris as the Italian member of the Inter-Allied Council.

Two main lines by road and rail lead out of northeastern Italy, one going up the Adige through the Brenner and the Tyrol, where it descends by the valley of the Inn to Munich, in Bavaria; the other, further east, going between the Carnic and Julian Alps over the Pontafel Pass to Tarvis, at

AN ITALIAN MOBILIZATION SCENE

the head of the Save River, from which place it reaches Villach, and thence follows a direct route to Vienna. There are subsidiary routes leading over these mountains to and from the Po, but all converge on the main thoroughfares, going, the one to Germany, the other to Austria. A third outlet from northeastern Italy runs south of the Julian Alps through Trieste to the Dalmatian coast, but this in the present war was far removed from the theater of strategical interest. The central pivot of the Isonzo River defenses was Gorizia, which was surrounded with outlying forts

armed with the latest guns. As the capture of Gorizia would cut Trieste from railway communications with Austria, except through Laibach, its subjugation was the first real objective of the Italian army. But the Trentino, as Italy's left flank, had first to be made secure.

In the opening days Italy sent a large army against the Trentino, making attacks from the south along Lago di Garda and the Adige Valley, from the east through the Dolomites, from the Ampezzo to the Brenta valleys, and from the west on the pass from Stelvio to Lago di Garda, west of Riva. Here the object was to close an open door from the north into the valley of the Po, the existence of which had been the chief source of grievance by Italy against Austria since 1866. A second force was sent eastward toward the upper Save in order to cut communications between Vienna and the Trentino and to close the Pusterthal, a long corridor north of the Julian and Carnic Alps, running parallel to the Italian frontier. This defensive offensive was designed to cut railway-lines near the highways and to protect Italy from an eventual offensive from Germany. A third army pushed east from the Venetian province, passed the frontier, and presently began to press over the Isonzo, which guarded the entrance into Austria from the Julian Alps and the Adriatic.

The Italians operating to the westward crossed the frontier at a number of points, and meeting with no serious opposition, soon established themselves a few miles inside the border. Alpine troops, the Bersaglieri, a corps of Italian troops famous for their marksmanship, as their name indicates, whom tourists know from their wide-plumed hats, distinguished themselves by scaling heights on the western side of the Austrian Tyrol. From these points of vantage, six or seven thousand feet high, they aimed to secure command of passes leading into the Trentino.

Over Stelvio Pass, one of the most difficult mountain-passes in Europe, an Italian column undertook to make an advance. Stelvio Pass, through which runs the highest wagon-road in Europe, near the border of Switzerland and between Italy and Austria, begins among a wild tangle of hills, plunges through a savage ravine, and struggles tor-

tuously out again, over a tossing sea of rocks, now going forward, now doubling back upon itself. The road is filled throughout its course with sharp hairpin-turns, lifting itself ever higher up the mountain ledge, until it reaches 9,200 feet above the sea, the summit being the highest point in the world accessible to carriages. There is an indescribable grandeur in the scenery at the summit, and also an indescribably bleak savagery as a war theater, something, in fact, appalling. The Ortler-Spitz, massive brother crags, command the way. The crash and echo of mountain-artillery among these rocky heights was something almost unendurable to human ears.

Robed in eternal snow, the forbidding Ortler-Spitz sends glaciers down the valley. Great rock masses, themselves almost of the size of mountains, lie as they were thrown down in rugged, broken, black-scarred pattern along the way. By the side of the deep ravine into which the glaciers sink the roadway is carried up to within a stone's throw of glaciers, and bordered with pinnacled rocks. Formerly this was the most dangerous passage of the Alps, because it was swept by unexpected avalanches, scoured by bitter winds, and often overlaid with treacherous ice and fallen débris. Avalanche galleries, however, which have been cut through solid rock and reinforced by masonry, have made those who use the pass more secure from threats of destruction from overhead. The Romans had forced their way through this passage. Austria poured legions through it to suppress revolts in Italy in 1859. It was over this road that the Italians and French in an earlier war drove back the Austrians. It was originally constructed by the Austrians in 1820, to serve for military communications with Italy, and was improved in 1870 as a means of civil communication. It is now one of the most admired of tourist roads. At the summit of Stelvio, 9,200 feet above the sea, a stone pillar marks the highest point in the pass. Here three frontiers meet among the clouds—Swiss, Austrian, Italian. A hotel guards the heights, and nearby rises the Dreisprachenspitze, or "the peak of three languages," where the German, Italian, and Romanish tongues clash on common ground. Like the ascent from Italy, the descent into Austria follows

a tortuous, difficult course. The whole route forms one of the least inviting war-theaters that could be imagined.

In the western Trentino, early in August, a correspondent saw an Italian cannon on its gun-carriage at a height of three thousand meters. It appeared like "a solitary hawk in an inaccessible cave amid the snow." Alpini in the space of six hours had dragged that gun from the valley below to that haunt of the chamois. They had raised it "with the same prodigious tenacity that is displayed by ants in dragging a large grain of wheat," and on the way had responded to attacks made by Austrians from a neighboring height. That cannon, which reflections from surrounding snows "colored with strange, dazzling lights," filled one with amazement "at the prodigious feat to which it bore silent witness." The men by whom it was taken to its place, like all the Alpine troops of Italy, were sons of the mountain, tall, sturdy, self-contained men, who had derived from their mountain air the strength that enabled them to perform such prodigious feats.

The sight of that fortress, at the top of a mountain never before trodden by the foot of man, made one think "the very mountains had a soul and favored their liberators." The Alpini had barricaded crevices with barbed-wire entanglements, had mined pathways, and circumscribed rocks with trenches, so that no outward sign was discoverable of this cannon at a distance of only one kilometer. Officers said that for three months they had not seen a human being who was not in uniform. During all that time they had been separated from their country and from the world, hemmed in by this defile between their own guns and those of the enemy. Their only amusement consisted in perfecting their defenses and protecting themselves against the forces of nature and the opposing army. In word and in thought the conditions under which they were living effected a great change in them. One saw in their faces how much they were accustomed to commune only with themselves.

Within the first few days of war the Italian troops had secured the highest points on the frontier and the most prominent had been converted into fortresses. The line of defense was an extreme sector, which ran from the Stelvio

to the Corno dei Tre Signori, and so continuous and complete was it that it constituted an impassable wall to an attempted invasion. Nearly all the heights in possession of the Italians were taken by surprize attacks. Before they had time actually to realize their successes they would set about consolidating positions won and in less than twenty-four hours could convert one into a fortress. No obstacle was allowed to stand in the way. Cannon were planted amid

ITALIAN BERSAGLIERI ON THE MARCH

eternal snows where for the first time the silence of centuries was broken.

During the first week after declaring war the Italians, pressing toward Trent, occupied the heights of Zuga, seven miles from Roveredo, and were bringing up heavy guns to mount on these heights as offsets to long-range Austrian artillery. On the night of May 31, after a stiff fight lasting several hours, the Italian tricolor was hoisted on Coni Zugna, which is more than 6,000 feet high, with a cone-like

eminence dominating alike the east bank of the Adige and the railway line running north through Roveredo to Trent. Several regiments pushed forward from Ala and began the stiff ascent of towering heights bristling with Austrian guns. Upward and onward they went undismayed by fire. In vain did the Austrians attempt to stem the rising tide. Some of the storming party, before coming to close grips with the enemy, put aside their knapsacks to secure freedom of action, rolled up their sleeves and when the moment came charged home with the bayonet until the Austrians were routed. There was no restraining the impetuosity of the Italians, who with cries of *"Viva l'Italia!"* dashed bravely on while the Austrians fell back thirteen miles.

Italy's troops employed here had been recruited from mountaineers, familiar with all the difficulties and dangers of the Alps. Small in body and hardy in constitution, these men were valuable additions to her fighting forces. They fought sometimes for whole days in small groups, crouching in crevices of rocks which commanded a valley, or hidden in an Alpine forest and half-covered with snow where they were as safe as if behind the battlements of a fortress. A Swiss patrol saw six of these "Alpini" fighting for three successive days against Austrian forces numbering five or six hundred. The men had entrenched themselves on the crest of a mountain near the Fourth Canton, and there established themselves as in a fortress. Profiting by the superiority of their position, they held their ground against Austrian assailants, who returned to the attack each night, trying in vain to scale rocks and reach their foe. When, after three days, the six Alpini received reinforcements, the rock side of the mountain was strewn with Austrian dead.

These Alpini were magnificent shots, their eyes accustomed to hunting the chamois and the white hare, and bringing them down with one shot in their swift course. Not one of the Alpini ever spent a shot unless certain not to miss his mark. In this lay an explanation of the fact that each was capable of holding out for a long time against superior numbers. They ate sparingly and slept in the hollows of rocks. Each carried on his shoulders a knapsack


THE ISONZO FRONT
Railroads:
Principal Highways
Heights in meters
Scale of Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 10
Leopoldskirchen
Malborghetto
Saifnitz
Pontebba
Pontafel
Tarvis
Wolfsbach
Mittagskofel 2089
Mt. Cleriis
Somdogna
Dogna
Raccolana
Wisenberg 2669
Predil Pass
Moistrocka Pass 1779
Riolada
Montasio
Chiusaforte
Moggio
Raccolana
Mittelbreth
Grintovec 2344
Luknja Pass 1779
Log
Trioorno 2863
Resia
Mt. Canin 2573
Stolvizza
Plezzo
Sozza
Isonzo
Mt. Plauris 2959
Resia
Coritis
Plusna
Zersoccia
Persuio 1761
Mitterdorf
Althammer
Tanataviele
Zaga
Mt. Chiampon 1710
Mt. Maggiore 1615
Serpenizza
Ternova
Mt. Nero 2246
Wochein L.
Sava
Monteaperta
Magost
Bogatin 1908
Vohu 1923
1965
Hradica
Luseyera
Staroselo Pass
Caporetto
Platischis
Mt. Mia 1228
Kamino
Volaria
Deutschrut
Ciseriis
Mt. Matajur 1645
Prossenicco
Tarcento
Mt. Cucco 1243
Tolmein
(Tolmino)
Montefosca
Podmenza
Attimis
Stupizzo
Drenchia
Volzana
Brischis
S. Lucia
Grahovo
(Gracca)
Masarolis
Tricesimo
Faedis
Sagogna
Grimacco
Veitsberg
Monte S. Vito
Reana
S. Pietro
al Natisone
Ronzina
Lom
Tavagnacco
Torreano
Togliano
Idria
Povoletto
S. Leonardo
Bodrez
Sebrelje
Grions
Cividale
Canale
Tribus
Moimacco
Castel del Monte
Jeret
Premariacco
Bainsizza
Chiapovano
Udine
Prepotto
Plava
Deskla
Bainsizza
Lokovec
Ipplis
389
Kolenec
Pradamano
S. Lorenzo
Mt. Santo 682
Plateau
Gargaro
Lokve
Mt. Goliuz 1498
Buttrio
Isonzo
Ternova Forest
Medana
Quisca
1401
Pozzuolo
Manzano
S. Florian
Percotto
Cormons
Ternova
Mossa
Görz (Goritz)
(Gorizia)
S. Lorenzo
Medea
Schönpass
Bicinicco
S. Maria la Longa
S. Lorenzo
S. Andrea
S. Pietro
Cernizza
Dornberg
Haidenschaft (Aidussina)
Versa
Gradiska
42
Palmanova
Visco
Rubbia 275
Ranziano
Gonars
Joannis
Sagrado
Upacchiasella
Wippach
Bagnaria
Villesse
Scherbina
Zablie
Porpetto
Strassoldo
Doberdo 172
Temnizza
S. Daniel
Ruda
Ronchi
Comen
Giorgio di Nogaro
Servignan
Kobilaglava
Coreansca
Monfalcone
Mavhinje
Porto Nogaro
Terzo
Pliskovica
Coprivo
Carlino
Fiumicello
Isonzo
Duino
Mt. Cenkard 402
Mt. Volnic 648
Dottogliano
Aquileia
Gulf of Panzano
Nabresina
Ausa
ISOLA MOROSINI
Aurisina
Belvedere
Punta Sdobba
Sdobba
Grignano
Prosecco
Monterupina
Miramare
Sesana
S. ANDREA
Porto Buso
Boccu di Primero
Barcola
Opcina
Grado
Trieste
Gulf of Trieste
P.S. Andrea
Bassovizza
Servola
Muggia
THE MATTHEWS-NORTHRUP WORKS, BUFFALO, N.Y.

weighing about 75 pounds. In several places they made raids in which they forced themselves into Austrian territory twenty or thirty kilometers from the battle-front. Patrols, composed of a few dozen men only, advanced over mountains and destroyed bridges and railway-lines.

In a region like the Tyrol which precludes aerial reconnaissance, motor-traction, and the use of cavalry, Alpini proved wonderful scouts. Moving with the speed and agility of the chamois, on almost inaccessible mountain-tops, they robbed the Austrians of the most important secrets of their military position. They were known to push into inhabited districts, from which the army of occupation had been temporarily withdrawn, and there to put fresh heart into the Italian population, renewing their loyalty and courage and showing by their own boldness that the liberating army of Italy knew neither doubt nor fear. The Alpini were scattered over the whole mountainous frontier from the Isonzo to the Swiss border. All the progress made by the Italian army in the first three weeks of the war was accomplished by these and other light troops of the advanced guard, the bulk of the army having been consolidated further back. A general offensive movement was yet to come.

One of the mysteries of the war was the unopposed advance of Italy. It evidently surprized Italy herself no less than the rest of the world. At the beginning, no one expected an easy advance. It seemed to be assumed that victory would come only at the cost of a long and bloody campaign. This was not because the Italian fighting qualities were doubted, but because the nature of the land along the boundary gave advantages to the Austrians. The Trentino wedge which Austria had kept pushed down into Italy, belted as it was with mountains, was expected to present an almost impregnable barrier. But the Italians went on from victory to victory. Their steady work in pushing back the Austrians resembled the German work of 1915 in driving Russians back in Galicia and in making their first rush on Paris in 1914. Austrian bulletins said the Italians had been pushed back, but these fallings back, when made at all, were made from points further north or east than those

which they occupied the day before. When the Austrian authorities maintained silence, the mystery grew, complicated by the further mystery that neither Germany nor Turkey had declared war on Italy, and that, altho the German Ambassador had withdrawn, the Turkish Ambassador still remained in Rome.

It almost seemed as if the Teutonic Allies were willing to let Italy conquer the very territory which had so long been the bone of contention between Italy and Austria, since, in the event of the Western Allies winning the war, Italy would get that territory anyway, whereas a victory for the Teutonic Allies would enable them to get it back with ease. Perhaps Austria, like Russia, was finding her ammunition-supply running short and most of it tied up on the San. It was remembered, too, that the Russians for a time had had things all their own way with Austria, while even Serbia had inflicted a disastrous and totally unlooked-for defeat on a great Austrian army. Austria had never given a good account of herself, in any recent war, except when she had aid from capable allies. In the campaign of 1915 against Italy she apparently stood alone; at least nothing was heard of assistance from Germany. Just before the declaration of war, Germans freely spoke of forces numbering 800,000 men as ready to throw themselves from the Trentino into Italy, but apparently Germany had left Austria to face the new enemy alone.

Austrian inactivity was the more remarkable since, about the end of March, it had been understood that half a million Austrian troops were massed in the southern Tyrol and the Trentino, where a strategical organization for a fortnight had been effected with feverish activity, indicating a fear that invasion was imminent. Practically all the villages between Sugana Pass and Lake Garda had been evacuated, and many houses along the frontier blown up with dynamite, so as not to hamper the range of guns dominating accessible points. The eastern portion of Roveredo had been razed to the ground, and the débris of destroyed houses used to improvise fortifications. Trees had been ruthlessly felled everywhere, and the region entirely devastated, even where already defended by permanent

fortifications. Guns had been mounted to an altitude of 7,000 feet.

At the close of the first week the Italians felt satisfied with their position. Their frontier, once thought the weakest in Europe, now seemed to be one of the strongest. Italian troops had wrested from the Austrians an offensive position that formerly had seemed of such power as to lay the whole of northern Italy at Austria's mercy. From the Stelvio Pass to Grado, a distance of 306 miles, 276 miles of which were mountains, there was no vulnerable point at



THE KING OF ITALY LEAVING ROME FOR THE FRONT

which Italian arms were not established. Could they hold their position?—that was now the question. The real offensive, it was to be always remembered, was not against the Trentino, but against the Isonzo line. Against the Trentino the operations were of an entirely defensive character—a protection of the Italian left. Easy to be seen was the fact that a movement against Trieste would be too dangerous to be thought of, provided the forces engaged in it were not protected against an attack in their rear and flank from Austrians pouring down through the passes of the Trentino. That open bottle had first to be

tightly corked, the Trentino to be neutralized. This the Italians were doing by sending, not their main army, but strong columns into every outlet that led into Italy.

Along the Trentino front was a wonderful panorama. From a bare plateau more than 7,000 feet above the sea, a vast mountain range could be seen in all directions. Clouds gathered, drove past, and disappeared. Snow-peaks were shrouded in white, great jagged rocks showed fantastically through drifting vapor, and veils of mist came between the Italian and Austrian positions far below. Both armies watched passes. All the skill of man was brought into play to bar the road. Below, to the north, a bare saddle marked by a winding ribbon of road, separated Italy from Austria, and on each side of the pass were forts, squat and gray. Guns spoke from hidden positions on mountain slopes. A correspondent[3] described one scene that came under his eyes:

"The Austrians open fire. A big gun booms, and after an interval another. The shells burst upon the Italian slope of the saddle. They seem to have been fired tentatively, on the chance of hitting any adventurous body of infantry who might think of approaching the summit of the pass. More shots follow, but no reply comes from the Italian side for some time, till suddenly a heavier note echoes through the mountain air. An Italian big gun has spoken, but we can see no results. The target lies outside our limited range of vision, round a corner, where there are two Austrian forts and some mobile batteries. An Austrian fort that shows clearly on the other side of the valley remains silent, and its appearance seems not quite normal. Two days ago a 12-in. shell from an Italian heavy battery found its mark; a great flame went up, and very little dust. It seemed as tho the shell had landed fair and square upon a cupola. Since then the fort has given no sign of life."

Before August ended everything was being prepared for winter. The population had left the district, but down below soldiers were cutting hay for fodder. Cattle had been collected—a score of cows to give fresh milk in case of illness, and others for meat, if snows should block the way of supply trains. Wooden huts that had sheltered soldiers were being walled in with stone, and stoves were being

[3] Of The *Times* (London).

built under the direction of a soldier who in civil life had been an engineer. Shelters were being constructed for outposts that would watch the enemy from higher up, under towering rocky ridges that backed the plateau. A supply of skis had been sent up from below, as movements in winter would be impossible without them. More guns had been brought up, along winding, nerve-racking roads, with drops in places of 5,000 feet, almost sheer, to green valleys below. The way had been blocked and the watch seemed sure.

Late in August the Italians made considerable headway in the Val Sugana, while important positions were won and consolidated to the east and northeast of Rovereto. In the Val Sugana the Austrians had been driven from Borgo and the Italians had pushed westward on slopes to the north. Farther west an advance was made, in the face of determined opposition, against strongly fortified lines in the Lavarone district. Here the fighting had been severe. The movement to the east of Rovereto was equally successful, the Austrian lines on Monte Maronia, to the north of Monte Maggio, being taken by storm. Every attempt was made to shell the Italians out of positions they had won, which put under fire the formidable group of forts on the Folgaria plateau, but they hung on tenaciously in spite of considerable losses.

While the Austrians were being pushed slowly back, many barriers remained. As these were reached, the ground had to be won yard by yard, almost foot by foot, as it was in Flanders. But here it was as tho flat Flanders had been tilted to an impossible angle, riven by gullies and scarred by rocks. On the barren mountain slope of the Col di Lana, Austrian and Italian trenches could be plainly seen from observation posts on the other side of the valley. The Italians had fought their way up step by step till their foremost trench was within 100 yards of the Austrians. Guns rained common shell and shrapnel on the Austrian lines. The rapidity of fire and the "pattern" secured were alike remarkable. There was no rifle-fire, except a little sniping by picked shots. Here, as elsewhere, the bayonet and the hand-grenade became the chief weapons of the infantrymen.

The positions of the Austrians enabled them to adopt a third, in the shape of inflammable liquid, which they rolled down on the Italian trenches. It was a bitter and cruel fight.

The Italians had a great advantage in numbers; but the Austrians still had all the advantages of position for defensive warfare. The superiority of the Italian artillery usually cleared the way for the infantrymen. The Austrians seemed to have plenty of guns and ammunition. They gave great evidence of preparations for war. But the superiority of the Italian artillery was not long in question. The Italians had better guns, they shot better, and developed that marvelous faculty for hoisting their artillery into apparently inaccessible places. If those who know the Dolomite country could have seen from what ridges Italian guns were belching fire in August, they would have shared the admiration felt by all who were permitted to see the work they had done.

The progress made in October on the Trentino front was considerable. The last Austrian was driven from the Coldi Lana, a mountain 8,000 feet high, thus opening the way for an infantry advance in the Parola Valley. Victorious engagements around Pontafel and Leopoldskirchen revealed incidentally the fact that the Italians were in the Fella Valley, and so gaining ground among a purely Austrian population. No incident so thrilled the Italian people as the capture of Bezzecca and the heights west of Riva which were hallowed by memories of the Garibaldi campaign. After the lapse of forty-nine years the Italian tricolor again floated over the hilltop of San Stefano, where lie buried Garibaldian heroes slain in July, 1866.

On November 13 thirty persons lay dead in Verona after three Austrian aeroplanes had dropt bombs on that city. Thirty others were seriously and nineteen slightly injured The bombs of the aircraft found most of their victims in the principal square where citizens and peasants from the outlying districts were at the market. Nineteen persons were killed by one bomb. This was the second time Austro-Hungarian aeroplanes had made a raid on Verona, which was a fortified city. In July an Austrian machine had dropt a

dozen bombs on the city. Passengers arriving in Milan from Verona gave thrilling pictures of the carnage wrought by one of the bombs in the Piazza della Erbe when the market-place contained at least 2,000 people. When the alarm was given people made a rush for shelter, a large number choosing a narrow passage leading from the Piazza to the Palace of Justice. As fate decreed, a bomb dropt right in front of this passage when it was full of people, and mowed down those who were nearest to the entrance.

THE CITY OF ANCONA, ON THE ADRIATIC
The Austrians attacked Ancona with airplane bombs

An indescribable scene occurred in which about sixty persons, the majority of them women, were killed or injured. Another bomb fell near "Juliet's house," in the outskirts of the city.

The chief Italian offensive in 1915, however, was directed against that part of the Austrian frontier which lies northeast of the Adriatic. Here, for a distance of some forty miles, the Italians established themselves on Austrian territory, along two railroads which cross the common frontier,

their destination Trieste. On the line from Udine to Gorizia they occupied Cormono, just over the frontier, and on the other line, which goes along the coast, advanced to the Isonzo, which, in negotiations before war was declared, they had demanded of Austria as their frontier. They soon occupied the hills commanding Monfalcone, which lie some ten miles inside Austrian territory. On the coast they took the fishing-town of Grado. By June 15 they had approached the first strong defensive position of the Austrians, at Monfalcone, where their extreme right was barely twenty miles from Trieste. Their object in this section was to isolate and then to capture Trieste. The operations, altho preliminary, had disclosed their objective. Nothing, however, as to Austro-German intentions was yet disclosed; nothing, in fact, of real importance occurred for weeks.

Before the end of June the central Isonzo district was being wrenched from Austrian hands, bit by bit, and the invaders were surging on to the north toward Tolmino. The tricolor of Italy had already been raised in the south at several points—Monfalcone, Gradisca, and Cormono. The sweeping movement to the north aimed at driving the Austrians from the right bank of the Isonzo. Tolmino was an important stronghold, about which it was expected that a ring of steel would close. The Isonzo cuts its way southward through the butt of the Julian Alps in a deep gorge which, ending sharply north of Gorizia, lies in a pocket of the hills, with uplands protecting it in a semi-circle on the north. West of the Isonzo, dominating the bridgehead and the road and railway to Gradisca and Udine, is the spur of Podgora, which also commands Gorizia. South of the town stretch some four miles of level plain, till on the east bank of the river rises the extraordinary plateau which Italians call the Carso, and Austrians the Karst, and which rolls east and west behind Trieste and south almost to the sea.

The Carso territory is a low, wind-swept tableland, strewn with limestone boulders seamed with deep fissures and covered with rough scrub and masses of scree. North of Gorizia the Julian Alps rise toward the stony uplands of Monte Nero. A tributary, the Baca, enters the Isonzo

on the eastern bank a little south of Tolmino. Up its difficult valley and through the great Wochein tunnel runs the railway to Villach and Vienna. The difficulties such a country presents for an offensive are obvious. The only passage through the uplands was a strip of land beside the sea, which is far too narrow for an army to travel. The flat land south of Gorizia is not really in a gap in the hills, for the hills close in a mile or two east of the town. Not only the ridges of Monte Nero and the gorge of the upper Isonzo but the plateau of the Carso offered secure

ITALIAN TROOPS MARCHING TO THE FRONT

positions for defense. Gorizia was the key to the Austrian front. So long as it could be held it would block any real advance across the Carso, since it threatened an attack on the flank, and, till the Carso railway was cut, could be munitioned direct from Trieste. The Austrians held not only the town but the bridgehead on the west bank of the Isonzo, and the spur of Podgora which commanded that bridgehead.

In the third week of June a bombardment of Divazzo

began. Divazzo lies on the railway which traverses Istria and ends at Pola. With Divazzo destroyed, all railway communications with Pola, except from Trieste, would be cut off. It would then be necessary to use motor-cars in going from Trieste to Fiume. Divazzo was a junction for both Fiume and Laibach. Early in July heavy fighting occurred on the Isonzo, desperate Italian attacks being made against the Doberdo plateau, which, with its flanks, St. Martin and San Michele, formed the key to the southern extremity of the Austrian position and blocked the way along the coast to Trieste. A general attack began on July 31, with an artillery bombardment almost unprecedented in intensity. King Victor Emmanuel and the Italian Premier, Salandra, visited the front waiting for an expected victory.

Up the western slopes of the plateau the Italians charged time and again. One attack was headed by the Bersaglieri, who were without rifles, but carried hand-grenades and so opened the way for infantry who followed. All their attacks, however, were repulsed, their losses being heavy, chiefly because outcropping rock did not permit the construction of trenches. Violent attacks were made against the bridgehead at Gorizia. Massed guns, including the Italian 11-inch mortars, delivered a prolonged and intense bombardment, until it seemed as if nothing would be left of the Austrian positions and defenders. Infantry-attacks were repulsed, however. The Austrians were about 200,000 strong; they occupied a front that was capable of being defended against superior forces and were entrenched on a chain of hills and high peaks that stretched from Tolmino southward almost to the coast, and thence ran along the shore to Trieste. Several important positions on this front —Malborghetto, the Predil Pass, Tolmino, Gorizia, and Gradisca—had been bombarded by heavy Italian batteries from nearby hills.

Naval operations began but were confined to shelling coast-towns. The Austrians made several attacks on the Italian side of the Adriatic and the Italians bombarded Dalmatian towns and islands. But there was no general naval engagement—nothing beyond encounters between small war craft, which resulted in the sinking of perhaps

half a dozen vessels. The campaign was, however, responsible for an engagement—the first of its kind—between two submarines, in which the Italian craft was sent to the bottom. Meanwhile the bulk of the Austrian fleet had been locked up in Pola. Apparently the Italians were refraining from making an attack on Pola until their army on the Isonzo could push its way to Trieste and thus cut off the



ITALIANS LAYING MINES IN LAKE GARDA

entire Italian peninsula from Austria, and so permit a combined land- and sea-attack on Pola and Fiume.

It was announced on July 8 that the Italian Government had closed the Adriatic to navigation by merchant vessels of all countries, altho safe convoy was to be furnished for ships wishing to enter ports belonging to or occupied by Italy or Montenegro. On the same day an Italian armored cruiser, the *Amalfi*, was torpedoed and sunk at dawn by an Austrian submarine while taking part in a reconnaissance in the upper Adriatic. Most members of the crew were saved.

The commander, before giving orders to the crew to jump overboard, cried "Long live the King! Long live Italy!" and the entire crew drew up along the stern and echoed the shout. The commander, the last to leave the ship, slipt overboard shortly before the *Amalfi* sank.

The effect of the *Amalfi's* loss was to furnish the Italian people with new proof of the necessity of going into the war, showing as it did the ease with which Austria could attack their navy, the *Amalfi* having been torpedoed only eighteen miles from the Italian coast. Italy's Adriatic coast line was without one good naval base, while the Austrians had many, thanks to the formation of the eastern coast, with its myriad islands shielding and giving unapproachable havens of refuge from ships. A large number of the crew of the *Amalfi* had been recruited in Venice, where their loss was deeply mourned. Venice was now no longer a gay, pleasant city. Many of her art treasures had been covered up or hidden away. The illumination of houses and gondolas had ceased. The Queen of the Adriatic seemed to have changed her character in keeping with those tragic days. Even the Colliseum was temporarily lost to view.

While regular siege-operations were carried on against Tolmino and Gorizia, the Italians put forth great efforts to secure possession of the Carso plateau that dominated the railroad and carriage-way between Monfalcone and Trieste, as well as the Isonzo valley as far as Gorizia. This plateau had to be completely subjugated before any advance could be made along the coast road into Istria and before Gorizia could be attacked from the south. On July 18 the Italians, who were already in possession of the bridgehead at Sagarado, stormed several lines of trenches on the summit of the western face of the plateau and captured 2,000 prisoners with a large quantity of war-material. They followed up this success by an infantry-attack supported by heavy field-guns. Further north another army operated against Tarvis along two routes, one of which went over the Carnic Alps through the Pontafel pass, and was traversed by the Venice-Vienna railway, the other being the coach-road.

It is doubtful whether Neuve Chapelle or Ypres should

stand out as more grimly terrible than were some of the battles fought in July along this eastern part of the Austro-Italian frontier. A picture of the green Isonzo literally filled with bodies, of meadows and fields along its course made into veritable shambles, of whole companies and battalions wiped out of existence on both sides, of prowling night-attacks, uncovered by searchlights, and of almost unbearable artillery-fire withering and destroying everything in its path was drawn by Leonard Adelt, in a

ITALIAN CAVALRY OFFICERS

dispatch[4] from the Isonzo frontier. Adelt sketched events leading up to the Italian attacks, the secrecy of the preparations, the terrible strains of withstanding them when they did come, and the bravery displayed on both sides:

"Behind the ruin of every house in Oslavija, Gradiscutta, and Podgora, behind every stone and bush, there were Italians. Their number grew to an entire corps, three infantry divisions. Their catapults spat mines into our obstructions, and at night smaller groups assailed our positions with hand-grenades and rifle-fire.

[4] To The *Berliner Tageblatt.*

All through the fifth of July the cannons thundered about us. Again and again they made dirt heaps of our covering and graves of our shelters. The howitzer-shells acted much like a sword that mows down everything in front of it, and under their shelter there advanced toward us from Oslavija column after column of the enemy.

"Opposition looked impossible and retreat out of the question, yet the Dalmatians, the Hungarians, and the Croatians did resist, outlasted the shell-covered death-zone, dug themselves out of the living graves into which they had been catapulted, and met the enemy with a lightning-fire that decimated the attacking lines. They held the position all that day and until the attack stopt at night. While an entire Italian army corps was trying to force the northern entrance to Gorizia, not less than three army corps were trying to get at it from the south, by a route which has as its pivot the plateau of Doberdo.

"The night of the 6th five strong divisions of Italians advanced against the Croatians, who were in inferior numbers, robbed of their shelters by the Italian artillery bombardment. Discharging their rifles and machine-guns until the muzzles threatened to burst, they met the onslaught, literally mowing down as with scythes whole columns. But the gaping holes continued to fill up, and the Italian flood swept on, crested the first hill, and threatened to engulf the exhausted defenders.

"Every available reserve was thrown into the breach, and by almost superhuman efforts it was possible to bring the enemy to a halt and then to throw him back. There the Italians took refuge behind bags of sand that had been brought along, and rested, awaiting another day and reinforcements. Dawn broke once more, and the bloody, dusty warriors rose wearily after a short, disturbed sleep among the stones, and resumed their work of slaughter like so many wild beasts. The ground was almost as blood-red as the sky. Thousands lost their lives during these two days."

The Italian trenches nearest the Austrians, high up in the Carnic Alps, had spread out before them a magnificent panorama. The mountain group comprised Avostanis, Pal Grande, Freikofel, and Pal Piccolo, where the frontier before the war was nothing but a formidable Austrian fortress. On the Italian side the declivity was in the nature of a gigantic bastion, while the Austrian side consisted of woods and meadows, through which ran roads constructed with military exactitude. Looking at the precipitous slopes of the Freikofel, which the Alpini scaled and captured

under fire of the enemy, it was obvious that the Italian troops possest almost superhuman endurance. There was something uncanny about what they accomplished. One of the officers said that on the morning of the day on which the Italians captured the heights, they had to lower their wounded from the summit to the base of the mountain with ropes. There was not even a path by which they could send them down to ambulances. Here blood-stained men, hanging by ropes above a terrible abyss, were exposed to the pitiless fire of the enemy in the clear light of morning. The old days of the Risorgimento had been revived in these combats.

Every day some history was here being made. The heights of Pal Grande, Pal Piccolo, and Freikofel were day by day abandoned successively by the Austrians, who fell back on prepared trenches facing those occupied by the Italians. One had to climb some summit of the Carnic Alps in order to understand a warfare which had no equivalent on any other part of the European battle-fronts. One illustrative example was that of two men, an officer and a corporal of artillery, who lived for four months in a cavern in the rocks at an elevation of more than 2,000 meters, where they communicated with their companions solely by means of a telephone wire extending from a mountain peak, having a heavy battery, to a point ten kilometers away. Once a week a patrol of Alpini climbed up to this haunt of the chamois to deliver to the two men their rations and letters. At other times the two were absolutely alone amid snows, the only other living creatures being hawks that flew about in the noonday sun.

Within a space of three months the Italians succeeded in destroying on these heights nearly all the strongly fortified modern works which it had taken the Austrians years to prepare. The defenses were nearly all provided with heavy guns, but it was impossible to direct the fire of the Italian batteries by use of aeroplanes, or other aircraft called "draken balions." It was extremely difficult to fire indirectly across mountains which were seldom less than a thousand meters in height. Little had been known previously of barometric and atmospheric conditions in these

narrow regions. The transport of heavy siege guns was extremely difficult in the face of the natural obstacles and notably so in the absence of roads. And yet all these difficulties were overcome. Among those Carnic heights siege-guns were transported from points in valleys to extraordinary heights along roads which in a few weeks' time had been constructed by Italian engineers in place of paths that had long been used by shepherds. Some of these new roads were so fine that they could be traveled over in a motor-car. There was in this work a kind of Roman grandeur in conception and execution that imprest one as a triumph of man over nature. These roads would remain as a memento of the war and fill future tourists with amazement. One saw how in the Italian much remained of the ancient Roman.

As one motored rapidly in the Friuli along the swiftly flowing upper Isonzo, one was profoundly imprest by the frowning, precipitous rocks which shut in the clear blue waters beneath. The whole valley, from Gorizia to Plezzo, had an indescribably terrible aspect, suggesting that the work of human hands had been superadded to a gigantic convulsion of natural forces. Between Tolmino and Caporetto, the scene of the Italian defeat in October, 1917, where Monte Nero shows up against the sky its sharp outline, the sense of awe was overpowering. On the left bank of the river there was nothing but an almost perpendicular mass of limestone, a thousand or more meters in height. Every peak, crevice, and moraine, formed, as it were, a natural bastion. Vegetation of all kinds seemed to have been torn or uprooted from sterile ground. Heights quite bare, the surface of various colors, white and yellow limestone, alternating with red marl, every peak at twilight shone with sparkling lights. From Santa Lucia to Zaga it looked as if majestic mountains were illuminated by a gigantic conflagration, while the granite banks of the Isonzo so swelled the echoes of cannon-fire as to cause the narrow valley actually to tremble. In this wild region Italians took the measurements of mountains, studied every rock and projection, and where no foothold existed, cut one out of solid stone. When this was done, they scaled heights. That in brief was the story of Monte Nero, on the moun-

tains that surround Tolmino, and of Plava, where great outposts were captured as a result of supreme efforts on the upper left bank.

The losses of the Austrians at these points rendered useless their defensive system on the Isonzo, which was one of the strongest in Europe. Never did a line of frontier appear so impregnable as that from the Predil to the foot of the Carso, where it ended in two natural entrenched camps, more powerful than any artificial fortifications, Plesso and

BOMBING POSITION OF ITALIANS ON THE ASIAGO FRONT

Gorizia. It was impossible to keep the Alpini out of any picture in this region. They were in evidence at every turn. Wherever one went in the high valleys, some new story was told of their feats. What could ordinary troops do against men who trod mountains like wild goats, and by the help of a rope did deeds that left goats staring after them!

While the Alpini held chief place in any picture of this mountain warfare, next to them came the guns—little mountain-guns that barked from topmost heights and 12-

inch howitzers that fired over at least three mountains before they dropt on an Austrian cupola. When shots were fired from a large caliber gun each found its mark. Some huge, clumsy-looking gun would be seen pointed skyward far above a great mass of rock to the east, and then would come the crashing departure of a shell and its visible flight through the sky to a point that lay beyond ridge after ridge, a telephone message from some one on a distant peak telling what had happened. Artillery stood behind the Alpini, but behind the artillery and all its works stood engineers, sappers and miners. Engineers had been the forerunners of the artillery, big guns being able to dominate the situation only because of the extraordinary way in which engineers built roads round and through mountains. In a few months they made solid roads where nothing but a mountain-path or a mule-track had been.

By late October along the 475 miles of the Italian front General Cadorna's forces had engaged many thousands of Austrians, of whom some 25,000 were reported to have fallen on the Isonzo and Carso fronts. In the latter sectors, after sixty hours of fierce bombardment, the total haul of prisoners exceeded 100 officers and 5,000 men, and the Italian left wing was advancing up an inclined plane of which every turn was a fortress. An official announcement that the Italian center had seized entrenched dunes in the neighborhood of Marcotini was evidence that the long-contested saddle of San Martin, which connects with San Michele, had finally passed into Italian hands. Satisfaction was felt that, after five months of effort, Mount Mzril, which dominated Tolmino from the northwest, had been conquered. Italian soldiers asserted with pride that they were now reaping the benefit of their systematic destruction of Austrian observation points on the mountain-peaks, mastered after fierce struggles lasting for months and lack of which, they said, greatly decreased the accuracy of the Austrian aim.

In the midst of these Italian successes came word that Austrian aeroplanes had made two separate attacks on Venice on October 24, when Italy suffered the first serious loss of art-treasures which she had experienced in the war.

One of the bombs fell upon the roof of a church and smashed a ceiling ornamented with frescoes by Tiepolo. Another missile fell on the piazzetta of St. Mark's and in front of the Palace of the Doges. Roman newspapers exprest great indignation at the bombardment of the famous Scalzi Church and the destruction of the Tiepolo frescoes. People were stirred to an extraordinary degree. The frescoed ceiling in the Scalzi was one of the best-known works of Tiepolo, the church itself a notable example of the rococo style. Tiepolo was the last great master of the Venetian school, a contemporary of Goldoni, the playwright, whose appearance in the world of letters, so long after the Renaissance had run its course, was almost as remarkable as that of Tiepolo in art.

In this war zone was a town of ancient memories, a remnant left over from old destruction in war. Indeed, there is now little left of Aquileia, which was a great city of the Roman Empire and became a sort of ecclesiastical principate in the Middle Ages. After the Roman town had been burned by Attila, the inhabitants fled to the coast and its islands, the port silted up and malaria did the rest. But a revival came in the eighth century, and for 600 years the patriarchs of Aquileia exercised temporal power over a great domain. Aquileia fought hard against the House of Hapsburg, but the Holy Roman Emperors gradually crusht out all resistance. Temporal power was finally lost in 1451. Some 300 years later the patriarchate was abolished and Aquileia reduced to a country parish. To-day the population is about 3,000, but in its great basilica of the eleventh century, and in the museum that enshrines many thousands of Roman relics, twenty centuries of history seem to be unfolded. The present basilica was built on the site of a church destroyed by Attila. Of that fourth century church, the wonderful mosaic pavement was recently discovered, marvelously preserved under débris that had lain upon it since the walls and roofs that sheltered it were burned. In the courtyard of the museum near by are many Roman tombstones, on one of which the fact is stated that the man buried there had been an officer in "The British Legion of Veterans."

The Italians were still fighting bravely all through late October and into November and especially on the Isonzo front, where a series of desperate attempts were made to storm the bridgehead of Gorizia, and establish a firm footing on the Doberdo plateau. This plateau, which acted as the citadel for the more extensive Carso position, rises from 350 to 650 feet above the level of the valley and dominates all the approaches to Gorizia. Monte San Michele, which is a ridge on the north side of the plateau, and rises in one place to 900 feet above sea-level, was the key to the whole position, and round it there took place some of the most sanguinary hand-to-hand fighting of the war, the Italians sometimes gaining the advantage, and at others the Austrians. Against that position Cadorna concentrated 1,500 guns, some of which were 14- and 15-inch howitzers. Italians outnumbered Austro-Hungarian troops, and there were no reserves to reinforce Boroevic, the Austrian commander. The defenses, especially on the Isonzo front, were enormously strong, and could only be captured after a heavy sacrifice of life and an unlimited expenditure of artillery ammunition.

For a month the Italian offensive on the Isonzo front had been pushed with great vigor, but altho it brought some appreciable success to the Italian arms their aim was not reached. Twenty-four divisions and two Alpine brigades were in action. Over 300,000 rifles and 1,500 guns had been directed against the defenders of the Isonzo. The first signs of an offensive had been clearly evident in the middle of October, when an artillery cannonade was feeling its way all along the front. The first heavy shells fell on October 15, and the first infantry hand-to-hand battle was fought on October 18. The first attack was delivered against the northern part of the front, where the Carso and the bridgehead of Tolmino were the objectives. At the same time the battle began to rage on the Doberdo as well. The real battle began on the 21st, when the first important infantry action was fought. On the 20th and 21st the Italian artillery worked with such vigor that the Austrians had to seek refuge in caves. The most strongly-fortified

ITALIAN TROOPS MANEUVERING ON SKIS

positions became quite unsafe. Guns of all calibers were used, and the bombardment lasted for fully fifty hours.

The battle reached its height on October 24 when the attacks against the Doberdo ceased, only to begin against the Monte San Michele and the San Martino. On October 26 it seemed for a moment that the struggle was coming to an end. But on October 28 the titanic conflict assumed a still more desperate character. This time the bridgehead of Tolmino bore the brunt of the attack for three days. In the first days of November the bridgehead of Gorizia was the goal of Italian endeavor, not only because its capture would be a visible symbol of Italian success, but because it formed a gap between the mountainous region and the sea, and on a front of almost twenty miles contained six excellent roads leading from Italy to Austria. The attacks delivered here were the most furious, and the losses inflicted the greatest.

The battle raged in three distinct periods—first, from October 18 to the 22d, which period was characterized by fierce assaults delivered on the whole of the front; second, from the 22d to the 26th, when the attacks were delivered only on the northern sector of the front; and third, from the 26th, in which attacks were made solely on the bridgehead of Gorizia and the neighboring heights. Yet there was one point where, from October 15 up to November 15, the battle did not cease for a moment, and that was the northern part of the Doberdo plateau. Boroevic afterward described this region[5] as "a hell of hells," where Italian artillery showered thousands of shells almost continually, and where more than thirty infantry attacks were delivered. Over three thousand bodies were counted before the positions of one regiment. "Altho the enemy's efforts did not succeed," he said, "and I hope they will not succeed in the future; neither can I refrain from saying that the bravery of the Italian troops is almost incredible, for, even if certain regiments lost all their officers, it did not deter the men from advancing with the greatest contempt for death."

General Boroevic was the anvil in the Carpathians upon

[5] In a Hungarian newspaper.

whom the Grand Duke's army, 1,000,000 strong, rained sledge-hammer blows during the terrible winter and spring months of 1914-15, when Austria-Hungary's fate at times seemed to hang in the balance until the Russian front was broken through by Mackensen at the great battle of the Dunajec and the wonderful rolling-up process—with Jaroslaw, Przemysl, Lemberg in it—followed. When Italy turned upon Austria in the following May Boroevic was sent to repeat, if possible, his Carpathian resistance upon the most critical and most endangered sector of the Italian front. For five months and with all the force of his superior Italian army, Cadorna had battered against Boroevic's lines on the Isonzo, smashing away with artillery which, in excellence, number and size of guns, was unequaled on any front. Boroevic was a Croatian, and looked to be about fifty, with a weather-tanned face, a little dark mustache, and small, sharp eyes, which were not unsympathetic in expression, altho they reflected intensity. Quick of decision, he was a bulldog for tenacity.

The fourth battle of the Isonzo, which began after a week's lull, following on terrific fighting that had lasted well over a month, was fought in the last week of November with even greater desperation than the three previous ones. Of the 2,500 houses in Gorizia every one had been struck and 1,500 badly damaged. Not a single church escaped. There was not a whole pane of glass left in the town. Everywhere you saw heaps of débris one story high. A 30.5-centimeter shell would fall before a coffee-house, and the street be turned into a yawning hole. Only a few hundred persons remained above ground in a city formerly of thirty thousand. There were no longer inhabitants above ground in Gorizia, for they had founded a new city underground where the inhabitants numbered three thousand. They did not live in houses, but in cellars and in catacombs like the early Christians, where a pathetic primitive communism bound them together. Not only citizens, but the whole of official Gorizia as well crawled underground. The entire city government retired into cellars, having a whole row of subterranean offices. Entering you almost fell over a writing-table and a straw seat, which was the Bureau of Finance. A pile of straw lay near by; that was where the

Finance Director slept. Immediately adjoining were the Police Headquarters with table, stool, wash-basin, robes, everything, in a space two yards square.

Gorizia—known to Austrians as Gorz—was the capital of the Austrian crown land of Gorizia-Gradisca. It had been on the map since 1307, when its town charter was granted, and had been mentioned in history from much earlier times. The war made Gorizia known to the whole world by the fierce struggle of the Italians to capture it, which lasted for four months in 1915 and was renewed in 1916. It was the burial-place of Attila, the ruthless Hun, whose body was laid away, according to tradition, in what is now the bed of the Isonzo River, in front of what is now Gorizia, about the middle of the fifth century. Austria had taken Gorizia from Italy more than five hundred years ago. Italy's modern claim to the town was justified not by this, but by the more substantial fact that of 30,000 inhabitants in peace times about 26,000 were Italians. The older part of the town clustered on and around the castle hill which rises to about five hundred feet. On the outskirts to the east is the Franciscan convent of Castagnavizza. In the church attached thereto are the tombs of Charles X of France, the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulème and of him that history knows as the Comte de Chambord. The Comte de Chambord under other circumstances would have been King Henry V of France. An inscription beside his sarcophagus declares:

"Here rests the high-born and very excellent Prince Henry, fifth of that name, by the Grace of God King of France and Navarre. Born in Paris September 29, 1820. Died at Frohsdorf, August 24, 1883."

The fighting on this front was declared by more than one writer to rank with the most sustained and fierce of the whole war. For weeks until winter set in the Italians were attacking Austrian bridgeheads and mountain positions and slowly but surely drawing their nets around Tolmino, Gorizia and Doberdo. Here, for the time being, was Italy's contribution to the war. It had kept a large force of Aus-

trians busy on the Isonzo when it was necessary for them also to supply reinforcements against the Montenegrins and Serbians.[6]

[6] Principal Sources: The *Morning Post* (London), The *Transcript* (Boston), "Nelson's History of the War" by John Buchan, *The Independent* (New York); The *Daily Chronicle*, The *Morning Post*, London; The *Sun*, The *World*, The *Times*, New York; The *Berliner Tageblatt*; The *Daily Mail*, The *Times*, London; "Bulletins" of the National Geographic Society (New York).

APPROXIMATE RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORMER AUSTRIAN EMPEROR'S SUBJECTS

III

AUSTRIANS REPULSED IN THE TRENTINO AND GORIZIA TAKEN—THE WAR IN THE DOLOMITES

May 14, 1916—December 31, 1916

AUSTRIA on May 14, 1916, began an offensive in the Trentino between the Adige and the Brenta. The fact that the Italians were overcome in the first rush and unable to resist, even when they retired on what were considered their lines of resistance, was attributed at the time to strong pressure from Austrian artillery, numerous powerful guns making repeated attacks; but it was openly admitted afterward that the Italians were swept away mainly because they had not dug themselves in. By early June, however, the losses they were able to inflict on the Austrians became notable. Austrian officers taken prisoners admitted that some of their regiments had been literally cut to pieces. It was estimated in Allied circles that within a few days the Austrians lost approximately 60,000 men in dead and wounded. Austria had accumulated a total of some 400,000 men in the Trentino with a striking force of fifteen picked divisions. She wished to forestall a great Isonzo attack which in March and April she had begun to fear. Her immediate purpose was to alarm Cadorna as to his communications, to upset whatever plans he had for his summer campaign. Here in essence was seen again the motive of the Verdun assault. Austria was playing the German game —to forestall in Italy by an immediate assault the expected Allied offensive on all fronts, which had become Germany's greatest peril. It was the summer of the great Somme battle.

In November, 1915, the Austrian troops on the entire Italian front had consisted of about twenty divisions, of which only three were massed in the Trentino, where barrier forts were considered sufficient to check an invasion. They

began to be reinforced toward the end of 1915, and by May 15, 1916, had been increased to thirty-eight divisions, eighteen new ones having been formed, in part from troops withdrawn from the Russian front, in part from new formations, in part from troops taken from Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania. It was estimated that sixteen divisions had been massed between the Adige and the Brenta. These were mostly Alpine troops, Kaiserjaegers, Landeschuetzen, and other men equipped for mountain warfare. It was difficult to estimate the number of guns, but the supply was formidable. On the plateau of Lavarone and Folgaria alone thirty 12-inch guns were in position.

After the subjugation of Serbia and Montenegro in the early winter of 1915-1916, the Austrian General Staff had decided to prepare for a spring campaign on the Italian front with a view to breaking through the Trentino and reaching the Venetian plain, and so to cut Italian communications on the Isonzo with Verona. The Archduke Karl-Franz-Joseph was entrusted with the nominal command, with General von Hötzendorf, Chief of the General Staff, in actual command. No German troops were employed. A month before the offensive began a dramatic episode in the war had occurred on the Trentino frontier. The Adamello range, with a vast glacier, seemed to offer an impassable barrier between the Austrians and Italians, but Colonel Giordana, believing in April that the Austrian lines might be seriously invaded, determined to attempt a seizure of Austrian positions on the far side of the glacier. This glacier is cut by three rock ridges that run roughly parallel to one another, north and south. Being almost on the edge of the glacier the ridges were lightly held by Austrian and Italian posts.

Early in April, the Austrians meanwhile having sent forward outposts to the central ridge, 300 Italian Alpini, clothed in their white winter uniform, left the Rifugio Garibaldi on skis, and by way of the Brizio Pass reached the glacier. Here, at 10,000 feet above the sea, they entered a region polar in severity and encountered a wild Arctic storm in which they lost their way. In a turmoil of wind and snow they kept moving all night to escape death.

which would have gript them had they stopt. The morning found them scattered over the glacier with all hope of a surprize gone, the Austrians having machine-guns on the central ridge. Dividing themselves into two columns, and in spite of weariness and heavy losses, they succeeded in storming the Austrian positions, the Austrians being nearly all killed or captured. A fortnight later the Italians completed their occupation of the eastern ridge and the Crozzon del Diavolo, which is the highest point of the ridge dividing the Fargorida and Lares glaciers. Accounts of this undertaking emphasized the support given by Italian artillery, which had been hoisted into impossible places. A battery of six-inch guns had been adroitly brought up to the western edge of the Adamello glacier. Words could not make clear the skill, toil, and hardship involved in the conduct of these operations. They were rightly called epic.

Adamello was crowned by Virgil as "King of the Italian Alps." It now acquired the further distinction of being the most elevated spot in the world where war had been actively waged. It is 11,500 feet high and covered with eternal snow. In this fighting white-clad Alpine soldiers, alert and eager, crossed glaciers, challenged avalanches and charged with fixt bayonets, all above the clouds. Heavy artillery was fired from the highest point in the world where artillery had ever before been placed. It seemed almost a miracle that such big guns had been transported in two months of hard labor from a point fifteen miles below. More than two hundred men were required in dragging up one of these pieces. At one stage of the work an avalanche swooped down from the mountain sides and swallowed up the cannon and forty men. Mountain climbers had never before attempted to reach the top of Adamello except in summer. The view from its summit, with Mont Blanc, the Jungfrau, the Matterhorn, and Monte Rosa, all in view, is considered the best in Europe. There Austrians and Italians met in silent death grip, their deaths and their deeds all but unrecorded save in dry army annals, or a brief line in the terse bulletins of Cadorna.

While Austrian and Italian cannon rumbled lazily, exchanging rude courtesies, or seeking to dislodge avalanches

in order the better to destroy and hamper the enemy, awakening echoes that leapt from dozens of miles up and down abrupt peaks, an Italian colonel was heard to say that in no other war had such fighting ever occurred. Neither Hannibal, nor Cæsar, nor Napoleon had ever dared to engage in work that resembled it; their armies had gone over mountains not half so high and were hardly larger than a regiment of Alpine troops as to-day organized.

AN AUSTRIAN SHELTER IN THE ALPS

Above all, their armies did not winter in the mountains, nor did they deal with heavy artillery, or drag up to such fastnesses, pound by pound, plank by plank, piece by piece, their food, their supplies, their guns and their ammunition.

One of the curious facts connected with this mountain front was that nowhere had the song birds deserted it. Said this officer: "If I were to write home that every night I had to go to sleep listening to the boom of cannon I would have been readily believed, but if I added that

often I lay awake for hours listening to the liquid trill of friendly nightingales in the nearby woods, my statement would have been taken for a soldier's yarn. That song was not an exception. I have crossed this valley at night for weeks on my way to my quarters, and that bird was always singing no matter how violent the artillery noise." In those upper mountain districts skylarks also "held to their usual haunts with the same tenacity as nightingales in the lower country, flying high in the air until they went out of sight above snowy peaks, apparently undisturbed by the whizzing of shells that went through the air hundreds of feet above the soldiers."

The Austrian attack was delivered on a front of about fifty miles, extending along the western edge of the Tyrol from the valley of the Brenta, or Sugana, southwestward across the plateau of Lavarone and the Astiaco to Monte Maggio, and thence west across Austrian territory south of Rovereto to the Adige and Lake Garda. The hottest fighting took place along the eastern half of this line from Mandriolo, ten miles east of the Astiaco, to Maggio, about the same distance west. That the Italian repulse did not amount to a disaster was indicated by the fact that the Austrian report of May 18, as issued five days later, still spoke of one end of the Austrian line as resting on that point. The Austrian forward advance had apparently averaged a couple of miles, and so it was altogether premature to speak of Hapsburg armies as descending from the Alps and cutting the railroads which fed the Italian armies on the Isonzo front. But Austria had come to the rescue of Germany with an offensive against Italy.

The offensive was carried out in two separate localities. On May 14 a strong Austrian force stormed opposing positions to the west of San Martino, an important Italian post in the Dolomite Alps, twenty-five miles northeast of Trent. No sooner was this offensive well under way than the Austrians, on May 15, launched a still more formidable movement south of Trent, along the east bank of the Adige, and down the valley of the Astiaco, ten miles further east. It was only twenty miles down the Adige to Verona and forty miles down the Astiaco to Venice. The Austrian ad-

vance between the two streams therefore carried a threat against the rear of the whole Italian field army, operating against Trieste. The Austrian blow assumed dangerous proportions from the very start. This outburst was more remarkable in that it constituted the first true Austrian offensive against the Italians. During the Polish campaign, up to September, and during the Balkan campaign and the Galician in the summer and autumn of 1915, the Austrian forces had been mainly busy elsewhere, and a minimum of defenders only could be sent to oppose Italy.

That Austrian troops should be withdrawn from the Russian front within a fortnight of the time when the season's advance would expose that front to renewed pressure, was a sign that the Teutons felt it necessary to take great chances. That troops should have been withdrawn from the conquered Serbian districts, endangering Mackensen's hard-won territories there, was equally a sign of desperation. Yet Austrian troops had been found somewhere and brought down into the Trentino to the number of one hundred thousand. The Italian chiefs faced the possibility of a capture of Verona, a great natural fortress commanding at once Venetia to the northeast and the valley of the Po to the west. The extent of the danger depended on the hitting power which the Austrian attack could develop. The loss of Verona to the Italians would have meant ruin. Once in Austrian hands Verona would have meant the forced retreat of the Italian army before Gorizia and Trieste. It would have had to withdraw from Venetia, both to avoid being surrounded and in order to defend the Po valley. But it was still a long way to Verona, for an attack with insufficient numbers. The Austrian offensive continued from about May 15 until the first week of June, when the Russians under Brusiloff were advancing with so much splendid but unfulfilled promise toward the Bukowina.

From the Tonale Pass region in the western Trentino to Monfalcone, a short distance from the head of the Gulf of Trieste, the Austrians were now vigorously on the offensive. In the Tyrol, and the south of Trent, heavy infantry-attacks east of the Adige forced the Italians to abandon some of their advanced positions and resulted in the capture by the

Austrians of an aggregate of 141 officers and 6,200 men. In addition thirteen guns and seventeen machine-guns were captured. South of Rovereto the Austrians stormed Zegnatorta, but five of their attacks were checked with heavy casualties, the bodies of numerous dead Austrians floating away in the swift current of the Adige. The repulse of another Austrian attack was made in the Sugana valley.

Along the remainder of the front were heavy artillery bombardments, with here and there infantry-attacks. Bombing operations by aviators of both sides took place against opposing positions. By May 19 the Italians in the southern Tyrol were tenaciously holding back the Austrians from further inroads. In the Ledro valley, southwest of Trent, and in the Lagarina valley, to the south of the city, the Austrians, after heavy artillery preparations, threw vicious attacks against the Italian lines, but all were repulsed. Five attacks were made on Zegnatorta, but all were stopt. In the Adamello zone, to the west of Trent, where previous gains had been made by the Italians, the Italians occupied additional territory in the Sarca River region, while in the Monfalcone region, near the head of the Gulf of Trieste, they recaptured trenches that had been taken from them by the Austrians.

Despite the most stubborn resistance the armies of the Austrian Crown Prince still pushed forward against Vicenza, the Italian Verdun, and Austrian artillery began a bombardment of the snow-capped peak of Monte Pasubio, twenty-one miles northwest of Vicenza. That position had been strongly fortified by the Italians. It barred the northern entrance into valleys leading directly into the northern Italian plain, less than ten miles distant. The whole Tyrol front now became the scene of desperate fighting. South of Rovereto the Italians made a stand near Serravalle. Italian guns on the ridge of Monte Baldo sent shells screaming across the intervening gorges against attacking forces. East and southeast of Rovereto, the Austrians entered upon Italian soil at three different places. Rome reported furious fighting in this region with hand-to-hand struggles, first on the Italian and then on the Austrian side of the border, but sent out expressions of confidence in the outcome of

the battle. Italian military critics believed the Austrians had driven southward solely to divert the Italians from a great offensive on the Isonzo line, and that the attacking forces would soon abandon their offensive because of heavy losses.

By the end of May there were distinct signs that the first chapter of the Austrian offensive had come to an end and that in consequence of difficulties and hardships the General Staff had decided to give its men a rest. There was no inclination, however, to attribute the Austrian success to anything but artillery. All military critics agreed that only with artillery could the Austrians have achieved their successes. On a fifty-kilometer front the number of guns employed was much greater than in any other of the operations undertaken by the Austro-Hungarian army. On this particular sector there were perhaps 4,000 guns of all kinds in action, at certain stages of the operation—at least that was the belief in Budapest. When the Austro-Hungarian troops had occupied the Cornolo fort and on the Asiago sector had taken the fortifications which barred the road to the Val D'Assa, they bel eved they had achieved their object, which was to frustrate an Italian offensive on the Isonzo. In the Sugana valley the Italians yielded a territory extending to 16 kilometers, retired from the Lafraun plateau for 18 kilometers, and from the Vilgereuth plateau 22 kilometers.

On the morning of May 21 the Italian position had become critical. Cadorna had in fact to contemplate the possibility of the Austrians reaching the Venetian plain. Meeting the crisis squarely he gave orders to draw up plans for a new army, to be concentrated in the Vicenza district. By midday on May 22 these plans were finished, and by June 2 the new army was in place. Meanwhile things had been going badly on the Italian right, in the highlands of the Sette Communi, where the Austrians were pressing hard upon their positions east of the Val d'Assa, and on the following day succeeded in advancing to the north of the valley, breaking the Portule line and occupying the height of Corno di Campo Verde (6,815 feet). The fighting on May 26 was very stiff, and both sides lost heavily. The Italians were still completely outgunned.

On May 24, after a very heavy bombardment, the Austrians had attacked all along the line from Coni to Pasubio. They came forward in the early morning in masses against both sides of Coni Zugna, against the pass that divides Coni Zugna from the Mezzana (called the Passo di Buole) and against Pasubio, but were repulsed. Before midday they renewed the attack against Passo di Buole, but were flung back again, and the Italians, counter-attacking, occupied a position southeast of the pass, on the northern slope of Cima di Mezzana. Artillery thundered all day. On the following morning the enemy, in compact masses, came again to the assault, and a brigade which was sent against the Passo di Buole was almost exterminated. For six days fighting continued, practically without ceasing. The Austrians showed the utmost bravery, but nothing could shake the resistance of the Thirty-seventh Division, who occupied the Zugna ridge. It was old-fashioned fighting, except for the guns. Trenches were makeshift affairs where they existed at all. When the Austrians approached the Italians leapt at them with bayonets. On May 30 the Austrians made their last attack on the Passo di Buole. Again and again they came up the slopes, but the Italians, who held the pass, never moved, except when they dashed forward to finish their work with bayonets. On this day alone it was said that 7,000 Austrians were killed. During the six days' fighting they lost perhaps 40 per cent. of their infantry effectives in this sector.

The Setti Communi position is an elevated plateau extending from the southern banks of the Posina to the Brenta. It is a position of considerable natural strength. Frequent attempts were made during the first half of June to break through and gain possession of the road to Schio, which runs down the Astiaco valley, and of the road to Vastagna down the Frenzela valley. Violent battles took place on June 7 and 8 east of Asiago, and on the 10th a whole Austrian division, eighteen to twenty battalions strong, was hurled against the Italian positions covering the railway to Schio. These attacks were repulsed, but without any appreciable gain of ground. The defeat of June 10 brought the Austrian offensive to a close. After that date the

Italians recovered the initiative. It was down the valley of the Brenta River where the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph had thus sought to press back the Italians that Napoleon made his amazing descent upon the Austrians in 1796.

Pasubio, the natural guardian of the Valle Ogra, had offered the most tempting access for the Austrians to the Venetian plain. It rears a snowy head 7,335 feet high. Before the war its enormous ridge was partly in possession of Austria and partly in that of Italy. When the Italians completed its occupation during the early days of the war it was found that the Austrians had bored a gallery through the summit from their own side and prepared bases for heavy guns that were to bombard Schio. Only a slender rock curtain remained to be destroyed before guns placed on Pasubio could have dominated the whole valley. This possibility the Italians nipt in the bud and so prevented the invasion of the Valle Ogra—at least for as long as Pasubio remained Italian. The struggle for the great bulwark was violent and bloody, but the gallantry of its defenders precluded an Austrian victory. For twenty-five days the Austrians outnumbered the Italians on this ridge. The heaviest guns were trained on it, but the Italians did not cede a foot. They slept in snow and fought in snow. At one time they had 200 cases of frostbite.

The resistance at the Passo di Buole saved Pasubio, and on the fate of Pasubio depended the fate of the Italian line south of the Posina. All the weight they could bring to bear was flung by the Austrians against this bulwark. For weeks heavy guns thundered against the Italian positions. Wave after wave of massed infantry was dashed to pieces. For three weeks the Austrians outnumbered the Italians in this sector, their artillery greatly superior, but neither massed men nor massed guns could break through. The conditions were terrible for both sides, and in May and June snow still lay deep on the high ridges. Particularly heavy fighting took place beneath Sogli di Campiglia and Pria Fora (5,415 feet). It was practically the last line of defense in the mountains. Monte Brazome (4.028 feet) formed the very last bulwark; beneath lay Schio and the Venetian plain.

It had been Cadorna's aim to draw and hold the Austrians well inside the salient that their great drive had made. By the night of May 22 the whole of the Venetian plain had been alive with troops and their transport, and in ten days more than half a million men, with guns, ammunition, and provisions, countless motor-camions and endless trains of mule-transport had been made ready in the plain to meet the Austrians. It was a great feat of organization and energy and by June 2 Cadorna knew the Austrians would never reach the plain. In addition to forming his fifth army, he had been able to draw on other reserves to reinforce his lengthening line in the uplands, and fill the gaps. For days a wonderful motor-transport was moving men and machine-guns and ammunition up to the mountains, while behind them, more slowly, came artillery, and still more artillery. The most spectacular fact was the transference of an entire division by motor in a single night, from the Carnic Alps in the east to the Pasubio district.

For fifteen days fighting in the Posina sector was heavy and continuous. Every morning the Austrian guns opened fire at 6.30, and the bombardment never ceased as long as daylight lasted. On June 2, 3, and 4, the Austrians delivered massed infantry-attacks on various parts of the front, from Colle di Zomo to Schiri in the Astiaco valley, but were unsuccessful. Next morning, under cover of the usual bombardments all along the line, they made one more attempt on Monte Ciove. After a furious preliminary shelling they lifted their fire to the rear of the Italian positions and launched a powerful infantry-attack. Nearly all the Italian officers were put out of action, so that it became almost impossible to get supporting troops through the curtain of fire. When the general could not see how the defense was going, a colonel from his staff climbed to a point of vantage and from there called through a megaphone to his waiting chief during a lull in the storm of fire: "They are holding marvelously." Nor did they cease to hold. At 3 o'clock the Austrians fell back.

The position of the Austrians had become critical. They now realized the weight of the Italian counter-offensive,

and staked everything on an attempt to drive a wedge between the Lemerle-Magnaboschi line and positions east of the Val Canaglia. On a narrow front, well under two miles, they sent in an attacking force of over twenty battalions. On June 15 their command issued an order that Lemerle would fall in two days, and that afterward only three mountains lay between them and Milan. But in the four days' fighting they did not gain anything. An attack on June 18 was their last effort. All along the line from



AN AUSTRIAN FIELD BAKERY

the Adige to the Brenta the Italians tested the ground for an advance, now that the Austrian offensive was over. Three out of four reserve divisions, originally concentrated on the Trentino, had either been brought into the front line, or sent in haste to Galicia. The smashing blows dealt by the Russians on the Eastern Front had shown that the Austrian Trentino attack was based on a great miscalculation. Instead of being able to bring more troops against Italy the Austrian command had now to study the problem of re-

moving a part of those that were already there. For a week they opposed a firm resistance to the Italian pressure, but their position was becoming untenable. Alpini were recapturing high peaks on the right, and on the left Col Santo was being seriously threatened.

The Austrian retreat was conducted with great skill. Most guns were got away. Cadorna's counter-offensive had only partial results, for the Austrians had realized its force in time. Despite all their efforts the Austrians were not able to detach more than three divisions, or possibly four, to the help of their armies in Galicia. They had inflicted heavy losses on the Italians, both in men and guns, and had made a rapid and brilliant advance on Italian soil, but they had not possest the necessary staying-power, and so their effort died out. They lost perhaps 150,000 men in two months' fighting. Altho they were better placed strategetically than before their offensive began, the price they had paid was far too high for what they had gained. It might perhaps have been worth paying if it could have paralyzed the Italian preparations for a big movement on the Isonzo. Critics thought this was its real purpose. But while the echoes of heavy guns in the Trentino were still resounding, Cadorna's was able to smash through the iron fortresses of Sabotino, Podgora, and San Michele, occupy the western segment of the Carso, and to drive the Austrians from Gorizia.

All over the world the Italian army won great fame by this resistance in the Trentino. Yet a greater title to renown was that Cadorna could have held back the invaders with his left arm while keeping his right ready for a blow elsewhere. What Cadorna did before Caporetto would never be forgotten by the Italians, and should not be by others in the Entente world. By June 29 the Austrian troops had begun a general retreat on the Trentino front. The Italian gains were the most important made by Cadorna's armies in a single attack since the first few weeks following the outbreak of the war. The retreat was most pronounced in the Val Sugana, where Cadorna's advance threatened an envelopment. In the region southeast of Trent, where the Austrians fell back, the Italians recaptured numerous important points.

The towns of Posina and Arseiero again fell into their hands, while between the Adige and Brenta rivers peaks and mountain positions were retaken.

In bringing forward men and materials, thousands of Italian laborers had worked night and day, widening old roads and cutting new ones, smoothing paths and constructing transport cables. Whole brigades of infantry were carried up from the plain in motor-wagons during the first week. About 100,000 men were fighting on the Asiago tablehead. Where a month ago a sparse population depended on wells for its water, hundreds of motor-cars carried up water ceaselessly for troops and served the plateau with men, guns, and supplies. Motoring down the fort-crowned mountain along a commodious road which before the offensive was a bridlepath, a correspondent met soldiers trailing heavy guns, motor-lorries with troops, mules and pack-horses, Milanese, Sicilian, and Neapolitan carts in one never-ending convoy.

In a single night an entire division had been transported to the Carnic Alps and to the Pasubio region in automobiles, 360 motor-lorries being allotted to each brigade. Along improvised tracks whole batteries of cannon were rushed to the Trentino Alps in this fashion. In ten days five double-line overhead electric railways were erected for the transport of thousands of laborers, who toiled incessantly at the construction of new roads. To solve the burning problem of an adequate water supply for the combatants, a new artificial lake was created by damming the outlets of a stream. Four hundred-odd cistern motor-lorries also provided for the transport of water. Throughout the fiercest phases of the battle from June 16 to June 27 Cadorna hurried hither and thither to the scene of the struggle and often was under fire while personally supervising operations. Austria in this offensive had made one of the worst blunders of the war. She had in one month's fighting gained about 15 kilometers of ground—as much as the Russians wrested from her in a single day—or, to state the balance differently, she had gained in Italy about one kilometer for every 10,000 prisoners she lost to Brusiloff's armies.

It was now possible to measure the true scope of the

Austrian offensive. In theory, with such a preponderance of men and munitions, the scheme of invading the Venetian plain should have succeeded, for the Italian operations were directed mainly to the Isonzo front. But Cadorna, who in this ordeal proved his title to be a real captain of men, knew how to adapt his own forces to the new situation. His swift transport of whole divisions, with all their trains, the employment of thousands of motors, the selection of new positions in the rear of those menaced, the organization of an unshakable resistance on his wings—all these conditions of a successful stand were provided for with sureness of judgment. Cadorna's problem was first to hold the Austrian onrush toward the plateau. If and when that task became impossible, he had to make sure of holding it and beating it in the plains. It was a situation demanding in a commander just those qualities which Joffre displayed in the first months of the war. When the full story of this Trentino campaign is written, it will probably be better realized that the things accomplished by Cadorna place his work among the brilliant achievements of the war.

On June 8 the Imperial Appeal Court at Leipzig rendered a verdict in which it was stated that Germany was now actually, altho not formally, at war with Italy. The case in which the verdict was rendered arose over a dispute about a clause in a contract for a supply of Italian produce. The court decided that "formally a condition of war does not exist between Germany and Italy, but, nevertheless, in view of the Austro-German alliance, it must be considered that Germany shares in the Austro-Italian war because she is bound to send troops to replace on other sectors the Austrian troops sent against Italy." This decision made clear a situation which for a year had been a source of wide speculation and wonder.

The first week in August saw an Italian offensive begin with smashing blows on the Isonzo front, the line of advance aiming ultimately at Trieste. But to advance on Trieste the Italians had first to take Gorizia, as defended by a formidable plateau and high hills, an enterprise in which they formerly, and for many months, had failed. They now seized the Gorizia bridgehead and two commanding

hills, and in two days took 10,000 prisoners. On August 9 their flag was flying over Gorizia's citadel and the Austrians were in full retreat. Two months before this event Russia had struck at Austria, and the following weeks had been filled with reports of great Russian successes. Barely a month elapsed before the attack by the Allies on the Somme marked the passing of the offensive in the West to the British and French. Not until long after the war was over could men expect to learn who had been the master-strategist that designed this campaign of 1916 on all fronts.



A SUBURB OF GORIZIA

There was every reason to believe that the supreme directing head was Joffre. Whoever he might be, the Allies were now acting as one. Their first aim appeared to be the destruction of Austria. Haig had said the decision of the war "would come in the West," but it seemed that the directing mind of the Entente had determined to crush Austria first.

Brusiloff's campaign was not simply a brilliant Russian dash or a sledge-hammer blow. It was true that he dashed and hammered, but he did so alternately, at different points, wherever he could inflict the most damage on Austria. He

threatened Lemberg from two points, and then descended toward it from a third. So Italy first pushed ahead in the Trentino, and then suddenly delivered her most destructive blow on the Isonzo. With each of these attacks Austria lost more and more of her resisting power. She had not men enough to save any one point from slugging blows delivered here to-day and there to-morrow, and Germany apparently could not reinforce her further. Germany must have seen that the plan of the Entente chief was the destruction of Austria, but she did not attempt to foil that plan, as she would have done in the early part of the war, because now she had to hold on desperately to her own western lines. Austria was therefore left to save herself, and this she could not do. If only she could be eliminated, the decision then would clearly come in the West. Germany had to hold on to the west, however, whatever the cost to Austria, and so Gorizia fell one day and Lemberg was expected to fall another. Russia and Italy thus brought the Allies somewhat nearer their final triumph two years later.

When Italy entered the war she had more troops available than Austria could spare from the western frontier, but she could not use her superiority until she had first broken into Austria through the narrow Gorizia gateway. Once through this gateway she would have more room in which to deploy her masses and Austria could not meet her with equal numbers. It had therefore been the sole purpose of Austrian strategy to hold Gorizia and so to keep Italy in a position where she could not use her greater numbers. Once Italy got through the Gorizia gateway, she would be in the rear of the great port of Trieste, which apparently could be cut off from the rest of Austria, invested and captured by siege. Contrary to popular belief, the Isonzo River, along which in 1915 the Italians had made their first attack on Austria, is not a national boundary. It lies wholly within Austrian territory, from two to twelve miles east of the border. Its source in the north is near the juncture of the Carnic and Julian Alps, on Mt. Terglou, the loftiest peak of the latter range. After following a tortuous channel for seventy miles, it empties into the Gulf of Trieste. So turbulent are its waters that it is practically

unnavigable, except in its estuary, where for a few miles its course runs through a wide delta, having another name, its mouth less than twenty miles from Trieste.

Against Gorizia the Italians had made substantial progress by August 7. Concentrating their forces in the Monfalcone district and in the southern section of the Doberdo plateau, they carried lines of Austrian intrenchments, seized prac-

THE CARSO PLATEAU AND THE GULF OF TRIESTE

On the Carso occurred a long struggle for opening the road to Trieste. Roughly the Carso includes the territory between Doberdo and Comen, and between Duino and the mountains south of Gorizia

tically the whole of the dominating position of Hill 85 and took 3,600 prisoners. This territory had all been under bombardment since July 14. It was now subjected to a ceaseless hail of shells of every caliber for nine hours. No such awe-inspiring cascade of fire had ever before been witnessed on the Italian front. Houses in the Gorizia plain, when not hit, were often shattered or made to collapse by

the mere force of seismic waves. Mouths of caverns on the Carso, into which thousands of Austrian troops had hurried crouching for refuge, were dammed and choked by tons of débris and so converted into living tombs.

When the order was given for the Italian infantry to quit the trenches where they had passed many months pent-up, they bounded forth in a way that recalled legendary heroes. Thousands in the front ranks wore round their helmets floral garlands, specially woven and forwarded to them for what was regarded as an historic occasion by women of Thiebe and Schio, of Vorastica and Vicenza. To the stirring cry of "Great Italy forever!" they bounded at the bridgehead of Gorizia and lower down scaled the lines of the Carso plateau, everywhere engaging in a hand-to-hand struggle with the foe. Ahead of the main masses went men bearing aloft big white disks, mounted on slender gray-green poles as guides to gunners in lengthening their range as the great advance proceeded.

When on August 8 Cadorna's troops captured the Gorizia bridgehead and more than 10,000 Austrians, London welcomed the event as one of the most significant and encouraging of the war. Not only did it give evidence of the regularity and solidarity of the Allies' scheduled advance, but it shattered all remaining hope for the Austrian offensive on the Trentino front. It was fresh proof that the initiative had been wrested definitely from the Teutons. The Italian successes also created a serious menace to Trieste. Gorizia, lying between mountains on the north and the Carso plateau on the south, had blocked the road to Trieste. The Italians a year before had won a hold on the Carso plateau, but they could not advance on Trieste because such a move would have laid their flank and rear open to attack by Austrians at Gorizia. The latter's surrender now made possible both an advance on Trieste and a new offensive eastward along the Carso plateau into Austria proper. Descriptions of the capture of Gorizia which came from Rome showed that the final attack on the bridgehead after long bombardment was furious.

The struggle for possession of San Michele and Sabotino, the two giant sentinels which guarded Gorizia, was attended

by unusual severity. San Michele was taken and lost by the Italians many times. For seven months they had held half of its summit but could take no more. Final possession was gained only after the capture of Sabotino, from which the Austrians commanded the crest. In the last effort Italian infantry was able to silence guns on both these positions, with the aid of twenty-four dirigible balloons, each of which carried four tons of explosives. By day and night these balloons were operated in the most daring manner. They were attacked frequently by Austrian aeroplanes, which were driven off either by Italian aeroplanes or by guns mounted on the dirigibles. The Italians also used dirigibles to harass the Austrians who were defending Gorizia, in which they did effective work.

Italian freedom from Austria and a reunited country originally came through aid rendered by other nations, by France first and then by Prussia; but now Italy had won by her own efforts. Hence, in Italian history the day that saw the fall of Gorizia became a landmark that stood for the completion of the great work of restoring Italy that had been first undertaken a century before, that, in fact, was begun on the morning after the Congress of Vienna turned Italy over to her ancient masters. By winning this victory Italy also made a notable contribution to the Allied cause. She took prisoners, captured guns, and inflicted casualties upon Austria at a moment when she was suffering terrible reverses in another field. The Italian victory cut another fragment from the war map of Bethmann-Hollweg

GORIZIA WITH THE ISONZO IN THE DISTANCE

and added a new and heavy burden to all the other burdens the Hapsburg monarchy was carrying. It was not a Waterloo; it was not a Leipzig; but it might prove to be another Eylau which was the first authentic sign of the crumbling of the Napoleonic prestige.

Altho the Italians had been fighting continually for fifteen months their successes before had been local rather than general. At the beginning of August they seemed no nearer the goal of their ambition than when they first took to arms, but now they felt they had in Gorizia something real to show for the sacrifices they had made. They had beaten the Austrians on their own ground, and were on the road to Trieste. Deprest as they had been by a temporary setback in the Trentino, their spirits had recovered their normal buoyancy. From the outset of the declaration of war Cadorna had been playing a waiting game, watching for every opportunity, taking every chance offered, but refusing to incur risks, or waste the lives of his men when by husbanding their strength he knew the future would swing to his side. Altho the principal obstacle was cleared, there promised to be severe fighting before Trieste could be taken. The Austrians had several strong positions to fall back upon. But when Trieste fell, the way to Pola, the great Austrian naval base and arsenal, would be open, and, with Pola menaced from the land, the Austrian fleet would have either to surrender or seek battle.

The occupation of Gorizia was followed by advances from Cadorna's forces in two directions—northward against Tolmino, to secure and consolidate the Italian position and prevent an Austrian attack from the north while the Italian campaign against Trieste was pushed; south and eastward on the great Carso plateau, which lies for twenty miles between Gorizia to the north and Trieste to the south, with valleys at east and west through which rivers and railways pass. The Italians already had a foothold on this plateau before Gorizia was taken, and in the week of August 9 to 16 made valuable gains. It was not assumed, however, that the capture of Trieste would be an easy task.

Military events of such great magnitude had easily diverted attention from operations going on at the same

time in the heart of the Dolomites. In that fairyland of pines and peaks, so well known to all travelers, the Italians had advanced their lines eight miles in a few weeks. In the first days of the war Italian soldiers were carried over the frontier for some fifteen miles up the Val Cortella and Val Cismone along the Dolomite road, and then followed a pause lasting for over a year during which the Austrians dug in on the Fassa Alps, where superiority of guns and of numbers had kept them at bay so long that no fears seemed to be entertained of a possible turning of the tables. But early in July the Italians prepared for an advance.

The upper Val Cismone is completely barred by the Cavallazza, an enormous natural fortress at an elevation of 7,800 feet. To the northeast is the Rolle Pass, through which winds the Dolomite road. To the west is the deep and narrow pass of Colbricon. These are gateways to an otherwise inaccessible rock castle. Cimone gave the Austrians an observatory over the Venetian plain; Cavallazza commanded the Val Cismone with its important military road. The Italian preparations were carried on entirely at night when heavy guns were hauled up rocky walls bordering Val Cismone. During the night of July 19 attacking columns, profiting by a violent thunderstorm, crossed the Bosco unobserved. On the 20th, when a thick fog prevented action, artillery troops rested an entire day in the wood, their presence unsuspected. On the morning of the 21st, under a serene sky, heavy guns opened fire on the great bastions of Cavallazza, and for three hours the Austrian trenches and caverns were subjected to the battering of heavy projectiles from batteries whose existence the Austrians had not suspected.

The Italians soon began climbing steep slopes while a strong column which moved up the Dolomite road occupied the Rolle Pass and cut off the enemy's retreat. When the Austrians left their dugouts to meet the attack, they found their front trenches already occupied by the Italians. So great had been the sense of security of the Austrians that an Italian soldier, on finding himself alone in front of a dugout containing sixty Austrians, was able to make them surrender and to hold them with his rifle till assistance

came. Mess for Austrian officers was being prepared in another dugout when a platoon of Italians forced the door and finished the meal served for them. The occupation of the Colbricon Pass was followed by the occupation of the Cima di Colbricon, the eastermost peak of the Fassa Ridge, 8,700 feet high. Five hundred prisoners, as well as guns of various kinds and a quantity of stores were taken.

The day following the Cima Stradone was stormed and occupied, and by the 28th the Italian line had been pushed west to Val Ceremana, after several days of ceaseless fighting and a further capture of men and guns. During succeeding weeks the Austrians made many efforts to win back lost positions, but the Italians held their own, and in fifteen days transferred an entire column with its service and guns twenty-two miles over a difficult mountainous country. This operation gave the Italians dominion over the upper Val Travignolo, and freed the whole of the Val Cismone. Along with the military advantages won, pleasure for many tourists was found in the fact that the wonderful Val Cismone, Italy's by right of race and culture, had become hers by right of conquest.

On August 12 the historic Venetian church of Santa Maria Formosa was destroyed during an Austrian air-raid. This church which had been visited by most tourists was one of the oldest in Venice, dating as it did from the beginning of the ninth century. Many of its most precious art-treasures had been removed from the city a year before in anticipation of an attack when war began, and safely stored in an inland depository. But there were beautiful mosaics in the dome, from designs by Palma Vecchio, which were destroyed in the air raid. In the careful measures taken to protect buildings in Venice, every arch, of which there are about a hundred in the Doge's Palace, had been walled up. Sand, put in sacks, had been used to protect roofs and walls throughout the city. Some 25,000 sacks were used for St. Mark's alone. Santa Maria Formosa was first built in 842, restored in 1350, and remodeled in 1699. One of the altars was considered the masterpiece of Palma Vecchio.

By September 12 a new offensive was started on the Isonzo, with Trieste as the objective. The drive had then been going on for some days from Gorizia to the Adriatic, but was still in its first stages, the Austrians still intrenching and blocking the way to Trieste. One hundred new 305-millimeter guns were being employed by the Italians, the aim of which was deadly, due to an invention for long-distance range-finding, by which observation was made possible despite rain. In the Monfalcone sector, where

ITALIAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION

the invaders were striving to advance along the railway, the drive was making progress. The Austrians had begun counter-attacks in an effort to check the entire offensive before it could win important points on the strategic railways. Heights east of Gorizia were proving a greater obstacle, but some progress was being made in the south, along the coast. The Italians broke into the Austrian third line in the region of Monfalcone after three days of fighting.

On the whole front from Gorizia south the drive on Trieste was proceeding. Austrian positions from Oppacchiasella southward through Pietra Rossa were carried and the Austrians driven back to trench positions. The advanced Italian lines were now less than thirteen miles from Trieste. Heavy rainstorms had interfered with the progress of the offensive, preventing aerial observations and thus impeding the artillery attack. Cadorna's men, however, had driven the Austrians down the eastern slopes of dominant positions and thus held up the advance along the Vallone. By September 19 a great battle was raging on the Carso. In intensity it was said to resemble the battles of Verdun and the Somme. Between September 13 and 16 the Austrians had lost something like two-thirds of their front line in killed, wounded, or disabled. The bloodiest encounters thus far witnessed in those sectors marked the second and third days' attacks, when Austrian reserves sent by General Boroevic and concentrated on the Carso plateau and in the Vippacco plain, entered into action. The whole country between Tercena and Nova was marked with the bodies of the slain. Slavic villages, which had served as veritable hives for Austrian reserves, were reduced to mounds of pulverized ruins, "sprouting all over with arms, legs and heads of the overwhelmed defenders." Entire battalions were annihilated. The battle one day extended up the Isonzo valley as far as Plezzo.

The September operations had left the trench-line on the Carso full of twists and zigzags, which were straightened out by the attack of October 10. By the end of the day the Italian line ran almost in a straight line from Hill 144 to the western slopes of Veliki Hribach, with a slight curve forward east of Oppacchiasella, and a slight curve backward west of Lokvica. The Italians had now won the whole of the first line to which the enemy had retreated in August, and had taken many prisoners. The total for the day was 5,034, including 164 officers, and a great store of war material found in conquered positions.

The losses during the four days' fighting were heavy on both sides. On the first day the Italians lost comparatively few but the Austrians suffered severely. Italian artillery-

fire was exceedingly destructive, and on many parts of the line the Austrians were unable to put up a fight. On the second and third days, when the Austrians threw in their reserves, the struggle was terrible. It was comparatively old-fashioned fighting, more or less in the open, for the trenches were crusht and flattened, and the only cover was supplied by the unevenness of the ground. It was a ghastly mêlée, where companies and battalions fought hand to hand, while the artillery on both sides put a very heavy barrage fire on the reserve lines. The Italians brought their number of captures up to over 8,000. The Austrians claimed 2,700, but on this occasion, as on many others, they included in the number the dead left in their lines.

The Austrian line was completely broken on a front of over two miles, from the northern rim of the Carso to the Oppacchiasella-Kostanjevica road, and it is difficult to say how far the attacking troops might have gone if they had not been held back to avoid the formation of too pronounced a salient. The enemy lost 4,731 prisoners, including 132 officers, and a great mass of war-material. The speed and impetus of the Italian attack were so great that mule-trains, laden with provisions and ammunition, were captured far in the rear of the trenches, before the Austrians had realized that their line had crumpled.

The Italian offensive now had as its immediate occasion the relief of Teuton pressure on Roumania. The Teutonic forces called for more men, whether Austrian or German mattered little. Cadorna had begun his drive on the Carso plateau two weeks ahead of time, for the sake of the Roumanians. The most important result of the fighting was that the Italian line was established on the plateau. In this situation the main thing was the Carso itself—a long, narrow plateau about 1,500 feet above the level of the sea, running parallel to the coast all the way from Trieste to within five or six miles of the Isonzo. The stretch of flat country between the foot of the Carso and the Isonzo had been occupied long before. But when the foot of the slope was reached the advance had stopt. The western edge of the Carso is crowned with a road which runs from Gorizia to Monfalcone. This road had been crossed and left behind

over a mile when the Italians undertook to clear the western edge of the plateau for its entire width. Firmly established on the plateau, their line stretched from the coast due north across it.

A fight between an Italian dirigible airship and an Austrian aeroplane, at a height of more than three miles on the Albanian coast, resulted late in October in the aeroplane being shot down and the dirigible being afterward destroyed by its own officer inside the Austrian lines. On the morning of October 12, while off the Albanian coast, this Italian dirigible, piloted by Captain Ercole, with Captain Corbelli and Captain Albino as observers, was surprized and attacked at a height of 16,000 feet. On obtaining a favorable position the Austrian turned his machine-gun on the dirigible, wounding the observers and disabling Captain Ercole's left arm; but Ercole succeeded in overcoming the aeroplane and killing its pilot, altho he was obliged to land thirty miles within the enemy's lines. Captain Ercole then destroyed his dirigible and, after two days of wandering and suffering from cold and hunger, managed to elude the Austrians, recross the mountains, and finally to reach the Italian camp on the River Voyusa.

Italian troops resumed their activity on the lower Isonzo front on November 1 as if in preparation for a new drive on Trieste. A Berlin dispatch several days before said the Italians would shortly launch another offensive to help relieve the Austrian pressure on Roumania. This move seemed to be on a larger scale and better sustained than any others which the Italians had made since Gorizia fell, and was coming at a time when the indications were that the Austrians were none too well prepared to meet it. In Transylvania there were a few German divisions under Falkenhayn, but the greater part of the forces were Austrian. The fighting with Russians in Galicia also occupied the attention of a considerable number of Austrian troops.

Apparently the Italians, by resuming a period of activity after long inaction, and by the suddenness of their attack, had caught the Austrians by surprize and were scoring important successes. From Gorizia to the Gulf of Panzano,

which is an arm of the Gulf of Trieste, a distance of about twelve miles, they struck the Austrian lines with terrific force and made notable gains. Before the attack was launched the Italians were in possession of the western edge of the Carso plateau. They were facing, however, defenses which the Austrians had had plenty of time to prepare and which had stopt their attempt to advance a month before. North of the Carso, and just east of Gorizia, the Italians had been held in place since the day when Gorizia fell. Possession of the heights in this section, flanking as they did the Italian line to the south, was necessary to an Italian advance.

The Italian army therefore struck at these two points—against the heights east of Gorizia and on the Carso—and in both cases were successful. For nearly a mile along the railroad from Gorizia to Prebacina they moved forward, occupying heights overlooking the railroad from the north as they advanced. Further south to the foothills of the Carso plateau their line kept pace with the advances. On the Carso as well as at the southern foot of the plateau, in the narrow neck of land between the Carso and the gulf, the offensive was particularly severe. For nearly a mile here the Italians pushed ahead, establishing their lines almost as far south as Duino, the largest town on the gulf north of Trieste. A small advance here was more important than a much larger one in Galicia would have been. The Italians were now only a little over fifteen miles from Trieste. The Carso, even in greater degree than other battle-grounds, was a question of artillery, and artillery for the most part of the heavier caliber.

The main features of Italy's share in the war during 1916 were, therefore, the repulse of the Austrian offensive on the Trentino front and the notable advance beyond the Isonzo. These two fierce struggles—the one lasting uninterruptedly for six weeks, and the other being carried on at intervals through more than three months—were events of first-class importance in the war, and they naturally overshadowed other Italian military operations which were remarkable in themselves, and would in different times have claimed wide attention. Among these operations the most noteworthy was the Italian advance upon the Fassa Alps. All through

October extraordinary fighting continued. But the Entente world in 1916 was occupied more with Verdun first and then with the great Anglo-French offensive on the Somme. Pétain and Haig, rather than Cadorna, were the heroes in American reader's minds, but Cadorna deserved to be classed with them. More and more as time passed, men saw how important had been Italy's contribution to winning the war, in that she kept occupied large Austrian armies which otherwise might have gone to the help of Germany on the Western front.[7]

[7] Principal Sources: The "Military Expert" of The *Times,* The *Tribune,* The *Times,* New York; The *Daily Chronicle* (London), The *Evening Post* (New York), Associated Press dispatches; The *Evening Sun,* The *Sun,* New York; The London *Times'* "History of the War."

IV

AUSTRIANS EAST OF GORIZIA LOSE MONTE SANTO AND MONTE ST. GABRIELLE

May 12, 1917—October 1, 1917

WHEN late autumn snows in 1916 brought an end to the campaign on the Isonzo, the town and bridgehead of Gorizia and 43,000 Austrians had been captured. The Italian front through intricate windings just over the frontier skirted the Monte Nero heights of the Julian Alps to the bridgehead of Tolmino, thence swung along the range east of Gorizia, passed over the plain, and, crossing the Vippacco, struck over the northwest corner of the Carso plateau, reaching the sea two miles northwest of Duino, once the summer home of the former German Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe. This point on the sea was only fourteen miles northwest of Trieste.

The Carso, which geographically forms a peninsula and an isthmus of Istria, in its western part is a quadrilateral elevation of volcanic soil, with rocks, mounds and craters, and has only a few widely scattered settlements in an area of 150 square miles. Along its northern side the Vippacco flows westward, the railway from Gorizia ascending its valley as far as San Daniele, while another turns south across the plateau to Trieste, completing the eastern side of the quadrilateral. The precipitous southern side, which resembles the Palisades of the Hudson, with a highway along its base and a railway on its summit, faces the bay of Trieste. On its plateau the rise of the Vippacco averages an altitude of 500 feet. In this region the Austrians, strongly intrenched, swept the face of the Italian front with their guns, from the Carso north to advanced works on Monte San Gabriele and San Marco, east of Gorizia.

Here on May 12 the Italians opened a violent bombardment of Austrian positions from Tolmino to the sea. Two

days later this was concentrated across the Isonzo, five miles north of Gorizia, where the Austrians in their defenses on the Cucco, at an elevation of 611 meters, and on the Vodice, at the height of 524 meters, still held the Italians on the right bank of the stream. By the middle of May the Italians were either keeping up the offensive or warding off violent counter-attacks, all of which failed. In six days of fighting, 4,021 Austrians were made prisoners. By the end of May Italian troops on a Çarso front of nearly ten miles had smashed the Austrian line. Positions from the town of Castagnavizza to the head of the gulf were taken, the Italians being aided by British batteries off the coast. More than 9,000 Austrian prisoners, and officers exceeding 300 in number were taken. The Austrians seemed to have been completely surprized by the sudden onslaught. To divert their attention the Italians had first struck a blow in the north. Cadorna then switched his attack from north of Gorizia, and debouched on a bulging front from Castagnavizza to the gulf, seizing part of the area south of the Castagnavizza as far as Bagni, a coast bathing-resort. A fleet of 130 airplanes flew ahead of the troops, dropping several tons of bombs. When the counter-thrusts came, the Austrians were thrown back everywhere.

From the outset of Italy's entry into the war, Cadorna's strategy had been steadily directed toward Trieste. Recent operations had justified the care with which he first sealed up the valleys of the Trentino and then removed the Austrian menace at Gorizia. Trieste, with a population of 279,475, mostly Italians, was a much more important place than Gorizia, with its 30,000 souls. It is a magnificently improved seaport, originally a Roman city, and historically a part of Italy, but it had been under Austrian rule for centuries. Should Trieste fall, domination of the Adriatic would pass with it, but the strip of territory over which the Italian armies had still to operate, as already stated, was one of great difficulty for an attacking force, and had been elaborately fortified. In their advance the Italians were confronted by an enemy-line quarried into solid rock, with barbed wire in acre-wide complexity supported by iron standards cemented into stone—a front, in short, where all

FARTHEST ITALIAN ADVANCE AGAINST AUSTRIA
Territory occupied by Italy
Railroads —— Highways ——
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30 40
AUSTRIA
TYROL
CARINTHIA
ITALY
VENETIA
TRENTINO
Venice
Gulf of Venice
Trieste
Gulf of Trieste
Lake Garda
Brunneck
Lienz
Iselberg
Sachsenburg
Kleblach
Greifenburg
Spittal
Ghesau
Glanegg
Sirnitz
Franzensfeste
St. Lorenzen
Innichen
Valley
Gailthaler
Hermagor
Villach
Ossiach
Velden
Kreuzberg
St. Leonhard
(Abbey)
Landro
Mauthen
Gail
Drave
Lesach Val
Carnic Alps
Plöcken Pass
Gail Pass Valley
Hohe Gaisl
Dolomites
Cortina
Auronzo
Mt. Paralba
Forni
Timau
Malborgeth
Arnoldstein
Fürnitz
Ratschach
Assling
Trafoi
Stelvio Pass
Ortler
12,852
Botzen
Tiers
Falzarego Pass
Marmolata
Gelser Spr
St. Vito
Alleghe
Pieve
Forni di Sopra
St. Stefano
del Comelico
Rigolato
Comeglians
Pontafel
Pontebba
Tarvis
Racchiano
Chiusa Forti
Predil Pass
Moistroka Pass
Luhnja Pass
Triglav
Flitsch
Resiutta
Mt. Canin
Venzone
Gemona
Caporetto
Feistritz
Kirchheim
Polland
Idria di Baza
Cepovan
Unter Idria
Ober Idria
Trnovo
Gorizia
Cernizza
Haidenschaft
Wippach
St. Daniel
Nabresina
Sesana
Divaca
Cosina
Muggia
Capo d'Istria
Pirano
Buje
Pinguente
ISTRIA
Lupoglava
Bormio
Adda
Mendel Pass
Male
Fucine
Fuenno
Fort Strino
Sulzberg
Tonale Pass
Mt. Presanella
11,685
Edolo
Mt. Adamello
11,600
Pinzolo
Fai
Romeno
Auer
Branzoll
Vigo
Valles Pass
Paneveggio
Cencenighe
Agordo
Saltern
Fleims
Rolle Pass
Gosaldo
Canale
S. Bovo
Primiero
Cembra
Lavarone
Vezzano
Pergine
Borgo
Castel Tesino
Tione
Sarca
Trent
Lavico
Matarello
Mt. Predoi
Fort Larina
Breno
Ft. Dancelino
Arco
Calliano
Mt. Manderiolo
Dogna
Brenta Pass
Roveredo
Casotto
Gallio
Rona
Asiago
Pesciera
Pasubio
SETTE COMUNI
Arsiero
Bassano
Piovene
Primolano
Cismon
Quero
S. Marino
Carpane
Mt. Grappa
Crespano
Montebelluna
Bagolino
Storo
Ledrone Pass
Limone
S. Giovanni
Anfo
Vestone
Gargnano
Barghe
Toscoland
Salo
Capino
Gavardo
Sermione
Lonato
Peschiera
Solferino
Dossobuono
Villafranca
Mt. Baldo
Lessini
Peri
Velo
Malo
Thiene
Castelfranco
Cittadella
Valdagno
Rivoli
Bellori
S. Pietro
Incariano
Arzignano
Montebello
Verona
Adige
S. Bonifacio
Albaredo
Vicenza
Camisano
Barbarano
Abano
Padua
Bacchiglione
Brenta
Alano
Piave
Belluno
Montereale
Mahiago
Meduno
Barcis
Ponte nell' Alpi
Aviano
Mel
Feltre
Col Vicentin
Cison di Valmarino
Segusino
Valdobbiadene
Conegliano
Serravalle Vittorio
Sacile
Prata
Azzano
Pordenone
Nervesa
Oderzo
Spresiano
Motta
Faggare
Istrana
Treviso
Zenson
S. Dona di Piave
Capo Sile
Cava Zuccherina
Piave Vecchia
Mestre
Mirano
Dolo
Fort Malghera
Burano
Porto di Lido
Malamocco
Castel Daila
Osoppo
Buia
Platischis
Tarcento
Faedis
Stupizza
S. Daniele
Tricesimo
Cividale
Spilimbergo
Campoformido
Udine
Buttrio
S. Giovanni
Codroipo
Casarsa
Palmanova
S. Vito
Sedegliano
Fasian
Salcano
Tivoli
Romans
Sagrado
Cervignano
Ronchi
Monfalcone
Aquileia
Latisana
Mariano
Concordia
S. Giorgio
Grado
Gardo
Sdobba
Pta. Grossa
Isola
Pirano
Bassania
Umago
Porto Buso
Porto Lignano
Porto Baseleghe
Caorle
Porto Fulcanera
Porto Cortellazzo
Porto Rosega
Porto Tagliamento
Tagliamento
Meduna
Cellina
Col Mora
Col Vicentin
Piave
Livenza
Sile
Brenta
Bacchiglione
Alano
Gua
Adige
Tagliamento
Venetian Alps
Carnic Alps
Julian Alps
Karst Plateau
Isonzo
Timavo
Recoaro
Schio
Torrebelvicino
Chiampo
Montebello
Lonato
Pastrengo
Arcole
Porto Malghera
Porto Cortellazzo
Porto Fulcanera
Porto Baseleghe
Porto Lignano
Porto Buso
Porto di Lido
Gulf of Venice
Gulf of Trieste
THE MATTHEWS-NORTHRUP WORKS, BUFFALO, N.Y.

that Austria's war-genius could accomplish in eight quiet months had been done lavishly and well. As in the north, where floods threatened to prevent the passage of the Isonzo, the weather favored a battle only at the last minute. The day before a violent east wind, locally called a *bora,* had been roaring down the battle-front, raising the stinging red Carso dust into blinding clouds, sweeping the smoke of guns backward upon Italian observers. Every shell that fell against those stony heights now became a great leap of flame immediately densified into a high-spreading column of red smoke, shot with rust-colored dust. Hundreds of trench-mortars of the largest caliber, each more portentously noisy than whole batteries of howitzers, furnished unending thunder, and their effect on the trenches was disastrous.

For ten hours this red-hot hailstorm of shells of every caliber systematically and remorselessly kneaded the Austrian line. At 4 o'clock came the infantry's turn, a visible token of their movement being the sudden appearance of an Austrian shrapnel-barrage which broke into rose and white clouds, "as pretty as confetti." Perceval Gibbon[8] said it might as well have been confetti, "for all the effect it had upon that forward fighting impulse of the troops, who had fretted for nothing better than this," and then added:

"Parallel with the road from Castagnavizza to Hudhog, where every ruined cottage was a machine-gun hive, gray, dust-caked, thick-set men, each a goblin horror in his gas-mask, thrust forward in the death fog of shells, stumbling, tripping over ground, where every inch was barbed with jagged stone, methodically, scientifically bombing one machine-gun position after another, till they stumbled, silent and terrible in their masks, across the shattered parapets into the Austrian trenches. Jamiano had subterranean shelters where the garrison was packed like sardines, with officers and men together sheltering from the shelling. The first line here once taken, these surrendered *en masse,* and went to swell the procession of prisoners who were marching back to the rear by every road from the front. Their number was enormous. Yesterday they estimated the strength of the first batches at about 2,000. At daylight this morning the commanders of the cages were wildly telephoning for assistance, and up to now the prisoners counted number in all 9,000, with 300

[8] Correspondent of The *Times* (New York).

odd officers, and again there were identified among them those suspected divisions newly withdrawn from the Russian front. The effects of the victory are manifold. Apart from its obvious aspects, the great advance and severe blow to the enemy forces, it singularly stultifies the Austrian endeavor to draw the attention of the supreme command to the Trentino and local attacks. It also straightens most advantageously the Carso line, ironing out that abrupt cape from Castagnavizza to Hudhog. And finally it shows to Italy herself what Italy in her capacity of a great power can achieve and hope for."

Rome was delirious with joy over the success of her troops in this, her greatest blow thus far in the war. Special editions of the newspapers which told of 9,000 prisoners taken were issued just as great crowds had assembled in the streets to celebrate the second anniversary of Italy's entrance into the war. Crowds paraded, singing, shouting and cheering for Italian heroes and those of the Allies as well. It was now understood that the offensive between Tolmino and the Gulf of Trieste was likely to assume large proportions. Austrians realized that if the Italians occupied Laibach they would be only 160 miles from Vienna, but the immediate objective was Trieste, with the ultimate one Laibach. Loss of Trieste would not have constituted a deathblow to Austria, nor would its capture have justified the enormous preparations which the Italians had made on the Julian front, where the bulk of the Italian army, estimated at over 2,000,000, were massed. Besides this great body, Austrians believed that 250,000 British troops were in this territory and that the British were largely artillerymen.

The Italians by May 23 had pushed forward their lines more than a mile on a front of six on the Carso plateau. In ten days they had captured 18,000 prisoners. Along the southern edge of the Carso and on the Adriatic coast they had forced the enemy back south of Jamiano to a line running from Hill 31, just south of Jamiano, through the village of Flondat, to Foce Timavo, directly on the coast. Here the Italians faced a natural fortress, a solid rock plateau, of which Medeazza was the center and Hill 323 the highest point. With the capture of another strongly fortified position on the southern Carso the Italians next

day took 3,500 additional prisoners, making a total of 22,419 captured since the offensive began. Near Trieste, on May 26, they cut off an entire battery of field-guns, ten pieces in all, with a quantity of ammunition, and took 812 more prisoners. On the Isonzo they captured another gun, two trench-mortars, seven machine-guns, and 438 prisoners, making a total of 23,669 prisoners for the fighting since May 14. On the southern edge of the Carso plateau and on the coast of the Adriatic, they penetrated on a three-mile front to a depth of two miles and more, crossed the railroad from Monfalcone to Duino and captured Hill 145, northeast of the point where the railroad was crossed.

This Italian assault was the most remarkable of the year. It lasted for sixteen days. While French and British in France and Flanders had been fighting for little hills, or "rising ground," the Italians had scaled mountains. French and British had been going forward, but the Italians had been going upward, the French and British fighting horizontally, the Italians perpendicularly. The Italians were now on a so-called plateau, but the plateau was of volcanic creation and consisted of craters, rocks, and caves, bare, blasted, and waterless. Never was a battlefield that looked so like some petrified specimen of nature. It furnished no water and so the Italians had to build an aqueduct leading to it, bit by bit, as they went along. This land of coves, of hiding places and desolate rocks had been fortified by the Austrians with barbed wire and chevaux-de-frise until nature and art had made it seemingly impassable to man.

To the Italians these obstacles came only as a modification of their original task. For two years they had been fighting their way up into the air, had had to ascend steep faces of high mountains which ordinary men do not ascend in time of peace, and these mountains had been well fortified and garrisoned by a powerful foe. Other armies opposed to the Teutonic Powers had to attack soldiers, but the Italians had to attack mountain-peaks, and to take heavy guns and supply-trains up mountains that had hitherto been ascended only by Alpine climbers roped together. Soldiers in these regions swung bridges from one mountain peak to another, built trench-fortifications, road-tunnels, and

retaining walls, 10,000 feet above the sea level, all in the face of an enemy fighting desperately on the defensive. But before such superhuman resourcefulness the Austrians gave way. After the taking of Gorizia the Italians emerged from perpendicular warfare in the Alps to horizontal warfare on the Carso plateau, and so they no longer fought in the eyries of eagles. But they still had to battle with nature in a place nature had fortified, as if determined that man should never intrude upon it. It had been additionally fortified by Austria with all the arts of military science.

It was no longer possible for Italy to count upon the collapse of Austria as an incident of Russian victories. For no nation had the revolution in Russia meant as much as for Italy, for it might ultimately bring a new invasion of the Trentino. She had to contemplate the possibility of having at no distant date to face the entire military power of Austria, which would be turned against her if Russia should make a separate peace. She already had before her some Austrian divisions that had been released by the truce on the Eastern Front. It was with this situation confronting her that Italy had undertaken this spring campaign. If it succeeded it would give her Trieste. If it failed, it might easily be followed by an attack from Austria through the Trentino, where an Austrian attack had only just failed of success in 1916, while the Germans were battering at Verdun and the French and British on the Somme.

In the presence of the King, who in all these operations spent his time at the front living a soldier's life, and under command of Cadorna, the Italians on August 19 resumed their attack on the Julian front from Monte Nero to the sea. Cadorna's May offensive had for weeks been in suspense because on this rugged Julian front it was necessary to proceed by stages, and to wait until men and ammunition could be made available in sufficient numbers, and communication with a new front could be assured. Nearly half the Austrian weight of men and guns was assembled on the Carso between the Vippacco and the sea, more than half of these Slavs; namely, Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Serbo-Croats, and Slovenes. Considering the great natural strength of the Julian front and the number

of available rifles and guns, the work which lay before the Italian armies required great qualities of leadership and courage. Italy's previous efforts on the Julian front had forced the enemy back on the Carso to the sea at the mouth of the Timavo, whence the Austrian line ran approximately north through Fornaza, Versie, Kstanjevica, and Dosso Faiti, to hills south of the Vippacco and of Biglia. The Italian lines were 100 to 400 yards distant, east and northeast of Gorizia. Here the dominating heights of Santo,

BRITISH OFFICIAL PHOTO.

AN ITALIAN ARMORED TRAIN WAITING FOR A SIGNAL TO FIRE

Gabriele, and Daniele, with their easterly extensions, forbade for the moment an advance.

Cadorna's resources had been greatly increased in both men and guns. One branch had received remarkable expansion—his flying corps, which performed valuable service. Victories, under the particular conditions in which battles were now fought, were not actually won by airmen, but they were begun by them, and, without opening success by airmen victories were difficult to obtain. These Italian airmen obtained complete photographs of all the Austrian arrangements, and during the preliminary Italian bombardment,

which was violent and lasted for twenty-four hours throughout the day and night of August 19, bombed the enemy's communications, depots, and centers of distribution of food and water. The Italian airmen materially contributed to success by bombing the Chiapovano valley, a deep, rugged indentation, which was probably the main line of Austrian communication in this quarter, and was reported to be full of troops. This brilliant affair almost rose to the height of a maneuver-battle. The capture of 25,000 prisoners and 75 guns in a week of fighting was a record which gave the measure of Austrian claims to success. No Allied army had such natural difficulties to contend with, nor could any other have displayed greater resolution and skill in overcoming them.

The initial battle was described as the most violent fought on the Isonzo. The Austrian line gave way at various points, and in three days' fighting more than 10,000 prisoners were taken. At the same time, the Italians concentrated on the Carso hundreds of heavy guns on a line of fifty miles. Entire Austrian units broke and fled under the bombardment, until Germany and Austria had to withdraw troops from the Russian front to arrest the Italian gains. Naval guns placed at the mouth of the Isonzo swept Austrian positions with a terrific fire. Shells passed through and even beyond Mirimar, where the former unhappy Empress Carlotta of Mexico lived so long, which is less than two miles from Trieste. The Italian batteries advanced in the open unprotected and without cover.

By August 26 Monte Santo had fallen. The tricolor of Italy, carried up its slopes by the battalion which had assaulted it from its steepest side, was unfurled from a long stone heap crowning the hill at a point where once stood a beautiful old monastery. It could be seen there distinctly by troops who were far below at Cucco, or in the Isonzo valley, and by watchers from the grim slopes of Santa Caternia and Gorizia's ruined suburb of Salcano. Eyes, field-glasses, and telescopes of artillery-observers at once converged on it from a thousand points of the battle-line. The news of its fall traveled to the uttermost ends of the front, so that the cheers of the victors on the sum-

AN ITALIAN TRENCH ON THE ISONZO

mit of the hill found a distinct echo from troops who had been consolidated at Selo, on the Carso. Monte Santo, which looks north and south across the whole battle-area, had been a symbol of Austrian strength. Its fall ensued as a result of the great operation which began on August 18, when the Second Army threw the first of fourteen bridges across the Isonzo under the shifting glare of search-lights and the fire of Austrian shrapnel. Their objective lay before them beyond a chain of precipitous, wooded hills which flank the river on its eastern bank and lead up toward the great forest-clad plateau of Bainsizza and across to the big Chiapovano valley, whose roads were the line of the chief Austrian communications north and south with the Isonzo. Any Italian advance in this direction became a menace to these sections of the Austrian line.[9]

The Italian army had been fighting a week with valor and dash, from Tolmino to Gorizia, and through the rocky, pitiless heights of the Carso. In the assault on Monte Santo could be seen from the neighboring heights, small, hardy, intrepid soldiers sweeping up the mountain-sides, their bayonets fixt, and shouting the national war cry of "Avanti Savoia." Momentarily their drive onward was checked as they met the Austrians, and a desperate bloody fight would ensue. Then on again they would press in a grey-green irresistible stream until they gained the heights. Here a battle raged to and fro as men were locked in deadly fight. At first the enemy gave way slowly, but at last, hard-prest, they took to flight, followed by the joyous yell of the pursuing Italians. The capture of Monte Santo, which lies four miles northeast of Gorizia, cleared the way for the Italians in two directions—to the north, where they had been held back at Tomino, and to the south, where they had been held back by the Carso plateau. Through Tolmino lay the way to Klakenfurt and Vienna, while over the Carso ran the road to Trieste.

When the Italians gained control of the Bainsizza plateau, they were almost ready to enter the Chiapovano valley, so that the entire group of Tolmino defenses was threatened. Control of the Chiapovano valley meant that the communi-

[9] Dispatch from Percival Gibbon to The *Times* (New York).

cations of the Austrian forces both north and south would be cut, and that their armies would then be dealt with in retreating fragments. The Bainsizza plateau is 600 meters high, and lies between the Isonzo and Chiapovano valleys. It measures ten by fifteen miles, and was a formidable fortress, with precipitous slopes on the Isonzo and with strong redoubts and covers extremely well supplied with machine-guns cleverly protected and hidden in caves and dugouts. Austrian counter-attacks in force were made against the new Italian positions in the front above Gorizia on August 30, but everywhere the Austrians were driven back. Arthur Toscanini, the noted Italian conductor, who for several years, up to 1915, was musical director at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York, was decorated by the Italian Government for bravery under fire in this offensive. Toscanini kept his military band playing during the battle of Monte Santo, soldiers storming positions to the strains of this martial music. In the midst of the fighting, and at a time when the Austrian barrage fire was at its height, Toscanini led his band to one of the advanced positions where, sheltered by a huge rock, he conducted a concert until word came to him that the Italian soldiers had stormed and taken the trenches of the Austrians.

With Monte Santo eliminated, it was necessary only to occupy San Gabriele and San Daniele. The Italians would then be able to push a wedge into the Austrian lines down the Vippacco valley, or across the plateau, and so flank the whole Austrian line to the south, throw them to the rear of the Carso line, and force a long retreat. Monte San Gabriele early in September was reported unofficially to have been taken, but the Austrians in violent counter-attacks reoccupied it. Several times the position changed hands.

By September 4 infantry activity came to a pause, and the Italians paid their respects by air to Pola, Austria's big naval base on the Adriatic. Nine tons of explosives were dropt on warships in the roadstead and on military works. Pola at the same time was bombarded by great new Italian and British monitors. It was recalled how early in the war British monitors, having light draught,

had been able to keep up an effective bombardment on German lines along the Belgian seacoast, and how later they had repeatedly shelled the German naval base at Zeebrugge. The monitor was a peculiarly American type of vessel, the fruit of Ericsson's genius. In thus receiving recognition in this war, after it had been discarded at home, no surprize was created among its advocates.

Trieste was the center of Italianism on the east Adriatic coast. Its acquisition, more nearly than any other single conquest, would have meant a realization of the Irredentists' dream of a reunited Italy. Trieste had no such sentimental significance to Austria. To her it represented nothing in terms of racial strife. Trieste was, however, Austria's most important seaport, the home port of her transoceanic Mediterranean and Levant lines. Without Trieste Austria's sea-traffic could practically be eliminated, for there would remain to her only the Hungarian port of Fiume and the smaller ports of the Dalmatian coast, making her almost as completely landlocked as she had so long made Serbia. Trieste had an even greater Teutonic significance. Bismarck had once told Italy she could never have Trieste. Austria had planted large Teutonic colonies in Italy and its neighborhood to assure her a permanent position there. In the Kaiser's ambitious scheme of controlling southeastern Europe, Trieste was to become a stepping stone to Asia. To Alexandretta, on the Asia Minor coast, where reshipments could be made to and from the Bagdad railway, Trieste was to be a route shorter than any other route from Berlin. Trieste, in fact, was the southern key to the Central European State of which Pan-Germanism had been dreaming, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, and which was to spread Hohenzollern kultur and trade throughout the Near and Far East. Because the imminence of the capture of Trieste was thus a peril, not only to Austria but to Germany, an importance attached to the advance of the Italians greater than any of their military activities had been before.

The battle of the Isonzo was now at its height. Once more the Carso had been made to resemble Dante's Inferno. In a birdseye view the whole front appeared like a long

road fringed with black pine-trees which grew as by magic from bare rock, the result of continuous explosions of shells which the combatants had rained on each other's trenches. These trenches had been dug in porous Carso rock, but had now been wiped out by incessant artillery fire. Deep below the surface in caves and dugouts defenders had huddled together, watching their time. Some of the entrances were blocked again and again by falling rocks. On a clear calm night one saw a fantastic display of fireworks of

BERSAGLIERIS ON THE CARSO PLATEAU

incomparably gigantic proportions, an orgy of destruction which called up everything dead as witness against living men. Against this broken-loose hell Austrian artillery had to defend itself—had to protect men in the front trenches that seemed to be serving as a dancing floor for a devil's own party. That ghostly avenue of smoke, earth, fire, and steel actually danced to the hellish music of Austro-Hungarian batteries. In the background one saw clumps that seemed like chaotic comets rising from the earth.[10]

[10] Leonhardt Adelt in The *Berliner Tageblatt.*

Fourteen fortified positions on the Isonzo front had been stormed and captured by September 1, and a breach made in the Austrian lines over eleven miles in width. Italian advance-guards were bivouacking at some points seven and a half miles ahead of their old positions. The newly conquered territory embraced some forty villages and hamlets, the civil population of which had been found in famishing condition, because all food supplies had been withheld since the eve of battle. The Italians by September 7 had taken 30,000 prisoners, with total losses to the Austrians estimated at 120,000. For upward of a fortnight a fierce battle pivoted on Monte San Gabriele, the twin sister of Monte Santo, the long saddle and high peak of which rise between the Gargaro valley and the plain to the northeast of Gorizia. The concept of the battle was Napoleonic. Sheer audacity was what contributed to its initial success. The retreat of the Austrians across the Bainsizza plateau became almost a flight, partly because they could not believe the Italians had the courage to try this venture. The crest of Monte San Gabriele which commanded the plain of Gorizia to the south and southeast and the Frigido valley to the east, was captured on September 14, after three weeks of bitter fighting.

By October 1 the Italians had started another offensive on the Isonzo front, where for a fortnight virtual quietude had prevailed. On the Bainsizza height positions were stormed and taken by Cadorna's forces and 1,400 prisoners captured. By their new successes the Italians brought their line almost to the bridgehead of the Chiapovano river, which gave them possession of almost all the southeastern portion of the plateau. Little did the Entente world dream that before the month ended the Italians would be overwhelmed on the Isonzo, would be forced to evacuate Gorizia and the Friulian plain, be driven back across the Tagliamento and unable to make a stand again until they reached the banks of the Piave.[11]

[11] Principal Sources: The *Times* (London); the "Military Expert" of The *Times*, The *Sun*, The *Times*, The *Tribune*, "Bulletins" of the National Geographic Society, New York; The *Berliner Tageblatt*, Associated Press dispatches.

V

THE ITALIAN DISASTER AT CAPORETTO, AND THE RETREAT ACROSS THE TAGLIAMENTO TO THE PIAVE

October 23, 1917—February 1, 1918

THE late summer of 1917 had seen the army of Cadorna with a great record behind it. Starting from a position in a high degree precarious and difficult, it had slowly won security for its flanks and in well planned stages had hewn its way towards Trieste. It had resisted one of the most formidable attacks that had been delivered by the Central Powers. It had shown a genius in fighting natural difficulties in the Alps that brought many of its achievements into the realms of unique romance. Its morale had been superb, and it had acquired that mechanical backing without which no army could succeed in modern warfare. By the autumn of 1917 the omens seemed propitious for a final effort which would crumble the last barriers between Italy and Trieste. But there were forces at work—dark forces, far from the battle-line—which, combined with Teutonic military skill, were destined to frustrate the skill of Cadorna and Cappello and the valor of Alpini and Bersaglieri. The foes of Italy were not only those she had to meet before her gates, but foes in her own household as raised up by a skilful German propaganda.

The storm broke on the night of October 23-24, when a tremendous Austro-German bombardment was opened from the Plezzo valley to the northern sector of the Bainsizza. Heavy fire extended southward over the whole front of the Italian Second and Third Armies, the main concentration directed upon lines between Plezzo and the Avsecek valley. The crisis came when troops, driven back from the Caporetto-Tolmino sector, got out of control and in their disordered retreat, along deep, narrow mountain glens, overwhelmed and carried away with them the reserves, which

had been hastily dispatched to the line in small detachments. A breach was made and it widened rapidly owing to failure of reserves to arrive in good order. Those who came through, certain broken troops retiring from the front line, got out of touch with commands, until they could put up a resistance only in isolated handfuls. Many never reached the fighting line at all, infected, as they were, by the state of mind of those who were pouring back down narrow mountain roads. Somehow the word was spread (probably by enemy troops disguised in Italian uniforms, for a number of these were caught later and shot) that the war was over, and that there was nothing to do but "go home." It was a curious case of collective deception, spreading among weary, dispirited, hungry men, completely staggered by the crushing blow which had befallen them so unexpectedly.

The main disaster was not wholly due to the number of German men or German guns concentrated upon the upper Isonzo. It was due primarily to Socialist propaganda operating among the soldiers short of food—an influence exerted to break down morale. After the Pope had made his peace proposal a few months before, Italian troops had been encouraged to cheer both for the Pope and for peace until the terms had become to them almost synonymous. What the Bolsheviki did in Petrograd after the collapse of Russia, Socialists and failure of food supplies had been doing in northern Italy. In the military disaster at Caporetto, large German numbers, drawn from the Russian front, had reinforced the Austrian line until a big battle was possible over a 25-mile front from Monte Rambon southeastward through Flitch and Tolmino and thence southward to the Bainsizza plateau, ten miles northward of Gorizia. The capture was reported on October 25 of positions near Flitch and Tolmino and points in the northern portion of the Bainsizza plateau.

The Germans began their offensive with an intensive fire, in which specially constructed gas-shells were thrown. Large quantities of booty were taken and more than ten thousand prisoners in the first onset, including divisional and brigade staffs. By October 26, the Italians on the

northern wing of the 25-mile front had been forced to give ground and at several points were forced back across the Isonzo north and south of Tolmino where the battle was raging on Italian territory. To the south the situation of the Italians was precarious. Here the evacuation of the Bainsizza plateau became necessary, a retirement which neutralized in great measure the brilliant Italian successes in the summer campaign. By October 29 Austro-German armies were shaking the Italian line from the Julian Alps to the Adriatic. They had pushed forward and captured Cividale, northeast of Udine, and were nearing the plains beyond. In addition Gorizia was retaken. Perhaps 10,000 Italians had by this time been made prisoners and more than 700 guns captured.

It was idle to deny the gravity of the situation. The Germans had won a great victory with tremendous speed. Throwing their weight on the weakest spot in the Italian line, they had won back much of the territory conquered by the Italians. In five days they had obtained control of a district which it had cost the Italians perhaps half a million men to take during a period of sixteen months. The effect could only be to hamper the reform movement in Germany, to stiffen the Junkers and, therefore, to prolong the war. That it was another desperate move by Berlin with a view to forcing peace, by subjecting Italy to the treatment given to Serbia and Roumania, was obvious. What the effect would be upon Italy was watched with the greatest anxiety. Lack of coal, lack of food, and war weariness had greatly swollen not only the Socialist forces, but the republican movement as well. The operation was one more undertaking forced upon the Kaiser by the weakness of his Hapsburg ally. Confirmation of much that had been published concerning conditions in Austria was found in the decision of Germany to employ her few remaining resources in this attack upon Italy. The attack had been made possible to Germany by the Russian collapse, Italy having been called to pay the price of the folly and madness which ruled in Russia. The attack was the second one in Italy in which German troops and guns participated. Because of the world interest in Verdun, the combined German

and Austrian offensive from the Trentino in the spring of 1916 had attracted little notice, and yet at that time desperate battles on the Asiago plateau only narrowly escaped leading to an Italian disaster and an Austrian eruption into the Valley of the Po. Cadorna managed to stop that advance into the Venetian plain, just as Pétain a few weeks before had halted the German onrush before Verdun. It was Brusiloff's Russian offensive of June, 1916 that drew from the Italian front the men and the guns which Austria and Germany had massed for an expected thrust southward to Vicenza and Verona. Brusiloff at that time probably saved Italy from disaster.

Upon Italy had fallen the heavy task of fronting a blow into which Germany put every ounce of power that was left at her command. Germany aimed at something more than the frustration of an intended Italian offensive or the shaking of the Italian morale. She needed very substantial fruits of victory, in order to brace her armies on the French and Belgian front, and, more than that, to repair the tottering Junker prestige at home. Large captures of prisoners and the carrying of war into enemy territory were something, but it needed a broad sweep into Italian territory, out of the mountains into the Venetian plain, and beyond, in order to justify the German effort and the aims to which it was directed. From that point of view the loss of men and guns to Cadorna was less than the possible effect on his lines from Gorizia to the Adriatic. If these could have been held the German purpose would have failed. The attack aimed primarily, not at a victory on the field, or a capture of territory, but at the paralysis of Italian war power and the ultimate elimination of Italy from the conflict. On the military side, it had to be compared with Mackensen's victory at the Dunajec.

The Germans after having broken their way through the Italian defenses west of the upper Isonzo, and pushed through the mountain passes, came down toward Udine, through Cividale, across the rear of all the lines of communication which served Cadorna's army facing the Carso and occupying the Bainsizza plateau. Once the resistance of the Northern Army was broken, Cadorna had no choice but to draw his troops from Gorizia and off the Bainsizza

plateau. The sole question was whether he could retreat westward quickly enough to escape envelopment by forces coming down from the north. His natural line of defense was the Tagliamento river, which runs south from the Alps to the Adriatic, and it would have proved an admirable line, if his forces could have been reconcentrated behind it in time. It was on the east bank of this stream that the Austrians made their final stand in Napoleon's Italian operations in 1797.

The peril to Austria of a thrust toward Laibach, the immediate menace to Trieste, was now over. All the great sacrifices of two years of the Italian campaign had been lost. Austrians and Germans could hereafter fight on Italian soil. The Germans had evidently taken from the Russian lines a considerable number of battalions, but probably less than 200,000 troops. The attack was made irresistible by the weight of artillery and the amount of shells accumulated. The Italians were surprized on the upper Isonzo as the Russians were surprized at the Dunajec, as the French were surprized in the early days of Verdun. At the Dunajec the Russian collapse was so complete that the dislocation of the whole Russian front followed. At Verdun the French were able to avoid a general dislocation and pinned down the advance four miles south of its starting point. The problem was now whether the Italians would be capable of following the French precedent, or would prove themselves unable to escape a disaster like the Russian.

We were not to overlook the fact that the front between Switzerland and the North Sea was still the decisive front, and that all German operations away from this front were in the nature of a side-show, unless they produced results that affected that front. Should they succeed in detaching a large number of French and British troops from the Western front, their campaign along the Isonzo might bring relief along the Yser and the Aisne. But this was a contingency for the future to work out. If Italy could rally from her defeat as France rallied in late August 1914, Germany would have won only in so far as she had succeeded in saving Austria from dissolution and in restoring

the drooping spirits of her own countrymen. All the same a great battle had been lost and the whole Italian offensive for the time ruined. The Italians had been within three miles of the greatest and most decisive victory of the war. Had these miles been covered, the Austrians would have been thrown into the greatest danger, their left wing threatened with destruction and the way opened to Trieste and Laibach. The danger had been so pressing that Germany could not afford to disregard it, because further Italian success might have driven Austria out of the war. Germany was thus forced to abandon whatever plans she might have formed for herself in Russia. Her preparations for the attack must have been going on for many weeks. The concentration of heavy guns and of shell, with which the Italian lines were deluged, was on a scale that had required much time to complete. Certain it is that, when the attack was launched, everything was in readiness for a quick and overwhelming victory. The Teutonic plan was the essence of simplicity, as all great military plans are. It was exactly the same idea that was employed on the Dunajec—to mass all available strength against a short section of front, break through, and turn against the rear of the enemy's line on one side of the breach.

Tolmino had never been taken by the Italians, nor had they been able to take the entire eastern bank of the Isonzo up to Santa Lucia, which had resisted all attacks. Making full use of facilities for pushing troops across the western bank of the river, the Germans struck southwest from Tolmino against Italian lines on the western side of the Isonzo. So rapid were the movements that Teutonic troops reached the rear of two divisions of Italians before they had time to withdraw and practically the full strength of these divisions were made prisoners. This exposed the flank of the Italians occupying the center and lower portions of the Bainsizza plateau. Two things were apparent from this success. The first was that Austria had been about exhausted. She had little resisting power left and no striking power. Germany alone could have saved her.

By the end of October the Teutons were standing before Udine, the former grand headquarters of the Italian army.

In the press westward from Gorizia they had captured Cormono, ten miles to the southeast of Udine, and the entire Italian line southward to the head of the Adriatic was in retreat. To some extent the Italians appeared to be checking the advance and Great Britain and France were preparing to lend them aid. Troops were being hastened across the western Italian frontier by way of Turin and Milan. As a result of the Teutonic offensive internal conditions in Italy had been unified, the prepondering idea of the entire population now being to abolish party lines in order to meet the situation. Even a Cabinet crisis was solved with comparatively few changes in portfolios. The drive in the main, however, continued, with Italian cavalry fighting rear-guard actions to cover the retreat. Udine was captured and the Teutons were invading Italian territory from the north through passes in the Carnic Alps. Virtually one thousand square miles of Italian territory had been overrun by November 1, more than 120,000 Italians made prisoners and in excess of 1,000 guns captured. The Teutons were well within gun-range of the Tagliamento.

It was useless to deny that Italy's position was serious. On the other hand, every mile the Austro-Germans advanced weakened their striking force, and every mile the Italians retreated brought them nearer their reserves, which would create an enormous numerical superiority in their favor. News from Rome showed that the heart of Italy was sound, that all disunion had been forgotten in the common danger, and that the possibility of creating internal political weakness had disappeared. The advance had slowed up appreciably and the situation appeared slightly better. Rome dispatches described a marked relaxation of the German pressure on the center of Cadorna's line, due to lack of railways.[12]

Even if the Teutons compelled Cadorna to go back to the Adige, with the loss of Venice, Padua, Verona, and Vicenza, it was still true that the heart and bulk of Italy remained—Lombardy and Piedmont and the entire peninsula south of the Po. It was not a cheerful eventuality to contemplate, but it fell far short of a disaster such as the

[12] Cable dispatch from G. H. Perris to The *Times* (New York).

Roumanians had had. Venetia was an Italian Poland thrust out into hostile territory. It might be lopped off and leave nine-tenths of Italian soil intact, and the richest and best organized portion. Unlike the occupied departments of France, with their great bulk of the mineral and industrial resources of the country, the Venetian plain contained only a small part of Italy's war-resources. Cadorna's loss in men was not so serious as his loss of guns. If Great Britain and France could rush help forward to their ally it would come in the form of artillery. Of all the leading combatants Italy had suffered least in human wastage. Mountain fighting during two years and a half had been costly, and 120,000 prisoners meant a total casualty list of close to 200,000 men. Nevertheless, Italy was a nation of nearly forty millions, with a fighting man-power of nearly five millions, and it was doubtful whether Cadorna had more than a million of his men along this entire front.

Whether or not the Italians were inadequately supplied with shell, the primary cause of their defeat was probably the superior generalship of the Teutons. The Italian line, crossing and recrossing the Isonzo, had its flanks unprotected, particularly in the north, where the line was thinly held. The Germans struck where they were not expected to strike. Never before in history had Italy been invaded from the Isonzo front. The barbarians had come down through passes in the north, Napoleon through the Trentino on either side of the lake of Grada, but the Teutons came from the east, caught the Italians unawares, and, before they had recovered from their surprize, sent them reeling back toward the plains.

It does not appear that Cadorna alone was to blame for failure to anticipate the Teutonic offensive. It had been a fairly good guess that Germany would make another effort somewhere before the year ended, for she was being depleted rapidly. In Flanders the war had been going badly for her. As weeks passed the number of American troops in France had steadily increased and the weight of American resources began to bear heavily, and would soon bear still more heavily. The spring held no hope, it was only a day of dread—the day when the opening guns of a new offensive

would be fired. Verdun had sealed the German fate in the west, and made a successful German offensive impossible ever afterward, while in the east nothing could be gained by attacking Russia. The only remaining front was Italy. But on which Italian front? Obviously the front where there was real danger. Only a few miles had separated Italy from a victory which would have been as important as the Marne, but this situation, for Germany, irrespective of an attack in the Trentino, could be reversed by a success on the Isonzo. Germany's method since her failure at the Marne had been to strengthen a front with artificial defenses instead of men, to man it with just enough men to hold it without attempting to strike out beyond and then to free the army thus released for operations on other fields. This is what happened when Germany turned on Russia in 1915; it happened in the case of Serbia, and again in the case of Roumania. Now it had happened in the case of Italy.

By November 2 the Italian Army was assembled on the Tagliamento, toward which Austrian and German armed cars and cavalry patrols had been feeling their way. The line of the Tagliamento is a phrase which is exact only as regards its southern end. Northward its whole length wriggles and writhes like a broken-backed snake. It is ordinarily a mile-wide bed with a mere trickle of water, but now tempestuous rains had converted it into a boiling flood. For a time Cadorna's forces were holding the invaders along the Tagliamento by means of heavy artillery and quick-firers. On the left wing they replied vigorously to strong pressure and held the attacking forces. Italian aviators, soaring over the lines, dropt bombs on ammunition depots and troop formations. But by November 5 the Tagliamento river, west of which Cadorna had established his new line, was crossed by the invaders, and in a great arc more than 160 miles in length, the Italian armies were falling back upon and through the plains of Venetia to a new and shorter line of defense. From the Fella valley to the head of the Adriatic the entire line of the Tagliamento was given up, while from virtually the borders of the Trentino northeastward and eastward through the Dolomites and the

Carnic Alps to the Fella, the Italians were carrying out a retrograde movement southward through the mountainous country toward the plains. Germans and Austro-Hungarians were everywhere following them up, but with the Italians offering resistance to rear-guard actions.

The decision of the Italians to evacuate the Tagliamento line was taken after the enemy had intensified his pressure along the upper reaches of the river among highlands and pushed forces across the stream in the center and to the south. This movement compelled a simultaneous withdrawal along the northern front from the Fella valley to Colbricon. Cadorna, in falling back, shortened his battle front from approximately 160 miles to slightly more than 60 miles—along the Piave river east of Venice and northwesterly to the Trentino boundary—and also gave British and French reinforcements an opportunity to arrive in sufficient numbers to check the invaders. The retreat was declared to be an orderly one, with rear-guards on both fighting fronts holding back the enemy and with airplanes playing an important part in harassing the invaders, destroying bridges that had been thrown over the Tagliamento, and bombing troops who were trying to cross the stream. Thus far during the retreat the invaders had not come in close contact with the main Italian forces; no great battle had been fought anywhere, nor was any large number of prisoners taken. Mackensen was not there as reported, the Germans being commanded by Von Below. As to German claims of prisoners and booty, experience had shown that the Germans in these circumstances reckon every male inhabitant, whether soldier or not, as a war prisoner, and in reckoning guns count trench-mortars and machine-guns.

The larger units of the Italians continued to fall back without molestation, but considerable fighting continued in the hills of Vittorio and at other points in the north. On the middle Tagliamento, Italian troops who stood out against the invaders were captured,—a general and 17,000 additional troops. It was asserted that guns in excess of 2,300 had fallen into the hands of the Teutonic allies. The bulk of the invading forces presented on November 8 a main frontage of about thirty-five miles back of and along

ITALIAN OFFICIAL PHOTO.

ITALIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN ON A MOUNTAIN TOP

as attacked. Hence neither the Austrians nor the Italians had adopted sufficient protective devices, masks, etc. The Germans had just invented a new and particularly powerful weapon in their so-called "mustard gas," which had made its appearance in the West, and against which even the excellent masks invented by the English proved only partially effective, since this new product attacked the entire body surface, as well as the respiratory organs. An unexpected concentrated barrage of gas-shells, containing a new and terrible poison paralyzing trench occupants from head to foot, would naturally have caused a panic on the Italian front, and the German forward-surging masses took prompt advantage of it.

By November 12 the Italian and Austro-German armies were in battle array along the Piave—the Italians on the western side, the Teutons along the eastern. The Italians were stoutly holding the river line and the region running westward. Several attempts made by the Teutons to pierce the northern front and encircle the Italian left wing had failed. On the upper Piave, however, the Italians had been cut off and forced to surrender. Asiago, on the Trentino front, twenty miles west of the Piave, had been captured after desperate street fighting. British batteries had now taken position along the front, prepared to give support to the defense. An agreement for a Central Military Council for "the entire western front" for the first time recognized and incorporated the Italian as part of the western front, thus terminating the Italian front as a separate unity. It also established a reciprocal control, not only giving the French and British a voice in the Italian campaign, but permitting Italy to advise in the French and British campaign.

Austrians on November 12 crossed the Piave on floats between two railway bridges which linked Trevigo and Oderzo and the Port of Ruaro and Mestres. They had been advancing across the evacuated country at the speed at which the Italian rear-guards retired, feeling their way over roads and halting to make good some of the broken-down bridges. Between the Isonzo and Piave the foot-prints of war had been stamped deep. It was a country covered with villages and bristling with tall, slender cam-

paniles which are characteristic of North Italy—those bell-towers of churches which are descendants of the old Venetian watch-towers along a pirate-infested coast. Many villages had been shelled flat lest the retreating army should use them as observation points. So many churches had suffered ruin at the hands of Germans that it had probably been useless to protest, but the plain of Venice without its companiles became "like a woman without her hair."

Venice was now almost empty, the population having been reduced from the usual 160,000 to 20,000 or even less. The outward appearance of the city was desolate, much as when the Austrians made their last descent upon it more than fifty years before. All the main hotels, cafés, and factories, the jewelry and glassware stores patronized by tourists, were closed. One hotel, on the Grand Canal, remained partly open, and two well-known cafés on the Piazza San Marco or Square of St. Mark, but there was nothing open along the Lido. Authorities were furnishing trains and ships to take away any of the remaining population who wished to go. Such centers as the Rialto, St. Mark's Square, and the quay where gondolas are hired were deserted, except for a few stragglers. All the Grand Canal palaces were closed and the occupants gone, except for a few noble families who remained with a firm purpose not to abandon the city under any circumstances. All Government offices had been removed to points outside the city. Pope Benedict by November 20 had extracted from Germany and Austria a promise not to damage Venice, nor remove her art treasures in case the city should be evacuated. Dispatches from Venice reported heartrending scenes as the civil population went out. Every man between 18 and 45 who was able to handle a gun had left to fight. Practically all women and children had been removed. A few old men, weeping and insisting upon their right to stay in the city, were all who remained. Lagoons and canals were deserted, and interior palace walls showed empty spaces from which works of art had been removed. Even the pigeons in St. Mark's, hungry and neglected for the first time, fluttered with apprehension as the far-off sound of guns vibrated through the air.

The reconcentration of the Italian armies behind the Piave had eliminated the greatest of all perils, which was an enveloping movement coming down from the upper Isonzo and cutting off the retreat of the main armies before Gorizia. Thus the danger of an enormous Sedan had passed. Here was exactly the same thing that had happened in the first Marne campaign when the British and French retired behind the Oise and the Marne. The only question that remained was whether or not the Italians had elected to make their final stand along the Piave. Their line now ran from the hills where the Piave breaks into the Venetian plain, straight south behind the Piave to the Adriatic, the Piave a natural obstacle, an admirable defensive basis, but now, as three weeks before at the Isonzo, the Italians were threatened with an attack from the north behind their front. Precisely as Below struck south from the upper Isonzo behind Cadorna's line about Gorizia, the Austro-Germans could strike south from Borgo, north of the Asiago plateau, behind the Piave. On the military side, the chances indicated that the Italians would retire once more, this time to the Adige, and take their stand behind this river from the Lago di Garda, near Verona, to the Gulf of Venice. Once in this position, their northern flank would rest upon the Lago di Garda, safe from all peril of a flanking thrust. The parallel was with Joffre's strategy in withdrawing his exposed flank until it rested upon the forts of Paris in the Marne campaign. Such a retirement carried with it the evacuation of Venice, Vicenza, and Padua, and would bring Austrian and German artillery to the forts of Verona, with a consequent peril to that city. It would mean a sacrifice which, on the sentimental side, would be very bitter to all Italians, but on the military side it would bring a security it was impossible to see in the Piave position.

During the bewilderment that followed the Caporetto disaster, the simple explanation that it was due to a breakdown in morale found most favor. Later it became obvious that not one cause had led to the defeat, but a complex of causes. It was the year that saw the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the subsequent collapse of the Russian

armies, and the beginning of the final crumbling of the whole Russian Empire. It was a critical year, as far as morale was concerned, not only for Italy, but for the Entente in general. War-weariness had grown with the mere passage of time and as the prospect of an early Entente victory more and more receded, war-weariness increased still further, until the futility of dreams based on Russia had become evident everywhere. "Peace without victory" had acquired attractions for many people. Socialist leaders, in each of the Allied countries, were playing the German game, wittingly or unwittingly, until in Italy, France, and Great Britain there had been a definite growth of Bolshevist ideas. Cadorna had protested against the pacifist propaganda with which his drafted men were becoming infected before they got to the front; in fact a proportion of the troops that came to him from the depots were centers of infection. While the infection was not widespread, the majority of cases being slight, still there were incidents during the summer to give cause for uneasiness.

Besides all this, the trials and hardships undergone by the Italian army and the Italian people had far exceeded, in most ways, those experienced by Great Britain and France. There was great shortage of the type of "canteen" which had been worked with wonderful effect in France—a place where the men, coming up to and going from the trenches, could find hot coffee, or hot soup to cheer them. The necessity for these helps to the life of the soldier came to be understood in Italy slowly. The idea of such assistance had thus far been Anglo-Saxon. The work in France, even with the French Army, was originally started by British and Americans, altho the later development was French. Italy had little assistance of this kind from her allies. Another cause of depression was scarcity of food, both in the army and in the country. The soldier's ration had had to be cut down in 1917 to a scale which would have seemed utterly insufficient to an Englishman or a Frenchman. And while the Italian had to go short of little luxuries and even necessaries, he was further disturbed by news that his family at home was worse off.

There was great suffering in Italy. In many places there was hunger. Cadorna seems to have miscalculated the weight of the blow that was being prepared against the left of the Second Army, and perhaps trusted too much to the apparent strength of the positions held by the Fourth Corps. In any event, he was heavily outnumbered in a critical sector, and the disposition of troops did not take into account to the best advantage the natural strength of ground.

Before heavy snow had fallen in the Alps, the question whether General Diaz could hold the invading forces was being answered in the affirmative. Less than a week after the Teuton blow fell on the Isonzo, the arrival of some Anglo-French forces in the war zone was announced. While the halt to the advancing Germans and Austrians was effected in the field by Italians alone—that is, except for the help given them by a few batteries of Allied guns and a certain number of British aeroplanes—there was great moral value in the support these British and French forces gave, small as they were in number, but this support did not warrant any claims that the British and French forces were mainly responsible for "saving Italy." Until the beginning of December, as far as front lines were concerned, the Italian army had stood entirely alone, and a new front had been established by them before Allied troops even got into line. At the same time, such confidence as was given by knowledge that British and French divisions were standing back of them as reserves, became of great value during those critical days. The actual fighting, however, was done by the Italians.

Teuton forces were reported on November 13 as having crossed the Piave between Monte San Dana and Zenson, some twenty-three miles northeast of Venice, and to have established a bridgehead on the west side of the river. Meanwhile preparations were being made to protect Venice and its historic buildings from the shells of the invaders; sandbags had been piled high around the Palace of the Doges and the Campanile. On the Asiago plateau the invaders had met with several reverses and the Italians on November 15 defeated their efforts to cross the Piave.

Everywhere from Lake Garda eastward and thence southward along the Piave to the Adriatic, they were holding the enemy in check, except in the hilly region of the Asiago plateau, where additional gains had been made by the invaders.

In the hills to the north of the Venetian plain, General Diaz had withdrawn his advanced posts south of Monte Romatico, and thence eastward to where the battle-front met the upper reaches of the Piave. The Italians continued to stiffen their front from Lake Garda to the Adriatic. The Teutonic allies were unable to make any gains of importance. Such attacks as they made met with fierce resistance and ultimate repulse, except in the north, where the town of Cismon, on the east bank of the Brenta, and several hill positions, were taken. All along the Piave a furious artillery action was in progress on November 21. Italian airplanes came into the fray and did notable work in dropping bombs. Near the south of the Piave, in the region known as the "Holland of Italy," engineers opened dikes against Teutonic forces which crossed the stream at Grisolera. The inundation made harder the Teutonic task of bringing up guns with which to shell Venice from the northeast.

One began to hear talk that if the Italian line could hold out a few days longer the tide would turn. A successful Italian defense, extending over six fearful days, had established the fact that the Teutonic power had its limitations. Nothing beyond battalions had as yet crossed the river; no corps or brigade, much less a division, had passed the dead-line. Only at Zenson and Grisolera were there any serious lodgments on the west bank. Because the Italians on the lower Piave had resisted so well, the Germans turned to the north where they still hoped to make a breach. At several places where they gained access to the western bank, they were counter-attacked and forced to withdraw to the water's edge, the Italians capturing considerably more than two thousand prisoners and taking twenty-seven machine-guns. In the hilly region, representing the northern front from Lake Garda to the region south

A SCENE IN THE DOLOMITES
Before the battle of Caporetto the Italians had made advances in the Dolomites

of Feltre, all Austro-German attacks, some of them delivered with extreme violence, were repelled.

Less importance was attached to the situation on the lower, than on the upper, Piave, because on the lower river the defending forces had Austrians alone to deal with. On the edge of the Asiago plateau between the upper Piave and the Brenta, German troops were in action, but the defenders appeared to be slowly giving ground. Nevertheless the vigor of the defense suggested that here, too, the Italians were digging their heels into the ground, and that the battle was approaching the trench deadlock stage. For a comparatively narrow front of about thirty miles between the Piave and the Brenta, the defenders had railway facilities in two short lines which ran up the valleys from the main Verona-Padua-Treviso line, whereas the invaders had to depend on two widely bifurcating lines, one from the west through the Val Sugana in the Trentino, the other from the east through Udine.

Germany found compensations for her arrested drive. Her rich harvest of war-material constituted an enormous asset. The guns captured were not only a positive addition to her artillery, but a loss to the Allies of a great part of the recent production of guns which had been going on in Great Britain and France. The loss in fact represented a large part of what those countries could produce over and above replacements in twelve months. Already the Allies' demands for guns had been hard to meet. The Admiralty wanted them for arming merchantmen, the air service wanted great numbers for anti-aircraft purposes, and the armies always wanted them. How to equip with guns the coming American forces had been a pressing problem, when suddenly was superadded to these tasks that of making good the loss of guns by the Italians. All the needed guns would eventually be made, and the demands met, but this would take time. The Italian losses in men and material were enormous. More than 200,000 prisoners and 2,300 guns fell into Teutonic hands. In regard to prisoners, a large proportion consisted of non-combatant troops, chiefly labor battalions, who had been engaged in hurrying on the construction of new roads, hutments and water-supply, rep-

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THE COLLEONI STATUE IN VENICE

Because of threatened bombardments of Venice, the Italians took down and stored in safety this masterpiece of Italian sculpture. A copy of the famous work was erected a few years ago in Newark, N. J.

dered necessary by the advance upon the Bainsizza. But the number of combatants captured was large, and many more who had become "disbanded" could not be reckoned upon for weeks to come. The loss of guns, stores, and equipment was no less serious, and perhaps was even more serious.

After severe repulses with heavy casualties, the invaders, by November 25, had switched their main offensive to the Asiago plateau, but here also they were held up and could not gain a yard of ground. The fighting along the Piave, from the hilly region to the Adriatic, was sporadic, but at one place where the Teutons attempted to cross on pontoons they were wiped out by the fire of defending artillery. The Italians had now caught their breath, having become accustomed to German attacks, with all their ferocity and disregard of loss. They fought steadily every foot of the way, and in general gave the Germans as hard blows as they received. German gains were unimportant, as far as actual territory was concerned, but they made in the south slight ones which brought them somewhat nearer the plains. The experience of three years had shown that almost inevitably when a German offensive of this character slowed down and halted it was difficult to "speed it up" again.

By November 24 considerable British and French reinforcements—infantry and artillery—had arrived after days of anxious waiting in which the Italians had borne the brunt of terrific fighting on both fronts and kept back the enemy from a further invasion of the Venetian plain. It was now a month since the offensive started, and more than a fortnight since the Italians checked it on the Piave. The whole campaign had been made up of episodes of heroism too numerous even to be listed. One brigade fought for eight consecutive days, stopping neither day nor night —all this in weather ten degrees below the freezing point, in a region covered with snow, where soldiers were compelled to remain for a long time motionless, lest they be discovered against the whiteness of the snow before they pounced in surprize attacks upon the enemy.

Alpini and Bersaglieri who defended strongholds on the

Asiago were troops taken from the Carnia and Cadore fronts, where they had passed their lives. They dug trenches in solid rock during battle, built shelters for the wounded, hid machine-guns under ground and suffered hardships which were aggregated by the winter season. A battalion of Alpini, attacked by great enemy masses near Meletta di Gallic, lost two-thirds of its effectives without yielding an inch of ground. The Teutonic losses also were heavy. Three divisions on a front of ten miles, between San Marino and Fener, had to be withdrawn because decimated. From the Asiago plateau to the Piave the Teutons suffered appalling losses without gaining any advantage. Between the Piave and the Brenta they wore out six divisions. Terrible blizzards swept over the mountains, and on November 27 a heavy fall of snow forced the enemy to delay moving up heavy artillery and made movements of reinforcements practically impossible. The Italians, accustomed to mountain-fighting, repeatedly attacked with all the fury of the storm which was raging across the lines. They harassed the Austrians day and night.

The Italian rally, when it came, took on the character of the French resistance at Verdun. If the Italians could hold the invaders, they promised to rank with Pétain's troops, who on the hills above the Meuse had made good their proud boast, "They shall not pass." Apparently the peril of a supreme disaster was over. The situation was well in hand, so far as it was a military situation, while, so far as it was a moral situation, there had been an unmistakable rebound of Italian spirit. Invaded Italy had returned to the fight in something of the spirit of France. One could hope that Venice was safe and that the crest of the invasion had passed. Germany elsewhere had lost the war so far as it was a military question. She could not defeat the armies of her enemies. She could only win by corrupting people behind armies and portions of the armies themselves. On the Western Front it was the period of Haig's advance on the Flemish ridges.

Again had German history in the war been repeated. After a great initial success, when it seemed that the opposing force had been completely shattered, suddenly there

had come a lull in the fighting, a temporary check, and then a halting of the advance. The reason in the Italian case was most probably found in the breaking down of the German transport service. Beyond a certain point transport difficulties in war are multiplied. In Italy, before German transports could bring up a full ammunition supply, the Italians had seized the more vital points in their retreat, prepared them for defense, and made a positive stand. Delay was fatal to Teutonic success. Meanwhile English and French guns were being hurried to the front to replace those left in German hands. The Germans tried desperately, but in vain, to forestall this work. Real winter had now seized the mountains in its grip. The temperature was fluttering about zero. Each day made the Teuton task more and more difficult. It was beginning to appear impossible for them to make any impression on the Italian lines in the mountain section. Intense cold and heavy snows, with drifts and dangerous slides, offered to transports more and more difficulties. The Entente Allies could now breathe more easily and conclude with justifiable optimism that the Teuton danger to Italy was at an end.

The first American ambulances to enter active service on the Italian front left Milan on December 13. There were three units, comprising 65 ambulances and 110 American university students. Citizens of Milan gave the Americans a great send-off. They passed in review before high officials in a great parade. By January 1, the American Red Cross expected to have at least 200 cars on the Italian front. These units were America's first official participation in the war in Italy.

The mountains between the Asiago plateau and the plain are a jumbled mass, penetrated by small valleys, through which run roads, winding in and out among precipitous peaks. The Austrians attempted to gain access to these valley-roads and to follow them down into the plain. Such an operation, if successful, would not only have flanked the Piave line but cut in behind the Brenta position, and thus turned both rivers at the same time, forcing the Italians to make a long retreat from the Piave to the Adige. Only minor successes were achieved, however. Checked on this

front, the Austrians were trying the same thing east of the Brenta. The fight was kept at the highest pitch, but inconsiderable progress was made. Practically all the Austrian effort was expended against heights within two miles of the Brenta. The Austrians stormed Monte Capriele, one of this series of peaks. This placed them on both the north and west of Monte Asolone. They then shifted the attack to Monte Grappa. But after repeated attacks in which they suffered heavy losses, the action was suspended and the fighting taken up between Monte Grappa and Monte Asolone. Here a wedge was driven into the Italian positions which completed the semicircle about Asolone.

The Italians, being flanked, were obliged to fall back and leave Asolone in Austrian hands, which left Monte Grappa exposed to attacks from both the north and west. The Teutonic gains were not commensurate, however, with their losses. The Austrians were fighting against time. The weather had been unusually favorable for them. Heavy snows and blizzards of great intensity were common in those mountains at that time of the year, but the weather now was fine. Had new storms occurred, the fighting would have had to come to an end, because the Austrian army would then have been in a difficult position as to supplies. The lines of supply available were railroads which ran down the valleys of the Piave and Brenta and the connecting highway which came westward from Feltre. Leading from these to the actual fighting front were nothing but indifferent mountain-roads and narrow trails. Not only would all dirt roads be blocked by heavy snows characteristic of these regions, but there was a probability that railroad traffic would be seriously interfered with. Should this happen, the Austrians would have to draw out of the mountains, leaving only a thin line to hold their positions. Altogether the Italian situation, despite great Teutonic gains, seemed at last to be well in hand. Even a cursory visit to the Grappa sector was sufficient to reveal convincingly how very far the enemy was from achieving his objectives, and how formidable the Italian positions were, backed up now by a rejuvenated army, thoroughly reorganized and re-equipped and whose spirit had been shown

by a counter-attack which recaptured the great Solone position.

In the third week of December the Austro-Germans renewed in great strength their effort to pierce the Italian line. In fierce fighting around Monte Asolone, reinforcements in large numbers were brought up and the Italians compelled to give ground. Likewise, along the southern reaches of the Piave, there was heavy fighting. A crossing of the old Piave on pontoon bridges was successfully carried out, but later the Italians drove back the Teutons to the water's edge. In attacking positions near Monte Asolone, Diaz's troops regained a considerable portion of the terrain and held it, notwithstanding the terrific artillery-fire that was turned upon them. The situation was not expected long to continue, for the Austro-Germans were constantly bringing up heavy reinforcements and a return to their offensive was expected. Reinforced by British and French troops and newly equipped in every department, the Italians, however, were prepared to sell at a dear price every inch of ground.

The battle on the Piave was raging as late as December 25, but the Italians had recaptured, despite stubborn resistance, positions they had lost on the Asiago plateau. Berlin reports tended to minimize the setback and put stress on the repulse of Italian counter-attacks. The entire mountain region where the heavy fighting had been going on was having an unusual experience for the holiday season. Slopes and summits were green, the entire area in the Brenta valley free from snow, and the weather mild. Between the Brenta and the Piave, Monte Grappa, which usually has four to six feet of snow, had only from ten to twelve inches on its northern slopes and six inches on its southern. Montes Asolone, Pertica, and Solarolo, where the heaviest fighting occurred had only a few inches; it varied from three to five inches and did not last, owing to the mild weather. In the foothills was no snow and the temperature was above freezing-point. Similar conditions existed on the Carso and in Julian ranges, through which the Austrians maintained their communications with the invaded regions of eastern Venetia. Owing to this mild

weather, the enemy was able to operate four distinct lines of communication to Gorizia, Udine, and Venetia.

One of the heaviest air-raids the Teutons had attempted on this front came to grief on December 25, when eleven airplanes of a fleet of twenty-five were destroyed. The big fleet swept over the camp west of Treviso, sixteen miles north of Venice, at 8 o'clock in the morning, flying low and discharging machine-guns. Considerable damage was done, but, notwithstanding the surprize, Italian and British machines were soon in the air and engaged at close quarters. The fighting was most spectacular, eight of the Teutonic cars being brought down, six of them falling within the Italian lines. The other machines beat a hasty retreat. The raiders returned at 11 o'clock and three more were disposed of, two falling inside the Italian lines. One of the machines brought down was a dreadnought carrying three persons. The others carried two. All the Italian machines returned safely.

By January 1, winter at last had come to the relief of the Italians and their French and British allies. The New Year brought blizzard weather, choking gorges with snow and bringing arctic temperature. For the invaders the setting in of winter, bitter and relentless, meant privation and difficulties, which it had been their plan to escape by a rapid and irresistible advance. Luck had deserted the Teutonic armies on what seemed the threshold of success. The degree of cold could be judged from a zero temperature reported at Lyons. The whole mountain country as far north as the Vosges was snowbound. Even in Central France snow lay three feet deep on the level, with railroads "completely blocked." The grave problem for the Austro-German commander was to keep his troops rationed over a single railroad buried in snow. In addition, he had to protect them from severer cold than the *Grande Armie* ever encountered on its retreat from Moscow. Regiments were said to be crippled and in a state of starvation. Unless they were relieved, a surrender to the enemy might follow, in spite of iron German discipline.

Italian troops struck the Teutons a hard blow on January 28 in the mountain region west of the Brenta, where their

purpose had been to push down the Frenzela valley toward Bassano. They made an advance along the stretch from the Brenta to Asiago, and captured more than 2,000 men, including sixty officers. War-material was taken and havoc spread in some of the forward trenches. Aerial activity was especially active, Italians bringing down ten machines and the French two. The battle was fought by mountain troops, infantry, and Bersaglieri, with support from batteries and fleets of airplanes, manned by Italian, French, and British. Late in the day the enemy made violent counter-attacks, which were broken up. The Italians retained possession of Col de Rosso and Monte di Val Bella, but were unsuccessful in the Monte Sisemol region, where their attack collapsed with heavy casualties. On February 1 the Austrians made an attempt to drive the Italians from Monte di Val Bella, but were unable to reach the Italian line. Remarkable fighting qualities were shown by the Sardinians. Austro-Germans captured the heights of Col de Rosso and Monte di Val Bella, peaks rising just outside of the mountain wall, through which the Brenta breaks before going down to Bassano. A heavy fall of snow then delayed the Austro-German offensive.[13]

[13] Principal Sources: "Nelson's History of the War" by John Buchan, The London *Times'* "History of the War"; The *Tribune*, The *Times*, The *Evening Post*, the "Military Expert" of The *Times*, New York; Associated Press dispatches.

VI

AUSTRIA'S DÉBÂCLE ON THE PIAVE—ITALIAN NAVAL EXPLOITS

May 1, 1918—November 3, 1918

THAT Austria would resume her successful offensive in the spring of 1918 was thought probable, but weeks passed without any visible sign of her doing so. Not until early in May, or about six weeks after Ludendorff began his offensive in northern France, did increased tension appear. Emperor Charles, accompanied by his Chief of Staff and other German officers, was then reported on his way to the Italian front, and a great movement of troops was taking place in the Tyrol. Another offensive had really become obligatory upon Austria because of the grave political and economic conditions at home. The Austrian movement, however, was essentially a part of Ludendorff's offensive. German domination of Austria had now become complete. For food administration purposes at least the Tyrol and Bohemia had virtually been annexed.

By the middle of May, the Asiago plateau, east of the Brenta, had flared up into violent action, but the aggressive had been taken by the Italians, so that Austro-German forces, instead of launching a long-expected assault of their own, found themselves compelled to fight hard to maintain the positions they had been occupying since November. The fighting centered between Monte Asolone and Monte Pertica, two heights about three miles apart, rising to an altitude of 5,000 feet. From Vienna and Rome official statements spoke of the fighting as bitter, Rome stating that Italian soldiers had entered Austrian trenches on Monte Asolone in two places. The fighting was fierce east of the Brenta, but the whole Italian line from Lake Garda to the Piave and thence to the sea was marked by isolated actions, which might become component parts of a greater plan later in the season.



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ROME CELEBRATING IN THE COLISEUM THE ANNIVERSARY OF OUR ENTRY INTO THE WAR

IX. In the upper tier, where once were seats for a Roman populace, our flag is seen hanging

A daring raid, at this time, on the Austrian naval base at Pola was made by Italian units, and an Austrian battleship of the 20,000 ton type was destroyed, naval forces being aided in their operations by cooperation from an aerial squadron. Details of the exploit showed that it was one of the most audacious feats of the war, worthy to rank with the British exploit at Zeebrugge. The plans for it had been matured by Lieutenant-Commander Pellegrini. A raiding party escorted by destroyers arrived at Pola at 2 o'clock in the morning when it was very dark. The moon had been down two hours, but a long neck of land pointed the way into the great harbor, in which lay Austria's fleet of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, encircled by a frowning terrace of land batteries. The preparations called for a dash in the darkness followed by a discharge of torpedoes at the big ships, after which the Italians, having blown up their own craft, were to jump overboard and take their chances of capture or drowning. All realized that there would be practically no chance of returning alive.

Three lines of Austrian defense were encountered, first a guardship, then wooden buoys marking a chain of mines, and last, a heavy steel net strung from bank to bank. How the Italians were able to penetrate these obstructions remained a mystery, particularly as to the steel net. The silence was first broken by two distant explosions of torpedoes, followed by the sound of an alarm-gun from the inner harbor. Two signals of parti-colored lights then slowly rose. The first meant that Pellegrini had torpedoed a battleship; the second said "Don't mind us; we have no chance." In the meantime, the sky had become vivid with searchlights, while land batteries poured a terrific fire on the invaders who, however, managed to escape, altho searchlights and countless batteries continued to play for them. As daylight broke, a fleet of Austrian airplanes swooped down upon the scene, but they were beaten off by a smaller fleet of Italian planes. Three Austrian machines fell into the water during the battle.

Pellegrini's exploit recalled how, only a few months before, on December 9, 1917, Luigi Rizzo, a Sicilian, aged

31, formerly in the merchant service, had sunk in Trieste harbor the battleship *Wien* on a dark and moonless night. With Italian torpedo-boats, Rizzo had approached the port, steering with great caution, as far as Muggia, and then after cutting the wire entanglements at the mouth of the harbor, shot his boats through. It was about two o'clock in the morning when the outlines of great vessels were seen. Rizzo went for the first, while Ferrarini, who was in the second motor-scout, steered for the other. Each discharged two torpedoes and the two warships were hit. Rizzo's ship sank the *Wien*. Ferrarini's victim was only damaged. Confusion followed, guns were fired and torpedoes discharged, but both scouts escaped and reached their base.

Rizzo afterward had an exploit more amazing than the first. In June he destroyed the *Szent Istvan*—this time not in harbor but in the open Adriatic. No other individual in this war had had the fortune to sink two such monsters. The fight in June occurred six miles off shore. The warship was sunk, or believed to have been sunk, by torpedoes released from two tiny motor-craft, while hemmed in by dreadnoughts and destroyers. The exploit was hailed throughout Italy as one of the most gallant of the war, and Rizzo became a popular naval hero. He had been cruising at the time off the Dalmatian coast, in a motor-craft belonging to a flotilla that he commanded. He had with him one other boat in command of a midshipman named Aenizo. Between them the two had approximately thirty men. They were going quietly along the coast thirty miles southeast of Pola when a great column of smoke attracted their attention. Rizzo said afterward:

"I changed my course and was soon running northward. I could make out in the dim dawn—it was about 2.50 o'clock—that a powerful enemy-squadron was approaching. There were two dreadnoughts flanked by two destroyers. I called on my men for volunteers and every one said he was ready to begin an attack. I ordered Aenizo to attack as he thought best, and then I made straight for the squadron. They did not see or hear me. When I judged the moment was right, I slipt between the second and third escorting destroyers. As I passed, the former caught sight of me and the alarm whistle was blown violently. She began firing but her shells passed over us. I

was already over the line a distance of 400 or 600 feet. I let go my torpedoes, one striking on a line with the funnels and the second struck further off, but exploded with full force."

Commander Rizzo was now inside the Austrian line with his torpedoes all gone. An Austrian destroyer turned to run him down. But he had another resource left—depth charges. Comparing the speed of his own little vessel with that of the destroyer, he flung a charge overboard. As it failed to explode, he forced a second depth charge into the water and then saw the destroyer "lifted up in the sea and roll like a drunken man," badly hit. Altho a third destroyer rushed toward him in an attempt to ram his small craft, Rizzo slipt away, the whole fight not lasting more than twenty minutes. Meanwhile Aenizo's boat had slipt up to the rear convoy of the destroyers and fired two torpedoes at the second *Viribus Unitis*. The first slipt past her bows, but the second hit her full toward the stern. Aenizo saw the dreadnought that had been attacked by Rizzo was keeling over, and he pushed away his own boat. Some desultory firing in his direction followed, but the shots failed to hit because of his nearness. Sixteen hours afterward, Italian aircraft flying over the scene saw masses of wreckage drifting away to the north. Other aircraft which flew over Pola reported that only one dreadnought was left where once there were four. The third dreadnought of the *Viribus Unitis* type was the one which had been torpedoed earlier in the harbor of Pola.

Austria's expected land offensive, which developed into one of great force, and was made after long preparations, began on June 15, and extended over the entire front. At that time Ludendorff had been slightly checked in the west—notably by the American marines and other units of the Second Division at Château-Thiérry and Belleau Wood. On the Asiago line, Italian, British, and French forces still held positions firmly and recaptured other positions on Monte Asolone, east of the Brenta and on Monte Solarola, but at two places on the lower Piave the Austrians forced a passage. This was at a point thirty-three miles from the sea, but in the Fagare-Musile region nearer the coast, the Italians prest them closely. The Austrian offensive had been

fixt by Ludendorff for June, in expectation that by that time his own campaign in the west would have attained a decisive success, and that a similar achievement in the South, by crushing the only remaining active hostile Entente army, would have ended the war. His program by the middle of June had miscarried, through successive checkmates administered by Foch to German efforts in the West—in Picardy, French Flanders, and on the Marne.

A great change had come over the Italians since October, 1917. Their leaders, roused to new efforts from consciousness of their shortcomings, had carried on a systematic campaign of education, bringing home to the people exactly what the war meant and what it was for. The temper and morale of the Italian had in fact been raised higher than it had ever been. Teutonic barbarism, as evidenced in German treatment of occupied parts of Italy, had reacted and, together with educational forces, had done much to restore the fighting ability of the Italians and bring back their confidence, and so the Italian lines stood fast; in fact, the Italians and their allies gained ground after the attack lost its momentum. Small initial advances were made by the Austrians, but nowhere was there any evidence of an Italian panic such as had occurred when the two antagonists last met. Every foot temporarily gained by the Austrians was gained at terrible cost. The attack in one sense became unique in the war.

Heretofore in the first rush of a heavy attack, the defense had gained ground rapidly until the shock of impact could be absorbed, which usually was after the first few miles, but the Italian lines in this offensive practically stood fast from the beginning. The character of the Austrian troops employed was obviously below par. They had no stomach left for fight; they could not be driven forward in the face of destructive opposition. Never first-class troops, they had been beaten in this war in every fight in which they had been engaged. It was only when Germany came to their aid that they were able to hold their own even against Serbians, Russians, Italians, or Roumanians, and now they had to fight alone, for Germany was using all her man-power in northern France.

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AUSTRIAN PRISONERS FROM THE BATTLE OF THE PIAVE

The Austrians at the beginning secured a strong foothold on Montello, took the village of Nervesa and established a bridgehead. Fifteen pontoons were thrown across the river to connect the two forces and keep up the necessary flow of supplies. Other crossings were effected further down, between Maserada and Candelu, and near Fagara, where the railroad from Treviso crossed. Near the lagoons the Austrians took Capo Sile, occupied the triangle between the Piave and the Fossetta Canal, and crossed the canal—a part of the operation that was, in a measure, successful. But the mere crossing of a river was not a vital thing. In order that any results should flow from it, it was necessary for troops after they effected their crossing, to debouch on the other bank. They must, in other words, cross in such force as to be able, after establishing themselves on the opposite bank, to spread out laterally like a fan and clear the bank on either side. When this had been done, a sufficient advance had to be made from the river to give room behind for maneuvering. If, after crossing, the forces were held close to the river, unable to advance, or to clear the bank above and below them; if, in short, after getting across, the advance was suddenly checked, the crossing would be more of a detriment than an advantage. Crossing a stream in the face of an enemy, rather than by surprize-maneuver, is always a hazardous undertaking in war. Against troops in any way equal, with numbers as great and with equal morale, it is practicably impossible to achieve anything more than a mere crossing.

The fighting on Montello, where the crossing was first made, was, for the first two days, desperate. Then it died down for a day, and the Austrians suddenly found themselves in a serious predicament. The Piave, which up to this time had been very low, suddenly, by reason of heavy rains in the mountains, became a flood. Bridges which the Austrians had built were swept away, leaving Austrian troops to the number of about 40,000 isolated on the western bank, where they could go neither forward nor backward. At no point were the Austrians able to do more than make good their crossings. They could not push their way westward, but were held at the bridgeheads which they had

established at heavy cost, unable to advance beyond them. At Capo Sile they had a favorable opportunity, because the condition of the ground in that marshy area made the defense somewhat difficult. But here, too, they failed. The result was that the greatest Austrian effort of the war was doomed to failure at the beginning. The Austrians had to make some move to relieve the situation—to recross the river and acknowledge themselves beaten, or surrender. There was no alternative, unless Germany could again come to Austria's assistance. This she had done many times before, so often in fact as to have formed the habit. But if this were done, it would so seriously interfere with the German needs in France as to make them hazardous and practically unworkable. Ludendorff afterward maintained that Austria's failure was the chief cause of his own.

Germany was in the saddle—or Ludendorff was—and was exercising complete control. Germany had had excellent reasons for insisting on an offensive in Italy at this time. Her experience in France, and especially in the last ten days, had not been particularly cheering. She had found that, while the Allied line in the West could be bent, and, if taken by surprize, bent badly, there was nothing to indicate a possibility of breaking it. An offensive in Italy, should it succeed, might result as before in a shifting of Allied strength from France to Italy. Germany needed help on the French front, and perhaps decided to get it by way of Italy, through forcing Allied troops away from the Western Front to protect Italy. One Teuton offensive had thus crowded on the heels of another, so urgent was Germany's fight against time. Ludendorff's fourth major effort in France, launched on June 9, toward Compiègne, had failed on June 12, and on June 15 the offensive which Austria-Hungary had been threatening for a couple of months in northern Italy was let loose.

The operation became a general frontal attack on a line ninety miles long, stretching from the Asiago plateau to the Adriatic. The Italians had the advantage of interior lines and well developed communications; they lay within a concave arc where they had the use of both lateral and perpendicular railroads, while the Austro-Hungarians were

on the convex side and had no lateral communications. To pass from one end of the Austrian line to another involved a tedious and circuitous journey of many miles back to the rear and then around. The offensive became the weakest Teuton effort made in 1918. It showed ferocity but no intensive, sustained quality. Rome soon dismissed it as a failure. It emphasized again the vast discrepancy between German and Austrian military capacity. Germany was only just passing her peak of military efficiency, while Austria-Hungary was in the last stages of military decline.

Italian, French and British troops were now on the Piave front to meet the shock on a 100-mile front. The first force of the Austrian blow in the mountain region drove the defenders back to their third line, but at that point they held their ground and by successive counter-attacks reoccupied important positions on the Asiago plateau and recaptured mountain heights along the Brenta. On the low land the Austrians had crossed the Piave at three places south of Montello, where the battle-line left the river and mounted westward into the Alps. Nowhere was the struggle so severe as on the Piave, but one of the most brilliant actions was the defense of the Monte Moschin salient which protected important Brenta positions. Here the Austrians suffered heavy losses, having many of their machine-guns captured. The severity of the fighting was disclosed in the fact that artillery fired 70,000 shells in twelve hours. Austro-Hungarian casualties were reckoned in thousands, while those of the Allies were comparatively light. Austria had sixty divisions in Italy, and yet the attacking forces did not really succeed at any point. There was a relatively brief, but extremely violent, artillery preparation with gas-shells. After a bombardment that aimed to destroy the Italian front line and paralyze Italian artillery, the Austrians, under cover of an artificial fog created by smoke apparatus, advanced in open formation to an attack. The bombardment, however, had been frustrated by Italian artillery, which destroyed lines and shelters, made full hits on massed troops, and drenched battle-emplacements with gas. When the Austrian infantry came into the front-line

zones they met resistance from Italian machine-guns, and a counter-attack from supporting troops.

Not alone did the Italians and their British and French comrades hold in check the Austrian offensive along the greater part of the battle-front; they soon turned aggressors themselves on some of the more important sectors, and especially in the mountain regions. The strokes of the enemy were particularly violent on the Montello plateau, the capture of which would have given them command of roads leading through Treviso to Venice and a fairway

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ITALIAN GUNS ON A BARGE IN THE LOWER PIAVE

westward through the province of Treviso. Even with Emperor Charles at the front the Austrians became demoralized. Their deficiencies, in comparison with Italian troops, became more evident than ever before, while British airplanes did notable work. The number of foot-bridges destroyed by British bombs was seven, some 25,000 cartridges being fired at the Austrians when they were scurrying across bridges. The enemy had engaged 29 out of a total of 58 or 59 divisions.

The first two days were enough to show that the Allies

did not face a situation like that on the Isonzo in October, 1917, or that in Picardy, at Armentières, or on the Aisne in the spring of 1918. The sense of relief shown at Rome had a double source. In France anxiety at the front had centered about military facts only—in the worst days of defeat there had been no really serious question of morale. But in Italy morale had perhaps been the main cause of anxiety. It was not simply a question whether an army that had suffered as heavily as the Italian army did in October, 1917, could "come back," but whether an army which undeniably had for a time gone to pieces in spirit, could re-form. It was primarily the splendid Italian revival of morale, the reassertion of staying power, that the Deputies in Rome had welcomed heartily. It meant that Italy, like France, had passed through the fire and emerged finely tempered. Taken in conjunction with the exploits of Italy's seamen, with Rizzo's gallant feat still on every tongue, one could easily imagine the effect of the situation on the nation's mind and heart.

The results obtained by the Austrians were all the more meager, in view of the extremely ambitious nature of their plans. The attack was delivered on a front almost twice as long as the front of Germany's elaborate effort in Picardy in March. One could only wonder how Austrian leaders could have felt themselves capable of supervising an operation twice as big as Ludendorff's, with nothing like the striking power that Ludendorff then had at his disposal. The Austrian total strength along the whole Italian front, both on the line and in reserve, was estimated by the Allies at perhaps seventy-five divisions. Instead of 10,000 men to a mile, which Ludendorff sent forward, the Austrians could have employed hardly half as many men and when one took into further account the established inferiority of Austrian troops, and the much more rugged territory they had to deal with, it was more difficult than ever to understand why the attempt should have been made along the whole front, instead of being concentrated for a break along twenty or thirty miles, which would have been sufficient if a real breach could have been made.

General Bovoeric's offensive, only in a restricted sense, was

a counterpart of the tactics of Ludendorff in France and Belgium. His armies like Ludendorff's were equipped with some of the newest German offensive devices, like an artificially created fog and dirigible smoke clouds to cover the first rush; they had the latest gassing devices, and had benefited from a certain amount of training in the Hutier storming methods; but there the resemblance ended. In strategy the action departed widely from Ludendorff's. The Germans, moving west from St. Quentin on March 21, had attacked on a fifty-mile front; the more ambitious Austrians chose a front of ninety miles or more, when they had not divisions enough to maintain an attack on such a front without compromising their ability to deliver crushing blows at specified points such as Ludendorff always aimed at delivering. An offensive thus spread out was an aid to the defensive, in that it enabled the Allies to apply a great deal more strength in meeting the first shock. It involved many separate battles, instead of one great battle on one sector, where the assailant had created an overwhelming superiority in numbers and so equalized the chances of the offensive and the defense. All this was in violation of the fundamental Napoleonic doctrine of concentration for attack.

Austria-Hungary could look back to great victories in olden wars on the soil of northern Italy. She could recall Custozza and Novara, but in the Italian wars of Francis Joseph's early days she had for leader Radetzky, a Czech, and the flower of her armies were Slavic troops, then the main prop of Francis Joseph's throne, hating the Italians and fighting against them gladly. In this war Austria-Hungary at one time could count on the southern Slavs to defend Trieste and the Adriatic provinces, but since the recent Italian settlement with the Jugo-Slavs, in the Pact of Rome, the whole situation had changed. Austrian Slavs were now fighting in Allied ranks and Slav peoples of the Dual Monarchy were practically in revolt. They had nothing to fear from the break-up of the Austrian monarchy—nothing to gain by shedding their blood for it. General Boyoeric was no Radetzky, altho he also was a Slav; but he did not lead troops whose heart was in their work. The spirit which won Custozza and Novara was dead. Every Austrian,

Hungarian, and Slav now serving in the armies against Italy knew that the cause he fought for was not Austrian, or Hungarian, or Slav, but German.

After being foiled in mountain areas, the Austrians redoubled their efforts to break through on the Piave front, but without making any marked progress. This phase of the battle became exceptionally violent. The Italians resisted the onslaughts of twelve divisions, constantly replenished by reserves from between Susegana and Conegliano. Mass-attacks between Montello and the Piave were carried out by twenty-five first-line divisions and eight reserve divisions. On the mountain section the battle had resolved itself into local operations. Enemy forces estimated at 92 divisions—80 of infantry and 12 of cavalry—approximately 1,000,000 men, and 7,500 guns of all calibers—had probably been brought into action on the entire Italian front, but the pincers were not closing upon Italy with the precision of October. In fact, they did not seem to be closing in at all. The upper jaw in the Venetian Alps had been halted by Italian, British, and French forces.

The offensive settled down into a series of nondescript operations, which did not disclose any definite form or strategical purpose. No material advance was indicated—no advance at all, in fact, except on the west bank of the Piave. It started raggedly and was halted almost in its tracks. It had developed a little secondary punch in the Piave region, but it remained a series of loosely connected operations, along a far too extended front. It had been so long delayed that the Italians had had ample time in which to collect reserves to meet it. What the Emperor Charles needed was not a local success here and there in northern Italy, but an imposing victory with which to restore confidence at home and quiet not only his half-rebellious Slavs but his war-weary Austrians and Hungarians. With this offensive a failure, he had now to stand on the defensive. Austria's fighting spirit was flickering out. Her mountain barriers might protect her for months to come, but she could hardly cast her eyes again toward Verona, Vicenza, and Padua, or even toward Venice.

Indications multiplied that the Austrians were doomed

ITALIANS BEHIND A BARRAGE ON THE PIAVE FRONT

to defeat. The fighting, however, was not yet over, as they had prepared for a longer offensive and had mustered their maximum strength. The struggle settled down to a series of pitched battles of great intensity, battles in which numbers became the most prominent factor. Numerous attempts were made to gain further bridgeheads on the western bank of the Piave, but the Italians everywhere checked them with gun-fire, doing sanguinary work in the ranks across the river with bombs and machine-gun fire. More than 9,000 men had been taken by the Italians since the offensive began, many guns and several hundred machine-guns. Fifty enemy planes had been shot down, while only two Allied machines failed to return to their base.

The heaviest fighting was around the bridgehead the Austrians established on the lower Piave, where they were trying to push westward toward Venice. They held the west bank of the river from Meserade to Fossalta and San Dona Di Piave, a front of about twelve miles. Their artillery was pouring thousands of poison-, tear-, emetic-, and mustard-gas shells into rear areas, until Schio, Bassano, Asolo, and Treviso were thus rendered practically uninhabitable. To all outward appearances the offensive was doomed to failure all the way from the Venetian Alps to the Adriatic. In the hill region ground was recaptured, while along the Piave, where intensive fighting was in progress, at some points with fluctuating results, the balance toward ultimate victory swayed in favor of Italian arms. South and east of the Asiago the French and Italians, in brilliant counter-offensives, retook Pennar, Bertigo, and Costalunga, past which the Austrians had hoped to push their front and gain the Astigo valley, which leads to Vicenza on the plains below. Not alone were the positions regained, but more than two hundred prisoners fell into the hands of Allied troops. Farther south, between Fossalta and San Dona di Piave, the Italians pushed back the invaders and captured Capo Sile. Possession of the valley of Capo Sile meant control of the Piave River locks, by which a stretch of 125 square miles could be flooded or made dry land.

After four days of fighting the operations were confined to two salients on the Piave, where the Austrians who had

crossed were surrounded by the Italians, the swollen river preventing their retreat, and Italian artillery and airplanes inflicting losses upon them. Communicating bridges had been destroyed, making it difficult to bring up supplies, and the exhausted enemy abandoned operations in mountain regions. Repeated attempts to cross the river south of Montello failed and the losses inflicted were tremendous. Italians estimated that of twenty divisions who were engaged in the first three days many had been withdrawn. Two were taken out of battle at Monte Grappa with losses of several thousand men each. The Austrians had practically used up their reserves, whereas the Italian reserves remained intact. The first four regiments that attacked the Montello plateau were practically wiped out, the losses inflicted on some of the succeeding regiments aggregating 50 per cent. One Austrian officer, who tried to lead his men across the Piave, stated that at least one in every ten of his men was killed before reaching the river bank. He had orders to cross at any cost and suffered terribly in consequence. Austrian prisoners said they had been told they would find abundant food-supplies on the other side of the river.

The open fighting permitted Italian cavalry to act. In a certain sector on the Piave, 500 mounted Lancers made a spectacular charge, breaking up five barricades and slaughtering large numbers. It was established that five enemy divisions (60,000) were on the west side of the river. Attempts to cross or recross in boats and rafts resulted in many being swept away and drowned. Slavonic units, aiding Italian troops, performed brilliant work. In the mountains, Italian, British, and French troops secured the upper hand, and along the Piave from the Montello plateau to the mouth of the river east of Venice, the Italians, notwithstanding prodigious thrusts by the enemy, here and there made gains. Hoping to alleviate the situation, the Austrians on June 21 delivered attacks on the Montello plateau, the keystone position for an advance to the plains, but met with repulse. American aviators who had joined Allied airmen bombed the pontoon-bridges.

By June 23 the first phase of the Austrian offensive had

ended in defeat. The culmination of what was intended to be the crushing of Italy had been the rout of the invaders themselves. With their backs to the swollen Piave, the Austrians tried for several days to ward off vicious counter-attacks and save the situation. Then under great pressure they tried to recross the stream and reach safety on its eastern bank. From Montello to the Adriatic they were now in retreat, having had losses estimated at 180,000 men. There was doubt if they could escape without additional heavy casualties. Large numbers of pontoon-bridges had been swept away by the torrential stream on all sectors of a thirty-three-mile front. The Austrians were sorely harassed by Italian guns, by machine-gun fire and by the aviators' bombs.

Numerous official documents secured from prisoners afforded evidence that Austria had confidently expected a big smash through along the whole front, the speedy rout and destruction of the Allied forces, colossal booty in foodstuffs and munitions, and comparatively easy attainment of all objectives within three days. Fifty divisions had been lined against the Italian front when Austria opened the battle. They were numerically equivalent in units to seventy-five German divisions. The force therefore was greater than Germany had ever hurled forward at the first moment of an offensive. Nine of these divisions had been completely annihilated and fifteen were worn out in attacks on the peaks east of Asiago. Fifteen more were concentrated against the key-position of Monte Grappa, where they gained nothing. In the name of its heroic defenders, Diaz afterward besought the Italian Government to preserve that mountain intact as a sacred national monument with its splendid system of defenses constructed by British soldiers. Thirty enemy divisions were engaged from the northern salient of Montello, fronting Falze, down to Cortellazzo. They succeeded in occupying, for a brief space, more than two-thirds of the Montello hills, but after a few days held only the northeast quarter. About 40,000 Austrian troops were hemmed around in that rocky shrub-covered ground.[14]

[14] Cable dispatch from Austin West to The *Times* (New York).

In the midst of his success General Diaz warned the nation that there were still hard days ahead. Austria was known to be preparing feverishly for another onslaught and to have made a desperate appeal for German aid, but the news each day became better and better. Austria's long prepared and greatest effort had left her with nothing but a few miles of marshy low-land and a precarious footing



GABRIELLE D'ANNUNZIO

D'Annunzio, who had made a wide reputation as an author, was serving in the war

on Montello. The western bank of the river had been practically cleared of Austrians and Montello entirely retaken. Only a few points on the right bank from Zenson southward to the sea were occupied by the enemy. Many guns and great quantities of material had been abandoned. All the Italian guns lost on this front in the Austrian attack

had been recaptured. Nine Austrian divisions (103,000 men) had been annihilated. Fifteen others had been worn out in the San Dona di Piave region, entire regiments being destroyed. The total Austrian losses in this drive were now estimated at more than 200,000. The Italian losses, in killed, wounded, and captured, were 40,000. Reports indicated that General Diaz had seized the psychological moment for renewed and vigorous counter-attacks along the whole river-line where the Austrians had only two bridges of any size left.

The Italians at last cleared the remaining Austrian rear-guards from the west bank of the Piave, and were in possession of the entire river front from Montello to the sea. Forces that crossed the stream in pursuit of the Austrians still harassed them, inflicted heavy casualties and drove them into disorderly retreat. The Austrian War Office, on June 25, admitted a reverse along the Piave, but the retrograde movement had been carried out "in accordance with plans and without loss of material." It was added that the Austrians had taken more than 50,000 prisoners from the Italians since June 15, and that the aggregate losses of the Italians in the fighting at the lowest estimate was 150,000 men—an estimate not confirmed elsewhere.

From the Montello upland to San Dona the whole countryside had become a vast cemetery. In many places thousands of unburied bodies rendered the air unbreathable. Throughout this district there were no longer any Austrians other than dead, wounded, or prisoners; but from San Dona seaward strenuous fighting was going on because the width of the river, and the treacherous character of the currents thereabouts, added to the difficulties of the Austrian retreat. Taking advantage of this situation, Italian cavalry regiments punished the fugitives with furious charges. At Campolungo, south of Zenson, their onrush overwhelming all resistance, brought them to the very pontoons that were crowded with Austrians about to cross. Italian infantry and cyclist Bersaglieri following in their wake destroyed the passageway, taking many prisoners. Hundreds of bodies were carried out to sea. The general commanding the Ninety-first Schutzen Brigade was found near Meolo with

his brains blown out, having killed himself amid the piled-up corpses of his forces who were annihilated after a valiant resistance. Many Italian prisoners and wounded were found famishing and untended in caves and abandoned dwellings. They had been despoiled of all personal belongings, even to their boots and clothing. Beside his burned machine the body of the gallant Italian aviator, Major Baracca, was found at the foot of Montello, where he had shot himself with a revolver to avoid capture. Allied airmen detected Austrians busy on the left bank of the river moving some miles inland a prodigious array of artillery with which they had begun the battle of the Piave.[15]

The Italian High Command was not thrown off its balance by the victory. Diaz's proclamation breathed restraint and caution. It was not overexultant. The great victory was, however, the turning point in Italian fortunes, altho much remained to be done before the enemy could be driven out of northern Italy. Diaz was going ahead carefully and methodically. He had cleared the entire west bank of the Piave, the last Austro-Hungarian rear-guards having surrendered, but the flooded Piave was still a problem. It had risen again, after subsiding, and some of the new Italian bridges had been carried away. Probably only Italian advance-guards and cavalry were as yet operating east of the river. General Boroevic now had time to choose a new line, either between the Piave and Livenza or at the Livenza. But if his left wing was badly broken it could hardly make a serious stand west of the Tagliamento. The situation could not be cleared until the Italians had crossed the Piave in force.

A terrible sight was witnessed on the Piave as the Austrians fled under a hail of bullets and shells. They leapt into the river and grabbed pieces of wood or anything that would aid them, tied themselves to mules and horses, but their efforts were in vain, for, as they reached the opposite bank, they were caught by the fire of Italian guns from the other side. On the Montello the slaughter was terrific. Bodies of troops were mowed down almost in their entirety.

[15] Cable dispatch from Austin West to The *Times* (New York).

At the crossing at Nervesa both banks were strewn with dead and dying, and hundreds of bodies were carried down to sea. At one place a correspondent counted 300 bodies in a walk of half a mile. Along the lower Piave the Austrians found themselves, if possible, in a worse plight. In some places where the fighting had been extremely severe, such as in the Montello region, the scene was one of fearful havoc.

Every little village near the fighting line was a ruin with scarcely one stone or brick left in place. The dead were mixed with heaps of débris in incredible confusion. Men familiar with Ypres and other sectors in Flanders, and with swamps on the Russian front, said that nothing worse in the way of desolation, destruction, and death had been witnessed there.[16] The whole Italian army had been at the zenith of its fighting enthusiasm. Man for man it was worth twice what it was before. Among the individual achievements in restoring the morale was work done by Gabriele d'Annunzio. By July 6 the Austrian troops had been pushed back across the Piave along its lower reaches. The Italians steadily forged ahead in this region, until it was now admitted by Vienna that all Austrian positions west of the river had been abandoned. This restored to the Italians the west bank from northwest of the Montello plateau to the sea.

How serious had been the menace to Venice was indicated by the fact that Austrian guns at one time were only five miles away. It was due to the valor of the gunboat crews of sailor-soldiers fighting deep in mud, water, and reeds that an Austrian flanking movement was blocked. The fighting was specially arduous on canals behind the lagoon district, where every cellarless hut was transformed into a machine-gun nest. The Italians had to make night attacks, swimming with knives in their teeth until they surprized and killed machine-gun defenders. Artillery played night and day upon every road in between the canals. One night when there was heavy shelling an Italian captain kept up the courage of a group of reserves by saying each time

[16] Cable dispatch from Austin West to The *Times* (New York).

THE BRIDGE OF SIGHS IN VENICE

This famous bridge narrowly escaped being hit by an Austrian airplane bomb

a shell fell: "The Americans are coming over faster than that."

Caporetto was avenged in this fight on the Piave. In all his unlucky reign, Kaiser Franz-Josef had undergone no ghastlier reverse than this one of Kaiser Karl. Italy had won her greatest victory of the war—the greatest she had won since her rebirth as a nation. This battle in northern Italy would probably be reckoned the major turning-point in the 1918 campaign. It was won by steady courage, unity of effort and admirable generalship against Teutonic generals over-ambitious in strategy, with poor coordination of armies, and representing a government and people approaching the last stages of military disorganization. The victory promised to remain an enduring incident in the history of the Italian people, one more landmark in their brilliant record—a history in which defeat had been frequent, but patriotic devotion unfailing. After a disaster, Italy had emerged victorious in a contest with a far greater nation, possessing larger human resources and aided by German material and German strategy. It was hardly less important as a victory for the Allied cause than that French victory at Verdun in 1916 which held the western line until Great Britain could arrive in force for her blow on the Somme.

How serious had been the damage done by Austrian bombs to Venice was not divulged until after the signing of the armistice. Venice, Padua, and several small towns on the Venetian plain had been repeatedly attacked. The worst raid made upon Venice came on the night of February 26, 1918, after the city had already been visited more than forty times. On this occasion over 300 bombs were dropt on Venice. Machines came in waves and each no doubt made more than one journey. Venice was then very near the Austrian lines. In all fifty machines took part in the raids. Thirty-eight houses were destroyed and three churches damaged—SS. Giovanni e Paolo, San Giovanni Crisostomo and San Simeone Piccolo. Yet the sum of loss was small considering the thick cluster of treasures that makes up Venice. Fifteen bombs fell near the Doge's Palace, but all in the water. One just missed the Bridge of Sighs. Bombs fell all around the Ponte di Rialto. It

was a miracle that the finest jewels of Venice were untouched. A bomb had fallen within five yards of St. Mark's. Other escapes were as narrow. The attacks were all sheer wantonness. No military purpose could have been served by attacks on the treasures of Venice. Both port and arsenal lay far enough away to refute any excuse as to confusion of aim.

For their achievement in defeating the Austrians the Italians received no end of praise, which needed in nowise

ITALIAN OFFICIAL PHOTO.

AN ITALIAN TRENCH ON THE PIAVE

to be modified because of the aid rendered by British and French troops. To have reconstituted their army and to have reestablished its morale and spirit after one of the most crushing defeats in history, and to win within six months so decisive a victory—of few armies had this ever been recorded in history. The Austrian losses were estimated later at 250,000. Of these it was reported that fully 20,000 were drowned in the retreat across the Piave. The Thirty-first and Thirty-second Austrian Infantry covered the retreat until only eighty men remained un-

wounded and these finally surrendered. Italy was now able to take care of herself. It was by no means certain that a defeat of such proportions was due solely to the breaking of Austria's military force. It was not impossible that the force behind the army had also begun to disintegrate so that the spirit of the war had passed both from the people and the military.

By July 26 American fighting troops had arrived on the Italian front and were billeted with Italians. Before that the only combatant American troops had been aviators. The appearance now of a considerable body of fighting men from the United States occasioned the greatest satisfaction. After receiving congratulations, the overseas men sought out a bathing-place and started several games of baseball. "Hurrah for the Americans!" English words being used, became the cry first from trenches along the Trentino Mountains and the Piave and then throughout Italy, even to small villages in Calabria and Sicily. Italians returning from the United States had brought unshakable faith in what America would do. These emigrants of southern Italy always had predicted, even in the darkest hours, that the fortunes of war would turn when America entered the conflict. They were now going about proudly saying: "I told you so." The American work in France, at this time on the Marne, was celebrated by them as if it had been their own success.

On October 25 the Allies broke into Austrian positions on a twenty-mile front between the Brenta and the Piave, stormed important and formidable mountains, and took about 3,000 prisoners. Diaz had attacked in a critical sector, where a successful advance could force an army to withdraw on the whole mountain-front and give up the line of the Piave. By the new drive it was evidently hoped to add sudden military defeat in the field to the internal causes which were forcing Austria toward peace. The time was ripe. Three months had gone by since Boroevic's offensive, which was to take Venice and roll the Italians back to the Adige, had ingloriously failed. Foch since then had won great victories in France. Now, if ever, could Italy hope to thrust the Austro-Hungarian armies back out of

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GENERAL DIAZ

Commander-in-Chief of the Italian armies after Caporetto

Italian territory. In Austria-Hungary, as in Bulgaria, the military authorities were simply waiting for a defeat in the field in order to find a plausible excuse for surrendering.

By October 29 the battle was proceeding on a front of about fifty miles from the Asiago to the Piave between Treviso and Oderzo, and Italians and British had broken through the Austrian lines across the Piave on a thirty-mile front between Valdobbiadene and Roncadelle. They had driven a great wedge into them northeast of Treviso, and advanced more than five miles east of the Piave on a fifteen-mile front. In the mountain region they extended their gains north of the Ornic river. The retreat was fast approaching a rout. Diaz's armies had driven the enemy back everywhere in disastrous fighting with a few American troops held in readiness to aid them. The battle was fast assuming the proportions of the Italian *débâcle* of a year before, when Cadorna's army broke down under the German-Austrian attack. Apparently the Austrians had no intention of trying to check the advance south of the Tagliamento. Their retirement out of Venetia had become unavoidable. It was only a question whether Emperor Charles' armies would go back as fugitives or, thanks to an armistice, become willing prisoners. Caporetto was well avenged. The twitchings of a death-agony were seen in Vienna but there was no peace on the Piave. Emperor Charles' advisers had been glad to abandon Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, and Roumania, because the situation, everywhere below the Danube, was hopeless. Not a hand was lifted to withdraw 1,000,000 Austrian and Hungarian soldiers from northeastern Italy.

While the Austro-Hungarian army hoped an armistice would come in time to check the onward roll, the *débâcle* developed into a gigantic military catastrophe. Terrific losses were inflicted on legions of men in flight. A whole stretch of country, in mountains and on plains, for seventy miles was littered with the bodies of Austrian dead. Tumbled heaps of abandoned war-material were to be seen everywhere—colossal stores of ammunition, mounds of foodstuffs, equipment of every sort, some of which had been

hidden away in caves and underground labyrinths of the Grappa and Asiago plateau. Austria-Hungary had really been out of the war for weeks. She had ceased to exist as a European state. Her armies were fighting in Italy under a flag which no longer represented anything. The Allied armistice terms, amounting to complete surrender, had been made known but were not accepted by the Austrian High Command until November 4. Hostilities then ceased in the Italian field, and Italian land and naval forces entered Trieste, the goal of Italian Irridentist hopes for generations. Fiume, Hungary's chief Adriatic port, was handed over to a Croatian Local Government on friendly terms with the Allies, and was ready to surrender to the Allied fleet the remainder of the Austro-Hungarian navy assembled in Fiume harbor.

Pola, the Dual Monarchy's chief naval base, had become little more than an Austrian memory. Italian submarines had penetrated its waters a few days before and sunk the last remaining Austrian first-class battleship, the very vessel which had brought back Archduke Ferdinand's body from Serajevo in 1914. So it was that the warship which had participated in the opening scene of the final Hapsburg tragedy, went down at the moment when the curtain was falling on the history of that ill-starred house. The *Viribus Unitis* was torpedoed and sunk by an Italian "naval tank" which, manned by two officers, succeeded in penetrating the mine field at the entrance of the harbor of Pola. The naval "tank" was a small vessel, similar to the "Eagle boats" that were being built for the United States Navy. The Adriatic had become an Italian lake. Trieste and Italian Istria were under the flag of United Italy, and Italian armies had hurried into Trent. Trent and the Adige Valley were the keys to the northern Italian plains. In Austrian hands they had for generations been a dagger pointed at the heart of the Italian kingdom. Now the Trentino had reverted to its natural possessors, and so Italy reacquired the northern mountain barrier which made her secure against attacks through Alpine passes. Italian armies passed the Tagliamento and reached Udine, their former base near the Austrian frontier. Thus did Italy close in

glory her three and a half years of warfare with Austria-Hungary.

Before the armistice went into effect, the Italian army had captured nearly 300,000 Austrians and at least 5,000 guns. The value of the booty, which included thousands of horses, amounted to several millions of lire. In the

AMERICAN TROOPS IN FIUME
These troops were with the Italians when the latter entered Fiume

Trentino alone over 150,000 prisoners were taken. Italian naval vessels landed troops on Dalmatian islands, and the Italian flag was hoisted over them. Italian battleships and destroyers landed troops at Fiume. Business was virtually suspended in Rome to celebrate the victory. Bonfires were lighted on many hills throughout Italy to carry far and wide the news of the occupation of Trieste. Church-bells

were rung and guns fired. All windows in Rome were illuminated regardless of police orders concerning restricted lighting. Crowds in the streets eagerly sought newspapers fresh from the presses, paraded through the night, carrying American as well as Italian flags. American sailors were taken through the streets on men's shoulders. Ambassador Page was heartily acclaimed by assembled citizens. A committee asked him to convey to President Wilson the gratitude of the people of Rome and Italy and to express their admiration for America's part in the great struggle.

The final defeat of Austria-Hungary, the destruction of a despotism that had been one of the worst instruments of oppression in modern history, was in all essentials an Italian achievement. What Russia began, Italy completed. From the second year of the war the Italian army and navy had been the principal factors in bringing about Austria's downfall. The Italian army was 90 per cent. Italian—fifty-one Italian divisions, three British, two French, one Czecho-Slovak, and a single American regiment. It was a great Italian achievement. Had the Austrian attack on the Piave in June, 1918, succeeded as well as the German attack at St. Quentin and on the Aisne, we might still have been looking to 1919 for victory. But the Italians held the enemy back and so won the first of that series of Allied victories which continued without interruption afterward.

The entire population turned out to welcome General Petitti di Roreto, the new Italian Governor-General of Trieste. On landing he was showered with flowers. This was a notable event in the history of Italy which an Italian poet described as "the realization of a century's dream, and the end and aim of Italy's war against Austria-Hungary." As the warships approached Trieste all on board were affected by the approaching climax to Italian hopes. When the bay came into view those on board embraced each other and cried like children in their joy. As the ships anchored, airplanes circled overhead, and beflagged tugs and skiffs gathered around. Altho the population of Trieste was only 130,000, it seemed as if a million inhabitants from the new Italian province had come out to piers, the balconies of houses and the towers of churches to welcome the war-

ships. After landing it was impossible for the general's automobile to move. He was embraced by weeping women, little children, and white-haired patriots. The popular celebration continued for two days. No peace rejoicings could have exceeded the delirium of delight with which people on the peninsula and adjacent islands greeted the tidings. The humblest hamlets, like great cities, were bedecked with flags and made a merry festival. Petitions were flowing into Government offices from all sides demanding that the Third of November be declared an annual holiday.

Scenes of destruction and starvation were seen in the Trentino wherever one passed along the roads over which Italian troops conveyed thousands of Austrian prisoners who had been cut off southwest of Balzano. Every road was crowded and on every hand were evidences of the great military collapse. The horrors of Napoleon's retreat from Russia, it was said by military observers, were eclipsed by the sufferings of Austrian troops in this region. Great masses of men waited for long hours to move a few feet, or a few hundred yards, and then had to halt anew on a road littered with carcasses of horses and with cannon, pieces of shields, pistols, rifles, broken-down motor-trucks, and machine-guns. Many Austrians died from sheer fatigue and starvation instead of from wounds. Italians did all they could to hasten up food supplies, but this was difficult. In the meantime dead horses were eaten, the flesh being cooked along the roadside. Between Roverto and Trent, a distance of sixteen miles, an unending column of men was marching none knew whither. There was not a house left standing in Asiago. Throughout the mountains people were foodless and had been robbed of their possessions.

The outcome of the war wrought profound changes in the Adriatic. That inland sea, so rich in historical memories, was to become what long before it should have been, an Italian-South Slav lake. Austria and Hungary had been thrust back from its shores, and hereafter their ocean trade would find ingress and egress only through foreign ports. At the Congress of Vienna, Austria had obtained almost complete mastery of the Adriatic. The annexation of Venetia and Dalmatia and the establishment of reactionary

governments in Naples and the Papal States under the direct influence of Vienna, had extended the Hapsburg power in one long sweep from Otranto to Cattaro. With the war of 1859, however, and the founding of the kingdom of Italy, Austria's monopoly of the Adriatic was broken, and six years later still further weakened by loss of Venetia. Now Italy had extended her territory, reaching eastward and southward around Istria and parts of Dalmatia, until, with the exception of a short coast line for the new South Slavic State, she controlled the entire circuit of the sea.

For Serbia, her acquisition of ports upon the Adriatic assured a glorious revenge for the injustice she had suffered for generations at Austria's hands. The little Balkan State, landlocked and economically enslaved, had long sought an outlet on the sea. In 1912, when at last she had attained her ambition by á victory over Turkey, the Government of Franz-Josef robbed her of a port and set up between her and the sea the artificial State of Albania. This was not the least of a long series of unjustifiable aggressions by the Dual Monarchy which had ended in the criminal ultimatum of 1914 and the World War. It was a long cry from 1914 to 1918, but it was now Serbia and Italy that controlled the Adriatic coasts, and it was Austria and Hungary that were left without ports. Unless Trieste were made a free port for goods to and from Vienna, the new South German State, which might emerge from the wreckage of Central Europe, would be economically helpless. Similarly, if Hungarians were cut off from Fiume, they would become landlocked and at the mercy of their neighbors.[17]

[17] Principal Sources: "The "Military Expert" of The *Times,* William L. McPherson in The *Tribune,* The *Evening Post,* Austin West dispatches to The *Times,* The *Times,* The *Sun,* New York; Associated Press dispatches; The *Evening Sun* (New York).

IN THE GERMAN COLONIES AND ON THE SEA

Part I

THE WAR IN THE COLONIES

GEN. LOUIS BOTHA

A former Boer general who, accepting defeat in the Boer War, had risen in South Africa to office as Premier. After the World War broke out Botha suppressed a rebellion and then conquered German Southwest Africa

I

THE COLONIES THAT GERMANY HAD

WHEN the war broke out Germany had several large and several small colonies in different parts of the world. In Africa she had German East Africa, German Southwest Africa, Kamerun, and Togoland; in the Pacific, German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, one of the Solomon Islands, and the Caroline, Ladrone, Pellew, and Marshall Islands; further east in the Pacific, the Samoan Islands, at least the chief portion of them, and in China, on a long lease, Kiaochow. Altogether in Asia, Africa, and Oceania, she owned colonial possessions and "spheres of influence"—the latter being areas where she had special privileges—covering nearly 1,500,000 square miles. She was also regarded as the dominant power in European Turkey, and, except for Armenia, her influence was preeminent in Asiatic Turkey—that is, in Asia Minor, including Antioch, Aleppo, and on the Euphrates and Tigris. In northern China, she ruled or administered 400 square miles of territory, and enjoyed concessions in the province of Shantung. Her ally, Austria, had a semi-protectorate over Albania, with the right to maintain a Prussian prince there as ruler.

In Africa alone, Germany controlled over 1,000,000 square miles; that is, 291,950 square miles in the Kamerun (including more than 100,000 square miles which she obtained from France in 1911), 33,700 square miles in Togoland (a possession wedged in between the British Gold Coast and French Dahomey), 384,180 square miles in German East Africa, and 322,450 square miles in German Southwest Africa. In addition she had obtained from Great Britain public or private acknowledgment of a special commercial interest in a large portion of the Portuguese African possessions, and an admission that she was a fourth party, with co-equal interest, in the affairs of Liberia. Sir Edward

Grey had stated publicly that any scheme of German aggrandizement in the Kongo Basin, provided it did not interfere with vested British interests to the south of that region, or did not involve aggression against other powers, would not be opposed by Great Britain or any part of the empire.

Germany, joined with Austria, was thus in a fair way toward building up a Teutonic overseas empire which, combined with spheres of influence in Africa, the Near East, and the Far East, might have aggregated a total of 2,000,000 square miles of productive lands for Austro-German exploitation, as sources of raw products for industries and as markets for the purchase of German wares. This is an area about ten times as large as that of the German Empire in Europe, and more than double the combined areas of Germany, France, England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. Meanwhile, for twenty or thirty years, she had been supplying Belgium with capital, enterprise, and racial influence; and had been slowly winning over Holland to a closer alliance, if not an ultimate fusion, with the German Empire. In Brazil colonization by Germany was proceeding apace. German interests in tropical America generally had become a good third in rank, coming next to those of Great Britain and the United States.

Only in the Near East had Germany's expansion sustained a check. In 1911, Italy, alarmed at reports of German designs on Tripoli, had made use of certain grievances which Turkish policy gave her, and taken possession of all that portion of North Africa as yet unclaimed by France in Tunis and Morocco and by England in Egypt. This action not only engendered the break-up of the Triple Alliance, but placed Germany in a peculiar dilemma; for, when Turkey appealed for help, Germany found herself unable to give assistance against Italy who was her ally, whom she could not strike without losing her, and so injuring, not only herself, but Austria. Germany thus had to stand by while Italy took possession, not only of Tripoli and Barka, but of the Dodecanese (a group of twelve small islands in the Ægean Sea, of which Rhodes is one) and proceeded further to demand a share in the development

of southern Asia Minor. That, however, was only a beginning, for Italy, in order to overcome Turkish resistance in North Africa, had roused Greece, and Greece, having been perpetually frustrated by Germany in her ambitions, led in the movement to organize the Balkan Alliance. The ensuing Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 reduced Turkey in Europe to an area of about 10,800 square miles, and interposed between Austria-Hungary and Constantinople a formidable barrier of warlike Balkan peoples.

The irritation which this caused to Germany was partly appeased by an international recognition of her privileged position in what remained of Turkey by which she obtained command of the Turkish army and control of the Bagdad railway. At the same time she had to accord recognition to French concessions in Syria and to Russo-French interests in Armenia. It was understood that she had come to terms with Great Britain and had virtually been able to extend her influence not merely to Bagdad but to Bassora, which is within sight of the Persian Gulf. But there still remained the Balkan obstacle. Two years of the Balkan War had effectively shut out the Dual Alliance from Saloniki, which was the goal Austria had aimed at for more than thirty years. Saloniki itself had instead become Greek; while Serbia and Montenegro interposed a long range of territory between Austrian dominions and an Ægean harbor. Serbia, in fact, became an obstacle between Berlin and her coveted Byzantine supremacy, and to Austria as well, because Austria had become almost a subordinate German state. The Dual Alliance had expected a quite different issue from the first Balkan War. For the Turkish army, as reorganized by German officers, it had anticipated a victory, after which Austria could intervene, expel the Turks, and become mistress of the Balkan peninsula, the interests of the two empires being thus virtually fused in a dual rule of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg. It was the outcome of the first Balkan War that dissipated those dreams.

Probably German Southwest Africa, with its minerals and tracts of temperate mountain country, sufficiently well watered to nourish a vigorous European or negro popula-

tion, would in time have proved a valuable possession, and the Kamerun, with its coast regions rich in rubber, timber, and palm-oil, might also have been found to possess tin as good as the tin of Nigeria. Togoland, on account of its palm-oil and numerous other tropical products, was almost as valuable a possession as the Gold Coast. German East Africa was not so attractive. Its regions were as a rule more unhealthy, yet they possest, to the north of Nyassaland, one of those splendid tracts of fertile, well-watered country which had been among the wonders revealed within the last fifty years of explorations in the Dark Continent. Here are mountain peaks reaching to 10,000 feet in districts sparsely populated, but as well suited to European colonization as British East Africa and Nyassaland had proved to be. Valuable tropical produce had been already garnered along the shore of the great Tanganyika lake and transported to the coast in a recently completed Tanganyika railway, which of itself represented an outlay of probably $50,000,000, and tapped for maritime transport all the eastern part of the Congo Basin. In addition, there were indications of the existence of coal, diamonds, gold, and possibly copper. German East Africa was admirably adapted to growing cereals like maize and rice, on a large scale, and was capable of sustaining a large negro population.

In all these lands international science had made large gains under German influences. Evidence of this was present in German museums of ethnology and natural history; in German contributions to African philology, to the study of tropical diseases, to economic botany, chemistry, palaeontology, history, and archeology. In East Africa, and in the Kamerun hinterland, Germany had abolished the deeply rooted slave-trade, but in Southwest Africa, the negro population had diminished through long drawn out wars. In 1884, when the Germans first came to this region, the Hottentots were exterminating the Bantu negroes, and perishing themselves from alcohol, smallpox, syphilis, and starvation due to the disappearance of big game. In later years, however, some elements in the native population in Southwest Africa had been on the increase. Germany had constructed a thousand miles of road in East Africa, nearly

GERMANY'S SOUTHWESTERN AFRICAN COLONY

two thousand miles in Southwest Africa, 128 miles in Togoland, 149 miles in Kamerun, and 272 miles in Kiaochow. In the Near East she had built the famous Bagdad railway from Konia almost to Skanderun and Aleppo and, in patches, onward toward Bagdad. Her future policy in Turkey would probably have tended to secure preference for German trade; yet in the territories actually under Germany sway she had preserved the free trade principle. Her own trade, with her entire oversea possessions was, however, not yet very large.

Germany had made no great profit from her overseas empire, but as a colonizing Power, she had in general deserved attention. There were only 23,383 Germans in "Greater Germany" as against 243,000 Germans settled in lands under the British Crown, including 100,000 in the United Kingdom prior to the outbreak of the war. Germans had always been welcomed by Great Britain as colonists, for they had been the best of settlers any nation could desire, especially when living under a liberal form of government. Germans had played a considerable, and never officially recognized, part in the foundation and development of the British Empire, of the French and colonial lands in North Africa, of the United States, and of Spanish America. German names stood out in connection with great achievements in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Nigeria, Kongoland, East Africa, British Guiana, India, and the Himalayas. German pioneers had brought patience, thoroughness, accuracy, endurement of hardships, and frugality to many of these colonies and protectorates.

In 1913 the volume of Germany's trade with her African, Pacific and Chinese colonies, was $115,000,000, of which exports stood for $50,000,000. Two-fifths of this total was accounted for by her trade with China, done through Kiaochow, but with that trade German possessions had little to do. There remained for the African and Pacific colonies a total trade of $66,000,000, of which $30,000,000 was for exports and $36,000,000 for imports. German colonial advocates laid stress on the fact that the colonies of England, France, Holland, and Belgium were selling tropical products to Germany of the value of $269,000,000 a year, while they

bought in return only $70,000,000 worth of German goods. Of the 50,000,000 square miles of habitable earth's surface, 12,000,000 were British, 8,500,000 were Russian, 4,500,000 French, while only 1,336,000 were German.

The reason why Germany had made so little of her African colonies was commonly stated to be that she had followed neither her own system of government intelligently,

TWO GERMAN COLONIES IN WESTERN AFRICA

nor the system adopted for colonies by the English. The German Government mistrusted private enterprise, fearing that individuals might control, or squander, natural resources. Hence there was no opening in her colonies for keen business-men, not even for keen German business-men. The administration was characteristically German. Regulations drafted for every possible contingency minutely governed the activities of all who desired to engage in colonial

exploitation. If a business-man went to a colony, he found he could not begin operations without official permission. If he wished to trade with natives, to build railways and roads, to prospect for gold or copper, to farm, to grow rubber or cotton, he had first to get authority to do so from Berlin.

The Germans not only hampered colonists, but overburdened them with taxes; animated by an ambition to create Kultur colonies, they attempted to create other Germanys in far-off wilds. Magnificent and substantial, but empty, towns under this system were laid out, huge schools and public buildings were erected, monuments and statues raised, parks and public gardens created, with a huge body of officials to see that everybody was registered and labeled, that everything in German colonies was done exactly as it was done in Germany. Meanwhile, the chief essentials of colonial prosperity were neglected; the Government would not allow private enterprise to build railways and the Reichstag refused to vote sufficient funds for their construction by the Government itself. In the first ten years of her possession of African colonies, Germany built only eight miles of new railway. In 1914 her whole African empire did not have as many miles of railway as Switzerland. Germany's actual colonial empire, altho acquired after much pains through many years, proved the weakest link in her line of defense. That these outposts should lie open to early conquest was inevitable, but it was surprizing that the conquest was accomplished so largely by British colonial forces.

Germany's colonial activity had been almost wholly a post-Bismarckian development. Her struggle for commercial and maritime importance began in resentment over conditions in which her ships were at the mercy of the colonial ports of the English, French, Portuguese, and Dutch. At that time nowhere on the Seven Seas was Germany in possession of any naval or commercial bases such as the smallest among the other European nations had. It was in these circumstances that Togoland, Kamerun, German Southwest Africa and German East Africa were acquired, as well as Samoa, Kaiser Wilhelm's Land and certain

Spanish islands in the Pacific. While Germany was doing this, France had acquired Madagascar, made good her African empire from the Mediterranean to the Niger and Kongo, extended her frontier in Indo-China, and begun the absorption of Morocco. Great Britain, meanwhile, had conquered the Boer republics and the United States had acquired the Philippines and Porto Rico. Even Belgium had come into possession of the vast Kongo Free State, which was incomparably superior to all the colonial acqui-

GERMANY'S POSSESSIONS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

These possessions were included within the black line enclosing the central part of the area covered by the map. Guam, however, belonged to the United States

sitions that had been made by the German Empire. Italy, until 1915 the ally of the Teutonic empires, but still a rival, meanwhile had taken Tripoli, the last waste place on the North-African coast.

Thus there had grown up an ever increasing bitterness in Germany over her failure to acquire some better "place in the sun." There was felt to be manifest injustice in a

distribution of overseas land by which was allotted to France, with her stationary population, and to Great Britain, which also in European population was inferior to Germany, such splendid colonial territories, capable of receiving European immigrants, while Germany, with her ever-growing population, was compelled to see her people lose their nationality if they chose to emigrate. Meanwhile, German industrial prosperity had been threatened by an ever-increasing number of lands in which hostile tariffs handicapped German exports.

Such was the colonial state of Germany prior to the war. The effect on it of the war was that, while the world's attention was fixt on battlefields in Western Europe, nearly all her colonial possessions became an easy prey to her enemies. In a similar way Napoleon saw vanish his oversea territories in what was French Louisiana, and so, fifty years before, France had lost Quebec in the new world, and India in the old.

Germany's attitude toward her colonies had not successfully helped in their development. Regarding a bureaucratic system as the best, not only for Germany but for all the world, she had first established in each colony a central government, rather than a trading-post. To each dependency was sent out a complete complement of officials. Germans who sought to emigrate, preferred to settle in North or South America rather than go where they would have to conform to an elaborate organization such as they had been familiar with at home. Lands in abundance were there, but Germans were not tempted to occupy them. A government was there, but it assumed much the attitude of a regiment having a complete set of officers but no privates.

Germany's colonial policy brought with it new perils and rivalries when the successors of Bismarck hastily sought to plant the German flag on territories which had not yet been absorbed by other nations. Ten years before the World War began, the Moroccan incident, out of which war between Germany and France almost broke out in 1911, aside from its merely political aspects, had appealed to the whole German public, because it represented an effort to prevent

the annexation by France of the last considerable territory in which German manufacturers could find a market, and German colonists and merchants a foothold. Year by year Germany was growing stronger, and yet year by year she was being out-distanced by rivals in a portion of the earth in which lay the potentiality of great commercial gains.

In any study of the German attitude toward England, France, and Russia—an attitude which made for war—resentment over colonial distributions played no inconsiderable part. The feeling was mainly directed against England, because it was recognized that, except for British support, the French colonies in North Africa would have met the fate of Alsace-Lorraine—that is, would have been acquired by Germany. British conquest of the Boer republics closed to Germany the last attractive home for a surplus population, desirous of emigrating to a place where they could remain German in tongue and German in sympathies. But in this matter of colonies, as had already been the case in the matter of mother lands, British sea-power was to prove its tremendous value in the world war.[1]

[1] Principal Sources: The London *Times'* "History of the War," an Article by Sir Harry Johnston, in the Edinburgh *Review, The Literary Digest,* The *Evening Sun,* The *Journal of Commerce,* New York.

II

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF TSINGTAU IN KIAOCHOW AND THE TAKING OF SAMOA

September 18, 1917—November 7, 1917

GERMANY'S colonial possessions being accessible from the sea, became almost immediately the objectives of naval operations. For one thing, they invited prompt action from the Allies because they contained important wireless telegraph-stations. Just what Japan would do became an early subject of speculation, since she was an ally of Great Britain, and Germany had in China an important possession in Kiaochow. It was not until August 15 that Japan declared her purposes. She then issued an ultimatum to Germany, forwarding it by six different channels, in order to insure delivery, demanding the withdrawal of German warships from the Orient and the evacuation of the German protectorate of Kiaochow. August 23 was set as the date for the expiration of the ultimatum.

Altho her alliance with Great Britain was given as the reason for this attitude, Japan had other reasons for wishing to engage in the war. Since the outbreak of hostilities Japan had discovered that Germany was rushing military preparations at Kiaochow, that German cruisers were seizing British ships in the Orient, and Germany had demoralized Japanese and other shipping. These conditions, to her mind justified the statement that the possession of Kiaochow by Germany as a fortified base was a menace to the peace of the Orient.

That Japan was bound by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to participate in the war, if requested to do so, there was no doubt. There were many Japanese who longed to "get even" with Germany, but there was much speculation as to whether she ought not to wait for an invitation before initiating hostile operations. The suspense was more or less relieved when a note from the

British Government was received on August 4 asking what Japan could do in the way of safeguarding British shipping in the Far East. An Imperial Council was called, and a reply at once sent back to London that Japan could not guarantee the safety of shipping, so long as the presence of Germany at Tsingtau menaced it, but Japan would undertake the responsibility of safeguarding shipping on condition that she be allowed to end German occupation of that part of China. In this suggestion, the British authorities acquiesced, on condition that Kiaochow be subsequently returned to China and the integrity of China be in no way threatened. Japan then sent her ultimatum to Germany,

JAPANESE SOLDIERS LANDING NEAR TSINGTAU ON A QUAY BUILT BY THEMSELVES

demanding the evacuation at the frontier of Tsingtau, the disarming of her warships, and the handing over of the territory of Kiaochow to Japan for ultimate reversal to China. From the first, it was widely believed that Germany would treat the ultimatum with silent contempt, and that was what she did. The time limit for reply was twelve o'clock on August 24. During the last moments preceding the firing of the noon gun in Tokyo on that day, newspaper men and others crowded the waiting-rooms at the Japanese Foreign Office, listening intently for the sound of the fateful gun. When the sound finally reverberated over the city, a messenger handed out a piece of paper reading: "No

reply!" Thousands of newsboys, with "extras" already printed, then swarmed over the city. At 2.30 P.M. the German Ambassador was handed his passports and war declared.

Kiaochow, Germany's leasehold in China, is situated on the eastern extremity of the Shantung province, and faces Chefoo and the British Colony of Wei-hai-wei. The distance from Chefoo is 239 nautical miles, from Shanghai 335, and from Moji, in Japan, 570. Kiaochow has the Yellow Sea on the south, the Rusham Mountains on the east and Reishaw hill on the west. The entrance to the bay is a little less than a mile wide. A neutral zone surrounded the German colony that had been established there. The chief town was Tsingtau, a new German city built in the most up-to-date style on the right side of the bay. Altho the area of Kiaochow, including coasts and adjacent islands, is only 193 square miles, land for 30 miles adjacent to the "leased" territory and comprising 2,750 square miles were generally regarded as under the influence of Germany. Germany's administrative expenditures in this colony, for the year before the war, amounted to $4,300,000. They were covered partly by local resources, and partly by a German subsidy of $230,000. The exports for the year 1912 amounted to $13,700.000 and the imports to $20,000,000.

The population of Tsingtau was over 60,484, including 4,256 Germans, 316 Japanese, and 53,312 Chinese. Outside the new town there was a Chinese population of 192,000, all under the influence of the Germans. Since the German occupation, Kiaochow had been reorganized on a large scale and provided with the latest developments of German science. The fact that it was directly administered by the German Navy Department while other German colonies were under the Colonial Minister, furnished evidence of the importance which the German Government attached to it as a naval station. The amount Germany had spent on Tsingtau was stated to have been $100,000,000. To protect the port from strong northwesterly winds, a huge mole, nearly three miles long, enveloping nearly the whole of the bay, had been built and two large piers had been constructed. There was provision for loading or unloading simultaneously

twelve steamers of as much as 6,000 tons. The accommodations thus provided were far better than those at Port Arthur, or at Dalny in Manchuria. Piers and jetties had also been built. The new town had waterworks, hospitals, Government buildings, schools, barracks, and large commercial buildings. It offered a wonderful contrast to the insignificant fishing village which existed there twenty years before.

Wherever the Germans colonized they tried to reproduce the kind of town to which they were accustomed at home.

THE JAPANESE OPERATIONS AT TSINGTAU

Kiaochow, the small piece of Chinese territory, of which Tsingtau is the largest town, was under a long lease to Germany when the war began. The reader will note the nearness of the Japanese operations in 1915 to places where Japan some twenty years before had fought in her war with China, and in her ensuing war with Russia—Weihaiwei, Port Arthur and Mukden

Visitors, therefore, on arrival at Tsingtau, found themselves surrounded by the orderly architecture, the precision, of Germany. The place, it was clear at a glance, had not grown up haphazardly, as so many British colonial possessions appear to have done, but had been laid out and built over in accordance with a definite, preconceived plan. The streets ran parallel and at right angles to one another. There were gardens and open spaces just where they should be. The Government House and official residence occupied

sites that had been selected with great care. A fine street fronted the bay and was called after the Emperor. From the railway-station one had a choice of three routes into the heart of the town. Either the Prince Heinrich, Kronprinzen, or Hohenzollern Strasse could be taken, all three wide and ornate. At the head of Berliner Strasse was a magnificent police-station. In trade the place was rivaling Chefoo and was threatening Shanghai and Tientsin. Commodities made in Germany had become a menace to those of other Powers. Neither Great Britain nor America had fully realized the far-reaching commercial and political influence Germany was exercising in China, altho British, American, and Japanese commerce all had felt German competition. Japan believed she had the same reason to fear Germany in the Shantung peninsula that Great Britain would have to fear her should Germany get possession of Belgium.

The German forces during the siege that now set in, included five battalions of infantry, five of marine-artillery, one of mechanics, and about 2,500 reservists. The naval forces included a flagship, two cruisers, two gunboats, one torpedo-boat, one survey-boat, one transport, and one Austrian warship. The place was strongly fortified and armed with about 600 Krupp guns of varying calibers. The blockade of Tsingtau was begun on August 27, when the Japanese and British occupied certain adjacent isles to serve as bases and begin mine-sweeping. Japanese troops, destined for the siege, were safely landed on September 18, and were joined on September 24 by a small British force. On September 26 the Allies attacked the Germans on high ground between the rivers Pai-sha and Li-tsun, and on the following day occupied the right bank of the latter river at a point seven miles northeast of Tsingtau. On September 28, by noon the Allies carried ground distant two and a half miles from the German main position. Preparations for a close attack followed, and early in October fire was opened on the fortress. On October 14 the naval squadron blockading Tsingtau destroyed portions of the Iltis and Kaiser forts, but a day or two later the Japanese cruiser *Takachiho* fouled a mine and sank with a loss of 28 officers 54 petty officers, and 189 seamen. Storms which then en-

sued delayed operations until October 31, when the general bombardment began, the Anglo-Japanese blockading fleet concentrating their fire on the enemy's forts. This bombardment did great damage to the Iltis fort. Oil-tanks in the town were set on fire.

For five days sapping by night and digging zig-zag trenches, three feet wide at the bottom and four and a half at the top, continued, and the relentless bombardment from dawn till dark became the regular order of each day. The first three days were stormy and bitterly cold. Each

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AT THE SIEGE OF TSINGTAU

Germans moving from the city to the outer defenses preparing for the attack

night sand-bagged heads drew nearer the redoubts till at some points the German lines were only 200 yards away. The whole Allied front measured, roughly, five miles. The British headquarters lay in a muddy valley, on one side of which three Japanese batteries blazed away at the German forts, while on the other ran a line of bivouacs, with roofs of tarpaulin, earth, and twigs, supported by walls of rough stakes. The "mess" consisted of a round table with a hole in its rim, three or four chairs, and some empty provision boxes—all in the open air. Close by stood shells which on a previous day had fallen not more than twenty yards away. Trenches and defiles, concealing 500 or 600 "Tommies" and Sikhs, all as merry schoolboys.

The final assault occurred on the night of November 6, when, shortly after midnight, General Yamada sent two companies of sappers to attack redoubt No. 3, and by one o'clock the fort was in Japanese hands. Yamada immediately advised a general advance, meanwhile launching two more companies against redoubt No. 2. By 4 o'clock that redoubt was taken, and General Horiuchi, on the extreme left, apprized of what was happening, sent four companies against redoubts 4 and 5, and captured both. General Johogi's men, supported by the British, now advanced, while two small bodies of not more than 70 each were sent from the left and center against the Iltis and Bismarck forts. Before half-past six both were taken. About half-past six redoubt No. 1 and the forts on Moltke hill hoisted the white flag.

The Allies had to pass a 20-foot wall running the entire length of the redoubt across entanglements of the most scientific kind, up a slope without cover, on which heavy guns could no longer play for fear of hurting their own men, then across another lot of entanglements and up a second slope, against Maxims, pompoms, rifle-fire, and finally bayonets. After the redoubts were taken, the Allies had to cross more than three-quarters of a mile of open ground, and climb the steep side of Iltis, Bismarck, and Moltke. All this was accomplished between midnight and the first gray light of dawn. During the last hour before dawn, the air was filled with what were described as "sounds as if the hills were being flogged with gigantic iron rods," and then suddenly, in the midst of the din and the pale morning light, all became still. The change was emphasized by the disappearance of all the reserve troops, who, a few hours before, had been bivouacked on either side of General Kamio's headquarters where the General sat in his tent, placidly smoking a cigar and coaxing a parrot to eat his breakfast. Near by was a crowd of Japanese newspaper correspondents, hastily scribbling telegrams, an officer giving them details. Telephones buzzed and receivers clinked. Then two companies of infantry appeared along the edge of a gully, descended into it, and piled their arms. Every now and then an orderly was called up and given precise

instructions, after which he saluted, mounted and rode away.

On entering a redoubt after its surrender one saw perhaps two or three hundred prisoners with officers, surprizingly spick and span, in the center, a light cordon of Japanese sentries fringing the circle. A few defenders looked thin and pale, but the majority were well-fed and strong. Some sulked, others chatted and laughed, and three or four were drunk. The ground above and around was covered with shell-marks. Jagged lumps of lead lay in all directions. In some places the churned earth showed where a mine had been struck or had exploded. Great heaps of earth and stone lay across a path inside the iron gate. The

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JAPANESE RED CROSS NURSES AND SURGEONS

concrete part of the fort, built underground in horseshoe shape, was practically unharmed, but the sandbagged parapets above showed big gaps and pools of blood. Parties from the Japanese Red Cross were turning over bodies that lay with faces down, putting those that still breathed on stretchers and those that were dead in a row on one side. Here and there were horrible sights—a man with a face unrecognizable, another with a leg torn away, a third in a heap too mangled to look at. Groups of prisoners (over 5,000 were taken) stood with hands in their pockets and their mouths drawn down. Inside were Japanese troops who slept while leaning against one another in all sorts

of postures, completely fagged out. The Germans estimated their casualties at 1,000; the Japanese theirs at 7,000.

Jefferson Jones,[2] who witnessed the bombardment, said he had never before heard of the possibility of seeing, in one modern battle, "the attack of warships, the fire of infantry and artillery, the maneuvering of airships over the enemy's lines, and the rolling up from the rear of reinforcements and supplies, all at one sweep of the eye." But after he had watched for three days the siege of Tsingtau from a position on Prinz Heinrich Berg, one thousand feet above the level, and only three miles from the beleaguered city, he was sure there was actually such a thing as a "theater of war." On October 31, the bombardment had began, when a great black column of smoke arose and hung like a pall over the city. At first glance, it seemed as if "one of the neighboring hills had turned into an active volcano and was emitting a column of smoke," but it was soon learned that the great cloud of smoke came from an oil-tank in Tsingtau that was on fire.

The bombardment had been scheduled to start late in the morning, when Mr. Jones and others were invited to accompany staff members of the Japanese and British forces to Prinz Heinrich Berg. When they reached the summit, they saw the theater of war laid out before them like a map. To the left were Japanese and British cruisers in the Yellow Sea, preparing for the bombardment. Below was the Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, steaming about the harbor, while to the right one could see the Kiaochow coast, with forts, redoubts, the entrenched Japanese and British camps.

They had just couched themselves comfortably between large, jagged rocks, where they felt sure they were not in direct line with the enemy's guns, "when suddenly there was a flash as if some one had turned a large golden mirror on the field down below to the right." A little column of black smoke drifted away from one of the Japanese trenches, and a minute later they heard the sharp report of a field-gun. "Gentlemen, the show has started," said the British captain, as he removed his cap and adjusted

[2] Correspondent of The Minneapolis *Journal*.

JAPANESE INFANTRY IN ACTION

his glasses. No sooner had he said this than reports of guns came from all directions, "with a continuous rumble as if a giant bowling-alley were in use." Everywhere the valley at the rear of Tsingtau was glowing with flashes from discharging guns. At the same time, "great clouds of bluish-white smoke suddenly sprang up around the German batteries where Japanese shells had burst." Over near the greater harbor of Tsingtau could be seen flames licking up large oil-tanks, which they afterwards learned had been set on fire by the Germans and not by bursting shells.

Warships in the Yellow Sea now opened fire on Iltis fort, "and for three hours we continually used our glasses on Tsingtau and the warships." They watched the effects of the Japanese fire until the boom of guns from a German fort on a little peninsula jutting out from Kiaochow bay, toward the east, attracted attention. They could see the big siege-gun on this fort rise up over the bunker, then aim at the warship and fire, and then quickly go down again. Next they would turn their eyes toward the warships, "in time to see a fountain of water shoot out 200 yards from a vessel, where the shell had struck." They scanned the city only to find that a 150-ton crane in the greater harbor, which they had seen earlier in the day, and which was said to be the largest crane in the world, had disappeared and only its base remained.

On November 1, the second day of the bombardment, that party again stationed themselves on Prinz Heinrich Berg. From early morning Japanese and British forces kept up a continuous fire on the German redoubts. When the party arrived in their seats "it seemed as if shells were dropping around the German trenches every minute." On the redoubt of Taitung-Chen the Japanese fire was particularly heavy. By early afternoon, through field-glasses, this German redoubt "appeared to have had an attack of smallpox, so pitted was it from holes by bursting shells." By nightfall many ports in the German redoubts had been destroyed, together with machine-guns. The result was to advance the Japanese lines several hundred yards from the bottom of hills where they had rested earlier in the day.

It was not until the third day that Mr. Jones observed

from the hill that this theater of war had a curtain, "a real asbestos one that screened the fire directly ahead of us from our eyes." Already he knew this theater was "equipped with pits, drops, a gallery for onlookers, exits, and an orchestra of booming cannon and rippling, roaring pom-poms," but that nature had provided it with a curtain—that was something new. He and the others reached the summit of the mountain just as heavy clouds, evidently disturbed by the bombardment during the previous night, were dropping down in front of Tsingtau. For three hours they all sat on the peak shivering in a blast of wind from the sea, "all the while wondering just what was being enacted beyond that curtain." The firing had suddenly ceased, and with the filmy haze before their eyes they conjured up pictures of Japanese troops making a general attack upon Iltis fort, evidently the key to Tsingtau, "while the curtain of the theater of war was down."

By early afternoon the clouds lifted. With glasses they were then able to distinguish fresh sappings by the Japanese infantry near the German redoubts. Japanese guns, which the day before were stationed below to the left, had advanced half a mile and were on the road just outside the village of Ta-Yau. Turning their glasses on Kiaochow Bay, they discovered that the *Kaiserin Elizabeth* was missing; nor did a search of the shore line reveal her. Whether she had been blown up by the Germans or had hidden behind one of the islands, no one then knew. All guns were silent now. The British captain quickly asked, "Well, shall we take advantage of the intermission?" A half-hour later the party were down the mountain and riding homeward toward Tschang-Tsun.

After desperate assaults, extending over three weeks, in which the Japanese were described as having rivaled the bravery of their fellow countrymen at Port Arthur, and in the face of an heroic resistance by the Germans, Tsingtau surrendered to Japan, on November 7, when Governor Meyer-Waldeck, following the hoisting of white flags on the forts, sent an officer with a flag of truce to the Anglo-Japanese lines. Japanese officers paid unstinted tribute to the bravery of the Germans, who fought tenaciously to the

last. Before surrendering they blew up what was left of their forts and practically the whole town was in ruins. A Japanese torpedo-boat flotilla that entered the bay found nearly all the ships had been destroyed.

Thus terminated German rule in the Pacific. Tsingtau was a fairly strong place. It was expected to hold out for six months, but could not withstand the attack upon it for as many weeks. As there was no possibility of giving relief, the defense was hopeless from the first, and probably was made only for the honor of the German flag. The Allies conducted the attack with method, courage, and decision. The fall of Tsingtau deprived Germany not only of her last possession on the Asiatic mainland, but of her only strategic position outside of Europe. For two months the German garrison, which was almost wholly composed of reservists who were living or doing business in China, held out against the land- and sea-attacks of the Japanese and of certain British detachments of both white and Indian troops, who were already in China at the outbreak of the war.

The immediate question which occupied the minds of the Japanese after the fall of Tsingtau was the future of the territory they had taken from Germany. While the territory had never been German freehold, there were many years of the German lease still to run. The general idea prevalent in Great Britain and in other countries was that Japan had "promised" to hand over Kiaochow to China, but this was not the general opinion in Japan. Foreign opinion was based on the terms of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany. As the ultimatum had not been accepted by Germany, its terms were regarded by Japan as nugatory; war, they considered, had altered the case as it existed when the ultimatum was launched. Because of its rejection, Japan had been forced into great expenditures of money and lives and was now under no compulsion to fulfil the offer which she had made. Acceptance of the demand made on Germany would have saved Japan a waste of money and blood and would not have involved her in the risk of defeat. She had faced danger and had incurred losses for which she should be allowed to recoup herself. This thought was on

every Japanese tongue. The Japanese Government, however, said the future of Kiaochow would be settled by negotiations after the war. Meanwhile the colony would be retained by Japan as an asset for use in the negotiations. Germany was perhaps not surprized at the fall of Tsingtau, but its loss stirred bitter feelings. In a Berlin newspaper, the *Lokal Anzeiger,* was an article in which the writer said:

"Germany will never forget the heroic fighting at Tsingtau and those who have defended the colony. Never shall we forget the brutal violence of the yellow robbers, nor England who instigated them. We know that we can not settle our account with Japan at present. For years she will enjoy her booty. Our mills will grind slowly, but even if years should pass before the right moment comes at last, then a shout of joy will resound through Germany: "Wo to you, Nippon!' "

Early in August a British expedition from New Zealand, under command of Rear Admiral Sir George Patey, set out to capture the Samoa Islands. Samoa had been the scene of international wrangling in earlier years. Great Britain, Germany, and the United States all had had parts in it. It was on March 1, 1900, that the German flag was hoisted with due ceremony at Samoa. With an almost complete absence of ceremony it was now to be hauled down.

The New Zealand Expeditionary Force left Wellington at dawn on August 15 and at 6 A.M. met three British cruisers in New Zealand waters—the *Psyche*, the *Pyramus*, and the *Philomel*. For the next fortnight or so these ships played a game of hide and seek among certain big islands that provided an excellent playground for such a game in the Pacific. The first evening out the *Psyche* signaled that, as the whereabouts of the German warships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisen,* then in southern waters (two of the German ships that were concerned not long afterward in the battles with the British off Coronel and at the Falkland Islands), were still unknown, the British ships were to extinguish all their lights and proceed with shaded lights at bow and stern. On August 20 they met along the shores of New Caledonia the big French cruiser *Montcalm*, which was entering the harbor, and

next day they were joined by the battle-cruiser *Australia* and the light cruiser *Melbourne*. An enthusiastic reception was accorded the French ship. As the British passed the *Montcalm* their band played the "Marseillaise," while the band on the French cruiser responded with the British national anthem. Cheers from thousands of men amid the singing of patriotic songs, added to the general enthusiasm, French residents being greatly excited by this sudden and unexpected appearance of "their brave Allies from New Zealand's shores." When the ships were all assembled, they moved off in the evening light.

In due course Fiji was reached. At anchor in the harbor of Suva was found the Japanese collier *Fukoku Maru*, which had been coaling German cruisers at the Caroline Islands just before the declaration of war. After the coaling was completed the Japanese captain had gone on to Samoa and called at Apia, but the Germans would not allow him to land. He had been paid for his coal by drafts on Germany, but on reaching Suva found them useless and so lacked the means with which to coal and reprovision his ship. Not being allowed to land at Samoa he went on to Pago-Pago, still in complete ignorance that war had been declared. Unable to get supplies at Pago-Pago, he had left for Suva. At the latter port, the harbor light having been extinguished, he ran his vessel on a reef in the night. He sent up rockets, but no assistance could be obtained from the shore. As the tide rose he got off.

In the early dawn of August 30 a glimpse of German Samoa was obtained, but the American island, Tutuila, was out of sight, away to the right. Presently the ships rounded the southeastern corner of the island of Upolu, with fertile, wooded hills on its summits, beautiful in the morning mist, and saw a white line of surf breaking along the coral reef of historic Upolu, the home of Robert Louis Stevenson, on the summit of one of whose mountains he lies buried. Here was the scene of old wars, rebellions and international scheming; the scene, also, of that devastating hurricane which wrecked six ships of war and ten other vessels and sent 142 officers and men of the German and American navies to their last long sleep, while the British *Calliope*,

in the teeth of the gale, and amid the cheers of the doomed men in the other ships, steamed out between the jaws of the Apia reef and on through the blinding rain and spray to safety. The rusting ribs and plates of the *Adler,* the German flagship of that time, were to be seen, still pitched high inside the reef as a reminder of that memorable event of many years before.

The *Psyche* now went on ahead, and, after the harbor had been swept for mines, steamed in under a flag of truce and delivered a message from Rear-Admiral Sir George Patey, demanding the surrender of the town. The Germans, who had been expecting their own fleet, were surprized by the suddenness with which an overwhelming force had thus descended upon them, and decided to offer no resistance. Captain Marshall promptly made a signal to the ships to steam to their anchorage. Motor launches, motor surf-boats, and ships' boats were now quickly launched and the men began to pour over the ships' sides and down the rope-ladders into the heaving boats.

In a brief space of time the covering party was on shore, officers and men darting out of boats up to their knees, and sometimes their waists, in the water. The main street, cross-roads, and bridges of the town were quickly in possession of the men, who had landed with Maxims and rifles and were waiting for the main body to debark. The Government buildings were seized, plugs in the telephone-wires were pulled out to prevent conversations among residents, and an armored party started out to seize the wireless-station, which was conspicuous by its tall latticed iron-work mast, some three or four miles distant. Meanwhile, the German flag was hauled down, the Germans saluting it before it was carried out of sight. On the following morning, at eight o'clock, the British flag was slowly hoisted in its place, to a salute of twenty-one guns from the *Psyche,* the flag reaching the summit of the staff as the final report was heard. Troops then gave the "Royal Salute," and the ceremony was ended with the British national anthem, and three cheers for the King. The Germans, since the declaration of war, had treated the British and French residents of Samoa with courtesy. They received similar treatment

at British hands. The German Governor was sent to New Zealand for detention, but treated as a distinguished guest.

The largest island in the Bismarck Archipelago to the north of New Guinea is Neu-Pomern, or New Pomerania, formerly New Britain. The center of government is at Herbertschohe, at the northeast end of the island on the Gazelle Peninsula. Here was a wireless-station. An unsuccessful attempt was made early in August to reach it, but on September 11 a landing party got on shore at daybreak unobserved, presumably at some distance from the town, and at seven o'clock presented themselves to the astonished residents, and proceeded, without opposition, to hoist the British flag. They then set out to destroy the wireless-station, but encountered opposition. Having reason to suspect the road was mined and ambushed, they fought their way through the tangled bush for four miles, after which the Germans in charge of the station surrendered. On the following day guns were landed, and the island formally occupied. Two German officers and five non-commissioned officers were made prisoners and thirty native policemen. Two days later British forces paid a visit to the colony and met with little resistance. After a parley, the Governor surrendered on September 24 and retired to Bougaiville, in the Solomon Islands. Wilhelmshaven, in German New Guinea, was occupied without resistance.[3]

[3] Principal Sources: The *Independent, The Literary Digest,* The *Sun* (New York), *Morning Post,* The *Times* (London), The *Journal of Commerce* (New York), Jefferson Jones in The Minneapolis *Journal,* The Manchester *Examiner.*

III

THE BOER REBELLION QUELLED AND GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA, TOGOLAND AND KAMERUN TAKEN

October 13, 1914—November 30, 1914

THREATENED rebellion in the Union of South Africa —or what South African people sometimes called "the other U. S. A."—came as a shock to Great Britain, at a time when pride in the support received generally from her colonies and dependencies had reached its height. Everywhere in the empire, the Motherland's call to arms had seemed to put an end to every sign of local discontent or quarrel—in Ireland, Canada, India, Australia, and Africa alike,—individual grievances being laid aside and official assurances given of loyal support. The attitude of South Africa had been especially conspicuous. Public announcement by Premier Botha that his Government would definitely aid England was taken as crowning proof that Britain's generous policy toward the Union since the Boer War ended had not been in vain. This satisfaction, however, was short lived, followed as it was by the open revolt of Colonel Maritz, his apparent implication in aggressions from German Southwest Africa, and an uncertainty as to the proportion of burghers who were with Botha and the number who were with Maritz. At once the picture was drawn of an eventual expulsion of Great Britain from South Africa which, combined with German success in Europe, would have threatened the whole British Empire. In fact, a dissolution of the empire might then have occurred, for Egypt would have been demanded by Turkey, and, with the backing of a victorious Germany, Turkey might have got it. That would have meant a German Suez and German domination over the route to India.

Danger really lay, not so much in what annoyance Maritz might cause the Colonial Government, as in his act as a precedent and in the exaggerated rumors of it that were likely to spread to other parts of the empire where perhaps more real disaffection existed. It required no strain of the imagination to picture the straits Great Britain would be in should her Mohammedan subjects rise, and it had been Germany's hope to see them rise. England's chance of avoiding serious difficulty lay in the confidence she had won in South Africa, and in the fact that the Boers were convinced that she really meant to respect their nationality. Botha's own words—"Tho many of those now here have in the past been hostile to the British flag, they would to-day ten times rather be under the British than under the German flag"—definitely indicated the change that had come over the attitude of the Boers within a few years. Professor Paul Gamassa,[4] who had spent ten years in the Transvaal, had emphasized the fact that the Boers were "clinging to the idea of realizing their racial and national ideals under the British flag," and saw no "call of the blood" between the Boer and German. In his opinion the Boer still recalled Germany's failure to answer to his call for help during the Boer War. German Southwest Africa had not the men nor the wealth sufficient to support the Maritz faction, unless strengthened by a vast number of Union Boers going over to the German standard. Another consideration was the action of Portugal, which had a colony adjacent to German Southwest Africa, and had sided definitely with Great Britain. The little Iberian Republic, heretofore almost forgotten in this war, had now an influence that was by no means to be despised.

The Boer War, that for two years taxed the skill of British commanders, ended in 1902. Twelve years and a few months afterward Boer leaders who won eminence in that conflict were now ranged against each other. Botha and Smuts were Ministers of the Crown; Beyers and De Wet rebel leaders in the field. Of the Dutch people the majority went with Botha and Smuts; the others with Beyers, De Wet, and ex-President Steyn's lieutenant and mouthpiece, Hert-

[4] In the Hamburg *Fremdenblatt.*

zog. Botha became the leader on one side, Hertzog on the other. There had been some personal quarrel between Botha and Hertzog, but the real trouble was much deeper; it was a definite rupture between two ideals. Within a week after war began in Europe conditions were grave. In various parts of the Union there were mutterings of discontent, in the western Transvaal particularly. On October 13 Maritz had rebelled in the northwest Cape Province and martial law had been proclaimed throughout the Union. Maritz was commanding German troops as well as his own; he had

BOER SOLDIERS SERVING UNDER GENERAL BOTHA

German guns in his possession; had the German rank of General, and had arrested officers and men unwilling to join the Germans, and sent them as prisoners of war to German Southwest Africa. An agreement had been drawn up between Maritz and the Governor of German Southwest Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, but ceding Walfisch Bay and other parts of the Union to the Germans and providing that the Germans should invade the Union only when Maritz asked them to do so.

At Cape Town, Maritz's revolt, combined with prompt

action taken by the Government, produced a wave of enthusiasm for Botha personally and for his policy. By the end of October rebels in the northwest part of the Cape Province were dispersed and the main interest shifted to the western Transvaal, where Beyers was the chief instigator of the revolt. Here Beyers and his followers were badly beaten by Union forces under Botha and Colonel Lichtenburg. The main body under Beyers then crossed the Vaal near Bloemhof, and were again routed on November 7 by Commandant Lemmer. Moving further south in the Orange Free State they suffered a third defeat on November 15. In the three engagements they lost 26 men in killed, 67 wounded, and over 700 in prisoners. Another portion of the rebels went west led by Colonel Kemp, who, like Beyers, had been an officer of the Union Defense Forces. Apparently he intended to effect a junction with Maritz's forces. On November 14 seventeen were captured on the Transvaal border and 50 more southeast of Vryburg. The third section of the group collected by Beyers had fled northeast, led by Commandant "Jack" Pienaar, and on November 6 were reported at Warmbaths, on the railway that comes down from Pretoria, about 64 miles from the administrative capital. Two days later Colonel Van de Venter inflicted a defeat on Pienaar's followers at Zandfontein, killing and wounding 120 and capturing 25. East of Pretoria occurred a detached outbreak from rebels led by Commandant Muller, but they were routed at Bronkhorstspruit by Colonel Mentz and finally dispersed. Muller, wounded, was captured on the 13th.

It seemed probable that the rebellion in the Transvaal was now practically at an end, but no sooner was the rising of Maritz subdued, and his army of one thousand men driven into German Southwest Africa, than another and apparently more serious revolt broke out in the Orange River Colony and the western Transvaal, under the leadership of De Wet and Beyers. A religious monomaniac named Van Rensburg had gone about declaring that De Wet and Beyers were the instrument of Heaven in bringing about the restoration of the old republics. De Wet's main success was won at Sand River, near Doornburg, where, on November 7, he resisted a Government force and retook some

prisoners, at the expense, however, of the death of his son Daniel. During the next few days he destroyed the railway-lines near Lindley, and entered the looted Winburg. The back of the rising was broken on November 12 at Mushroom Valley, about 24 miles east of Winburg, where Botha and Colonel Brand came into touch with De Wet's force and severely defeated it. Many surrenders followed. De Wet himself fled with some of his followers, first south, then back east, and lastly westward to the railway, where at Reitspruit his remaining force was met by Union troops



BRITISH SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS LEAVING DURBAN FOR EAST AFRICA

and divided. With a handful of men he succeeded in crossing to the west, but on November 20 was pursued toward Boshof, and next day with 25 men trekked north toward the Vaal River. Pursued by motor-cars, his band dwindled to six men. De Wet crossed the Vaal River but most of his commandants were taken, and two of his sons surrendered. A few days later it was officially announced that De Wet and all his followers had been captured without shots being fired.

The capture of De Wet and the death of Beyers practically ended the rebellion. Scattered parties in the Free State who for some time held out were gradually brought to surrender. Kemp, who operated on the extreme western border of the Transvaal, penetrated some way into the northwestern districts of the Cape and on November 7 attacked Kuruman, but was beaten off. Government forces in pursuit brought him to action on November 16 at Klein Witzant, but he managed to elude them and finally disappeared westward into the Kalabari desert. Two months later, in company with Maritz, he reappeared, invaded the northwestern districts of the Cape, and attacked Upington on January 24, but was repulsed. After desultory fighting during the next few days, Kemp suddenly appeared at Kakamas with 43 officers and 486 men, surrendered voluntarily without conditions, and the South African rebellion was at an end.

Interest was again drawn to South Africa when, on July 9, news came from Pretoria that General Botha, commanding the forces of the Union of South Africa, had accepted the surrender of all the German military forces in German Southwest Africa. Combined with the suppression of the Boer rebellion, this closed one of the minor campaigns of the war, and released for service elsewhere the South African contingent. The campaign against German Southwest Africa as a whole had been considered so vital that all the resources of the South African Union had been engaged in it. Its successful conclusion meant that, despite the fact that German East Africa still remained unconquered, a contingent could now be dispatched to France, while additional forces could be spared to aid in continuing the campaign in East Africa, where, in the first weeks of the war, there had occurred some inland naval fighting on Lake Nyassa, the northern portion of which runs into German East Africa, altho the whole western shore lies in British Central Africa. On this inland sea Great Britain and Germany each had small armed steamers, which naturally came into conflict. In one of these conflicts the *Gwendolen,* a vessel of about 350 tons, which was built on the Clyde and taken out to Central Africa in sections and launched on the lake in

1898, captured in August a German craft. Such minor operations had no weight, however, in the conquest of German East Africa, which became essentially a military enterprise that was not fully completed until the end of the war in Europe, as detailed in the following chapter.

After suppressing the Boer rebellion in the previous autumn, Botha had taken command of British operations against German Southwest Africa and headed an invasion of that territory late in February. The forces under his command captured Olymbingua on May 4 and two days later, after a march of thirty-five miles over a waterless waste, occupied the railway-junction of Karibib and other stations. During this march they suffered severely from heat, thirst, and hunger. The road to Windhoek, the capital of the German territory, was then opened by the occupation of Keetmanshop. Windhoek was taken on May 13 without opposition, and martial law was proclaimed.

German Southwest Africa lies on the west coast between the Orange and Kunene rivers for a distance of about 900 miles, between Portuguese West Africa and Cape Colony, and extends inland eastward to British lands. Its area is 322,450 square miles, or about seven times the area of New York State and half again as large as Germany's European Empire, but the population was only 79,556, chiefly Hottentots and Bushmen. The European population in 1913 was 14,816, of whom 12,292 were Germans. It was the first colony Germany acquired in Africa. It dated from 1884, when by proclamation what was known as Luderitz's settlement was taken over as "an effective protection of German commerce." Parts of it are inviting but the rainfall averages no more than three inches annually in Damaraland and Great Namaqualand.

There is no running water south of the Kunene River. Much of the land is waterless desert. The coast belt, especially, is lacking in water. Even the British settlement of Walfisch Bay, which lies in about the center of the Atlantic coast-line, has always been compelled to obtain fresh water periodically by ship from Cape Town. The southern half of Great Namaqualand is the most barren and inhospitable region of all. The inhabitants are Hottentots, whose an-

cestors once proudly called themselves Khooi-Khooin—"men of men"—a pastoral people, split up into various sects or clans, and nearly all of pure Hottentot blood. They speak Boer Dutch. Formerly they numbered hundreds of thousands. Unlike the Kaffirs, Bechuanas, Zulus, and Basutos, who have thrived and increased steadily alongside the white settlers of British South Africa, the Hottentots, quick and intelligent altho they are, have never been capable of holding their own with their white neighbors. During the last century they had vanished as a nation from Cape Colony. The same fate seems to await them in their last stronghold, Great Namaqualand.

In the campaign against German Southwest Africa, German troops, neither in numbers nor in equipment, were able to cope with the British. They fought an army eight or ten times as strong as they were—an army, moreover, which was in a position to receive war supplies by sea, while the German force was completely cut off. But they held out for eleven months against heavy odds, caused the British severe losses, and finally capitulated for lack of ammunition and other war-materials. The surrender virtually closed a remarkable chapter of the war—the South African chapter. If there was any part of the far-flung empire of Great Britain on whose disaffection the Germans had confidently reckoned, it was in that part of South Africa where a race which Germany classified as "Low German" was supreme.

If any one man in the whole British Empire within six months had "made good" in the war, it was Louis Botha, Premier of the Union of South Africa. Botha personally commanded the Union troops. Not content with merely crushing a Boer revolt in a remarkably short time, he had invaded and conquered German Southwest Africa. Botha himself, thirteen years before as commander-in-chief of the burgher forces in the field against Lord Kitchener, had been one of the shrewdest foes with whom Lord Roberts, Kitchener, Buller, and French had had to reckon. He fought his country's enemies into the last ditch. But after the treaty of peace was signed, with the independence of the Boer republics deeded away, and when they had assumed the status of Crown Colonies, no one on either side

was more tireless than he in the work of reestablishing the harmony and mutual understanding essential to South African unity. Other Boer leaders, also under stress of the terrible warfare which had desolated their country, accepted the inevitable. De Wet was one of the first of those who forgot their oaths of allegiance and the self-government and free franchise which Britain had bestowed upon them. Beyers and De La Rey had followed his example. There was one man in South Africa, however, who could keep the major portion of the Dutch population true, and he was Botha.

Englishmen came almost to believe that Botha, the son of a Dutch father and a French Huguenot mother, was Cecil Rhodes's peer. In less than a year he had cleared South Africa of two distinct menaces, and was prepared to send important contingents of South African troops, both British and Dutch, to assist in northern France. When the award of honors to Britain's statesmen and generals in this war was to be made, it was certain that one of the prominent names on the list would be that of Botha. He was already considered eligible for a peerage, he, who fifteen years before had beaten back British armies at Spion Kop and the Tugela. Tho not of British blood he was born on British soil, in the little hamlet of Greytown, in Natal, on September 29, 1863, so that in the World War he was fifty-two years old. When five years old his family migrated to the Orange Free State, where his father became a sheep farmer, and young Botha went to school. In 1884 he struck out for himself, taking up, by occupation and purchase, a farm in a nameless little republic which had just been started by white settlers within the borders of Zululand. He got on well in local affairs, and became a native commissioner and field-cornet, a place of rank in the Boer service. In 1888, when the "New Republic," as it was called, was assimilated with the Transvaal, he was continued in these offices until 1896, when he was elected to the upper chamber of the Volksraad.

Even in those days Botha, young, clear-headed and broad-minded, identified himself with the minority of burgher progressives, who were opposed to the retrograde policies of

"Oom Paul" Kruger. Botha always opposed the idea of war with England, and lived up to his convictions by being one of the seven men in the Volksraad who voted against the dispatch of Kruger's ultimatum to Lord Salisbury. But when his countrymen had committed themselves for better or worse, he did not hesitate. He knew, as did a few others of the younger men, the hopeless task that confronted the Boers. Throughout that wonderful first year of the war, during which Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking were besieged on the one hand, while, on the other, the Boers held off the British troops and beat them soundly, Botha was never deceived as to the outcome, altho he fought as stoutly as did De Wet, Cronje, De La Rey, and other extremists, some of whom were old enough to be his father. He fought so well, in fact, that early in 1900, after the death of General Piet Joubert, the knightliest of the older generation of Boers, he was appointed commandant-general of all the Boer forces. It was Botha who directed the long-drawn-out guerrilla war, which lasted two years after the formal fighting was ended. It was to him that Kitchener made the first proposals for peace, in the course of a meeting between the two leaders, on February 28, 1901. Botha's wife, to whom he was married in 1888, was Annie Clere Emmet, a granddaughter of the Irish patriot. He had three sons, all of whom were with him in his campaign against the Germans.

Besides German Southwest Africa, Germany had, in Africa, Togoland, on the Gold Coast; Kamerun, in the Gulf of Guinea, with a hinterland extending to French Equatorial Africa, and German East Africa, which lies immediately south of the equator. Togoland, which is about the size of Ireland, is bounded on one side by French Dahomey, and on the other by the British Gold Coast, and is shaped like a pyramid, with its narrow end on the sea, its coast line being only thirty-two miles long. About a million natives inhabit it, chiefly Hausas. The whites number about four hundred. It is a thriving little colony, with a docile and industrious population, and a large trade in palm-oil, cocoa, rubber, and cotton. The natives are large owners of cattle, sheep, and goats. One railway runs inland from Lome, and

there is a network of admirable roads. Togoland, some little time after the war began, was taken by the Allies as the result of a combined British and French attack by sea and land. Its capture was of importance, since, apart from the fact that it was the only one of the German colonies that did not encroach on the imperial revenues, it was the chief station of the German oversea wireless system.

Farther east and south lies the Kamerun, between British Nigeria and French Kongo. This colony extends from Lake Chad in the north to the Ubangi and Kongo rivers. Its area is about one-third larger than that of the German Empire in Europe. Its population of 3,500,000 comprises 2,000 whites, the rest being Bantus and Sudanese. Kamerun was a German colony with many possibilities. It contains a range of high mountains, which might form a health station for white residents, while the soil is rich and the water abundant. Its products are much the same as those of Togoland, but its forests provide valuable timber, and profitable mineral developments were certain to come. Roads had been opened, and 150 miles of railway built. Trouble with native tribes had done much to handicap progress. Being an inland country, it is destitute of harbor accommodations and it has no navigable rivers. Altho in part possest of a rich soil it has a deadly climate. The coast district of Kamerun and portions of the interior were in possession of the Allies as far back as April, 1915; the Germans afterward held only a weak grip on the colony. Edea, the point from which Major-General Dobell's force operated, is 25 miles from the coast and southeast of Duala. Jaunde is about 40 miles to the east. The main German force at this point had to face armies on two sides almost immediately, while a third column under Brigadier-General Cunliffe, having "beaten and broken up" the organized German forces in the north, was able to cooperate later. Kamerun was a German colony that paid its way. The Germans had there a large force of native levies, drilled and led by German officers and provided with machine-guns. Among other defensive advantages possest by the Germans was the fact that the routes by which the Allies had to advance were covered by dense bush and intercepted by many water-courses.

Early in the war Duala had been captured with assistance from the British navy, after which the Germans moved their capital inland to Yaunde. With the British advance on Yaunde, British columns were ambushed on several occasions. German machine-guns had a great effect on British native troops who had never seen these weapons before. Then, at a conference with the French from Equatorial Africa on March, 1915, a joint plan was agreed upon by which the British were to move on Yaunde from the coast and on Lome and Dume from the east. But they set out too late and in insufficient force. Strong resistance was made, sickness came with the rains, and the French were behind the dates in their program. This campaign ended in a forced retreat to a point near Edea, from which the British had started. After the rains their luck turned, the troops having been reinforced and provided with carriers. The heaviest fighting of the two campaigns occurred between Edea and Yaunde, but all the columns reached Yaunde within a few days of each other. The German forces in the country were then "rounded up" and compelled to seek an asylum in Spanish territory.

In the short space of five months 322,348 square miles of German territory had been conquered. There was no declaration of annexation. When one considered the distance covered, the difficult nature of the country, the greater part of which was desert constantly visited by sand-storms, the excessive heat and the scanty communications, the precision with which the movements of various columns were coordinated, the British at home felt that it was no exaggeration to say that so brilliant a piece of work had rarely been equaled in the history of desert warfare.[5]

[5] Compiled from *The Literary Digest,* The New York *Times,* The *Times* (London), The Manchester *Guardian,* The *Evening Post,* The *Journal of Commerce,* The *Sun* (New York), *The Review of Reviews,* "Nelson's History of the War" (by John Buchan), The Hamburg *Fremdenblatt,* Associated Press dispatches.

IV

GERMANY'S LOSS OF EAST AFRICA, HER LAST COLONY

August, 1914—1918

THE last and greatest of the German colonies was German East Africa, which is about twice the size of European Germany, with a population of 8,000,000, including in normal times about 5,000 white men. Variations of climate and landscape give the region great possibilities. Its northern frontier runs west from the coast south of Mombasa, just north of the great snow mass of Kilimanjaro, as far as the Victoria Nyanza, of which lake two-thirds are in German territory. Going westward, it includes also part of the shores of lakes Kivu and Tanganyika. Great Britain is its neighbor on the north and along part of its western border. The remainder of the west line follows the Belgian Kongo. The whole of the south follows Portuguese Mozambique. The islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, which are under British protection, dominate the northern part of its coast-line of 620 miles. Its vast lake-region provides admirable means of transit and is eminently suitable for tropical agriculture. Water is difficult to obtain, for the only river of any size is the Rufiki. The snows of Kilimanjaro drain largely toward British territory. Nevertheless, German East Africa is a land of great potential agricultural and pastoral wealth. Its forest wealth is enormous. Gold is known to exist, as well as base-metals and soda deposits. Germany had expended on the colony much money and thought. It had aimed to make it a planter's country, where huge agricultural estates had become the rule. Four excellent ports, Lindi, Kilwa, Tanga, and the capital, Dar-es-Salam, aided its commerce. It was well served by German steamship lines. Two railways which ran into the interior competed with the Uganda railway to Fort Florence.

In German East Africa, British cruisers in August, 1914, destroyed a wireless station on the coast of Dar-es-Salam, thus cutting off Germany's communications, and practically taking possession of the only German port of importance on the east coast. Its retention completed Great Britain's control—subject to the Portuguese ports of Beira and Delagoa Bay—over the eastern and western trade-routes of South Africa. Portugal, England's ancient ally, cooperated with British forces. Actual fighting began at the end of September, when a German raid took place across the frontier into British East Africa, and an attempt was made to capture Mombasa, the capital, which is the starting point of the Uganda railroad. From this district the Germans were beaten back into their own territory by a small body of African riflemen and Arabs from Zanzibar, who were presently strengthened by British troops from India, comprising regulars and men supplied by Indian Potentates and Princes. India thus early had made her entry into the war. In November the combined British forces made an attack on the German stations of Tanga and Jasin, the former an important seaport south of Mombasa, joined by rail with Moshi, which lies among the foothills of Kilimanjaro. Vigorous attacks and counter attacks were made at this time by boats on the Victoria Nyanza. Fighting in this region, as in the Kamerun region on the west side of Africa, continued into 1915, but by the summer of that year the entire coast-line was in the hands of Entente Powers, as well as several posts some hundred miles inland. The German garrisons, however gallantly they might continue to fight, were thus cut off from renewing their supplies of ammunition.

In December, 1915, news that General Smith-Dorrien, who had been conspicuous in the early British defense on the Western Front, notably in the retreat from Mons, was to take command in East Africa, seemed evidence of the importance with which hitherto incomplete operations against Germany's largest colony had been viewed in Great Britain. He was to have assistance from a strong force recruited from South Africa under command of Colonel Brits, who had distinguished himself in the rounding up of

rebels and in the invasion of German Southwest Africa. War by these men was now to be carried on in a country which would tax even such among them as had faced the drought and sandstorms of Damaraland. The five hundred or so miles of frontier between British and German East Africa, above which rises the 19,000 foot peak of

GERMAN EAST AFRICA

The boundaries of this former German colony, by the longest east-and-west and north-and-south measurements, are about 800 by 600 miles. Nearly 370,000 square miles are embraced within them, or nearly twice the area of Germany in Europe and seven times the area of New York State

Mount Kilimanjaro, abound in almost every obstacle to the carrying out of definite military plans. There are stretches of thick, thorny scrub through which a way could be forced only at the expense of a uniform and one's own skin—patches of trackless and waterless desert, and many dangerous swamps.

Before the winter was over, however, the Boer General, Jan Christaan Smuts, had taken command of the forces operating against German East Africa in succession to Smith-Dorrien, whose sojourn in Africa had apparently been a half-way station on the road to retirement from active service. A victory was reported in March on the slopes of Kilimanjaro. South African forces were coming from the north instead of the south, owing to questions of transport. An expedition from Rhodesia would have to labor across a thousand miles of wilderness before it could strike the main German forces. Instead, South African troops were sent by ship to Mombasa and thence up the railroad half-way to Nairobi, which lies close to the German frontier and Kilimanjaro. British success already achieved gave them the western terminus of the Moschi-Pangani Railroad.

The British occupied Moshi on March 13 and were soon pushing on to occupy Arusha, which was believed to have been evacuated by the Germans, who appeared to be retiring southward, their movements assisted by the Tanga Railway. Moshi is 18 miles in a direct line west of the Kitova Hills, the scene of a severe engagement on March 11. Arusha lies about 45 miles further west, at the southern foot of Mount Meru. It was on the road between Moshi and Arusha that Major-General Stewart's column—which had come from the north—appeared while the fight in Kitova was in progress, and compelled the Germans threatened in front and rear to retreat. The Germans had been twice defeated and were now in retreat with no avenue of escape open. Wherever they went they would meet with enemies, with no neutral territory in which they could take refuge.

By June 15 the British column, which was advancing along the seaboard, had reached Makuyuni, after Wilhelmthal was occupied and Tanga cleared of opposing forces. Operating on Lake Victoria a force had captured the German islands of Ukerewe, which constituted an important point for an attack on Maunsa, the principal German town on the southern shores of the lake. A branch of the railroad from Mombasa to Kikuyu had been constructed to Taveta, in order to bring the army of Smuts directly to

Mount Kilimanjaro. The capture of Moshi, the mountain terminus of the German railroad, opened the way into the interior.

From this point the British army had been divided into three sections. One moved west to Arusha and was driving the Germans back toward Lake Victoria. The second struck overland to the south and reached Kondoa, where it stood off a strong attack from the Germans. The third fought its way down the railroad which runs through the mountains and over the tablelands to the sea. In the northwestern corner of the colony Belgian troops under General Tambeur were making progress. Those that entered from the Kongo south of Lake Kivu occupied the German towns at the head of Lake Tanganyika, and cut the roads which connected Ujiji, the lake terminal of the central German railroad, with German plantations on the southern shore of the Victoria Nyanza. Another Belgian column, entering north of Lake Kivu, came into touch with the British column entering from Uganda. British gunboats captured the German islands in Victoria Nyanza. The Allies could now concentrate from three directions on a rich and densely populated region. Dispatches from London, early in July, stating that the British had taken Tanga, German East Africa's principal seaport and railroad terminus in the north, indicated that the campaign was proceeding successfully. As in the French and English wars of the eighteenth century, a great prize of the war had lain far away from the scene of heavy fighting. In the eighteenth century the real prize which hung in the balance was North America, and now it was Africa.

Early in August, Botha arrived in German East Africa to witness what was believed in London to be the last phase of the operations against Germany's one remaining colony, but it was far from being that. Botha was present at the fighting north of the German Central Railway, which resulted in a British advance to and occupation of the lines at Kilimatinde and other points. With the occupation of Ujiji by the Belgians, and of Sadani, and other coast-ports, by the British, the Germans apparently had nothing to do but to retreat into the southeastern corner of the

colony, where the Portuguese, in their East African possession, were awaiting them. The ring around German East Africa had thus been contracting. The Portuguese, who nowhere else were in striking distance of Germany, had advanced across the Rovuma River, and the Belgians from their Kongo colony, at two points north of Lake Tanganyika. While British war-vessels patrolled the coast, a British expedition had entered the country from the north, near the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. Germany's last colony, like the Fatherland itself, was now held in a ring of steel. The main objective of all the expeditions had been the central railway which the Germans built from the coast to Lake Tanganyika. The Belgians captured Ujiji, the western terminus; the British, after fighting their way through the northern jungle, reached the station of Kilimatinda, and with this as a base continued operations until they acquired control of most of the important railway points of the central high land.

The complaint that war had lost its picturesqueness might be true of Europe, but it did not apply to Africa. Here nature provided the strongest contrasts of climate and contour, and here primitive savagery was allied with modern science. In Africa were found the last of the world's great game preserves. Survivors of the grotesque mammals of the Cenozoic era here found refuge in forests and plains. Campaigning in German East Africa at times was like fighting in Hagenbeck's menagerie. As troops advanced they drove into enemy's lines herds of wild-cats and hartbeests, gemsbok and springbok, elands, and buffalos, zebras and ostriches. Soldiers complained that they could not sleep because of the howling of jackals, the laughing of hyenas and the grunting of wild pigs. Naval combats on lakes between British and German motor-boats were made extra-hazardous by crocodiles and hippopotami.

The boundary line between British and German East Africa makes a curve at one point, so that Mount Kilimanjaro is thrown into German territory. When the boundary was drawn in 1890 the Kaiser insisted on having the biggest mountain in Africa conceded to him. He afterward kept

on his desk a piece of stone from the top of it as a paperweight. Dr. Hans Meyer, who made the first ascent in 1889, to 19,321 feet above the sea, named the mountain "Kaiser Wilhelm Spitze." It had been discovered in 1848 by a German, Johann Rebmann, who was sent out by the English Church Missionary Society to convert the natives. Perhaps one should say he rediscovered it, since it was known to Aristotle and Ptolemy as the Great Silver Mountain, in which the Nile rose, a natural name since the cone of this extinct volcano is mostly covered by a perpetual ice-cap two hundred feet thick, from which deep glaciers flow, altho it stands within three degrees of the equator. Kilimanjaro is not quite as high as Mount McKinley, but McKinley rises out of the Alaskan ice, while at the foot of Kilimanjaro one can pick bananas as he feasts his eyes on eternal snows. Kilimanjaro has attracted the gaze not only of the poet, the missionary, hunter, and statesman, but of the socialist. Dr. Theodor Hertzka, an Austrian economist, looking over the globe to see where he could best found his Utopia, selected the fertile and temperate plateau lying between Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenia as the most suitable.

The eventual termination of German rule in Africa served to emphasize again the fact that the Dark Continent remained the greatest region for colonial exploitation left in the world. The area of Africa is 11,262,000 square miles, exclusive of islands, which makes it about four times the size of the United States. It has a population of 127,000,000. There are only two small countries in the entire continent that are independent—Liberia and Abyssinia. Liberia has the area of Virginia and a population equal to that of the city of Philadelphia. Abyssinia's area is a little more than twice as great as that of France or Germany, and its population about equal to that of Pennsylvania. Great Britain controls a territory in Africa larger than the United States including Alaska, and has an African population, under her dominion, about one-half as great as the population of the United States. France, at the outset of the war, had an African territory equal in area to that of the United States, and all her possessions, with Mexico added. The population

of French African territories equals that of Brazil. The Portuguese holdings in Africa are as large as Mexico, with a population about half as dense. The Belgian holdings are one-third, and those of Italy one-fifth, as large as the territory of continental United States. Great Britain's holdings in Africa are almost equal in area to those she has in North America. They are thirty-five times as large as the United Kingdom, and have a population large enough to replace that of the United Kingdom with enough to spare to populate another London. The African holdings of France are twenty-two times as large in area as the home country, while the population is nearly two-thirds as great. The Belgian holdings are eighty-two times as great in area as Belgium herself, while the population is more than twice as great. Italy controls 593,000 square miles of African territory, which is five times as much as her European area.

Before 1880 Africa had been allowed to drift along almost undisturbed by world interests outside. Scientific and commercial activities had invaded the continent, but there had never been any apportionment of territory under the sanction of international agreements. It was in 1884 that King Leopold of Belgium succeeded in having a conference called to determine the status of the Kongo territory, which was "held in trust for civilization" by the African International Association. The result of this conference was the setting up of the Kongo Free State, with the King of the Belgians at its head. In addition thereto, the conference defined the general spheres of influence of the Great Powers in Africa. In 1890, following the plans of the conference, Great Britain negotiated a treaty, signed in Berlin, which gave her Uganda and thus thwarted a dream the Germans had long held of a through railroad across Africa entirely on German soil. On the other hand, by gaining possession of territory in southeast Africa reaching to the Belgian Kongo, Germany as effectually prevented the construction of a Cape-to-Cairo railway under British control. A month later the English and French signed an agreement recognizing a British protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba, a French protectorate over Madagascar, and a French sphere of influence from Algeria southward to a point between the

town of Say and Lake Chad. Still later England and Portugal came to an agreement defining the delimitations of their respective territories. In later years came the Great Boer War, and thereafter another general scramble for influence in Africa, in which Great Britain secured control over the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Belgium formally annexed the Kongo Free State, Italy seized Tripoli, and France finally extended a protectorate over Morocco.

German East Africa was not yet entirely conquered by the Allies. After the operations already recorded, there ensued almost a suspension of operations for a year and a

NATIVE TROOPS CROSSING A BRIDGE IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA

half in which adequate forces for the final work were raised. The greater part remaining uncaptured was then secured between March and September, 1916. Smuts conquered the region from Kilimanjaro to Dar-es-Salaam, the Belgians, from the great lakes to Tabora, and General Northey occupied the southwestern part. The Germans were now restricted to the south, south-center and southeastern regions (save for the coast-line), but this was an area considerably larger than England, Scotland and Wales combined. After evacuating Tabora, German troops under General Wable in that region retired southeast toward Mahenge, a government-station on a high plateau centrally situated between the northern end of Lake Nyassa and the sea at Kilva.

Part of the forces which had opposed General Smuts retreated to Mahenge. Wable's force in retreat harried, and was harried by General Northey's columns. Wable broke through the British lines and joined the German General Kraut, who was being threatened from the north by General Van Deventer, the commander of Smuts' Second Division. In the closing days of 1916 and the beginning of 1917 a combined effort was made by Van Deventer and Northey to "round up" the Germans who were holding the Mahenge plateau. The movement promised success, but, in the words of Smuts, the enemy "eventually escaped through the dense bush and forest under cover of darkness, and eluded pursuit."

On January 1, 1917, Smuts began a new offensive in the Rufiji area, his object being to cut all connections between the enemy in the Rufiji and Mahenge regions and either to envelop the enemy on the Rufiji or to deal a heavy blow as he escaped south. The last object was accomplished, a heavy blow being inflicted on Lettow-Vorbeck's forces, but they were not brought to a decisive engagement. This brief campaign was ended in March by the advent of the rainy season. A campaign carried out by the Belgians had been equally successful and only second to that of Smuts in importance. The difficulties the Belgians had to overcome were great. Unlike Smuts' army there were no Europeans, other than officers and a few gunners, in the Belgian force. The Kongo produced practically nothing that an army needed save food. All other supplies had to be drawn from Europe. Even when they had reached Africa, there was, either from the Kongo estuary or from Cape Town, a journey of from 2,000 to 3,000 miles before Belgian headquarters could be reached.

During ten days' fighting which preceded the fall of Tabora the Germans lost, beside killed and wounded, 125 Europeans and over 300 Askari taken prisoners. The war-booty of the Belgians included four one-inch guns and several machine-guns. A considerable quantity of railway material was also secured. During a whole campaign, from May to September, the Belgian losses reported were only 41 Europeans and 1,235 natives, or about an eighth of the total fighting force. The operations of the Nyassaland-Rhodesia

Force had had no such spectacular climax as marked the campaign of the Belgians in the capture of Tabora, nor was it opposed by forces of the strength which Smuts and his lieutenants had to meet. Its work was carried out in the obscurity of an unknown region, where the obstacles presented by nature, if not on the stupendous scale of those in the volcanic region north of Kivu, were many and great. A total of 395,000 carriers was required to supply a force whose fighting strength was only a few thousand. The quantity of supplies carried may be gaged by the statement of Lord Buxton (High Commissioner for South Africa), that in nine months 20,000 natives carried 1,000,000 pounds of supplies from distant bases. In the same nine months 50,000 carriers were employed in bringing grain from districts adjacent to the frontier.

The main force under Smuts in January 1917 developed an encircling movement. The troops, which had to march through most difficult country, got in touch with the enemy on the afternoon of the 3d, and on January 4, Sheppard's Brigade caught up with the chief enemy-force as it was retiring from Beho-Beho. A sharp engagement followed, but altho severely handled the enemy "again slipt past," to use Smuts' phrase. During this fight, Captain F. C. Selous, the intrepid hunter and explorer, fell at the head of his company and was buried under the shadow of a tamarind-tree, beside the graves of members of his company who fell at the same time. Thus ended the life of the most distinguished of the hunter-naturalists of recent years, a friend of Colonel Roosevelt in his African hunting trip, a man who had opened up thousands of miles of South Central Africa. Throughout the campaign, altho well over 60, Selous had set an example of endurance and devotion to duty unexcelled by any member of the force. Smuts was not able to bring to a conclusion the operations he had initiated. Shortly after he began the Mgeta offensive he was asked by the South African Government to go to London to represent the Union at special sittings of the War Cabinet.

News of the armistice with Germany reached German East Africa on November 12, and somewhat to the general

surprize, Von Lettow, the German commander, at once complied with its terms, tendering his submission on November 14 to the magistrate at Kasama, and throwing on him the burden of feeding his force. The formal surrender was made to General Edwards at Abercorn, near the south end of Lake Tanganyika, on November 25, and was a ceremonious affair. His askari having been drawn up in a hollow square, Von Lettow, after saluting the British flag, took out a pocket-book and read from it in German his formal statement of surrender. Having repeated his statement in English, he called upon his few remaining troops to lay down their arms. The force surrendering numbered 30 officers, 125 other Europeans, 1,165 askari, 1,516 porters, 482 Portuguese natives, 282 followers 13 headmen and 819 women, with one field-gun, 24 Maxim-guns, and 14 Lewis-guns. General Edwards formally accepted the surrender and the German flag disappeared from the last bit of territory on the continent of Africa.

The colonial empire of Germany never was a very solid structure, but immense hopes and world-embracing ambitions had been built upon it. Even the Mitteleuropa movement had not made a more powerful appeal to the Teutonic imagination than the proposed organization of a Germanic Mittelafrica. In point of time the latter movement took precedence of the former, and no pains had been spared by colonial experts, university professors, and an inspired press, to bring home to the German people that Africa was destined to be the corner-stone of their world empire. There is no question that Germany had proved equally as bad a colonizer in Africa as she was a neighbor in Europe. She had employed the most barbarous methods to keep native races in Africa in order and to do her bidding. She had consistently treated them as if they were merely beasts of burden with no human rights that a superior race need respect. At the end of 1913, the total number of Germans in German colonies, a considerable expanse of which was entirely suitable for white settlement, was only 24,389, of whom a large percentage were officials and soldiers. During the World War the German press kept insisting that the German colonies must be restored, and that it was Ger-

many's destiny to become a greater colonial power than ever. But whatever else might happen after the war, that, assuredly, was not among the possibilities.

Bagdad, Jerusalem, and Germany's African colonies had been the real measure of the struggle in this war between the Briton and the German. German statesmen and scholars, as much as German soldiers, had proclaimed the war a contest between a modern Rome and a modern Carthage, in which the German would play the part of Rome. But now after four campaigns had been fought no German ship sailed the seas, and every German colony was in British hands save those occupied by her allies, France and Japan. Meanwhile Germany's Turkish ally had lost Mesopotamia, Arabia, and the Holy Land; British armies had occupied the roads to Suez and the Persian Gulf, and no single foot of British territory was in German hands. History strangely repeated itself. Peace with the Entente on the basis of the war-map, would now have left the German Empire not alone confined to Europe and Asiatic Turkey, but confronted with the facts that the sea-gates of the Turkish Empire were in Entente hands, and that British sea-power dominated the exits from the North Sea to the Atlantic, and from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and Atlantic.

Measured by the map, Britain had repeated her achievements of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. When the war began she had only a fleet for defense, with an expeditionary land force of less than 200,000 men, as the maximum of her military strength. In December 1917, Great Britain had at least five million men under arms; she had guns that outweighed German guns; a military machine as powerful as the German, and not yet had her man-power been weakened by the tremendous sacrifices which had been the price of German advances so far as Germany had achieved advances against the French, Italians, and Russians. If the war had ended even in 1917 Britain would have possest a fleet overwhelmingly superior to the German and an army at least equal to the German. No German merchant-ship could have sailed from Hamburg to the Far East save as Britain permitted it to touch at her coaling-stations.

Most observers in this war had been fixing their eyes on Europe, precisely as their ancestors, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century fixt their eyes on campaigns in Flanders and Artois, unconscious of the fact that the British Empire, in those centuries when Europe was contesting for provinces and cities between the Somme and the Meuse, the Rhine and the Danube, was being built up far beyond the confines of Europe. In the same way after this war ended, the world was to see German colonies in the Pacific permanently assigned to Japan, to Australia, and to New Zealand, German Southwest Africa perhaps annexed by British South Africa, and the ultimate obliteration of other German colonial power, while India and Egypt still remained British. German commercial establishments in the Far East had been permanently destroyed; German commercial edifices in South America and the United States had disappeared or were crumbling.

Nothing in what was to happen to Germany's colonial empire would have seemed strange to Louis XIV, or to his successor, Louis XV, who lost India and eastern North America while winning campaigns in Flanders. Men had been watching the West Front with bated breath, with hopes and fears for Russia, and they had been estimating the meaning of the war by daily *communiqués* that marked changes in the western trenches, but men of a later generation would look back at the European campaigns in this war as relatively fruitless efforts, while lesser campaigns beyond the sea permanently altered the fate of millions of men and the future of lands almost as limitless as they had proved to be fertile.[6]

[6] Principal Sources: The *Independent*, The *Evening Post*, The *Tribune*, The *Times* (New York), The London *Times*' "History of the War," The *Journal of Commerce* (New York).

IN THE GERMAN COLONIES AND ON THE SEA

Part II

SUBMARINE WARFARE AND WAR-ZONE DECREES

A GERMAN *U*-BOAT OF THE LATER TYPE

This particular boat was among those surrendered at Harwich after the armistice was signed

I

GERMAN SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE FIRST YEAR—BRITISH SUCCESSES IN SCANDINAVIAN WATERS

September 22, 1914—October 10, 1915

BEFORE the war the general public knew little of submarines, their design or their construction. That they were shaped like a cigar, and could be propelled under water while an officer in command was viewing objects on the surface through a periscope, and that a torpedo could be fired from them at a ship, some readers, but not many, knew. The test of war, however, soon demonstrated that the submarine had its place among effective warships, and that the greatest ships could not despise them as foes. When the war ended submarines had sunk some millions of ship tonnage.

The submarine was not a new boat, but a product of centuries of experiments, the governing principles having been developed long ago. It had failed in becoming practically useful only because it was deficient in certain advantages which science afterward made available. It could not become successful until what is known as the internal combustion oil-engine was perfected; until storage of electricity was made practicable; until the Whitehead torpedo was devised and perfected; until the hydroplane had been devised for keeping vessels on an even keel under water, and until such structural materials had been evolved as would combine length of hull with lightness. Under-water boats had been used in three wars in the nineteenth century —against a British fleet in the War of 1812; against a Danish blockading fleet off the German coast in 1850, and against Federal ships in the American Civil War. It was only in our Civil War that any real success was secured, one ship being sunk and three others injured by submarines.

The first submarine of record was built by William Bourne, sometime before 1578, or as early as the Elizabethan period. As in modern boats, water ballast was used

to ensure immersion. In 1620 a Dutch physician, Cornelius von Drebbele, constructed an undersea-boat which made a trip, just awash, in the Thames from Westminster to Greenwich. It was weighed down with ballast and propelled by oars projecting through holes in the sides and was kept water-tight by leather lining. In 1653, a Frenchman named de Son built at Rotterdam the first mechanically propelled boat, which was 72 feet long, tapered toward a point at both ends, and was to be propelled from Rotterdam to London in a day. Robert Fulton, in his desire through submarines to make navies impossible, vainly sought encouragement from Napoleon, Great Britain being then as strong in ships as France was weak.

Fulton's submarine, the *Nautilus*, marked the beginning of practical submarine-boats. Launched in 1801 and first worked on the Seine, she was 21 feet 4 inches long, 7 feet in diameter and designed to dive to a depth of 25 feet. She was constructed of copper with iron frames. Submergence was achieved by admitting water into tanks, pumps being used for expelling the water when she wanted to rise. She carried a mast and sails, which were collapsible like an umbrella, and could then be folded up on deck. The vessel was easily submerged. On the Seine she had continued submerged for eight minutes. At other and later trials made in the harbor at Brest, she remained below for an hour. When under water she could cover 500 yards in seven minutes and return to the point of starting. As a test an old schooner was blown up by her with 20 pounds of gunpowder, this being the first time a ship was ever blown up in Europe by a submarine. Fulton, getting no encouragement in France or England, returned to America in 1806 and afterward developed here his famous steamboat, the *Claremont*. The American War of 1812 with England first brought a submarine into hostile action. The boat used was invented by David Bushnell, of a well-known Connecticut family and educated at Yale. Germany's first submarine was built in 1850 from designs by a Bavarian artilleryman. It was a boat 26½ feet long, of 38 tons.

It was John P. Holland, an Irishman living in this country, who finally demonstrated the efficiency in subma-

rines of the gasoline-engine which now took the place of the steam-engine. Use of this engine had the most far-reaching effect on the submarine of all that was done for it in fifty years. Steam machinery was not only heavy, but it involved an almost insufferable temperature on board and increased the time required for diving; gasoline involved some danger, owing to the possibility of ignition; but when paraffin or petroleum was used, the danger was less. What is known as the Diesel engine was adopted for submarines by France after the Paris Exposition of 1900.

The British Admiralty gave an order for their first submarine in 1900, when, after careful consideration of all types, they adopted the Holland design, which was already in use in the United States Navy. An American company, which had supported Mr. Holland (who was from Paterson, New Jersey), in his experiments, entered into an agreement with the British Vickers company, with the consent of the Admiralty, for the construction of five boats. From that time, until shortly before the World War, all British submarines were built at the Vickers' works, which are at Barrow-in-Furness. The results were described as most satisfactory. Five boats were built. All embodied Holland's latest ideas. In 1890 Germany ordered two boats of this class to be built, one at Kiel, one at Danzig. They were 114 feet 4 inches long and of 215 tons displacement on the surface, had steam machinery, and a speed of 11 knots on the surface and 4½ knots when submerged. Germany's next boat followed French lines. This craft, 47 feet long, depended exclusively on electric storage accumulators and a motor for propulsion. The speed was 6 knots on the surface and 4 knots when submerged. The radius both of action and reliability was low. The Germans next purchased some plans from a French officer whose proposals had been declined in Paris. From these a boat was built by Krupp at Kiel, 116 feet 6 inches long and of 180 tons displacement on the surface. The gasoline-engine for propulsion was of 200 horsepower and gave a speed of 11 knots on the surface. The electric motor gave 8 knots submerged.

While Germany entered on submarine boat building late

in the day, she profited at once by the experience of others. After she had evolved her policy with it, the "frightfulness" of which was to be amply revealed during the war, she pursued her way with the same energy that characterized her in other departments of war preparations. The sum set apart in her 1907 budget for submarine construction was £250,000; in 1908 it was £350,000; in 1909, £500,000; in 1910, £750,000; in 1913, £1,000,000; in 1914, £950,000. After the war began, an immensely greater sum was believed to have been devoted to submarines.

It is interesting to recall that the real pioneer among modern submarines was an imaginary one called, as was the real one of Fulton, the *Nautilus*. This was the creation of the ingenious French writer, Jules Verne. In some respects, the real article has not yet come up to the specifications of that writer, but this is not because such a boat has been regarded by engineers as wholly impossible under present conditions. Verne's *Nautilus,* formidable as she was, was built largely for pleasure-cruising and scientific observations, while the modern submarine is for war, and to warfare it is adapted.

The earliest of German submarine exploits in this war—at least the earliest among those which caused heavy losses in ships and men—occurred in the North Sea on September 22, 1914. Rough weather had culminated in a gale, the force of the wind having been quite exceptional for northern latitudes, and almost equal to that of a cyclone, or typhoon, when, on the 21st, the wind moderated somewhat, and arrangements were made for British destroyers to go out of harbor and join the cruisers *Aboukir, Hogue,* and *Cressy.* The following morning broke cloudless, with no haze, a brisk northerly wind and a choppy sea. The cruisers had just gone to their day patrol-stations, and were three miles apart, when at a few minutes before 6.30 A.M. the *Aboukir* was seen to keel violently and then settle down with a list to port, having been struck by a torpedo. An eye-witness of this event and other British losses that followed afterward said.

"There was only one explosion, and most of the onlookers were

THE "ABOUKIR"

THE "HOGUE"

THE "CRESSY"

Three British warships sunk by a German submarine in the North Sea on September 23, 1914. The *Aboukir* was the first to go down

of opinion that she had struck a mine, and, following their first and strongest impulse, both the *Cressy* and *Hogue* closed in at once to save life. At 6.55 A.M. the *Hogue* was within a quarter of a mile of the *Aboukir* on her starboard bow, with the *Cressy* a similar distance away on the other side. The *Aboukir* had started to lower her starboard sea-boat, but the list had become so great that she stuck and could not be got away. The sun was shining very brightly, and the red glow of the copper bottom with the pink bodies of the men as they climbed down her sides made a picture that will never be forgotten.

"Some jumped in, others sat down and slid, others contented themselves with walking a few paces as the vessel keeled over. Suddenly, with two tremendous crashes, one immediately after the other, the *Hogue* was struck, both torpedoes exploding in the same place, just aft of the starboard after-bridge. The ship leapt up like a rowelled horse (she was a vessel of 12,000 tons), quivered all over, just as a steel spring will quiver when firmly held at one end and sharply struck at the other. Looking over the side, the twin lines of bubbles made by the torpedoes were plainly visible and led the eye at once to the first sight of the submarine's periscope. The *Hogue's* two sea-boats had been got away, together with the launch, in aid of the *Aboukir,* and the latter, with a number of saved, was close to on the port bow. When the *Hogue* was struck she stood off a few yards and waited. Meanwhile another party was busy throwing overboard planks and bulwarks of timber which had been used for the construction of targets. The rest of the men stood quietly by waiting for the order to jump, meanwhile slipping off their clothes. After a few minutes the order came and the men went in. Unfortunately, obeying a natural impulse, by far the greater majority went off the port side, close to where the launch lay, and, as the *Hogue* disappeared about six minutes after she had been struck, scores of them clung to the gunwhales of the launch until she was unable to stand the strain and fell to pieces, precipitating her own crew and those unfortunates already saved from the *Aboukir* into the water. What followed is best left to the imagination. Suffice it to say that nearly all those from the *Hogue* who were lost perished here.

"As the *Hogue* went down, she partially righted, with the result that a steam picket-boat and steam-pinnace both floated off undamaged. In this many survivors were saved. The *Cressy* then came up, 'opened fire with both batteries on the submarines,' and continued the work of rescue until she herself was struck amidships by two torpedoes and sank almost at once. Trawlers did good

work in rescuing those who were still floating in the water, and men from the boats were taken on board arriving steamers."

This swift and silent destruction of three big British cruisers by one or more German submarines attracted wide attention, because the episode was not only the most spectacular so far in the war, but because it was the greatest feat ever performed by submarines thus far. In the opinion of many observers the day of big units in naval warfare—the dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts—was over. This outcome was predicted especially by Sir Percy Scott, who said he saw in the submarine the war-vessel of the future; but his opinion was vigorously challenged by Admiral Mahan. Previous to this war the record of the submarine had been chiefly one of self-destruction. All accounts agreed that the *Aboukir*, *Cressy* and *Hogue* had been torpedoed and sunk in rapid succession by this invisible foe. The cruisers were all of the same type, had cost $4,000,000 each when built about fifteen years before, and each carried a crew of more than 700 men. The loss in men and officers was said to have been more than 1,300. The world had been warned at the outset of the war that the Germans had "surprizes" in store for their opponents. Efficiency with the submarine had not been the only one of these surprizes thus far to materialize. First was the great German siege-gun, which had gone far to prove, by its effects at Liége and Namur, that reliance on fortresses "had been in vain." More than any other factor these howitzers had contributed to the opening defeats of the Allies. Such an attack as this naval one the British had been led to expect, for the Germans had frankly avowed that their plan was to reduce British naval superiority by submarine-raids and the sowing of mines. They had long been training young officers for sallies of this kind. Nevertheless the losses came as a surprize to Englishmen.

Otto Weddigen, who commanded submarine *U*-9, wrote of his exploit.[1]

"I had sighted several ships during my passage, but they were not what I was seeking. English torpedo-boats came within my

[1] In The *World* (New York).

reach, but I felt there was bigger game further on, so on I went. I traveled on the surface except when we sighted vessels, and then I submerged, not even showing my periscope, except when it was necessary to take bearings. It was ten minutes after six in the morning when I caught sight of one of the big cruisers of the enemy.

"I was then eighteen sea miles northwesterly of the Hook of Holland. I had then traveled considerably more than 200 miles from my base. My boat was one of an old type, but she had been built on honor and she was behaving beautifully. I had been going ahead partially submerged with about five feet of my periscope showing. Almost immediately I caught sight of the first cruiser and two others. I submerged completely and laid my course so as to bring up in center of the trio, which held a sort of triangular formation. I could see their gray-black sides riding high over the water.

"When I first sighted them they were near enough for torpedo work, but I wanted to make my aim sure, so I went down and in on them. I had taken the position of the three ships before submerging and I succeeded in getting another flash through my periscope before I began action. I soon reached what I regarded as a good shooting-point. Then I fired one of my torpedoes at the middle ship. I was then about twelve feet under water and got the shot off in good shape, my men handling the boat as if she had been a skiff. I climbed to the surface to get a sight through my tube of the effect, and discovered that the shot had gone straight and true, striking the ship, which I later learned was the *Aboukir,* under one of her magazines, which in exploding helped the torpedo's work of destruction. There was a fountain of water, a burst of smoke, a flash of fire and part of the cruiser rose in the air. Then I heard a roar and felt reverberations sent through the water by the detonation. She had been broken apart and sank in a few minutes. The *Aboukir* had been stricken in a vital spot and by an unseen force that made the blow all the greater. I stayed on top long enough to see the other cruisers, which I learned were the *Cressy* and the *Hogue,* turn and steam full speed to their dying sister, whose plight they could not understand, unless it had been due to an accident. The ships came on a mission of inquiry and rescue, for many of the *Aboukir's* crew were now in the water, the order having been given, 'Each man for himself.'

But soon the other two English cruisers learned what had brought about the destruction so suddenly. As I reached my torpedo depth I sent a second charge at the nearest of the oncoming vessels, which was the *Hogue.* The attack on the *Hogue* went

true. But this time I did not have the advantageous aid of having the torpedo detonate under the magazine, so for twenty minutes the *Hogue* lay wounded and helpless on the surface before she heaved, half turned over and sank.

"When I got within suitable range I sent away my third attack. This time I sent a second torpedo after the first to make the strike doubly certain. My crew were aiming like sharpshooters and both torpedoes went to their bull's-eye. My luck was with me again, for the enemy was made useless and at once began sinking by her head. Then she careened far over, but all the while her men stayed at the guns looking for their invisible foe. They were brave and true to their country's sea traditions. Then she eventually suffered a boiler explosion and completely turned turtle. With her keel uppermost, she floated until the air got out from under her and then she sank with a loud sound, as if from a creature in pain.

OTTO WEDDIGEN
Commander of the submarine *U*-9, which sank the *Cressy*, *Hogue* and *Aboukir*

"I reached the home port on the afternoon of the 23d, and on the 24th went to Wilhelmshaven to find that news of my effort had become public. My wife, dry-eyed when I went away, met me with tears. Then I learned that my little vessel and her brave crew had won the plaudit of the Kaiser, who conferred upon each of my coworkers the Iron Cross of the second class, and upon me the Iron Cross of the first and second class."

On October 16, the British cruiser *Hawke*, of 7,350 tons, was sunk by the same submarine in the northern waters of the North Sea. All the commissioned officers went down with her except Lieut.-Commander Robert R. Rosoman and twenty of the crew who were saved on a raft. Of the rest of the ship's complement of 544 men only three non-commissioned officers were known to have been saved, in a total of seventy-three. The *Hawke* was an old ship of the 1890-91 type.

Coming so soon after the exploit which had sunk the *Aboukir,* the *Cressy,* and the *Hogue,* the sinking of the *Hawke* created a profound sensation throughout England. No blame was attached to the Admiralty for these mishaps, which were recognized as parts of the war's chances, but everywhere the sentiment was growing that, for some inexplicable reason, Germany, with her smaller and weaker equipment of submarines, had been able to inflict serious blows on the British Navy. Including the *Pathfinder* and the *Amphion,* which were sunk by striking German mines, and the *Pegasus,* which was battered to pieces off the coast of Zanzibar by a German cruiser, the British Navy had now lost seven cruisers. All were old ships, not of the first class, but they were known by name to the British public for some performance in the past. It was the *Hawke* which in 1911 came into collision with the White Star Liner *Olympic* near the Isle of Wight—an accident from which a prolonged litigation followed. Captain Smith, who commanded the *Olympic,* but was exonerated, became afterward captain of the ill-fated *Titanic* and went down with her.

Weddigen became the hero of the hour in Germany. Several weeks later his submarine, another and newer boat, the *U*-29, to the command of which he had been advanced, was caught in the Straits of Dover in a fish-net and sunk. The captain of a trawler near by hailed the submarine in English when he saw she had been caught, but, receiving no reply, abandoned her and steamed to port, leaving the vessel to her fate. Weddigen perished with his boat.

By the destruction of the British torpedo gun-boat *Niger,* which was sunk by a submarine in the Downs on the afternoon of November 11, the realities of war were brought home to Deal and Walmer. A loud explosion was heard from the gunboat as she lay off Deal pier and great volumes of smoke enveloped her. When the smoke cleared, the *Niger* was observed to be settling down forward. Men, women, and children rushed to the sea front, exclaiming that she had been torpedoed, or mined, and soon realized that she was doomed. The Deal and Kingsdown lifeboats, as well as boats from other ports, were launched in an effort to save the sailors. Consternation and almost panic

prevailed among hundreds who stood watching from the beach.

In the midst of other British forebodings, came the news late in November that the battleship *Bulwark*—a predreadnought—while lying near Sheerness, had been mysteriously blown up and sunk within five minutes, 700 lives being lost. The cause was probably internal, but a submarine was suspected. As there were few, if any, survivors, and the whole affair took place quickly, it long remained

OFFICERS AND CREW OF THE GERMAN SUBMARINE *U*-9

a matter of conjecture as to what had caused the loss of a useful warship of 15,000 tons and more than 700 men. For some days the *Bulwark* had lain at Sheerness. It was a few minutes before 8 o'clock when a roaring, rumbling sound was heard by almost everybody on the neighboring Isle of Sheppey, and by many residents on the mainland. The first assumption was that a Zeppelin raid had become an accomplished fact—that the first bombs had been dropt on English soil. But the silence which followed, with the

cloud of dense smoke which hung over the river, prepared people for something worse. Very few on land witnessed the blowing up of the ship but all heard the report. Many looking toward the river saw the *Bulwark* suddenly enveloped in flames.

In December came word of the loss of the *Audacious,* a British battleship of the superdreadnought class, off the northern coast of Ireland, her crew being rescued by the Atlantic liner *Olympic.* No announcement in regard to this loss was made by the British Admiralty, as the cause lay long undetermined. She sank in shallow water and was afterward raised. A trawler saw her from his steamer a few weeks later and when off the Irish coast on his way to Liverpool. She had a number of "camels," or big pontoons, about her, and wrecking-steamers were pumping out the pontoons. In this method of salving sunken ships pontoons are partly filled with water and sunk to a moderate depth about the wrecked vessel. Chains placed under the wreck are fastened to the pontoons on either side and the water is then pumped out of the pontoons, which rise gradually and raise the ship with them. At either end of the *Audacious's* deck, when this traveler saw her, a torpedo-boat destroyer stood near by on guard. He afterward talked with members of the crew who said there was no doubt that it was a torpedo, and not a mine, which had attacked the battleship. Sailors described the injury as "a long rent aft," such as could scarcely have been caused by a mine. They pointed to the shape of the rent as proof that it was the work of a torpedo. The *Olympic* made an effort to tow the sinking vessel into port, but the cables broke. The *Olympic* then went away and the *Audacious* was run on to the beach. After she grounded, her funnels and conning-tower remained partly out of water. Naval men exprest a belief that the work of raising her would take only a short time, and that, once raised and towed to Belfast, it would be an easy task for the big yards there to put her in shape for active service again.

In the midst of these disasters came word from the Dardanelles to hearten the English. On December 13, the British submarine *B*-11 went through the Straits, torpedoed

and sank the Turkish battleship *Messudieh* at the northern end of the Dardanelles, braving mines and the fire of forts, and returned uninjured to the fleet outside. It was at the time the most daring marine exploit of the war, far more hazardous and difficult than any of the open sea raids of the German "Untersee-boote" *U*-9. The achievement not only robbed Turkey of a big warship but greatly restored the confidence of the public in the British Navy's ability to match the German Navy in bold and successful use of submarines. The announcement delighted London almost as much as if the Admiralty had reported that a British submarine had slipt through the mine defenses of Wilhelms-



THE UNDERSEA BOAT WHICH TORPEDOED THE TURKISH BATTLESHIP "MESSUDICH" AFTER PASSING THE DARDANELLES BENEATH ROWS OF MINES

haven and had torpedoed one of Germany's superdreadnoughts in the Kiel Canal. It was recognized by naval and military experts that it was as difficult a job to enter the Dardanelles, let fly a torpedo or two and get away unscathed, as it would have been to dare the perils that beset all craft at the mouth of the Elbe.

On January 1 occurred the destruction of the British battleship *Formidable,* by a mine or submarine. The ship was fifteen years old and cost about $5,000,000. The British Admiralty was unable to say whether the ship struck a mine or was torpedoed; but as the British fleet had then been active in shelling German positions on the Belgian coast,

and as German submarines had been using Zeebrugge as a base, the inclination was to believe that a submarine caused the loss. This news dwarfed in England for the time all news of the battles of considerable proportions that were then taking place along the two frontiers on the Continent. The ship went down between 3 and 3.30 A.M. From 700 to 800 men were on board. Of the four boats launched, one, a barge, capsized and several men were thrown out. The second, also a barge, got away with 70 men, who were picked up by a light cruiser. The third, a pinnace, also with some 60 men, got ashore at Lyme Regis, and the fourth, a launch, with 70 men, after being in a rough sea for 11 hours, was rescued about 15 miles off Berry Head by the trawler *Providence*, and brought into Brixham.

Stories told by the *Formidable's* survivors showed that the great ship, struck abaft the magazine, trembled and quivered. At the same moment there came from the sea an awful smell, which betokened the character of the explosive used. The ship took a list to starboard, and in about three-quarters of an hour went down. It was a terrible night. A gale was blowing, rain was falling in torrents, and a high sea running. The extent of the injury was so great that water poured into the engine-room. There was no panic, but from the first it was realized that the *Formidable* was doomed. When the starboard cutter was hoisted out, she got smashed against the ship's side, and foundered, taking down four or five men who were attempting to launch her. Then a pinnace and a launch were got out with difficulty.

In the Dogger Bank battle of January 29, where a dreadnought first met a dreadnought, the German ship *Blucher* being sunk, the submarine played a significant part. In Admiral Beatty's report it was stated that the presence of the enemy's submarines finally broke off the action. Here was something undreamed of in naval warfare: the presence of underwater boats had compelled the sudden ending of a victorious fleet action between the most powerful battle-cruisers yet produced. At the moment when the complete destruction of his enemy's ships was in sight Admiral Beatty had to haul off—not because of the appearance of

a great and superior fleet of battleships, but because the enemy had submarines at hand. This was the more remarkable because the British ships had with them their own destroyers and torpedo-boats. More than that, the *Tiger,* like the *Lion,* had been going at a terrific speed, making 28 or 29 knots; yet, as in the case of the *Hermes,* which was sunk by a German submarine when running at full speed, the ability to go fast was not to Admiral Beatty sufficient defense, despite the fact that he had once successfully dodged submarines. All this raised the prestige of the submarine. It had now become so formidable as to be a deciding factor in a great fleet action, and without having actively scored a single hit. The German cruisers that escaped destruction plainly owed their safety to their underwater comrades.

A German submarine made its appearance in the Irish Sea on January 31, and carried out a series of daring raids on British merchant-vessels, sinking at least three. The scene of these operations was off Morecambe Bay and a few miles from the mouth of the Mersey. The sinking of the vessels was witnessed by several other steamships, which, realizing their danger, put on steam and succeeded in escaping. The Irish cross-Channel passenger-boat *Graphic* had a particularly exciting experience. She was chased by the submarine, but, in consequence of her captain's seamanship, eluded her enemy and arrived safely, altho a little late, at Liverpool. The raider was the *U*-21, a submarine which had figured in other exploits. She had torpedoed the light cruiser *Pathfinder* on September 5, in the North Sea, and the British ships *Malachite* and *Prime* on November 23 and 26. Altho enemy submarines had appeared in the English Channel—as when His Majesty's ship *Formidable* was sunk—this was the first occasion on which they had been known to penetrate the northwest coast of England.

From the time when the German submarine activity began around the British Isles, the great stream of transports carrying British troops and supplies across the Channel to France apparently flowed on unchecked by undersea craft. Only once had the Berlin official bulletin reported the sinking of a transport by a submarine, and London promptly

denied that any such thing had happened. All the evidence went to show that the submarine captain made a mistake in claiming a success. Contrary to a general notion that a protective lane of destroyers and other warships was maintained across the English Channel, it was learned that there had been stretched from Folkstone to Cape Gris-Nez a cable wire netting, with meshes eighteen inches square. The cables, which were woven in the north of England, were clamped together in sections, submerged to about 150 feet, and kept in place by anchor buoys. This submarine "deadline" the German *U*-boats could not pass. A narrow passage was left open for merchant shipping, by way of the Downs and Deal, and carefully guarded by torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. That German submarines had been unable to get at the Allies' troop- and supply-ships beyond the submerged netting was explained by the fact that their 3,000 miles of cruising radius, while permitting them to pass through the North Sea and around the British Isles and return to their bases, fell short just before the protected area was reached. Travelers from Berlin reported in January that fourteen German submarines had been lost. Many of these perhaps came to grief in the meshes of the cable netting. Traveling at a speed of six to eight knots when under water, these ships might thrust their way inextricably into a tangle of steel before they could be brought to a stop and freed.

In the spring of 1915, a German submarine appeared in the eastern Mediterranean and was reported to be near the entrance to the Dardanelles where were assembled the Allied fleets. In March the British *Irresistible* and *Triumph* had been sunk in the battle, and the *Inflexible* disabled, while the French battleship *Bouvet* was sunk and the *Gaulois* disabled. In April in the Ægean Sea, the French cruiser *Léon Gambetta* was sunk by an Austrian submarine, and in June in the Adriatic an Italian boat by another Austrian submarine. Some days later a fleet of five small steamships, in close formation, was seen in the Straits of Gibraltar. Owing to their failure to report the contents of their cargo and their destination, the British destroyers ordered them to stop and gave chase. The five small ships put

on full speed ahead, but were soon overhauled and taken back to port. At an inquiry, conducted by the British commander of Gibraltar, it was learned that these five steamers were Spanish "tankers," loaded with petrol, but having no destination. Enough, however, was made known to show that the *U*-51, on her voyage to Gibraltar, had used these five steamers as fuel ships and tenders and that, during the chase and capture of the petrol-ships by the British destroyers, she had escaped unnoticed. In the midst of a fleet of such slow-going steamers, the British had not looked for a submarine.

In spite of the successful German attacks on British shipping, the condition of British commerce was not as bad as it might have seemed. From February 18, 1915, to July 8, 1915, nearly 20,000 vessels entered or left the port of Liverpool. To show how far the Germans failed to blockade a British port, it was stated that, of the ships making these 20,000 voyages to and from Liverpool, they had captured or destroyed only twenty-nine. In other words, the ships which sailed into and out of Liverpool completed in safety 998 out of every 1,000 voyages upon which they started.

On July 17, word came from Varna, on the Black Sea, that the *U*-51 had been sunk in those waters by a Russian warship. The *U*-51 was commanded by Captain Otto Hersing. It was her voyage from Wilhelmshaven, around the British Isles, across the Bay of Biscay, through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean to the Dardanelles that led the *Berliner Tageblatt* of May 30 to remark that the United States "must realize that, if a submarine could be sent to the Dardanelles, the matter of sending one across the Atlantic, which is about the same distance, would not be attended with more difficulty."

In the third week of July the Italian cruiser *Garibaldi* was sunk by an Austrian submarine off the Dalmatian coast. It was reported that the *Garibaldi,* before she was sunk, had attacked an Austrian submarine which had come from Spalato or Ragusa. The commander of the *Garibaldi* which had served as Admiral Thoan di Revel's flagship in the Tripoli War, was among those saved. Of a crew of 600.

more than 500 were rescued and transported to the Apulian coast. Owing to the exposure of ships to submarine attack in the Adriatic, in whose confined waters the Italian fleet had no haven of its own, every means for saving crews in such cases as this had been adopted. The survivors said that, after two of the Austrian undersea-craft were put to flight and a third was sunk, a fourth, which had passed unnoticed, lay in wait for the squadron some seven miles off the coast. The first torpedo was fired at a distance of 500 yards and missed its mark, but it was quickly followed by another, which shattered the ship's prow. The vessel remained afloat only a few minutes after she was struck. The *Garibaldi* was the fourth ship Italy had lost since she declared war on May 23, the others being the armored cruiser *Amalfi*, of 10,118 tons, sunk by an Austrian submarine on July 8; the destroyer *Turbine*, sunk May 24, and the submarine *Medusa*, sunk in a duel with an Austrian submarine on June 17.

Some weeks later the British transport *Royal Edward* was sunk by a submarine in the Ægean Sea and 600 out of 1,600 of the men aboard were saved. She was a steamer of 11,000 tons. After she was built and had been in service for one season, she was acquired by the Canadian Northern Steamship Line, under whose ownership she was altered. As she was to be employed in the mail service between Avonmouth and Montreal, her topmost deck was taken off and her hull greatly strengthened to stand the strain of Atlantic weather. She was fitted up luxuriously and equipped with all the conveniences of the modern floating-hotel. After the war broke out she was one of many fast merchantmen requisitioned by the British Government to serve in bringing the Canadian Expeditionary Force to England. Later she was used for several months for interned enemy aliens and later still as a troopship.

This was the first loss of a British transport that had occurred. That it should have happened in the time of the operations at the Dardanelles was embarrassing. The convoy of large bodies of troops through the Mediterranean, where not only German but Austrian submarines were known to be operating, had thrown upon the British Navy

heavy responsibilities. Only surplus ships and vessels were used in that theater of war. Marvelous work was done by the British Navy and the British Mercantile Marine in ensuring safe transport to troops, not only between British shores and the Continent, but to the Ægean Sea and from British Dominions across the oceans. The last named task was performed at a time when German raiders were still at large; indeed the *Sydney* was convoying an Australian contingent across the Indian Ocean when she received by wireless news of the arrival at Cocos Island of the *Emden*. Speaking in the House of Commons on February 15, Mr. Churchill said that approximately 1,000,000 men had been

GERMAN SUBMARINES AT WILHELMSHAVEN
At the sterns of two of the boats may be seen their torpedo tubes

moved without any accident or loss of life. The number must have been doubled by the time the *Royal Edward* was lost. The British Admiralty had under charter approximately one-fifth of the total British mercantile tonnage, or about 4,000,000 tons. The task of transport as carried out under protection of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, was conducted by naval convoys. On the mercantile marine devolved the actual business of transportation.

The rise and exploits of the submarine had extended over practically twelve months, since on September 22, 1914, a German *U*-boat sank the British cruisers *Aboukir, Cressy,*

and *Hogue* in the North Sea, and the British Empire was thought by some observers to be tottering. But on October 2, 1915, a dispatch from Washington which found its way to the front page of a great many papers, announced that the British Empire had been saved because the submarine peril was "ended." A year before the undersea-boat had scrapped the dreadnought. Now the big ship and the destroyer had scrapped the submarine. Such dramatic fluctuations imprest the public mind. From an unseen terror of the seas the *U*-boat seemed in a way of becoming the joke of the seas, a frail cockleshell that might be caught in nets, that might be "bombarded" from aeroplanes, that could be put out of business by a couple of men in a swift motor-boat with a gun.

The British fleet had apparently tamed the submarine by means of submarine telephones which heralded its approach, by establishing destroyer-patrols, by spreading nets along the most frequented channels of traffic, by planting mines, by using fleets of swift motor-boats, by spying from aeroplanes, by keeping thousands of trawlers on perpetual guard. In other words, if the submarine peril was ended, it had apparently been done through strenuous efforts of every conceivable kind. Germany might argue that a peril which had forced the British fleet to such extraordinary exertions was not "ended" at all, but had served its purpose.

Captain Persius, the naval expert of the *Berliner Tageblatt,* came to much the same conclusion. Captain Persius admitted the substantial accuracy of the British figures, but he believed "every one who is not guided by the optimism of inexperience thinks with satisfaction of the achievements of our German *U*-boats." Such persons, however, he admitted, were largely confined to naval circles, and, as a matter of fact, the results achieved by submarines in their war on commerce were viewed in many circles as "very modest." This article was the more notable since Captain Persius had been one of the most ardent champions of the *U*-boat warfare. Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the British Admirality, declared, on September 7, that, in spite of German submarine warfare, the British fighting

fleet had become relatively stronger than it was thirteen months before. There was no reason to suppose that, during the future course of the war, this process would be arrested. While the losses inflicted by German submarines had been formidable, British mercantile tonnage in September was greater than it was when the war began. It was mainly the telltale wake the submarine left behind them that became the evidence of losses. This trail on the surface, a sort of wave marked by air-bubbles, British seamen soon learned to recognize. In the summer of 1914, twenty-three hundred trawlers were engaged in hunting the submarine. They constantly patrolled all waters around the British Isles.

It was confidently asserted in September that the Germans had lost twenty submarines. Of these, seven had been noted officially. At the beginning of August, 1914, Germany owned eleven large sea-going submarines, and sixteen of a smaller type hardly suitable for voyages beyond the North Sea. Up to the beginning of June, 1915, ten new boats had been added to the number. By September the total number added was probably eighteen, giving a total of twenty-nine large seagoing vessels and sixteen of the smaller type, omitting all losses. Of the twenty losses mentioned, it was assumed that three-quarters, or say fifteen, had been of the larger class, leaving available fourteen seagoing submarines. Two of these were known to be in the Mediterranean, so that only twelve were available in home waters. Taking the usual ratio of two-thirds as available, Germany would now have eight large seagoing submarines that could be relied upon for work beyond the North Sea.

The greatest secrecy was thrown around the means employed by the British for the destruction of the submarines, but one of them was well understood to be a submarine telephone from observation boats, or stations planted off shore, and connected with points on the mainland. Another means was huge nets stretched across channels through which submarines might be expected to attempt to pass. In open waters, near steamship-lanes, or in the vicinity of warships, nets suspended between floats were spread broadcast. Armed patrol-boats watched and when floats disappeared beneath

the water, showing that a submarine had become entangled, the patrols congregated at the place and dispatched the victim when it came to the surface as it inevitably had to do in order to disentangle itself. A special type of mine was laid in large fields that proved particularly dangerous to submarines approaching steamer-lanes. But the greatest single factor, it was said, had been a fleet of small, newly designed seagoing motor-boats, armed with one or two three-inch guns and possessing high speed. These boats literally swarmed over suspected expanses of waters, and, by an effectively worked-out system of patrol, covered almost every mile of the surface in channels of commerce adjacent to Great Britain. As a submarine had frequently to rise to renew its air-supply and recharge the storage batteries by which it was propelled when submerged, any of them caught in the territory covered by scouts was almost certain to be eventually detected.

Early in October a flotilla of new British submarines built in Canada started to cross the Atlantic to join the British naval forces at Gibraltar. They made the passage safely under their own power and without extraordinary discomfort for the crews. The world thought little of this achievement when absorbed afterward in the exploit of the *Deutschland* in crossing to an American port. Convoyed by larger warships, the little squadron of four vessels, fresh from the yards at which they were assembled in Montreal, proceeded down the St. Lawrence River, and, after a stop at St. John's, N. F., put to sea for Gibraltar. No extremely rough weather was encountered, and all the boats were able to make the long run under their own power. Provision had been made to tow them if they got into any trouble. The crews stood the heavy rolling of the craft very well, and were said to have enjoyed the trip.

Built in Montreal, these boats by the middle of July were ready for the water. Naval officers, who arrived from England, had conducted a series of trials in the St. Lawrence River. When it was established that the new vessels were seaworthy they sailed from Montreal under convoy of the gunboat *Canada*. Off the island of Anticosti, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, they were joined by the cruiser *Calgarian*,

an Allan liner which had been taken over by the British Admiralty at the beginning of the war, and fitted out as an auxiliary cruiser with four-inch guns. With the *Calgarian* and *Canada* showing the way, the submarines followed the south coast of Newfoundland to St. John's. The submarines traveled on the surface throughout the voyage, propelled by crude-oil engines. Each carried a crew of two officers and sixteen men. The vessels were not so large as some of the British-built boats, and were designed more for offshore operations than for deep-sea work. Submerged they were driven by electric motors, but in the voyage to Gibraltar electricity was used only for heating and cooking.

On October 11 it was announced that the German steamer *Lulea,* of Lubeck, had been torpedoed by the British submarine *E*-19 near Giedesar Lightship, in the Baltic Sea. The crew were allowed to enter the boats before the torpedo was fired. In that month British submarines in the Baltic caused the German mercantile fleet great losses. Five steamers were known to have been sunk by October 12. Traffic across the Baltic was in a state of disorganization. One of the steamers sunk was the *Nicomedia,* with a cargo of 6,800 tons of iron ore bound from a Swedish port for Hamburg. The *Nicomedia* was sunk off the southern point of Oland, a Swedish island which Kalmar Sound separates from the mainland. The crew had fifteen minutes time in which to take to the boats. They all landed safely. Next day came word that another German steamship had been destroyed as a result of the British submarine campaign in the Baltic, undertaken to prevent Germany from receiving supplies from Scandinavia. The steamer was blown up and sunk after her crew had taken to small boats. Two days later it was said that a German destroyer and a German torpedo-boat had been sunk by a British submarine near the entrance to the Baltic in two separate engagements. One encounter took place at the southern entrance to the Sound, the narrow strait between Denmark and Sweden which connects the Baltic with the North Sea. It was then believed that British submarines had cleared the Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia entirely of German merchant-ships. Every German ship southbound from Sweden when the sub-

marines started on their campaign had either been sunk or run ashore. Of fifty German ore-carriers, at least thirty-seven were virtually interned in Swedish ports.

On October 16, British submarines operating in the Baltic sank five German transports and forced another ashore, a success which was regarded as a climax to operations in the Baltic Sea whereby the British had stopt practically all traffic between Sweden and Germany, and incidentally hampered, for the moment at least, the manufacture of munitions in the latter country by preventing the importation of iron ore. In an effort to check these raids a flotilla of German vessels was sent from Kiel. Off Faxe, Denmark, near the southern entrance to the Sound, the British submarine *E*-19 attacked the flotilla and torpedoed one of the German boats. The German vessels, reinforced, returned in search of the submarine. Again the *E*-19 attacked the squadron off Saxe and sank another torpedo-boat. After this second disaster the German squadron retreated to the south. Another flotilla was sent out—a German cruiser and three destroyers. Cruising through the Baltic and past the place where the two torpedo-boats had been lost, it penetrated into the Sound. There a single British submarine engaged the squadron. The German vessels moved in circles in an effort to avoid the attack of the enemy, but the British craft followed closely. The Germans, equipped with heavy guns, directed a continuous fire at the raider, but did not succeed in hitting her.

Finally the submarine, after continuous maneuvering, got into position to discharge a torpedo, which struck one of the destroyers in the bow, and the vessel foundered almost immediately. After the other German warships had retreated to the southward, the submarine rose to the surface and remained on the scene for some time before it disappeared. Information indicated that all members of the destroyer's crew had been lost.

That thirty-four German trawlers had been captured and taken into Grimsby since September 15 was disclosed in an official statement printed in London on October 15. Four days later word came from Stockholm that four German steamers, the *Pernambuco, Söderhamm, Johannes Russ,* and

SIR JOHN (AFTERWARDS BARON) FISHER

Sometimes Fisher has been called the creator of the modern British navy. Jellicoe was trained under him. Altho over 70 and retired, he was called into service again during the war as First Sea Lord

Delfshaven, had been torpedoed in the Baltic off Oxlësund. The *Pernambuco* and *Delfshaven* were sunk, but the *Söderhamm* and *Johannes Russ* remained afloat. All the crews were saved. The *Söderhamm,* loaded with wood, and the *Pernambuco,* with a cargo of iron ore, were bound for Germany. Four other German steamers were reported to have been sent to the bottom by British submarines outside the southern Stockholm archipelago within the previous twenty-four hours. The British sank them by opening their sea-valves, after giving the German crews plenty of time in which to leave their vessels. There were at this time forty-one German ships, mostly iron-ore carriers, blockaded in Swedish waters. The *Pernambuco* was a vessel of 4,788 tons, the *Söderhamm* of 1,499 tons, and the *Johannes Russ* of 1,751 tons.

The port of Stockholm, as well as the iron-ore ports of Lulea and Oxlësund, and the timber port of Hernösand, became choked with German steamers which could not venture out, and hotels were filled with German skippers and crews who were unable to sail and went ashore in boats. Six weeks before this time the Baltic had been as safe for German vessels as the Rhine. Germany was now repenting her lack of foresight in not completely sealing up the Baltic before the British submarines got in. In September, 1914, the Danes had mined the Great Belt, which lies between Fuenen and Seeland, as well as the Little Belt, between Fuenen and the mainland of Jutland. They treated both as territorial waters, and mined them so thickly that they believed not even submarines could pass through. The Sound, the third entrance to the Baltic, being on one side Danish and on the other Swedish, was a recognized international waterway which warships had a right to pass.

Much of the terror and destruction caused by German submarines had been thwarted with apparent completeness by the use of nets. In the narrow waters between England and Ireland and in the English Channel ships were able to ply to and fro without a thought of submarines. Human ingenuity had closed these narrow seas at either end by nets, some of which were nearly forty miles long. From a German paper came details of these traps; no account of

any sort was published in England. A net was drawn from Dover to the French coast and one from Portland Hill, near Weymouth, to Cape La Hague. Between the two was a space of over 150 miles, sufficient for all transport-service. Another net extended to Ireland from the Mull of Kintyre in Scotland, and still another from Carnsore Point in Ireland to St. David's Head in South Wales, the latter protecting the Irish Sea. To allow passage for trading vessels and warships of the Allies, these nets were fitted with gates which could be shut and opened. The passages were known only to the British Admiralty, and were often changed. Nets reached to sea-bottom, the Channel being never deeper than 265 feet. The upper edge of the net was fastened to buoys and both upper and lower edges were anchored, so that storms and ebb and flood tides could not change the position of the net or damage it. The anchor-chains were shortened so that the buoys were a few feet below the level of the water; consequently submarines could not see the nets either above or below the water. If one of them plunged into a net, it became entangled and was so damaged that it became an easy prey. English papers were silent on the subject of these nets, yet from time to time stray allusions to them passed the censor. Rudyard Kipling described how a British submarine became entangled in a net and, having extricated herself "by slow working and weaving and wriggling, guided only by guesses at the meaning of each scrape of the net on her blind forehead," rose from the perils of the deep only to be confronted by those of the air in the shape of bombs from a Zeppelin.[2]

[2] Principal Sources: The London *Times'* "History of the War"; *The Literary Digest,* The *Times,* The *Sun,* The *Evening Sun,* New York; The *Daily Chronicle,* The *Times,* The *Daily Mail,* London; The *World,* The *Evening Post,* The *Tribune,* New York; The *News Bureau* (Boston), The *National Tiderdale* (Copenhagen), The *Liberté* (Rome), Reuter and Central News dispatches, *The Independent* (New York), The *Vossische Zeitung* (Berlin).

II

BRITISH AND GERMAN WAR ZONE DECREES—VON TIRPITZ THREATENS SAVAGE SUBMARINE WARFARE

December 8, 1914—April 15, 1915

ON December 8, 1914, the outer world first heard of Germany's intention to declare a war-zone around the British Isles, as a rejoinder to a similar declaration made by England at an earlier date and affecting the North Sea. An American newspaper correspondent, Karl H. Von Wiegand,[3] writing from Berlin, reported Admiral von Tirpitz, the German Minister of Marine, as saying: "England wants to starve us! We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and torpedo every English or Allied ship which nears any harbor in Great Britain, thereby cutting off large food supplies. Would not such action only be the meting out to England of what she is doing to us?" After spending several days at the Prussian Crown Prince's headquarters in eastern France, Mr. von Wiegand had motored to the Kaiser's field capital in France, where all the ministries and departments of the German Government were then assembled. Here Tirpitz received him in a private house, the home of a French banker who had fled before the German advance. Mentally and physically Tirpitz was described as a "magnificent Teuton, with a mind of steel-trap order, a marvelous organizer" and with "more Bismarckian force and iron in his nature than any other German official" Mr. von Wiegand had met. Discussing the work of submarines he was asked if one of the lessons of

[3] At the outbreak of the war and afterward, Mr. von Wiegand represented the United Press in Berlin. He obtained, at various times, notable interviews with German leaders, including, besides von Tirpitz, the Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Falkenhayn, and Bethmann-Hollweg. From March, 1915, until November, 1916, Mr. von Wiegand was in the employ of the New York *World*. His interview, with von Tirpitz, here quoted from, is given as printed in The *World* and cabled to European newspapers.

the war had not been that dreadnoughts had been rendered obsolete, to which Tirpitz replied:

"It is difficult to draw conclusions just yet. It is unquestionable that submarines are a new and powerful weapon of naval warfare. At the same time one must not forget that submarines do their best work along the coasts and in shallow waters, and that for this reason the Channel is particularly suitable for these craft. The successes which have been achieved hitherto do not warrant the conclusion that the day of large ships is past. It is still questionable whether submarines would have made such a fine show in other waters. We have learned a great deal about submarines in this war. We thought that they would not be able to remain much longer than three days away from their base, as the crew would then necessarily be exhausted. But we soon learned that the larger type of these boats can navigate round the whole of England and can remain absent as long as a fortnight. All that is necessary is that the crew gets an opportunity of resting and recuperating, and this opportunity can be afforded the men by taking the boat into shallow and still waters, where it can rest on the bottom and remain still in order that the crew can have a good sleep. This is only possible where the water is comparatively shallow."

Asked if there was any truth in reports that an invasion of England by Zeppelins was being prepared, he replied: "I believe that submarine warfare against the enemy's merchant ships would be more effective." Among the impressions Mr. von Wiegand carried away was that Tirpitz advocated what would virtually be a submarine blockade of England, and that he contemplated torpedoing several large merchant-ships, with the result that other ships would not venture to approach England, which would thus be bottled up and starved out. Not long after this interview was published the German Government announced that, beginning on February 18 every merchant-ship entering waters surrounding the United Kingdom would, if possible, be destroyed, and that even neutral vessels would be in danger, owing to the misuse that had been made of neutral flags. This action by Germany brought up a question of neutral rights that deeply touched American interests.

The reference to the misuse of neutral flags was assumed

to refer to an incident that had occurred on February 6 when the *Lusitania* arrived in Liverpool flying the American flag. Her captain had hauled down her Union Jack and put up the Stars and Stripes while in the Irish Sea, on receiving by wireless a warning of danger to his ship from German submarines. Great Britain contended that this use of the American flag was legitimate in war, and cited the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, by which use of the British flag by a foreign vessel was prohibited, "unless the assumption had been made for the purpose of escaping capture by the enemy, or by a foreign ship-of-war in the exercise of belligerent rights." England, on February 2, declared foodstuffs contraband, even when shipped to civilians in Germany, and about this time German submarines torpedoed in the English Channel and Irish Sea five merchant ships of the Allies. On February 4, an official declaration from Berlin, declared English waters a "war-zone" and warned neutral shipping against entering them. These acts presented to the American Government and American exporters a new and serious problem. Interest had been further heightened by the acts of German submarines in torpedoing in the Irish Sea, on January 30, the British merchantmen *Linda Blanche, Ben Crachau, Kilkoan, Tokomaru,* and *Ikaria.* The crew of the first three ships had a chance to escape in boats, but the *Tokomaru's* crew seem to have been left to be picked up by French torpedo-boats. The *Ikaria* did not sink, but was towed into port by a French ship.

Shipping circles now became greatly alarmed. Sailings were suspended and rates of insurance on British vessels, Transatlantic as well as coastwise, were raised. All this meant trouble for the United States as well as for Great Britain and France, in increased freight rates and insurance. Thus far the sea-power of the Western Allies had enabled them to protect neutral commerce with themselves while prohibiting it with Germany and Austria. But, with hostile submarines operating on the gateway of British trade, neutrals faced the loss of their principal markets, not to mention other embarrassments and losses that rose in prospect.

Immense quantities of food and necessities of war at this time were going to Germany by way of neutral nations. So dangerous to the Allies was this trade that Great Britain enlarged the contraband list. Even this was found to be not enough. Not, however, until the German under-sea policy had made reprisals legally possible was the famous British Order in Council of March 11, 1915 issued. This instituted what in effect was a siege of Germany. Goods for and from Germany were subjected to restraint. America violently disliked the British contraband policy and was greatly roused by the policy of reprisals which supplemented Great Britain's ever-increasing contraband list. But Great Britain felt compelled to leave no legal measure untried that would reduce Germany and so the contraband list was steadily increased until cotton came under it. A siege of Germany from the North Sea now went on in this manner with relentless regularity.

When the German war-zone policy was announced on February 4, the British declaration of a "counter-blockade" by way of reprisals followed. With regard to goods upon neutral ships making for a German destination, it was ordered that no vessel be allowed to proceed on a voyage to a German port. Unless a pass was given allowing the cargo to make for a neutral market, the goods were to be discharged in a British port, and handed back to the owner upon such terms as the Prize Court should think fit, provided the Crown did not requisition them for its own use. If the cargo had an enemy destination, but was to be actually discharged not at a German but a neutral port, similar treatment was to be applied.

With regard to goods making their exit from Germany, whether they were laden in the vessel at a German or a neutral port, they were to be discharged at a British port. They could then be requisitioned by the Crown if necessary, or they could be detained, or they could be sold by direction of the Court. The proceeds were to remain in Court until the conclusion of peace, unless before the date of the order the goods had become the property of a neutral. If they were neutral property, they might also be released upon application to the proper officer of the Crown. In order to

mitigate interference with neutral shipping as far as was possible, instructions were issued giving a wide discretion in the treatment to be accorded to particular vessels as each case arose.

The obstacle to declaring a perfect blockade was the trade carried on across the Baltic to Germany from Norway and Sweden. Before the British began submarine activities in the Baltic they had made no pretense of blockading that portion of the German coast line. But trade from America could be cut off from Germany through these neutral countries by an application of what was known as the "doctrine of continuous voyage." Even then the home produce of Norway and Sweden had access to Germany; so that America was cut off from a trade which was left open to favored neutrals. American opinion, already irritated by British interference with trade in efforts to stop contraband, received the British measure of reprisals with anxiety and disapproval. The feeling was that our trade was being illegally interfered with.

The conduct of the German submarine policy involved the German Government in a controversy with the United States which was of a different nature from the discussion between us and Great Britain. The basis of the latter was interference with trade, the basis of the former interference with the rights and freedom of non-combatants and neutrals. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg said Germany's war-zone declaration was her reply to England's attempt "to starve a people numbering 70,000,000." With regard to the complaint that Germany was injuring neutral interests, he added that "neutral powers had not protested against England's action, and they must take the consequences." Germany's action was denounced in prominent American newspapers and by individuals of weight and standing as extraordinary, unprecedented, and without justification. The New York *Times* predicted that "no neutral nation on earth would acquiesce in the establishment of a paper blockade on such a scale as that proposed by Germany." The German Admiralty could not seriously suppose, either that the declaration of a war-zone which in its very nature could not everywhere and at all times be effectively

maintained as a barrier to commerce, would be respected, or that the destruction of a neutral's ship within the zone would be passed over as an unavoidable and excusable hazard in naval warfare.

The German press maintained that a warfare of starvation could be combated by Germany only by adopting exceptional measures. A submarine blockade of the British Isles was justified by the needs of Germany and by the acts of Great Britain. The Berlin *Vossische Zeitung* declared that it welcomed the protest that had come from America, but assured us that Berlin would show itself friendly and sympathetic. It thought America could not question "Germany's right to undertake military operations in all waters around the United Kingdom." Should we wish to protest that such action might involve American ships, because of a misuse of the American flag, "any such protest should be sent to London and not to Berlin, because England already had begun a deliberate misuse of the American flag and defended it as a permissible measure of defense." Could America expect Germany to respect its flag, "when it was misused, as in the case of the *Lusitania?*" The *Lokal Anzeiger,* while it expected a protest from the United States, said it was first the duty of the American Government to protest strongly "against British misuse of neutral flags." Basing its argument on the "doctrine of necessity," the *Frankfurter Zeitung* strongly indorsed the submarine blockade and complained that neutral countries had submitted themselves to English dictation. From the great commercial port of Hamburg came the strongest indorsement of the new naval policy. The *Hamburger Nachrichten* announced:

"At last, what we have so long hoped for is being done. England must be struck at the most vulnerable point, and must feel that she can no longer comfortably stand aside and rob and cheat and practise every brutality while she is represented on the European continent by mercenaries, the scum of her people, who play football with German bread and expose to their criminal tools of murder the valuable lives of our healthy, gifted, and educated youth, the springtime hope for the future of our race. Our people are struggling and offering sacrifices for the Emperor

GRAND ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ

The administrative creator of Germany's modern navy, often called "Tirpitz the Eternal" because, while others went out of office, he never did. In a book of memoirs, published in July, 1919, Tirpitz accused Bethmann-Hollweg of precipitating the war through a policy of "playing the game single-handed"

and the Empire, for its existence and its future, and these things can not be sacrificed to moral superstitions. What have we achieved in six months with our noble-spirited conduct of war? —calumnies and hatred and bitter hostility everywhere."

Was it recklessness or desperation that had moved Great Britain and Germany to imperil American neutrality in these efforts to starve each other into submission? Did their course represent the usual impulse of the war-spirit to break through the fence of international law, or was Germany actually facing a crisis in her food situation and was Great Britain in real danger of isolation by German submarines? These questions were persistently put forth in American press comments. Whatever the compelling motive, there was no questioning the fact that a new embarrassment had come to this country in our rôle of neutral. Each side admitted that it had possibly somewhat strained its interpretation of belligerent rights, but each excused itself on the ground that the other had set the pace. Thus, while the nations at war were rapidly developing unprecedented modes of attack and reprisal, the position of nations at peace was becoming more and more difficult. The situation amounted to a determination by Great Britain to keep food-supplies out of Germany by preventing their passage through waters surrounding the kingdom, and a retaliation from Germany declaring those waters a war-zone. The American press was virtually unanimous in its approval of a note addrest simultaneously by our Government to Great Britain and Germany, protesting, in the one case, against the use of our flag by British ships, and in the other against the implied threat to our shipping in the "war-zone" declaration. The note to Great Britain exprest the hope that:

"His Majesty's Government will do all in their power to restrain vessels of British nationality in the deceptive use of the United States flag in the sea area defined by the German declaration, since such practise would greatly endanger the vessels of a friendly Power navigating those waters and would even seem to impose upon the government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force."

In the note to Germany, our State Department called attention to "the very serious possibilities of the course of action apparently contemplated" under the war-zone proclamation of February 4, and added:

"If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now happily subsisting between the two governments. If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

In reply Germany justified her war-zone proclamation on the ground of military necessity and as an act of self-defense; reviewed the situation in order to show that the real responsibility rested with Great Britain, and called attention to the fact that Germany had given two weeks' notice before instituting the zone blockade in order that neutral shipping might make arrangements to avoid possible dangers. The German reply added:

"Neutral vessels that, despite this ample notice which greatly affects the achievement of our aims in our war against Great Britain, enter these closed waters will themselves bear the responsibility for any unfortunate accidents that may occur. Germany disclaims all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences."

In answer to our Government's reminder that "the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained," the German note

said that the situation had been altered by the "misuse of neutral flags by British merchant-vessels," and by the fact that "the British Government had supplied arms to British merchant-ships and instructed them forcibly to resist German submarines." Therefore, "in these circumstances it would be very difficult for submarines to recognize neutral merchant-ships, for search in most cases can not be undertaken, seeing that in the case of a disguised British ship from which an attack may be expected the searching-party and the submarine would be exposed to destruction."

In the spring of the year new and more important diplomatic negotiations were begun between this country and Great Britain on the one hand, and Germany on the other. Not only had the lives of American citizens traveling on the high seas been endangered and even destroyed by German submarines, but our commerce on the seas had been obstructed by Great Britain. Negotiations were conducted simultaneously with both countries. The wrong done to American over-seas commerce by Great Britain's "starvation blockade" of Germany was, however, greatly overshadowed in the public mind by the killing of Americans by German torpedoes—notably so in the case of the *Lusitania*. Newspapers when they discust this matter showed almost as little inclination to yield ground on the one issue as on the other.

Our State Department's protest, made in April against "Great Britain's resort to a course of action previously unknown to international law," had not been answered in July; but a British "memorandum," dated June 17, brought the matter again decisively before the public. The British Government, after describing in detail the steps it had taken to alleviate the hardships suffered by American shipping under its blockade, concluded that it could "scarcely admit that, on the basis of actual facts, any substantial grievance on the part of American citizens was justified or could be justified." Meanwhile, hundreds of exporters and importers were besieging our State Department with petitions seeking relief from the British embargo. One committee spoke for importers who had $50,000,000 worth of articles tied up in Germany because of the refusal

of the British Government to allow them to come through to the United States.

One of the chief objects of Great Britain was to keep cotton out of Germany, cotton entering largely into the manufacture of smokeless powder and high explosives. Thousands of tons of it were being consumed in Germany. The waste of ammunition was so great, so excessively beyond what ever had been known in war before, that ability to maintain a supply under the conditions of a blockade which cut off the materials from which it was manufactured might well be expected to become an important factor in the continuance of the war.

Great Britain's long-range blockade of Germany was announced in the Orders in Council of March 15. In the American note of protest, dated March 30, the United States Government pointed out that the provisions of this order amounted to "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace." The British memorandum claimed credit for his Majesty's Government for refraining from the exercise of "the right to confiscate ships or cargoes, which belligerents had always previously claimed in respect to breaches of blockade"; for facilitating the proceedings in case of seizures; for paying all claims as quickly as they were presented—these payments having already amounted to more than $2,250,000—and for showing all the consideration for neutrals that is compatible with the object in view, that object being "to prevent vessels carrying goods for or coming from the enemy's territory in cargoes." The reply finally came on November 7 when no point was left uncovered and no doubt was left open as to the position of the United States. The conclusion was reached that the so-called blockade was "ineffective, illegal, and indefensible"; in other words, that it was no blockade at all. The evidence showed that it had not precluded trade between Scandinavian countries and Germany and it was not for American shippers to make the blockade effective by refraining from trade with those countries lest the goods should be sent from them to Germany, or should replace

others so sent. A point was made against seizing vessels and taking them into port for adjudication instead of first examining them at sea to ascertain whether there was any evidence to justify such procedure. It was contrary to all precedent to assume guilt without adequate investigation on board, and to make searches for evidence while vessels were held in port. Nor had the British authorities been content to rely upon evidence discovered, or proof of violations of belligerent rights, assuming the blockade to be real, but had virtually required the claimants of vessels and cargoes to prove their innocence as to the character of cargoes and ultimate destination. But the real issue, many editors reminded us, was not trade but a principle. Because it ignored this issue the British memorandum was generally regarded as unsatisfactory.

The Allied Powers were known to have made large, and were likely to make still larger, purchases of munitions in this country. Germany became restive under these conditions, because, in consequence of the complete cessation of her own trade with this country, she was unable to transport across the Atlantic any purchases she might make here. In these circumstances, Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, in an official note, objected to our policies, chiefly on the ground of what was called acquiescence in British aggression and selling munitions to the enemies of Germany. This note exprest, as Americans felt, in arbitrary, if not in dictatorial, language, was widely resented. A reply was made in which Bernstorff was informed that the negotiations between the United States and Great Britain were "hardly appropriate for discussion between the Government of the United States and the Government of Germany." Mr. Bryan, our Secretary of State, regretted to find the language of the Ambassador's memorandum "susceptible of being construed as impugning the good faith of the United States in the performance of its duties as a neutral," and took it for granted that "no such implication was intended," but it was quite evident that his Excellency was "laboring under certain false impressions."

"In the first place," said the note, "this Government has

at no time, and in no manner yielded any one of its rights as a neutral to any of the present belligerents." It had acknowledged "as a matter of course the right of visit and search and the right to apply the rules of contraband of war to articles of commerce." It had, indeed, insisted upon the use of visit and search, "as an absolutely necessary safeguard against mistaking neutral vessels for vessels owned by an enemy and against mistaking legal cargoes for illegal." It had omitted, also, "the right of blockade, if actually exercised and effectively maintained." This Government noted with sincere regret that, in discussing the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of the United States to the enemies of Germany, his Excellency had seemed to be under an impression that it was "within the choice of the Government of the United States, knowing its profest neutrality and its diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair attitude toward Germany."

This Government understood and maintained that "any change in its own laws of neutrality, during the progress of a war, that would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war, would be an unjustifiable departure from the principle of strict neutrality, by which it has consistently sought to direct its action." It was respectfully submitted that "none of the circumstances urged in the memorandum altered the principle involved." The note closed with a declaration that the United States Government felt compelled to speak with perfect frankness, because "the friendship between the people of the United States and the people of Germany was so warm and of such long standing," and because "the ties which bind them to one another in amity were so many and so strong." Even Americans who had been inclined to think Bernstorff's criticism of our neutrality should have made him *persona non grata* in Washington, profest to be pleased with the reply from the State Department. A sharper answer such as it had provoked, in the opinion of the New York *Times*, "would have mightily tickled the country," but the answer actually sent "would have its sober approval." In the opinion of The *World* the answer could not fail to make "a

profound impression throughout the world." English papers were voluble in approval of it.

It was soon seen how little prospect there was that this Government would attempt to stop the making of war munitions in this country or to prohibit their sale abroad. That the Allies realized this no less than the Germans was indicated by a prodigious campaign to secure American arms and munitions that was now undertaken by Mr. Lloyd George. One metallic cartridge company obtained a contract to supply 3,500,000 rounds of ammunition weekly, and the understanding was that this would be increased to 7,000,000. A steel company received an order for 8,000 field-guns and was turning out 12,000 shrapnel-shells every day. For one-pounders and smaller shells the rate was 50,000 a day. An electric company was said to have an order for $100,000,000 worth of war materials. Reports of other large contracts became common items in American daily newspapers. Stocks in these companies traded in on the New York Stock Exchange advanced sensationally and continually for several weeks. Some of these stocks for years had paid no dividends and yet they advanced suddenly to sums far beyond par, even to twice par and more.[4]

[4] Principal Sources: Dispatch by Karl H. von Wiegand to The *World, The Independent, The Literary Digest,* The *Evening Post,* New York; The *Springfield Republican,* The *Journal of Commerce* (New York), The *London Times'* "History of the War," Associated Press dispatches.

III

SINKINGS THAT INVOLVED AMERICAN RIGHTS—THE "LUSITANIA" AND "ARABIC" CASES

May 1, 1915—September 15, 1915

SIX days before the German submarine warfare culminated on May 7, 1915, in the sinking of the Cunard steamer, *Lusitania*, the *Gulflight*, an American ship carrying a large American flag and bound from Port Arthur, Texas, for Havre, France, with a cargo of oil and gasoline, which were contraband of war, was sunk off the Scilly Islands by a torpedo fired from a submarine. While escorted by two British patrol-boats, she had sighted a submarine two and a half miles ahead of her, which submerged itself without disclosing its identity. Twenty-five minutes later the *Gulflight* was wrecked by a violent explosion. Altho badly damaged, she did not sink, and was towed to port. Two of her crew who jumped overboard were drowned. The captain died afterward from shock or heart failure. From stories told by the crew, there appeared to be no doubt that she had been torpedoed by a German submarine, altho conclusive proof was lacking.

More than a month before this, the *Falaba*, an African liner bound from Lisbon for Liverpool, was torpedoed in St. George's Channel. She carried a crew of 90 and about 100 passengers, of whom only 140 were rescued, and of those rescued eight died from exposure. On sighting the submarine the captain had tried to excape by putting on speed, but the underwater-craft overtook him. The captain was told that he had five minutes in which to get his passengers and crew into the boats, but, according to survivors, before this was possible, the torpedo was fired, striking the engine-room, and causing a terrific explosion. In the sinking of the *Falaba* fifty persons were killed. The steamer sank in ten minutes. Trawlers which happened to be in the neighbor-

hood rescued most of those who survived; others got away in the boats which were ready for launching and were quickly lowered when the order came to abandon the ship. The important thing in this case, as affecting the United States, was that an American citizen, Leon Chester Thrasher, had lost his life on the *Falaba*.

The *Lusitania*, on board which Germans profest to believe there were large stores of ammunition that had been purchased in this country but on which there actually were none, was torpedoed about 2 o'clock on the afternoon of Friday, May 7, and sank in twenty minutes. She had sailed from New York six days before and when struck was off the Old Head of Kinsale, the most southerly point of Ireland, which lies west of Queenstown. The submarine gave no warning. Some of the passengers who were on deck at the time caught a glimpse of it about a thousand yards away on the starboard side and watched the white trail made by the torpedo that was coming toward them. This torpedo exploded at the forward boiler-room and was quickly followed by a second one which penetrated the engine-room and exploded there. As the engines had been disabled, the vessel, altho at once turned toward the Irish coast, which was only ten miles away, could make no progress. Owing to a list to starboard, only half the steamer's lifeboats became available and of these few could be launched soon enough. The first-class passengers at the time were mostly at luncheon below and thus more in proportion of them perished than of the other classes. Some of the boats containing women and children capsized or were smashed while being lowered from the davits. As the ship sank, the submarine which had sent the torpedo rose to the surface and advanced to within 300 yards of the scene. "Its crew stood stolidly on the deck," a survivor said, "and surveyed their handiwork." He could distinguish German flags.

Captain Turner was on the bridge at the time and went down with his ship, but, having on a life-belt, was picked up from the water by one of many boats that came from all directions to rescue passengers. The total number of persons on board was 1,917. Of these 1,152 lost their lives—an ocean disaster surpassed in magnitude only by loss of the

Titanic with which 1,503 went down. The passengers numbered 1,250, of whom 290 were first cabin, 599 second cabin, and 351 steerage passengers. The number of Americans on board was 179, of whom 114 perished, among them Charles Frohman, the New York theatrical producer; Charles Klein, the dramatist; Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt, Justus Miles Forman, the novelist, and Mr. and Mrs. Elbert Hubbard. About forty babies and twice as many other children were drowned. Some of the passengers and crew were killed or wounded by the explosions. Others, including many women, perished from shock or exposure while floating in the sea before fishing-boats arrived. Forty-seven were taken to a hospital at Queenstown. The coroner's jury at Kinsale rendered a verdict in which they said:

"We find that the appalling crime was committed contrary to international law and the conventions of all civilized nations. We also charge the officers of said submarine, and the Emperor and the government of Germany, under whose orders they acted, with the crime of wholesale murder before the tribunal of the civilized world."

Following is the official German version of the event, as published by the Admiralty Staff over the signature of Admiral Behncke:

"The submarine sighted the steamer (which showed no flag) May 7 at 2.20 o'clock, Central European time, afternoon, on the southeast coast of Ireland, in fine, clear weather. At 3.10 o'clock one torpedo was fired at the *Lusitania,* which hit her starboard side below the captain's bridge. The detonation of the torpedo was followed immediately by a further explosion of extremely strong effect. The ship quickly listed to starboard and began to sink. The second explosion must be traced to the ignition of quantities of ammunition inside the ship."

On the day the *Lusitania* left New York newspapers in that city contained a notice, signed "Imperial German Embassy," warning transatlantic travelers that, if they entered the "war-zone" on "ships of Great Britain or her Allies" they did so "at their own risk." Many passengers

on the *Lusitania* before sailing had received telegrams, signed with fictitious names, stating that the ship was to be torpedoed and advising them to cancel their passage. Others, on reaching the pier from which the ship was to sail, were accosted by strangers who warned them to remain ashore. The warning notice signed by the German Embassy read as follows:

"NOTICE: Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war-zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk."

That the sinking of the *Lusitania* was directed from Berlin, and that Ambassador von Bernstorff, who after the event exprest "deep regret" for it, knew before she sailed that Germany had planned to sink her, was asserted in February, 1918, in an article printed in the *World's Work*, and written by John R. Rathom, editor of the Providence *Journal*. Mr. Rathom gave the following code message which was sent from Nauen, Germany, to the Sayville, Long Island, wireless-station at 2 A.M., April 22, 1915, and caught by the wireless of the *Journal:*

"From Berlin, Foreign Office, to Botschaft, Washington. 669 (44-W)—Welt nineteen-fifteen warne 175 29 1 stop 175 1 2 stop durch 622 2 4 stop 19 7 18 stop LIX 11 3 4 4 6."

This message had been prepared after none of the familiar codes, and, in form, was unlike any other message which had been received at Sayville up to that time. That it was considered important by the Germans was indicated by the fact that in unfavorable static conditions, four attempts had been made to put it through before Sayville got it. As finally decoded the message read: "Warn *Lusitania* passengers through press not voyage across the Atlantic."

This message was received by Count von Bernstorff in Washington on April 28, and on April 30 he sent for publication to the offices of the New York *World* and the New York *Times* the unusual advertisement published on the morning of May 1, the day the *Lusitania* sailed. Referring to the published statement emanating from German sources that Bernstorff regretted the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Mr. Rathom said:

"When word came that the *Lusitania* was sunk and Bernstorff's press-agents reported him as being 'overcome with grief and regret' in a fashionable New York hotel, he was at that moment actually giving a supper party elsewhere in New York and during this supper the destruction of the *Lusitania* was hailed as a glorious triumph for German naval prowess. During the evening von Papen, touching glasses with his chief made the remark: 'This is the end of the mistress of the seas.'"

Captain Boy-Ed, who was not at this function, alone among the entire group of embassy officials persisted in declaring that the sinking of the *Lusitania* was a blunder of the worst sort. A feeling of indignation ran high through all parts of the country. Nothing since the violation of Belgium had so stirred public sentiment. Here and there a German-American was found who deprecated the conduct of the German admiralty. Prominent among them were men who said publicly that, if war came between this country and Germany, their lot would be cast with the land of their adoption rather than the land of their birth or ancestry. Several German-American newspapers made similar statements. Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, formerly the German Colonial Secretary, who had been in the country since the first month of the war, and was believed to be acting as a personal representative of the Kaiser, his mission being to influence American public opinion favorably to the German cause, boldly defended the sinking of the *Lusitania* in a published interview in Cleveland, and placed the responsibility for it on Great Britain. Dr. Dernburg had formerly had a respectful hearing from American audiences of all classes and races in many cities east and west, but this defense of Germany's conduct roused such bitter feeling toward

him that a general demand for his return to Germany arose, and, after a few weeks arrangements were effected by which he could return on a Scandinavian ship unharmed. The following statement, representing the official British view of Germany's plea of justification for torpedoing the *Lusitania*, was transmitted to the State Department at Washington:

"The German Government state that the responsibility for the loss of the *Lusitania* rests with the British Government, which, through her plan of starving the civil population of Germany, has forced Germany to resort to retaliatory measures. The reply to this is as follows:

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CAPT. KARL BOY-ED

"As far back as last December, Admiral von Tirpitz (the German Marine Minister), in an interview, foreshadowed a submarine blockade of Great Britain, and a merchant-ship and a hospital-ship were torpedoed January 30 and February 1, respectively. The German Government, on February 4, declared their intention of instituting a general submarine blockade of Great Britain and Ireland, with the avowed purpose of cutting off supplies for these islands. This blockade was put into effect February 18. As already stated, merchant-vessels had, as a matter of fact, been sunk by a German submarine at the end of January. Before February 4 no vessel carrying food supplies for Germany had been held up by His Majesty's Government, except on the ground that there was reason to believe the foodstuffs were intended for use of the armed forces of the enemy or the enemy government.

"His Majesty's Government had, moreover, informed the State Department on January 29 that they felt bound to place in a prize-court the foodstuffs on the steamer *Wilhelmina*, which was going to a German port, in view of the government control of foodstuffs in Germany, as being destined for the enemy government, and, therefore, liable to capture. The decision of His Majesty's Government to carry out the measures laid down by

the Order in Council was due to the action of the German Government in insisting on their submarine blockade.

"This, added to other infractions of international law by Germany, led to British reprisals, which differ from the German action in that His Majesty's Government scrupulously respect the lives of non-combatants traveling in merchant-vessels, and do not even enforce the recognized penalty of confiscation for a breach of the blockade, whereas the German policy is to sink enemy or neutral vessels at sight, with total disregard for the lives of non-combatants and the property of neutrals."

When the *Lusitania* was hit, Rita Jolivet, an actress, who survived the disaster, stood chatting on deck with Charles Frohman and Alfred G. Vanderbilt. The three, together with G. L. S. Vernon, Miss Jolivet's brother-in-law, and Mr. Scott, an Englishman, who had come from Japan to enlist in the British army, joined hands as they stood on deck and waited, facing death together. A minute or two before the end, Mr. Frohman said with a smile: "Why fear death? It is the most beautiful adventure that life gives us." Mr. Scott had brought up three life-belts, one for Mr. Vanderbilt, one for Mr. Frohman, and one for Miss Jolivet's brother-in-law, and said he was not going to wear one himself. Mr. Vanderbilt gave his to a lady. Miss Jolivet helped to put one on Mr. Frohman. Her brother-in-law took hold of her hand and she grasped the hand of Mr. Frohman, who was lame. Mr. Scott took hold of Mr. Frohman's other hand, and Mr. Vanderbilt then joined the line. All had made up their minds to die together. Mr. Frohman, in a calm voice, said: "They've done for us; we had better get out." He now knew that his "beautiful adventure" was about to be realized and had hardly spoken when, with a tremendous roar, a great wave swept along the deck. The three in a moment were divided. Miss Jolivet never saw any of her companions alive again. Mr. Frohman, Mr. Vanderbilt, and her brother-in-law were all drowned. Mr. Frohman's body was afterward recovered. Thomas Slidell, a friend of Mr. Vanderbilt traveling with him, and who survived, said that when the ship gave every indication that it would sink within a few minutes, Mr.

Vanderbilt "took off his life-belt and gave it to a woman who passed him on the deck, trembling with fear of the fate she expected to meet." A steward who survived said Mr. Vanderbilt "turned back, as if to look for another belt, but he saw him no more."

From Berlin an official communication was issued declaring that the Cunard liner *Lusitania* "was torpedoed by a German submarine and sank"; that the *Lusitania* "was naturally armed with guns, as were recently most of the English mercantile steamers"; and that, as was "well known here, she had large quantities of war-material in her cargo." Her owners, therefore, "knew to what danger the passengers were exposed," and they alone "bear all the responsibility for what has happened." Germany, on her part, had "left nothing undone to repeatedly and strongly warn them." The German Ambassador in Washington had gone so far as to "make a public warning, so as to draw attention to this danger." The English press had "sneered at the warning and relied on the protection of the British fleet to safeguard the Atlantic traffic." The British Government declared "wholly false" the statement that the *Lusitania* was armed. Dudley Field Malone, Collector of the Port of New York, gave further denial to the German charge that the *Lusitania* carried guns mounted when she left New York. This report, he said, "is not correct. The *Lusitania* was inspected before sailing as is customary. No guns were found, mounted or unmounted, and the vessel sailed without any armament. No merchant-ship would be allowed to arm in this port and leave the harbor."[4a]

On May 10 the German Government, through Count von Bernstorff, sent a message to this country expressing "the deepest sympathy for the loss of lives," but maintaining

[4a] Out of the sinking of the *Lusitania* came a lawsuit extending to July, 1919, involving claims in total about six million dollars against the Cunard Company from those who had suffered losses. In the Admiralty branch of the United States District Court in New York, a decision was rendered in July, 1919, absolving the Cunard Company from all liability, the sinking and consequent loss of life and property having been "caused solely by the illegal act of the Imperial German Government, acting through its instrument, the submarine commander." The Company was "not liable to any extent for any loss, damage, or injury, nor for any claim whatsoever in any way arising out of, or in consequence of, the unlawful attack by a German submarine."

that responsibility rested on the British Government, since Germany had offered to stop submarine warfare in case England abandoned her plan of starving the civilian population of Germany. From many quarters demands were heard for direct action by our Government. The case of the *Gulflight* really concerned the United States more directly than the *Lusitania,* altho the loss of life on her was comparatively small. The *Gulflight,* which was carrying gasoline to Havre, was not sunk and need not have cost any lives, but she was displaying a large American flag, tho under convoy of a British patrol. She was torpedoed without warning in broad daylight. Her case appeared to come directly within the scope of the warning President Wilson had given to Germany.

The *Lusitania* case, tho having more influence on popular feeling, was legally somewhat different. She was a British vessel and, since President Wilson had warned Great Britain against using the American flag, was on this occasion sailing under her own colors. Technically, the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* and the sacrifice of non-combatants, including American citizens, possest no more significance than the torpedoing about the same time of the other British passenger-ship, the *Falaba,* with the loss of one American life. While logically, the concern of our Government with the *Lusitania* was less than in the case of the *Gulflight,* yet the fact remained that no episode of the war so startled and aroused public opinion in this country. The moral effect was almost beyond measure. "Dastardly" was the word that came to millions of American lips. Ex-President Roosevelt thought it "inconceivable that we should refrain from taking action on this matter, for we owed it not only to humanity, but to our national self-respect." The act represented "not merely piracy, but piracy on a vaster scale of murder than any old-time pirate ever practised." The kind of warfare which had destroyed Louvain and Dinant, and hundreds of men, women and children in Belgium had been applied to our fellow countrymen.

The intensity of the feeling aroused may be gaged from the utterances of several leading papers. The New York *Tribune* closed a vigorous editorial with the words: "The

nation which remembered the sailors of the *Maine* will not forget the civilians of the *Lusitania!*" From the Department of State, said the New York *Times,* there must go to Berlin "a demand that the Germans shall no longer make war like savages drunk with blood; that they shall cease to seek the attainment of their ends by the assassination of non-combatants and neutrals." While America had been suddenly brought into the maelstrom of gigantic war by this "villainous blow," declared the Philadelphia *Press,* "we have a right to expect that our Government will take some quick and decided action on this foul deed of enormous barbarity." America could and must demand

THE "GULF STAR," A SISTER SHIP OF THE "GULF LIGHT"

"an immediate accounting," said the Boston *Herald.* The German-American press emphasized the fact that the *Lusitania's* passengers had been amply warned, and argued that when they disregarded these warnings "they had only themselves to blame for what happened."

After the first shock of horror over the *Lusitania* there came repeatedly into the public mind the ominous question: "What are we going to do about it?" Naturally the press sought the opinion of leaders of public thought. An imposing and authoritative array of ex-Presidents, ex-Cabinet officers, Senators, and Representatives came forward in the newspapers from one end of the land to the other, and analyzed this problem. No single spokesman failed to realize the gravity of the issue. All pronounced their views

fearlessly, but for the most part with moderation. While ex-President Roosevelt raised a loud voice for "immediate decision and vigor," ex-President Taft enunciated the principle that a people must not be hurried into the sacrifices of war "until it is made clear that they wish it and know what they are doing when they wish it." Siding with Mr. Taft as to whether war was the only right solution, was Vice-President Marshall, who incidentally held that American citizens who sailed on the *Lusitania* were virtually on British territory, and so had to meet the consequent risks. Senator Stone, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was inclined to the same belief, and remarked that, apart from the lives lost on the *Lusitania,* the United States had a much graver case against Germany in the *Gulflight.*

Among those who considered the sinking of the *Lusitania* "a crime against civilization," were former Attorneys-General Griggs, of New Jersey, Bonaparte of Maryland, and Wickersham of New York. In the judgment of these men, Germany's latest offense sounded the knell of "Watchful Waiting." No one perhaps exprest this frame of mind so boldly as former President Roosevelt in an article written for *The Metropolitan Magazine:*

"In the teeth of these things, we earn as a nation measureless scorn and contempt if we follow the lead of those who exalt peace above righteousness, if we heed the voices of those feeble folk who bleat to high Heaven that there is peace when there is no peace. For many months our government has preserved between right and wrong a 'neutrality' which would have excited the emulous admiration of Pontius Pilate—the arch-typical neutral of all times."

Speaker Champ Clark was of opinion that "all American rights should be asserted forcibly and maintained boldly." Representative Gardner, of Massachusetts sincerely hoped the President "would not recede one inch." Former Representative Bartholdt, of Missouri, a German-American who long represented in Congress a constituency largely German, did not feel that "America should take any warlike stand altho it should demand from Germany an explanation."

All Americans of undivided allegiance were "behind the Government at Washington," declared the New York *Sun*, an assurance that was echoed by the press of all sections. There was every sign that the people were "substantially of one mind," remarked the New York *Evening Post*, which noted among the newspapers of the United States printed in English only two—the St. Louis *Times* and the Milwaukee *Free Press*, both published in cities having large German populations—which defended the sinking of the *Lusitania*. If in this way Germany proposed to continue the war, if this was the measure of her humanity, said the New York *Times*, then all neutral nations were on notice that "the complete defeat of Germany and the eradication of the military spirit of Germany are essential to their peace and safety."

Many papers called attention to the fact that the killing of American citizens on board the *Lusitania* was not only without the slightest sanction of international law, or the usages of civilized warfare, but a direct defiance of the warning given to the German Government by the Government of the United States a few days after the publication of the "war-zone" decree. In this warning President Wilson gave notice that Germany would be held to "strict accountability," if the activities of her submarines in the "war-zone" resulted in the destruction of American ships or the loss of American lives. This notice, remarked the Cincinnati *Times-Star*, "has been answered both by the destruction of an American ship and by the destruction of American lives on British ships." Germany had done exactly what the United States told her, with all the force of her position as a great Power, "must not be done," remarked the Baltimore *News*. Germany would never have committed "this atrocious act" if she had not scorned the President's warning, said the Providence *Journal*. But if Germany did not desire peace with the United States, if she rejected our demands, was war really the only alternative? *The Wall Street Journal* suggested that, "if Germany was trying to provoke war with the country, there might be a method in her madness," since "our ships added to the fleets which have already destroyed her commerce

could make little difference," while "the obligation laid upon us to increase our own resources in munitions of war and foodstuffs would to that extent hamper the Allies." That paper felt reasonably assured that the Allies "would much prefer that the United States should remain neutral."

A German daily of the Middle West, the St. Paul *Volks-Zeitung,* was glad to see the President take such a strong stand for "upholding the rights of American citizens." Whatever the outcome, no matter how great the suffering and mental agony that German-Americans would undergo, there could be "no question about their loyalty to the Stars and Stripes." In New York, the German *Herold* assured us that "the German-American press would surely prove in any crisis that the emphasis in the term "German-American" rests on "American." Herman Ridder, in a signed statement in the *Staats-Zeitung,* which received favorable comment far and wide, spoke thus for German-Americans:

"They have fought to uphold the flag in the past and they will do so again, against any enemy whatsoever. They deserve the fruits of past loyalty until they have forfeited the right to claim them. There has never been but one flag under which the German-American has fought. There never can be but one flag under which he will ever fight. And that flag is the Stars and Stripes."

After a canvass of German-Americans in New York, the *Tribune* said that, in general, among them "there can be no doubt of their choice, if war should make it necessary for them to choose between the land of their fathers and the land of their choice." Many of them upheld, in a measure, the German cause, but America "could count upon them in the hour of need." Eight thousand Baltimore German-Americans pledged their loyalty to President Wilson, in a resolution passed by the German Catholic Union of that city on May 16. In Washington, a prominent German-American, a gun-inventor, was quoted as saying that in case of war with Germany, "no men would be more loyal to the United States than the German-Americans." The Kaiser "would be wonderfully left if he expected any support from them." Further West were uttered expressions

of the same loyalty. "We are Americans first and last," said a leading German-American of Cleveland. Among representatives of different classes in Chicago's large German population, a New York *Herald* canvasser found "distinct dissatisfaction with the attitude of the United States toward Germany, but a sharp and violent resentment toward any suggestion that they would be found under any flag but the Stars and Stripes if the die were cast for war."

During several days following the tragedy, the American people waited, with ill-concealed impatience, the publication of the note of protest and demand to Germany, which Pres-

THE "FALABA"

The sinking of which was one of the earliest incidents leading to strained relations between the United States and Germany

dent Wilson was known to have in preparation. When published it was found to be a calm assertion of American rights and a high appeal to humanity. It cited not only the *Lusitania* case, but the sinking of the *Falaba,* an aeroplane attack on the *Cushing,* and the sinking of the *Gulflight.* These were "events which the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement." The Government had "understood the instructions of the German Government to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane of humane action prescribed by the naval codes of other nations," and reminded the German Government that it had already been brought to the attention of Germany that the United States could

not admit the submarine measures "to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant-ships of belligerent nationality." The note said further:

"American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainty in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights

"Expressions of regret and offers of reparation, in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results, can not justify or excuse a practise the natural and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.

"The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

Referring to the amazing "death-notice" that was issued before the *Lusitania* sailed and had the words "Imperial German Embassy" signed to it, the President pointed out that "no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse, or palliation for that act, or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission." Declaring that the commanders who committed such acts against us must have done so "under misapprehension of orders," he exprest a confident expectation that the Imperial German Government "will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation, so far as reparation is possible, for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Govern-

ment have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended."

Much more than the *Lusitania* tragedy was considered by thoughtful Americans to be involved in the correspondence between Washington and Berlin. For that reason principles were put before facts. Germany had introduced a new style of marine warfare, sacrificing neutral ships and neutral lives, and the United States stood as the champion of neutral rights and non-combatant humanity. What the press and the people demanded, "with virtual unanimity," declared the New York *Times,* was that people be protected in the ocean highways "as they are in city streets, or anywhere else where they are going about their lawful concerns."

The German reply, dated May 28, was a plea in avoidance. In the cases of the *Cushing* and the *Gulflight,* the German Government reaffirmed that it had "no intention of submitting neutral ships in the war-zone, which are guilty of no hostile acts, to attacks by a submarine or submarines or aviators. On the contrary, the German forces had repeatedly been instructed most specifically to avoid attacks on such ships." In the case of the *Falaba,* it said the vessel had fled, and had summoned assistance by rocket signals; thereupon the German submarine commander had given the crew and passengers ten minutes to leave the vessel, and had actually allowed twenty-three minutes, sinking her only when "suspicious craft were hastening to the assistance of the *Falaba.*" As for the *Lusitania,* the German Government exprest its "keen regret" that citizens of neutral states had lost their lives, but Germany could not "escape the impression that certain important facts having a direct bearing on the sinking of the *Lusitania* may have escaped the attention of the American Government." These "facts" were that the *Lusitania* was an auxiliary cruiser, and was carried on the British "navy list"; that the *Lusitania* had mounted concealed cannon below decks; that the British Government had counseled its shipping to misuse neutral flags, and had offered high prizes for the ramming of submarines by merchantmen. The note continued:

"The Imperial German Government, in view of these facts, in-

dubitably known to it, is unable to regard British merchantmen in the zone of naval operations specified by the Admiralty Staff of the German navy as "undefended." German commanders consequently are no longer able to observe the customary regulations of the prize-law, which they before always followed."

The point made at the end of this note was the core of the whole dispute as the New York *World* saw it, and inasmuch as "the customary regulations of the prize-law" are the rules which hitherto defined the rights of neutrals and non-combatants on the high seas in time of war, Germany had torn up the whole code of international law affecting those rights. The Imperial Government thereby "refused to recognize any law except its own lawlessness." Indeed, continued this paper indignantly, Germany's answer was "the answer of an outlaw who assumed no obligations toward society, but expected society to recognize obligations toward him." There could be "no diplomatic negotiations on such terms." Many papers denounced the German document as evasive. Some, however, excused its virtual ignoring of the main issue—the right of Americans to travel in safety through the war-zone—on the ground that it was avowedly only an *ad-interim* report, and therefore neither exhaustive nor final. The language of the note was courteous, and even conciliatory, but few papers regarded it as satisfactory, while many agreed with the Philadelphia *North American* in characterizing it as "impudently trifling in spirit and flagrantly dishonest in matter." "Germany," remarked the same paper again, "treads upon quaking ground when she urges examination of the 'facts,'" since "the facts in this case are the bodies of American men, women, and children," and the indictment against her is for "deliberate, calculated, bloody-minded murder." The one fact "horribly patent" was that the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* "was not war, but massacre," and this relegated all other facts to the category of the negligible, said the Boston *Transcript*, which shared with many others the opinion that Germany was playing for time and seeking to becloud the issue.

Immediately on publication of the German note, it was made manifest that the country was ready to support Presi-

dent Wilson in a firm and uncompromising reply. When this reply—the President's second note—appeared it was universally commended, but joined with the sentiment of approval appeared a feeling of complete amazement when it was learned that Mr. Bryan, on the ground that he could not sign the note, had resigned as Secretary of State. The press of all sections and all parties commended the second note. "The voice of the nation speaks in this note," declared the Richmond *Virginian*—a phrase which appeared with slight variations in numberless papers. Even the German-American *Westliche Post* of St. Louis could see "nothing which could be construed as a serious menace to the peace of this country." It thought "the danger of even a severance of diplomatic relations had passed." It was difficult to see how Germany could controvert "either the logic or the facts in this calm presentation of the American case," said the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*. Editors who went so far as to imply that the President's note meant war were few. Dozens of papers were at one with the New York *Times* in declaring that the note "makes for peace, not for strife."

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN
Who resigned as Secretary of State during the *Lusitania* negotiations

Mr. Bryan received telegrams and letters by the hundreds, indicating approval of his position. "No one," said the New York *Evening Post's* Washington correspondent, "ignored the fact that Mr. Bryan might have a considerable following, even outside of the German-Americans," for it was surprizing to observe "how universal was the sentiment against having any war with Germany." There were many people who did not hesitate to say that the *Lusitania* victims "went at their own risk, and the country ought not to be

plunged into war because they did so." Mr. Bryan had been Secretary of State just two years, two months, and four days. His resignation had been under discussion for several days before it took effect with the sending to Germany, on June 9, of a note which he did not feel justified in signing. Mr. Bryan, in his letter of resignation, told the President that he could not share the responsibility for the note "without violating what I deem to be an obligation to my country, and the issue involved is of such moment that to remain a member of the Cabinet would be as unfair to you as it would be to the cause which is nearest my heart, namely, the prevention of war." In an affectionately worded letter of acceptance, President Wilson declared that Mr. Bryan's judgment and his own had "accorded in practically every matter of official duty and public policy, until now," and that "even now we are not separated in the object we seek, but only in the method by which we seek it. We shall continue to work for the same causes even when we do not work in the same way."

After his resignation had taken effect, Mr. Bryan explained in a public statement that two of the points upon which he and the President differed were "as to the suggestion of investigation by an international commission and as to warning Americans against traveling on belligerent vessels, or with cargoes of ammunition." Later, the ex-Secretary gave out a statement "to the American people" for simultaneous publication with the note to Germany which more fully explained the basis upon which he "took the field for peace." The "real issue," he explained, was "not between persons," but "between systems," the system of "force" and the system of "persuasion."

Many papers found no omen of war in the second *Lusitania* note, but this was not because the United States had yielded ground. Beneath the velvet glove of conciliation was the iron glove of purpose, said the Philadelphia *Inquirer*, "and the German Government would do well to discern it there." No magnifying lens was powerful enough to enable the New York *Sun* to discover "one verb of menace, one noun of bluster, one adjective of provocation, one adverb of premature hostility," in the reply, but it did find skil-

fully marshaled there "the precepts of law and the forces of moral sentiment" which should convince Germany "that justice is with us, and that the right course is her best course."

The note touched first on the *Cushing* and *Gulflight* cases and exprest the gratification of this Government at "the full recognition by the Imperial German Government" in discussing these cases, "of the principle of the freedom of all parts of the open sea to neutral ships," and "the frank willingness to acknowledge and meet its liability where the fact of attack upon neutral ships 'which have not been guilty of any hostile act' is satisfactorily established." Passing to the *Falaba* case, by which an American citizen lost his life, our Government found the German reply less satisfactory:

"It was surprized to find the Imperial German Goverment contending that an effort on the part of a merchantman to escape capture and secure assistance alters the obligation of the officer seeking to make the capture in respect of the safety of the lives of those on board the merchantman, altho the vessel had ceased her attempt to escape when torpedoed."

It was then declared that "nothing but actual forcible resistance, or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit on the part of the merchantman, has ever been held to forfeit the lives of her passengers or crew." To the German suggestion that the *Lusitania* was equipped with masked guns, carrying troops from Canada, and cargo not permitted under the laws of the United States to a vessel which was also carrying passengers; that she was in effect serving as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great Britain, our Government replied:

"Of the facts alleged in your Excellency's note, if true, the Government of the United States would have been bound to take official cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral Power and in enforcing its national laws. It was its duty to see to it that the *Lusitania* was not armed for offensive action, that she was not serving as a transport, that she did not carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the United States, and that, if in

fact she was a naval vessel of Great Britain, she should not receive clearance as a merchantman.

"But these and other contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel. The sinking of passenger-ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania,* the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or warning, and that men, women and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare.

"The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the government of the United States to speak of these things, and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibilities which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragical occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy."

To the suggestion of the German note that this Government use its influence to induce Great Britain to desist from its efforts to starve Germany into submission, the President replied:

"The Government of the United States is happy to observe that your Excellency's note closes with the intimation that the Imperial German Government is willing, now as before, to accept the good offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an understand-

ing with the government of Great Britain by which the character and conditions of the war upon the sea may be changed. The Government of the United States would consider it a privilege thus to serve its friends and the world.

"The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May and relies in these representations on the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understanding of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation.

"The Government of the United States can not admit that the proclamation of a war-zone, from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away, may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. . . .

"The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practise in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done."

Berlin hailed the note in pleasant terms. Its newspapers were relieved to find that it was not in the least an ultimatum and that it opened a way for further negotiations. It was evident that the last thing desired was any open rupture and the prospect of putting off a definite answer by a further presentation of "views" was pleasant to Germans. Notwithstanding the friendly tone of the German press, little doubt was felt that the Kaiser's naval advisers would "stand pat" on the submarine issue. It was an unescapable conclusion that the German people regarded the sinking of neutral vessels as perfectly justifiable acts of war. On this point the German Government had behind it a united German nation. This sentiment was not at all affected by President Wilson's request for assurances that such warfare should cease. The semi-official *Kolnische Zeitung,* which with other papers of much consequence were prominent in views of this kind, said: "Our submarine war will not cease. If American ships or Americans in British ships enter the war-zone, they must take the risk involved in such a voyage. America can

claim the right to judge neutral's rights only when she herself maintains neutrality."

Germany's reply to the second American note was generally regarded as evasive and unsatisfactory. It seemed to bring the questions at issue no nearer solution. Like her answer to the first, it was regarded as "unresponsive." Our note of June 9 had set forth as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants can not lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of a non-resisting merchantman. Herr Von Jagow's reply contained no recognition of this principle. The first direct reference made in it to the sinking of the *Lusitania* was not a direct apology, or offer of reparation, but a statement that this case "shows with horrible clearness to what jeopardizing of human lives the manner of conducting war employed by our adversaries leads." The sinking of the ship was then defended on the ground that "if the commander of the German submarine which destroyed the *Lusitania* had caused the crew and passengers to take to the boats before firing a torpedo, this would have meant the sure destruction of his own vessel." Furthermore, it was urged, after "experience in sinking smaller and less seaworthy vessels, that it was to be expected that the *Lusitania* would remain above water long enough even after the torpedoing to permit passengers to enter the ship's boats." In addition, it was pointed out that "if the *Lusitania* had been spared, thousands of cases of munitions would have been sent to Germany's enemies, and thereby thousands of German mothers and children robbed of bread-winners." On the commander of the submarine which sunk the *Lusitania*, the highest honor a German officer can receive from the Kaiser—an order Pour le Mérite—was conferred. Otto Steinbrink was his name. He was long employed afterward in teaching other men the difficult art of operating a submarine. A medal commemorating his achievement was struck in Berlin, but whether this was an official or a personal act was not made clear.

The two governments were thus apparently as far apart as ever, tho it was no longer alleged that the ship was armed. The German Government, notwithstanding its atti-

tude, said it always would be ready to do all it could to "prevent the jeopardizing of the lives of American citizens," and repeated assurances that American ships would not be "hindered in the prosecution of legitimate shipping," and the lives of American citizens in neutral vessels should not be "placed in jeopardy." It was proposed that in order to exclude any unforeseen dangers to American passenger-steamships that "German submarines be instructed to permit the free and safe passage thereof when made recognizable by special markings and that notification be given a reasonable time in advance." In return the German Government confidently hoped that the American Government would "guarantee that these vessels have no contraband on board."

In order to furnish adequate facilities for travel across the Atlantic for American citizens, the German Government submitted for consideration a proposal to increase the number of available steamers by installing in passenger-service a reasonable number, the same to be later agreed upon, of neutral steamships under the American flag. It was assumed that in this manner adequate facilities for travel across the Atlantic could be afforded to American citizens, and that there would appear to be no compelling necessity for American citizens to travel to Europe in time of war on ships carrying an enemy flag, particularly in view of the fact that the German Government "was unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board."

Two Americans long experienced in public life gave notable expression to the general dissatisfaction over this German note. David Jayne Hill, First Assistant Secretary of State under John Hay, and for some years the American Ambassador at Berlin, stated definitely that the controversy involved only two points and upon the answer to these depended "the course that should be promptly followed." These points were: (1) "Was the sinking of the *Lusitania* in accordance with the accepted rules of international law, or was it not? (2) Does the Imperial German Government maintain its right and intention to disregard those rules in its treatment of the citizens of a neutral and friendly coun-

try, or does it not?" If the German Government accepted these rules and intended to observe them, the controversy "would end the moment the assurance was given and responsibility admitted." If it did not intend to recognize them, but to act and maintain its right to act in defiance of them and to create for itself the law of the sea, then it would be "difficult to regard the friendly professions of that Government as sincere." Moreover, it would be "an act of insincerity on the part of the United States also to accept such affirmations of friendship, and above all to express sentiments of confidence and amity in return." Until these two questions were directly asked and directly answered, Dr. Hill added that "mere assertions of friendship and the discussion of minor questions on either side only serve to obscure the vital issue, which some day must be squarely met."

The second of the two men was the venerable George Franklin Edmunds, 87 years old, for several terms Senator from Vermont, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and twice a condidate in Republican conventions for nomination as President. From southern California Mr. Edmunds wrote direct to President Wilson. He apparently would not have waited long for any further question and answer, but would have acted upon the reply to an explicit communication already received from Germany. The second reply of Germany he characterized as "in substance an attempt to justify, or else to evade, responsibility for all the slaughter of our civilian citizens which it has knowingly committed." "Let us then," he said, "cease futile correspondence and withdraw our Ambassador and send to the German Ambassador his passport." The ex-Senator acknowledged that he was an old man, and that he had long publicly worn the badge of a peace society, but he could no longer "endure the awful spectacle" without an expression of his "opposition to further discussion under present circumstances."

Out of this controversy, at one time apparently so irreconcilable, students of national ideals ultimately saw wherein lay the basic causes of such radical differences between peoples so long friendly and so closely bound together in

the past by human ties. Two ideas were fighting in Europe and the outcome would shape thought and mold human destiny for generations to come. America not less than Europe, Asia, and Africa, was to be controlled by the ideas which triumphed in that contest. The German notes to the United States were admirable indications of the German idea. They asserted that the will of one nation superseded the rights of all nations, that international law, the conventions that man has devised to mitigate in some degree the horrors of organized murder and collective killing, may be ignored and even abolished at the pleasure of a single nation. These conventions of nations had been the sanctuaries of civilization and Germany had asserted her right to violate them. Among them were the rights bestowed upon weak or neutral States, and against these the German idea made war, as in the case of the neutrality guaranteed to Belgium. As the German Chancellor had asserted, on the eve of the invasion of Belgium, that a violation of its faith was justifiable on the ground of necessity, so the German Foreign Minister now told Americans that the murder of the *Lusitania's* American passengers was defensible, in view of the war England had made upon Germany. He asserted the right of Germany to disregard law when law bore down on German interests.

It had become idle for Americans to attempt to deal with that German idea in the light of their own conceptions of right, civilization, and morality. Germans had repudiated the moral system established in other nations, and devised their own code. They had proclaimed and exercised their right to live outside the law established by the rest of humanity, not only during the war, but before it in a literature of national thought created from 1890 to 1914. It had become as just to quarrel with a Mohammedan for failure to live in accordance with Christian doctrines, as to assail a German because his Government followed other moral precepts than the rest of the world. It was not accident that made the application of this German practise to foreign affairs result in a world conflict, in which the Teuton found himself assailed by the Frenchman, the Italian, the Anglo-Saxon, and the Slav; and that, apart from the Turk and the Magyar, he

had no ally. It became more and more certain that if German submarines should again cause the death of Americans, and German statesmen should adhere to their view that it was the right of Germans to murder Americans when it was necessary to their purpose, we should ultimately join in the war, not upon Germans, but upon the idea Germany had been made to personify.

With Germans as individuals the United States had no quarrel. It was no desire and no business of Americans to contribute to the conquest of the Teuton by the Slav, provided the Teuton's cause did not imperil Americans. But the German in the *Lusitania* case was assailing, not Slav rights, but the rights of all men; he was making war on an idea which undermined our common civilization. The hopeless thing in our issue with Germany did not lie in the circumstances, terrible as they were, of the *Lusitania* episode. We could never forget that generations of Americans would recall it as an act of hideous barbarism; we did not desire to fight about it, but were willing to discuss with Germany any arrangement that could be made, subject to the operation of international law, within the boundaries of right and humanity. But Germany began by wiping these out. She talked, not about our rights or the rights which civilized nations had conceded as binding upon themselves, but of German rights, which had no other existence than in her own mind and under her own system. The battle of armies was of minor moment, the battle of ideas being the fact of permanent meaning. We had no sympathy with the territorial ambitions of Germany's enemies. So, too, we regarded with disapproval any scheme which aimed at a partition of Germany. But we nevertheless saw and believed that this German idea, as now revealed in unmistakable form, was destructive of all that we loved and had fought for. Conceivably Germany, already assailed by many nations, would yield to the United States rather than enlist a new foe. But to the American idea she could not yield, because her idea was utterly different. The rights we urged she did not recognize; the laws we cited she had abolished; the humanity for which we pleaded she had exchanged for her own. *Deutschland über Alles* was

with Germany no longer a song; it was a religion, a law above all other laws!

An attack by torpedo on the *Nebraskan,* an American vessel, had been made on May 25 of this year. She was struck near the bow, but was able to put back to port. Pieces of the shattered metal of her hull were sent to Washington, with fragments of a mine or torpedo. Naval officers examined these fragments and concluded that it was a torpedo and not a mine that struck the *Nebraskan.* To our protest the German Government on July 15 made reply expressing regret and offering compensation. Its reply was regarded as admitting the very essence of the American contention as to the illegality of submarine warfare as practised on the *Lusitania.* The Imperial Government recited the circumstances of the attack which occurred in the dim light of early evening, when the submarine commander was unable to see any markings showing that the *Nebraskan* was an American ship. As the sun had already set, the flag had been lowered. Said the memorandum: "Since the commander of the submarine was obliged to assume from his wide experience in the area of maritime war that only English steamers and no neutral steamers traversed this war area without flags and markings, he attacked the vessel with a torpedo, in the conviction that he had an enemy vessel before him."

It was only after the torpedo had reached its mark, without inflicting fatal damage, that the *Nebraskan* raised the American flag, and then the German commander "of course refrained from any further attack." The German Government assured our Government that the attack "was not meant for the American flag, and was not traceable to any fault on the part of the commander of the submarine." It should be "considered an unfortunate accident." The German Government exprest its regret and declared its readiness "to make compensation for the damage thereby sustained by American citizens."

Americans held that this "unfortunate accident" afforded proof of the soundness of the position taken by our Government in its note of May 13, after the sinking of the *Lusitania,* when it said to Germany that the objection to present

methods of attack against the trade of Germany's enemies lay "in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative." That visit and search, with adequate provision for the safety of a ship's company should precede attack was the only safe rule; in fact, the only rule of which this Government could admit the legality. Germany had had her warning and she appeared to have taken heed of it, since at this time (May 15) it had been apparent for some days that it was not her purpose to persist in murderous warfare on the seas. She had not given us another *Lusitania* case as a ground of complaint. But Germany, while admitting that her submarine destroyed the *Lusitania,* had thus far carefully avoided any avowal of responsibility and had tendered no expression of regret, made no offer of compensation. The American contention was that, to dispatch a torpedo against an American ship, or to dispatch a torpedo without warning against a belligerent merchant-ship carrying American passengers, was in either case a crime against law and a crime committed against us as neutrals. Disavowal of intent and tender of compensation should logically follow in both cases, unless Germany intended to persist in being a law unto herself.

The last German note was suspected in Washington as serving notice on the United States that Germany proposed to continue to torpedo belligerent merchant-ships, regardless of whether or not American citizens were on board. It was feared that it would gravely complicate a situation still tense between this country and Germany. To admit that in the *Nebraskan* case, or in that of the *William P. Frye,* the German action was justified would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The German Government in its memorandum virtually advised this country that, had the *Nebraskan* been flying the British flag, its torpedoing would have been justified, regardless of the fact that American citizens might have been on board. Whether or not the *Nebraskan* was marked, or whether she displayed the American flag, did not enter into the merits of the case. Even

if the submarine commander had been certain she was hostile, he was still bound to apply the rule of visit and to give proper opportunity for the crew to escape.

While President Wilson was preparing a third note to Germany, the public was stunned by news received on July 18 that the Cunard steamer *Orduna*, when near Queenstown, on July 9, on a voyage to New York, escaped a German torpedo only by steering further west, with twenty-one Americans on board her and that no notice was given by the submarine commander. While the *Orduna* escaped unhurt, this did not relieve the case of grave possibilities. The fact that a belligerent merchant-ship, bound for the United States with Americans on board, and without arms and ammunition or contraband cargo (which had been the reason assigned for the provocation for previous attacks), was assailed, while her passengers were asleep, convinced many that the theory which had been steadily growing of an actual change in the practise of German submarine commanders was not warranted.

The attack on the *Orduna*, bound westward and so carrying no munitions of war, or other contraband, and having 21 Americans among her 227 passengers, increased the gravity of the situation arising from the destruction of the *Lusitania*. Coming at a time when the President was preparing his note in reply to the German message of July 9, this event excited a sinister influence. It was impossible to reconcile an attempt to destroy 492 lives with the professions of the German Government in its apology for the attack on the *Nebraskan*, which also was bound westward and carrying no contraband. That act (the attack on the *Nebraskan*) was characterized by Germany as "an unfortunate accident." Clearly, the attempted destruction of the *Orduna* was no accident. She was free from suspicion, and that she was carrying American passengers was inevitable. The *Orduna* was attacked without warning. The torpedo failing to hit her, the vessel was pursued and shelled. Only good seamanship and courage saved her from the *Lusitania's* fate.

Telling Germany that another act like the sinking of the *Lusitania* would be regarded as "deliberately unfriendly,"

and rejecting the last German note with its elaborate proposals as "very unsatisfactory," might not be an ultimatum, but it was practically the last word, and this is what the President now said. It was the air of finality about the President's note, his third to Germany, that made the deepest impression on the world. President Taft's statement was that it "succinctly, forcibly, and finally presents the just attitude of the United States," and President Wilson would have and should have "the approval of the American people in maintaining it." President Wilson, in this note, declared that "if a belligerent can not retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice, and a due regard for the dignity of neutral Powers, should dictate that the practise be discontinued." Neutral rights were based on immutable principles, and it was held to be "the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way" to adapt the new circumstances of modern warfare to them. Germany and the United States had both contended, and were both contending, for the freedom of the sea, and "the Government of the United States would continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost." It was still willing to help belligerents to find a way for a mitigation of their respective blockade-programs; but, in the meantime, it insisted "solemnly" upon German observance of neutral rights. Finally, it was declared that "friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that contravention of the rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly."

In the midst of discussion of this note, came news that the White Star liner *Arabic* had been sunk. Was this Germany's answer to the note? Just thirty days after our Government had warned Germany that any further contravention of our rights at sea as neutrals would be regarded as an act "deliberately unfriendly," the *Arabic* was struck by a German submarine without warning off the south coast of Ireland while on her way from Liverpool to New York, and in her passenger-list of 181 were 29 Americans, her

crew numbering 242. Most of those on board were rescued, but the names of two American passengers were in the list of more than fifty persons reported missing. The steamer was struck at 9.15 in the morning, at a time when she was fifty miles west of the spot where the Lusitania went down, and sank in eleven minutes. The fact that a large loss of life was averted was explained on two grounds. First, perfect weather prevailed; and, secondly, from the time the *Arabic* left the Mersey her life-boats had been swung out, her life-rafts made ready for launching, and her life-belts freed from their racks. The sinking of the *Arabic* with the loss of American lives took place on August 19. It threatened to prove the instance that would lead to



THE WHITE STAR LINER "ARABIC"
Sunk by a German submarine in August, 1915, when on her westward trip

the breaking off of relations. But on September 1 Count von Bernstorff sent a communication to the Secretary of State of the United States saying his instructions concerning Germany's answer to our last *Lusitania* note contained the following passage:

"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

He added that "this policy of my Government was decided on before the *Arabic* incident occurred." The United States Government was believed to have won a great diplomatic victory in a communication from the German Government dated October 5—a complete disavowal of the sinking of the *Arabic,* and assurance that "stringent" orders had been

issued to prevent further submarine illegal attacks. The note added that the German Government was prepared "to pay an indemnity for the American lives which to its deep regret have been lost on the *Arabic.*" Count von Bernstorff had been authorized to negotiate about the amount of this indemnity. President Wilson, in the opinion of the New York *Evening Post,* "without rattling a sword, without mobilizing a corporal's guard of soldiers or lifting the anchor of a warship had won for civilization the greatest diplomatic victory of generations." The Ambassador's statement was accepted in good faith as a recognition of the fundamental principle contended for, but events soon proved that good faith from Prussianized Germany was a thing no longer to be expected by us.

Whether the submarine that attacked the *Arabic* had been sunk, as reported, whether its commander had disobeyed orders, or whether the orders issued by his Government had never reached him, was thought to be a matter of minor moment. The important fact was that "the case of the *Arabic* and the case of the *Lusitania* as well, were now in the way of honorable and friendly adjustment." All anxiety and doubt were not dispelled, however. No gratitude was due Germany, said Colonel Roosevelt, for simply announcing that she "intends to stop the policy of assassination." On its face, he said, the announcement "appears to be most gratifying, and, if the acts of the Germans bear it out, and if suitable amends are made for the lives lost on the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* and for the *Gulflight* and *Falaba* and similar cases, and if there is no provision exprest or implied as to action on our part, such as was requested by Germany before as regards England and France, the results will in every way be satisfactory."

Much to everybody's astonishment there was received at the State Department on September 9 a "memorandum" in which the German Government most deeply regretted the loss of life on the *Arabic,* especially American life, but adding that the German Government was "unable to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the *Arabic.*" The disappointment

and vexation which this caused were intense. The German Government apparently was unwilling, or unable, to support the reassurances that had been given informally by its Ambassador.

Several days later Bernstorff was able to deliver to the State Department a very different kind of memorandum. The German Government did not reject the opinion of its submarine commander that the *Arabic's* intentions were aggressive, and yet it did not doubt the good faith of English testimony to the contrary. Therefore it regretted and disavowed the submarine commander's act, which was against the instructions issued in regard to submarine warfare at the time, and the Government was prepared "to pay indemnity for the American lives which, to its deep regret, have been lost on the *Arabic*." Furthermore, the orders issued by his Majesty, the Emperor, to the commanders of the German submarines, had been made "so stringent that the recurrence of an incident similar to the *Arabic* case is considered out of the question." Thus not only was the *Arabic* case disposed of, but our whole case against Germany's submarine warfare, so far as one could see, had been conceded. But wonder arose as to why the sinking of the *Lusitania* had not been disavowed.

The note on the *Arabic* led to many American editorial utterances exultant in strain. Even with papers that had been almost willing to make an appeal to the sword this was the case. The *Brooklyn Eagle* said the administration had won "a signal victory for humanity, had cleared the track for the settlement of the *Lusitania* case and other cases, and had caused the Imperial German Government to file a bid for the restoration of at least some degree of lost respect." The Philadelphia *Record* could not "rejoice over this unprecedented triumph for international morality achieved by President Wilson without also rejoicing that Germany had the courage to yield." Everywhere in Washington, said the New York *Sun's* correspondent, there was "a disposition to concede to the German Ambassador great credit for his part in the diplomatic triumph," it being "no secret" that "his zeal and refusal to be discouraged were influential in bringing the German Government to the point of yielding." The

Philadelphia *Evening Ledger* and the New York *Evening Sun* also paid editorial tribute to Bernstorff. Since the sinking of the *Arabic* the submarine controversy had no longer been carried on by a series of diplomatic notes, but by informal discussions between the German Ambassador, the President, and Secretary Lansing, Bernstorff apparently having received full powers from the German Government.[5]

[5] Principal Sources: *The Literary Digest, The Independent, Bradstreet's,* The *Journal of Commerce,* The *Tribune,* The *Times,* The *World,* New York; The London *Times'* "History of the War," The *Evening Post* (New York).

IV

AMERICAN MUNITION PLANT EXPLOSIONS AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH LOAN

July 1, 1915—April 6, 1916

GERMANY had set out to disrupt methods by which England, France, and Russia were being provided from America with food, ammunition, and money, and so helping them to victory. But Germany saw that if our munition industries and the facilities for convoying them to Europe were to cease, the stoppage would have to be effected, not by direct Government action, but by a voluntary or induced action, on the part of those who were engaged in it. Early in the war there were rumors of German emissaries seeking to suppress or cripple this traffic, by buying up American factories and shipping, by subsidizing their owners to cease operations, by corrupting newspapers and by fomenting strikes. But these efforts, for various and more or less obvious reasons, failed to help the German cause. A climax came early in September, 1915, when President Wilson requested the recall of Dr. Constantin Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, because of activities in instigating strikes in American munition-plants. Through the general chorus of editorial praise of the President's action ran a suggestion that the incident had a wider significance than appeared on the surface. The Chicago *Herald* observed that Dr. Dumba destroyed his welcome at Washington by "plotting to destroy our industrial peace." The Baltimore *American* said the incident "should prove a salutary warning to other foreign representatives who had been just as active, but who had so far been shrewd enough to prevent a full exposure of their acts." The penitentiary sentence imposed about the same time on a German named Stahl who was a self-confest perjurer in having sworn that he saw guns on the *Lusitania*, added to the demand for the recall of Dr. Dumba. The New

York *Times* said we had served notice to Austrians, Germans, and German-Americans that "the cure for this plague of conspiracies is in our hands and that we are going to apply it."

The activities which made Dr. Dumba "no longer acceptable" to the United States Government came to light when British authorities seized certain papers carried by James F. J. Archibald, an American war-correspondent, who sailed from New York on August 21 on the Holland-America liner *Rotterdam,* bound for Rotterdam. The *Rotterdam* having been ordered into Falmouth, a search of Archibald's stateroom disclosed in his possession a number of confidential communications from the Austrian and German Ambassadors at Washington to their home governments. One of these, written in Dr. Dumba's own hand, and addrest to Baron Burian, Minister for Foreign Affairs for Austria-Hungary, outlined and "most warmly recommended to your Excellency's favorable consideration" a plan for "the preparation of disturbances in the Bethlehem steel and munitions factories as well as in the Middle West." In this letter Dr. Dumba said: "I am under the impression that we could, if not entirely prevent the production of war material in Bethlehem and in the Middle West, at any rate strongly disorganize it and hold it up for months which, according to the statement of the German military attaché, is of great importance, and which amply outweighs the relatively small sacrifice of money." Dr. Dumba secured passage on a steamer of the Holland-America line and reached Vienna without difficulty.

In the midst of the *Lusitania* negotiations in 1915, and as a bomb from the sky, which, if not clear, was becoming clearer than it was, came early in July an explosion in the Senate rooms of the Capitol at Washington and a pistol attack on J. P. Morgan, the banker, at his summer home on Long Island. That the criminal in both cases, Frank Holt (or Erich Muenter, as his real name was), was insane or a crank, all agreed. That pro-German clamor for an embargo on arms had driven Holt mad was emphatically stated by the Boston *News Bureau,* New York *Sun* and *Times,* Philadelphia *Inquirer,* Washington *Times,* and Richmond *News-Leader.* The man's diseased mind, said *The Star* of St.

Louis, a city of large German population, "was given its peculiar bent by the arms embargo harangue that has been indulged in by the pro-German press, the misnamed Neutrality Leagues, and the so-called Independence Unions, which have been too long tolerated in this country, as the crimes of the madman witness." The New York *Tribune* wondered whether the assailant of Mr. Morgan was really "more insane than the statesmen who ordered the massacre of the *Lusitania*." He was "the agent of the same propaganda—of the same spirit of truculence and violence which the world had come to associate with German military policy." That paper said further: "German partizans in this country are beginning to take their cue from the barbarity and lawlessness of the German Government. They are trying to practise the terrorisms inculcated by the German military code and are beginning to remove by violence those who hinder, or are supposed to hinder, Germany's success." The New York *Times* suggested that "the worst enemy of Germany could hardly have done the Germans a greater disservice than by such deeds," which could have no other effect than to "turn public opinion against Germany and her cause."



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J. P. MORGAN

Denounced by Dr. C. J. Hexamer, president of the National German-American Alliance, as a "nefarious plot" to "rob the American people of their savings," and defended by no less an authority than James J. Hill, as "of far more importance to the United States than to England," a proposed loan of a billion dollars to England and France for the negotiation of which the Lord Chief Justice of England and eminent bankers from London and Paris came to New York early in October, 1915, interested the man in the street

almost as much as it did the bankers, because, in the last analysis, it was his money that would be borrowed and used to buy American wheat, cotton and manufactures. Opposition to the loan ran high in many pro-German circles. The lives of the Anglo-French commissioners were threatened by letter, and there was a short-lived agitation for the withdrawal of German-American deposits from American banks subscribing to the board. Some few of the great Eastern banking-houses of German affiliation, however, shared Mr. Hill's view of the loan; they agreed with him that its failure would be a severe blow to American prosperity. It was imperative that a very large loan be consummated, and it was the duty of every one interested in American commerce and labor to work for its accomplishment, said a representative of one of these houses.

The object of the commission in seeking this loan was to facilitate, by the establishment of a commercial credit, the purchase of American wheat, cotton, meat, and other commodities, traffic in which had been seriously menaced by an unstable condition of foreign exchange. Failure of the Allies to borrow money here would have resulted in wholesale curtailment of orders all the way down the list from the least to the greatest exports, with the single exception of munitions of war. Since the Allies must get war-munitions from us at any cost, it was explained that if this loan should fail they would find other ways of financing their other traffic, such as shipments of gold or the sale of American securities. James J. Hill declared emphatically that the prosperity of the American farmer depended on the consummation of the loan. But to Dr. Hexamer the loan was a conspiracy of the "Money Trust" to rob the American people of their savings. He called upon "all patriotic American citizens" to thwart it by vigorous protests and earnest appeals to the President and Secretary of State and to American bankers. The loan as finally agreed upon was regarded as a compromise, the amount being $500,000,000.

At this time subscriptions to the third German war loan, put out a few months before, were still being received in this country. According to an estimate made by one closely in touch with the situation, over $20,000,000 would be sub-

scribed before the lists were closed. Subscriptions came through sundry channels, public and private. A good portion was privately transmitted through local banks with German connections. It was estimated that, through various German consulates in this country, and by other private means, about $9,000,000 had been secured in Greater New York alone and from $4,000,000 to $5,000,000 in the West. The proposal to extend a credit of $500,000,000 to the Allies had a stimulating effect on the rate at which subscriptions for the German loan came in. Circulars and handbills distributed among German-Americans urged them to invest their bank-deposits in the loan, "instead of letting the banks use it for the proposed Allies' loan," and a general propaganda was conducted through the advertising columns of the German press. In several instances property was known to have been sold or mortgaged to raise funds for the loan.

The most serious plot uncovered in this country since the war began resulted near the end of October in the arrest of Robert Fay, Walter Scholz, Paul Daesche, Herbert Kienzle, and Max Breitung on a charge of "conspiring against the United States" by planning to blow up ships carrying American munitions of war to the Allies. Fay, who claimed to be a Prussian lieutenant sent here on a mission of destruction by the German Secret Service, was arrested with Scholz in a wood near Grantwood, New Jersey, where they were experimenting with explosives. In their rooms on Fifth Street, Weehawken, detectives claimed to have found documents connecting Fay with the German Army and the German Foreign Office; a United States Coast Survey map, showing New York Harbor, with all its docks and piers in detail; and four suit-cases containing disguises, mechanism for bombs, and a quantity of high explosives. Other arrests then followed, the prisoners being held for trial under bail of $25,000 each. According to a signed statement made by Fay after his arrest, he had received before leaving Germany his instructions and $4,000 from Herr Jansen, of the German Secret Service.

Fay and his colleagues were said to have spent in six months some $30,000 on experiments and preparations.

Other rumors credited them with the command of large sums of money. Whether the instigators were German officials, or German sympathizers in the United States, the work of these men, many papers pointed out, was no less stupid than criminal. The New York *Journal of Commerce* said: "Nothing had done the cause of Germany in this war more harm in the estimation of the people of this country than these schemes, vainly designed to help that cause by committing crimes in its behalf." Among the German-American press in condemning the activities of the bomb-plotters and deploring the "undesired adventurers" that follow in the train of a great war was *The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*. In the New York *Deutsches Journal* was advanced a theory that Fay was not a German at all, but an English *agent provocateur*. That the real mission of Fay was to sink or destroy the British warships on guard outside the three-mile limit off Sandy Hook was set forth in affidavits in possession of the United States. Laid up in Hoboken, the fleets of the two German lines could have gone to sea except for the British cruisers and auxiliary vessels lying in wait off Sandy Hook. Fay was credited with an idea that, notwithstanding the vigilance of the British ships, he could make his way to their sterns, attach his machine to them with its time device in action, and escape before the explosions destroyed them.

By the autumn of 1915 there had grown up such an epidemic of fires and mysterious explosions in American munition-plants and on ships carrying American arms to the Allies, that a growing insistence arose among the public as to whether they were due to chance, to irresponsible fanatics, or to the secret promptings of a foreign Government. According to a list published in the New York *Journal of Commerce*, there had been about forty of these fires, involving more than a score of deaths and property losses aggregating over $5,000,000. In one week papers reported a $55,000 fire in the Baldwin Locomotive works, where engines for the Russian Government were being built; the destruction of two buildings of the Midvale Steel and Ordnance Company, which was making 3;000,000 rifles for the British Government; damage amounting to about $1,500,-

WHERE AMERICAN ORDNANCE WAS MADE AT THE BETHLEHEM WORKS

Known as shop No. 2. This room is nearly 1,800 feet long. Among the American plants for the destruction of which plots were discovered, the Bethlehem works became prominent

000 in the Bethlehem Steel Company's ordnance plant; a $1,000,000 fire in the Roebling steel-rope plant, which was filling orders for the Allies; and a fire in the ordnance plant of a company in Philadelphia. In the same period a fire occurred at Stamford, Conn., in the plant of a company which was manufacturing aniline dyes—until recently a German monopoly.

In the light of these events many editors were re-reading the bomb-plot confession of "Lieutenant" Fay, then under indictment on a charge of conspiring against the United States, and were giving a less skeptical hearing than they would otherwise have given to a still more startling statement of Dr. Joseph Goricar, who was for fifteen years in the Austro-Hungarian consular service. They recalled what Dr. Constantin Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador at Washington, had written to the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs. When a dispatch from Berlin was printed which said that in Germany and Austria it is "openly boasted that the destruction of American ammunition works is only beginning." The Austrian Embassy denounced Dr. Goricar as a liar and a paid agent of the Russian Government, but the Brooklyn *Citizen* thought it was not necessary to credit his story "in order to reach the conclusion that a vast conspiracy exists in the country, having for its object the destruction of American factories filling war-orders for the Allies and the setting fire to passenger- and cargo-ships plying between American ports and ports of the Allies." The whole question of the Teutonic propagandist methods in the United States was emphasized in the public mind by the alleged "revelations" of Dr. Goricar which were made through the columns of the Providence *Journal*. Dr. Goricar, who claimed to have resigned from the Austro-Hungarian consular service because his Government demanded of him, when stationed in San Francisco, the work of a spy as well as of a consul, said there was an army of about 3,000 Teutonic spies in this country, all of them card-indexed in the offices of Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen and Consul General von Nuber. He maintained also that all operations against munition-plants were known in advance and approved by the Austrian and German embassies.

While no law was violated and no offense committed against American neutrality by the Hamburg-American line's officials in chartering, provisioning, and coaling steamships and sending them out to supply German warships, four officials were found guilty in November by a Federal jury of conspiring to defraud the United States by "obtaining clearance for twelve ships to coal and provision the German fleet by means of false shippers' manifests, and causing customs officials to make and transmit to the Department of Commerce false statistics based on these false manifests." The verdict, said the New York *World,* was no "more than what the admitted facts called for," but the German-American *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung* found it "extremely difficult to understand how the United States was injured by the delivery of provisions, stores, and the like to a ship of a warring nation upon the high seas." In view of the technical nature of their crime, the *Staats-Zeitung* thought Messrs. Buenz, Koetter, Hachmeister, and Poppinhaus—the four men found guilty—could go on with their appeal to the higher court. There was no intention, declared an attorney for these men during the early course of the trial, to harm any one but the enemies of Germany. Moreover, these activities "were of but little benefit to Germany." The whole enterprise had cost something like $1,500,000, but only one of the ships got its supplies to a German ship. This was the *Berwind,* but within a few hours after the *Berwind* put its supplies on the *Cap Trafalgar,* the *Cap Trafalgar* was sunk by the British converted cruiser *Carmania.*

Attorneys connected with the prosecution congratulated the Government on winning one of the most important court victories in recent years. The verdict "meant that the laws of the United States must be observed by all the belligerent Powers, and that if its laws are violated by any of them, and the Government finds it out, they will be prosecuted." There was no question of neutrality or international law, said Judge Harland B. Howe, in his charge to the jury. The United States simply said to those who sent ships out of her ports: "You may come and go as you like, but when you go out you must tell the truth about

where you are going and what you have got with you when you leave; you must not intentionally deceive us." The United States had suffered wrong, said the Federal attorneys, in that every manifest and clearance issued by our authorities had been brought under suspicion. District-Attorney Marshal explained: "The first act of these defendants was to get neutral ships for their work, so that they could slip past the watching British cruisers. The next was to get clearances for these ships and such clearances were given under the seal of the United States. These defendants filled the South Atlantic Ocean with lying clearances; they placed the seal of the United States on lie after lie. The wrong they did was not only against the United States, but against every honest shipper." To use the spirited phrase of another federal attorney, Mr. Wood, "lie if you will to your enemies, but you shall not make the United States an indorser of your lies."

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CAPT. FRANZ VON PAPEN

Early in December the Washington Government formally asked for the recall of two German diplomatic attachés on account of "improper activities in military and naval matters." These were Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed, who were declared to be "no longer acceptable to this Government." Demands from Berlin for detailed explanations were met by a courteous but firm insistence that diplomatic usage did not require the filing of a bill of particulars when a member of a foreign legation had ceased to be a satisfactory person. "Proofs of pernicious activity have in part been made public and others are in the hands of the State Department," said the New York *Times*, "ample in volume and in character to justify the action now taken." The request for their recall seemed to

the Brooklyn *Eagle* more "important and significant than the enforced recall of Dr. Dumba, because it strikes directly at the heart of a criminal conspiracy of which the inspiration comes from Berlin and in which the part played by the former Austrian Ambassador was merely secondary." Before the end of the year both men sailed for home under guaranty from Great Britain and France of safe conduct. It seemed at the time to the New York *World* that an important service could be performed by Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed to Germany in respect to German relations with the United States. They could inform their Government that American resentment against the German propaganda was "steadily increasing and that a continuation of the conspiracy would soon make friendly relations between the two countries all but impossible." *The World* said further:

"They can tell Berlin that the American people are not frightened by threats of a hyphenated revolution; that the American Government can not be coerced by pro-German threats, and that the German campaign in the United States has been one of the gravest of the many blunders of which German diplomacy is guilty. It has not only failed completely, but it has produced an effect diametrically opposite to the effects it was expected to produce. If the two attachés can convince the German Government that the money it has spent in the United States in supporting perjury, in capitalizing conspiracies against our domestic warfare, in buying anarchy south of the Rio Grande, and in subsidizing sedition on American soil has all been worse than wasted, they may perhaps do more for the Fatherland than any other two men have yet done on the battle-line."

As the war proceeded other arrests were made of German officers. Early in April, 1917, Capt. Alfred A. Fritzen, a former German artillery-officer and reservist, who had been arrested in March, pleaded guilty to complicity in a plot to dynamite the Welland Canal in Canada and was sentenced to serve eighteen months in Atlanta Federal prison and to pay a fine. Upon his appearance before the court his case was outlined by John C. Knox, Chief Assistant United States District Attorney. "I feel," said Mr. Knox, "that this defendant had been merely a tool and instrument in the hands of the unspeakable Franz von Papen, who was military

attaché of the German Embassy, and who, at the outbreak of the European war, planned to create a veritable reign of terror among persons working in the interests of the Allies. The ambition of his schemes was equalled only by their asininity." Mr. Knox described the scheme for the blowing up of the Welland Canal, near Niagara Falls, by which the Teutons sought to interfere with the shipment of food and war munitions by the Canadians and denounced Captain Tauscher, husband of the opera singer, Mme. Gadski, and agent for the Krupps in this country, who, altho indicted for complicity in the plot, was acquitted upon trial. "Captain Tauscher," he said, "was a most willing party to this conspiracy, but the credulity of a jury in this court was so imposed upon that he was allowed to go free."

Prison sentences were also imposed early in April on six Teutons convicted of conspiracy to destroy merchant-ships of the Allies by means of fire-bombs. Upon Captain Charles von Kleist, who was a naturalized American citizen, and upon Chief Engineer Karl Schmidt, of the *Friederich der Grosse,* who was largely instrumental in the employment of the bomb-makers, was imposed the maximum sentence of two years in Atlanta Federal prison and $5,000 fine. The four other conspirators, George Praedeal, Frederick Karbade, Wilhelm Parades, and Ernest Becker, who did work on the instruments under orders from their superiors, escaped with light sentences of six months' imprisonment in the Mercer County Penitentiary at Trenton, New Jersey, and $500 fine each. Von Kleist, who, as a chemist, had been associated with Dr. Walther T. Scheele of Hoboken, then a fugitive from justice, in the making of the bombs, flushed crimson under a sharp rebuke from Judge Van Fleet, who told him that, being an American citizen, his action reflected upon all other citizens of his race. "Happily," Judge Van Fleet said, "I believe that when the supreme test comes most of the citizens of your race will be found to be loyal." Bail for the men, should they take an appeal, was fixt in the cases of Von Kleist and Schmidt at $15,000 each, and in the cases of the other defendants at $5,000 each. The plot of which the men were convicted was that

of conspiracy to place incendiary bombs in the holds of food-ships "with a view to setting the vessels afire on the high seas." These bombs, about 250 in all, had been manufactured on the deck of the interned North German Lloyd vessel *Friederich der Grosse* and were filled with combustibles in a chemical laboratory in Hoboken.[6]

Immediately after our formal declaration of a state of war with Germany in April, 1917, on the receipt of orders

PROVING GROUNDS AT BETHLEHEM FOR THE AMERICAN SOIXANTE-QUINZE

from Washington to seize the German ships in this country, United States Marshal McCarthy rounded up in this city, eight Germans, five of whom were taken to the Tombs. Three of the prisoners were Captain Paul Koenig, nominally head of a band of secret agents of the Hamburg-American Line, who was regarded by the Government as one of the master-spies of the Wilhelmstrasse; Frederick Stallforth, a

[6] The *Evening Sun* (New York).

German banker from Parral, Mexico, and a friend of Captain Franz von Rintelen, a man well informed as to the attempts made by Germany to embroil this country with Mexico; and Dr. Carl von Baur Breitenfeld, a chemist. The United States Marshals first went to Paul Koenig's office, at 45 Broadway, and arrested him. Koenig was taken to the Federal Building, where the prisoners were kept until after midnight, when they were removed to the Tombs. All the books and papers in Koenig's office were seized, including what was believed to be a set of code books. From Washington came word that "somewhere in Illinois" twelve others had been arrested. Sixty-five German propagandists were named in the orders from Washington, most of them residents of New York City.

Every man who was arrested, or whose arrest had been ordered, was regarded by the Government as dangerous to be at large, and all were known to the Government to have been connected with German intrigues. Most of them had worked under Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed. Among the men taken into custody but later released was E. J. Justice, indicted with Paul Koenig and others on a charge of plotting to blow up the Welland Canal. He had been out on $30,000 bail for eighteen months. Another was Frederick Schleindl, indicted on a charge of purloining documents from the National City Bank, where he was a clerk. These documents revealed the munition contracts of the Allies, and Schleindl at the time confest he sold them to Paul Koenig. Next to Koenig the most important arrest was that of Stallforth, made in his office at 120 Broadway. He formerly occupied a suite of offices in the same building with Captain Franz von Rintelen, then a prisoner in England, and who, while here, spent sums to foment strikes in munition-plants and in propaganda work for Germany.

The Department of Justice still had under strict surveillance thousands of German reservists—residents in the United States—who were suspected of having been connected with plots already brought to light, or with plots abandoned before perfection, or who had been active in German propaganda, or who, because of accentuated leanings toward the German Government, were regarded as likely to work against

the interests of the United States during the war. How many German reservists were residents of the United States had never been accurately determined, and was largely a matter of conjecture. While the belief was that the number ranged between 150,000 and 200,000, the great majority were men in middle life, or beyond. There was, however, an army of between 15,000 and 18,000 young reservists in the prime of life, who had been here a short time—from three to five years—and they might be properly regarded as potential sources of trouble. Of the persons ordered apprehended virtually all could be classed as quasi-officials of the German Government. Many were instrumentalities through which Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen carried out their activities. A few of the number could properly be classed as spies.[7]

[7] Principal Sources: The *Times, The Literary Digest,* New York; The *Journal* (Providence), *The World's Work*, Associated Press dispatches.



THE AMERICAN SOIXANTE-QUINZE

Of this gun, as made at Bethlehem, great numbers were supplied during the war to the British and American armies in spite of German submarines

V

INCREASED SUBMARINE ACTIVITY, BRITISH, GERMAN, AND AUSTRIAN—THE COMING OF THE "DEUTSCHLAND," AND THE CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT

October 14, 1915—May 31, 1916

REPORTS from the Baltic all through the autumn of 1915 gave evidence of continued activity in those waters by British submarines. At one time English reports were that an average of one ship a day was destroyed. Of more consequence was the moral effect produced on the German mercantile marine which ever since the beginning of the war had been plying between ports of Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. A state of panic set in which for the time being paralyzed both passenger- and cargo-traffic, and stopt the ferry services between the connected ports of the three countries. British submarines had been in the Baltic since early in the year.

On October 14 it had been stated from a Swedish source that, up to that time, altogether eleven German steamships had been sunk by British submarines. All were large vessels laden with ore from Sweden. A few days later two German steamers, the *Pernambuco* (5,000 tons), of the Hamburg-American Line, and the *Soederhamn* (1,200 tons), of Hamburg, had been torpedoed by British submarines near Stockholm. The *Pernambuco* sank immediately, but the *Soederhamn* was run aground on Swedish territory. Both carried iron ore. British submarines in the Baltic also torpedoed the German steamers *Johann Wulff* and *Hernoesand*. Within a few months after the British submarine campaign in the Baltic began fifteen German vessels had been torpedoed and in addition were sunk six German transports and a torpedo-boat destroyer. This record accounted for Baltic war risk

premiums going up from 10s. to £5 per £100—or ten times what they were before the campaign set in.

On October 21 Germany was said to have admitted that 27 of her submarines had been caught in British nets, and that 16 others had been destroyed by other means before the use of nets. By the end of October, Germany had apparently lost 43 submarines since the beginning of the war, and English submarines appeared to have established full command in the Baltic. They were doing what the German submarines had expected to do on the British coasts. At one time German transports were sunk almost daily, but the doomed vessels were visited, examined, condemned, and sunk only after half an hour had been given to the crews to escape. Before the war broke out the Russians had quite a flotilla of recently-built submarines, and had constructed, without German help, a number of submarines after the war began.

Early in November a German *U*-boat which had been launched at Stettin, within a few hours of leaving there was caught in one of the traps the British had laid. On November 3 the German steamer *Suez* was sunk by a British submarine off Karis Reowa, Sweden. On November 4 a German submarine of the *U*-8 type, found in distress, was towed into Terschelling, a Dutch Island in the North Sea, by a Dutch life-boat. On November 8 the small German cruiser *Undine* was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine off the Swedish coast, and on November 11 the German protected cruiser *Frauenlos,* a sister ship of the *Undine,* was torpedoed off the south coast of Sweden. On October 24 a British submarine sank the Turkish transport *Carmen,* laden with munitions, in the Sea of Marmora. The *Carmen* was an Austrian steamer of 4,424 tons, tied up at Constantinople at the beginning of the war, and converted into a Turkish transport. She was built at Sunderland in 1911.

On November 8 word came that five ships, four of them British, had been sunk, but only in one case, that of the armed steamer *Tara,* was the scene of the sinking revealed. Two German submarines, which a short time before had passed through Gibraltar, destroyed the *Tara.* The other

ships sunk were the steamer *Woolwich* of London, 2,936 tons gross; the *Buresh,* 2,278 tons gross, and the *Glenmore,* 1,656 tons. An official statement, given out in London on November 13, announced that the British submarine *E*-20 had been sunk by the Turks. On the same day the British steamship *Sir Richard Awdry,* of 2,234 tons gross, was said to have been sunk, and the British steamer *Den of Crombie,* whose crew were saved, a vessel of 4,949 tons gross.

The British hospital ship *Anglia,* with about 300 wounded men aboard, in addition to the crew, nurses and attendants bound from France for Dover, struck a mine in mid-Channel on November 17 and sank in a very short time. Nearly 100 men, most of them seriously wounded and unable to move, lost their lives while in their cots. The collier *Lusitania,* which was near at the time of the accident, went to the assistance of the *Anglia.* Her boats had just been loaded when she also struck a mine. All her crew were saved. A patrol vessel succeeded in rescuing 300 of the *Anglia's* passengers and crew, including some nurses. A number of bodies were recovered. It was believed that the mines had been broken from their moorings during a storm. The loss of the *Anglia* led to an official communication that King George "was shocked to hear that the *Anglia,* which so recently conveyed him across the Channel, had been sunk." King George had made this trip in the *Anglia,* when going to the front in France, only a few weeks before she went down.

Near the end of December the activity of German submarines was reported to have been revived in British waters, several ships having been sunk, one of them a French steamer with a loss of eighty lives. There were reports from Vienna that Austrian and German submarines, within the six weeks ending on December 14, had sunk eight troopships, twenty-five transports and thirty-four merchantmen, a total of sixty-seven, the loss of life in the case of the troop-ships being estimated at 5,000. The largest of the vessels was the Cunard liner *Transylvania,* of 14,000 tons. Near the end of December, in an engagement off Durazzo, the Austrians lost two destroyers, in consequence, however, of an attack from Italian warships rather than from submarines. In January a British submarine sank an Austrian

hydroplane in the upper Adriatic and an Austrian torpedo-boat which went to the rescue, capturing the crews of both. In the same month Russian torpedo-boats swooped down on the coast of Anatolia, and as a result no fewer than 163 Turkish sailing-ships lay at the bottom of the Black Sea.

Just as Great Britain had begun to believe herself almost freed from a further Teutonic submarine menace, there now came a new outburst of activity in the Mediterranean. It gave rise to much anxiety. Advices had indicated that Germany was sending a large part of her submarine fleet to those waters. This activity in the Mediterranean was closely connected with military developments in the Balkans and the Dardanelles. The sending of Allied troops to Saloniki and the Gallipoli Peninsula had imposed a strain on the Allied fleets such as they had not previously experienced. Hitherto it had been the British boast that two and a half million men had been ferried to and from England with a loss of less than 1 per cent., and this loss had occurred almost entirely in the Mediterranean. With a larger proportion of troops now going to the Near East, and the German Admiralty transferring its main submarine operations from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, the toll paid by the Allies was bound to rise. There was no possibility of guarding the long sea passage as effectively as the short lane across the Channel had been guarded. From Marseilles to Saloniki was a matter of a week's voyage for passenger-ships in times of peace. From Alexandria to Saloniki was three days. The offset to this difficult situation was that the German submarines had to set out from the North Sea harbors for a long and perilous trip to southern waters.

This activity resulted in Italian, British, and French warships entering upon a strong campaign to capture or destroy underwater-boats. Soon came a report from Morocco of the destruction of two German submarines by a British cruiser and a third *U*-boat was said to have been captured while in a disabled condition. Then the French steamship *Yser,* formerly the *Dacia,* which had been seized by a French cruiser in February, 1915, while carrying a cargo of cotton from the United States to Germany, was torpedoed in the

Mediterranean, but the passengers and crew all were landed. For several months the *Dacia,* which formerly belonged to the Hamburg-American Line, had been a vessel of international consequence, the subject of a long controversy. A French prize-court, after formal proceedings, had sold her to a private owner, who renamed her the *Yser.* This vessel first came into general notice when Edward N. Breitung, a banker and mine-owner of Marquette, Mich, bought her from the Hamburg-American Line, while she lay at Port Arthur, Texas. Mr. Breitung immediately placed her under American registry, the United States Government approving the transfer. On January 9, 1915, four days after the sale, the British Government gave notice that the vessel would be seized if caught trading with any of the enemies of Great Britain.

In spite of this, the *Dacia,* on February 1, started on a test voyage. She sailed from Galveston for Rotterdam with 11,000 bales of cotton, which were to be transhipped to Bremen, her German crew having been replaced by Americans. She had a cargo said to be worth $880,000 when laid down in Bremen. A week later the *Dacia* put in at Norfolk, Va., and on February 12 sailed for Europe. On February 28 it was reported that she had been captured at the entrance of the English Channel by the French cruiser *Europe,* and taken to the French port of Brest, where France, on March 23, offered to buy the cargo of the *Dacia,* if her owners would establish their American citizenship. On May 20 the French Cabinet passed a bill to reimburse the owners, and on August 1 the French prize-court announced that the *Dacia* had been confiscated. The court found no proof that the transfer to American registry had not been made for the purpose of saving the ship from capture, but that, on the contrary, the ship, under her new flag, was making a voyage for which she had been loaded while under a German flag. The court accordingly found the transfer "tainted with fraud and against the rights of belligerents," and ordered the ship confiscated as a prize. The judgment of the court was based on Article 56 of the Declaration of London. After the ship was bombarded in the Mediterranean, Mr. Breitung said that, if he was defeated finally in the French courts,

as he expected to be, and if it should turn out that there was no American law to afford him redress, Congress would be asked to relieve the situation and pass a law that would protect him and others similarly situated. The vessel was a freighter of 2,240 tons.

Late in December the British armored cruiser *Natal* was sunk after an explosion in an English harbor, the explosion being internal. There were about 400 survivors. The loss was attributed to foul play, attention being called to the similar disaster which overtook the British battleship *Bulwark*, blown up off Sheerness in November, 1914, with the loss of 700 or more men, and the British steamship *Princess Irene*, blown up in Sheerness Harbor in May, 1915, with the loss of between 300 and 400 lives. The *Natal* had been built eleven years before and was still considered a powerful ship. Her displacement was 13,550 tons, her length 480 feet, her beam 73 feet. She carried six 9.2-inch guns, three ahead and three astern; four 7.5-inch guns, twenty-four 3-pounders, and three torpedo tubes.

The British received another severe shock on January 10, in the announcement of the loss of the battleship *King Edward VII*, which was blown up by a mine. The official statement did not reveal the scene of the disaster. Owing to the heavy sea she had to be abandoned and sank shortly afterward. The ship's company was taken off without any loss of life. Only two men were injured. The *King Edward VII* represented an investment of nearly £1,600,000 ($8,000,000), and was one of the finest of the new class of super-dreadnoughts. She corresponded in general to American warships of the *New Jersey* and *Nebraska* type and was only slightly older than the *Natal*. She was the eighth British battleship lost in the war, not one of which was destroyed in action. She also was the heaviest vessel lost.

On February 14 it was officially announced that the British ship *Arethusa* had struck a mine off the east coast of England. About ten lives were lost. This cruiser was one of the most popular ships in the navy and generally known as the "Saucy Arethusa." She was covered with scars from many encounters, and was believed to have been

in more naval actions during war than any other ship in the navy. Within three days after leaving the shipyard where she was built she was in the Heligoland naval fight, and she had the distinction of firing the torpedo which finally settled the fate of the German cruiser *Blücher*. Altho one of the smallest light cruisers, her fighting qualities and her exploits had given her a reputation for embodying the real war spirit of the British Navy. She displaced only 3,000 tons, was 410 feet long, of 39 feet beam, and had a mean draft of 14 feet.

A brilliant chapter in the history of the Dardanelles undertaking was that which concerned French and British submarines in penetrating to the Sea of Marmora. After avoiding all the obstacles in that hazardous passage and passing under mine-fields, these vessels up to October 26 had succeeded in sinking or damaging two battleships, five gunboats, one torpedo-boat, eight transports, and 196 supply ships of all kinds, an activity which had effects on the reinforcement and supplies of the Turkish army. More than one of the submarines entered the harbor at Constantinople itself and attacked shipping at the wharves. The Turkish power mills at Zeintunlik and a railway cutting near Kara Burnu were also shelled. The measure of risk attached to this work was shown by the heavy losses sustained by the Franco-British flotilla, the submarines *Saphir, Mariotta, Joule* and *Turquoise* being sunk or captured during the year. On February 21 another Allied submarine passed through the Dardanelles to the Bosporus and torpedoed a tug and six transports laden with munitions. Its presence caused something like a panic in Constantinople. The feat of a former British submarine which passed under a chain of mines in the Dardanelles and torpedoed a Turkish warship early in 1915, was thus repeated a year later. The Bosporus is harder to "negotiate" than the Dardanelles. If only a flotilla of British submarine boats could have made their way into the Black Sea, they could have repeated on a large scale the work done by the British in the Baltic. For operations in eastern Asia Minor the Turks were largely dependent on sea transport. The story of how the *E*-7 in February entered the Sea of Marmora and operating for

SIR JOHN (AFTERWARDS VISCOUNT) JELLICOE
Commander of the British navy from the outbreak of the war to its close

twenty-four days sank twenty-three ships, shelled two railway trains, and did other damage, was told in a letter written by a young officer who was on board her, under Cochrane, the commander. He said:

"We broke all previous records. Cochrane was absolutely splendid. We went around the Sea of Marmora, leaving a trail of sunk and burning ships. We were the first submarine in history to bombard a place on shore under fire. I think we were under fire about three times a day on an average, and penetrated into all sorts of places and destroyed shipping. We even shelled a railway and destroyed two troop-trains. Altogether we sunk one gun-boat, five steamers (one of 3,000 tons) and seventeen large sailing-ships, and hit two trains, one railway embankment and a few villages that fired on us and 'got it in the neck' for doing so. We also dived up to Constantinople and fired a torpedo at the arsenal wharf where were a lot of ammunition lighters. There was a terrific explosion, which shook the boat, altho we were one and one-quarter miles away. One day we had a duel with a small gun-boat on the surface and drove her off, altho she fired 200 rounds from two guns. After that we were left alone, and everything ran like blazes when we got anywhere near.

"We had no trouble in diving in the Sea of Marmora, but when we came up we had an awful time, as the Turks rigged up all sorts of nets and things to catch us, and we got mixed up in them and also were fouled by mines three times. The reception we got on returning to base was great. The whole fleet cheered us madly. Just imagine, all dirty and unshaven, our flag with bullet-holes all over it, our conning-tower all dents from bullets, and rusty, steaming through the air and thousands of men cheering us like mad, battleships, cruisers, torpedo-boats, transports, and captains leading cheers. I have heard cheers before, but this was the real thing. Poor old Cochrane's eyes were full of tears as he saluted to the cries of 'Are we down-hearted?' and 'Well done, *E*-7.'"

On February 26 the French auxiliary cruiser *Provence* was sunk in the Mediterranean. She settled rapidly and water soon got to the boilers, which began to explode within a few minutes. There were nearly 4,000 men aboard. The number of survivors was 870, of whom 296 were landed at Malta. The first official statement said no signs of a submarine were noticed either before or after the sinking. A second official statement gave no explanation as to the cause

of the disaster. The *Provence* was a French liner that had been long in service between New York and Havre.

The press of Holland in discussing the sinking of the Dutch liner *Tubantia* on or about March 15 referred to the possibilities of war with Germany. The Netherlands Minister of Marine did not declare definitely that the *Tubantia* had been torpedoed, but from all evidence in its possession it regarded that explanation as extremely probable. Correspondents said that it was impossible to exaggerate the anger and anxiety that prevailed in Holland over this news of a second disaster to Dutch shipping in the North Sea. In street-crowds and café-throngs in Amsterdam one heard on all sides expressions of exasperation and declarations that the time to act had arrived. Holland suddenly changed from a nation indirectly affected by the war to one prepared and determined, if necessary, to take a very different rôle. On March 18 the Dutch steamship *Palembang* was torpedoed near Galloper Lights, in the Thames estuary, all the crew being saved. The *Palembang* was bound from Rotterdam for Java. She was thus the second Dutch steamship sunk within three days. She was steaming along fairly rapidly when a slight explosion quickly followed by two of greater intensity, occurred. She listed immediately and sank head on.

About the middle of May three German steamers, the *Kolga, Bianca,* and *Hera,* were sunk by submarines in the Baltic. Russian submarines and a large number of British undersea craft had been operating in the eastern and southern portions of the Baltic, then ice-free. A British submarine had sunk the *Hera.* The *Kolga* and *Bianca* were torpedoed off the Swedish island of Landsort, the *Kolga* being shelled for twenty minutes. Two members of the crew were slightly injured. The *Kolga* was then torpedoed. Thirteen of the crew were picked up by a Swedish steamer. Half an hour later the *Bianca* was shelled and then torpedoed, the captain being taken prisoner. The sinking of the *Hera* marked the first activity of British submarines in the Baltic that season. The *Hera* had left Stockholm to take on a cargo of 2,000 tons of iron ore at Oxlësund. This submarine's activity stopt the movement of numerous German

vessels with cargoes of ore then at Oxlësund and other ports.

A record of a submarine staying out on a trip lasting forty-six days without touching land was made by a British commander about this time. During its long journey the vessel participated in many thrilling episodes, including the sinking of more than one German warcraft. It had many narrow escapes. At one time it had to pick its way gingerly through mine-fields, in imminent peril at any moment of striking a mine. It towed many floating mines toward various ports, turning them over to other British craft. One striking feature of the forty-six-day trip was that, during the first forty-eight hours out it had to keep under water forty hours without once coming to the surface. It was amply equipped with fuel for the forty-six-day trip. In fact, it had enough left at the end to last a few days more, while plenty of food was on hand.

By June 21 there was reported from Berlin a growing indifference to American opinion as to submarine warfare. Advocates of a strong policy had reopened a campaign for a more effective use of *U*-boats. The German people were said to have realized that hostilities would not end that summer and might drag on into the next year. Faced with this fact they desired to see the war pushed with vigor. The slackening of the press censorship had been followed by rather bold statements regarding the effectiveness of the submarine as a war-weapon and by renewed activity on the part of the Navy League.

One of the unusual events of the war was the arrival at Baltimore, on July 10, of a new German merchant-submarine called the *Deutschland*. For some weeks rumors concerning the prospective voyage to America of such a submarine, carrying a cargo and capable of providing for passengers, had found their way into print, and like many other rumors, taxed credulity, but had a basis in real fact. What was novel about the *Deutschland's* trip was not that she crossed the Atlantic, but that she was the first cargo-carrying merchant-submarine vessel to do so. A year before ten British submarines, the parts of which were made in the United States, voyaged without mishap from Montreal to Ports-

mouth, England, 3,600 miles. Of course, there were no German warships on the way which could attack them, and they had as convoys one or more British cruisers. In sending submarines from their home-ports to the Dardanelles, both Germany and Great Britain long before had made marvelous long-distance records.

The facts as to the *Deutschland,* according to Captain Koenig's published statements and the report of the United States inspectors, were briefly these: She was 275 feet long, of 791 gross tonnage, carried 29 officers and sailors and

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THE GERMAN SUBMARINE "DEUTSCHLAND"

was entirely unarmed—altho the question whether she had structural facilities for mounting guns and putting in torpedo-tubes seemed unsettled. The time of her voyage was sixteen days. Her cargo was chiefly, or solely, dyestuffs, and other chemicals—750 tons was said to be the amount. These chemicals were extremely valuable—one estimate placed their value at $750,000. She could carry back rubber and other things greatly desired in Germany—that is, provided she escaped the cordon of British cruisers which was awaiting her outside the Virginia Capes. The *Deutschland* bore no letter from the Kaiser to the President, as had been reported. Her mail was of a semi-private kind, most, or all, of it for the German Embassy. Captain Koenig's story of

the voyage was optimistic. He submerged for only ninety miles out of the 3,800 he traveled. There was no breakdown or delay. He had waited at Heligoland a week after his announced sailing date in order to throw his enemies off the track. He was sure no enemy cruiser saw him, and few, if any, merchant-steamers. His longest submergence was in the British Channel, where it lasted for four hours. This submergence was described by Captain Koenig:

"And we lay on the floor of the British Channel, because the roof was crowded with noisy destroyers; we drank good French champagne while we sang 'We've Rings on Our Fingers and Bells on Our Toes.' Presently the destroyers gave us room on the roof, and we came up and went on to America. It was all just as simple as that."

It was not until August 1 that the *Deutschland* sailed from Baltimore under her own power down Chesapeake Bay, intending to cross the Atlantic and return to Germany. She had been in the United States territorial waters a little longer than twenty-three days, and was taking back a cargo of rubber and nickel and, it was said, a quantity of gold. Shortly before midnight she was well on her way toward the open sea, moving at a speed of about twelve knots an hour and attended only by her convoying tug and a lone yacht with newspaper correspondents and photographers aboard. News of her departure was flashed to the fleet of Allied warships lying outside the three-mile limit but which had drawn as closely as possible inshore to await her coming. As peacefully as a ferryboat crossing the Hudson River she passed out of the Virginia Capes at 8.35 o'clock the next night homeward bound for Bremen. There was not a ship of the Allied patrol in sight as she submerged under cover of darkness and tunneled her way through the danger zone. It was not until August 23 that she arrived at the mouth of the Weser on her way to Bremen, when she had been just three weeks on the way—a slow trip since it had taken her only sixteen days to get to Baltimore from Bremen, counting the many hours spent submerged.

Germany was exultant over the safe return in home-

waters of this submarine. She had traveled only 100 miles under water. In many cities in Germany the event was made known by the distribution of extra editions of the newspapers and by the reading of telegrams at the principal cafés, restaurants, hotels, and theaters. Everywhere was rejoicing as if Hindenburg had won another victory. Bands played patriotic tunes, houses were decorated with flags and people congratulated each other as if they themselves had safely returned from a voyage so beset with the dangers of war and weather.

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CAPT. PAUL KOENIG, WHO COMMANDED THE "DEUTSCHLAND"

A storm of protest in some neutral and in Allied lands arose over the execution on July 27 of the British sea-captain, Charles Fryatt, for what the German authorities described as "a *franc-tireur* crime against armed German sea-forces." According to the official account, Fryatt, who was captain of the *Brussels*, a passenger-ship plying between England and Holland, attempted, on March 20, to ram the German submarine *U*-33. Evidence adduced at his trial in Bruges showed that the *U*-33 when off the Maas lightship had signalled to the *Brussels* to show her flag and stop, whereupon Fryatt turned his ship at high speed toward the submarine, which escaped by diving. For this act Fryatt, whose boat was captured by the Germans June 23, 1916, paid the penalty of his life. In Berlin his execution was declared to have been right and legal. The German court-martial condemned him to death because he had "committed an act of war against Germany without being enlisted in his country's forces." He was not shot in cold blood and with premeditation, "as the British Government asserted, but was condemned as a *franc-tireur* after a formal court-martial."

Everybody in Harwich knew Fryatt. He had lived all his life in the suburb of Parkeston. He was also known to the Dutch of Rotterdam. Between Harwich and Rotterdam for years he had made fortnightly trips as captain of the Great Eastern Railway Company's steamship *Brussels*. At Parkeston he had a wife and seven children. On her last trip of March 21, the *Brussels*, when off the Maas lightship, encountered the German submarine. The crew and passengers first knew of the presence of the submarine when they felt the quiver of their keel grating upon the *U*-boat's upper works. The *Brussels* stopt almost instantly, whereupon the submarine came alongside, so close "that you could have leaned over the bulwarks and hung your cap on the periscope." Passengers and crew were horror-stricken. Death seemed certain when the propellers of the *Brussels* began to churn as the ship turned, and the submarine began to slide along her side aft. Had the swirling propeller blades touched the German craft they would have broken her plates like paper, but by an extraordinary maneuver the submarine swung clear, then dived and was seen no more. No shot came and no torpedo was discharged.

All this Fryatt, on his return, told in the simple language of a Harwich sailor to Harwich people who assembled in the Council Chamber, where the Mayor presented him with a gold watch inscribed with his name and a reference to his deed. That watch and the inscription led to his death when three months afterward the *Brussels* was captured by two submarines and taken to Zeebrugge as a prize of war. At Zeebrugge the prisoner was searched and the watch found. Fryatt thus identified was sent to Bruges, with his officers and crew, and later taken to the Ruhleben Prison Camp. On the night of July 26 Fryatt was hastily taken back to Bruges and the next morning, at the Town Hall, was arraigned before a naval court-martial on a charge of being a "freebooter" of the sea, and sentenced to death by shooting. The same afternoon, against a wall behind the Town Hall, the sentence was carried out. Commenting on this event, the "War Cyclopedia" issued by the United States Committee on Public Information in 1918, remarked: "Captain Fryatt was entirely within his rights, and his execution

as a *franc-tireur* was an outrage upon law and humanity." Soon after the armistice had been signed, men responsible for Fryatt's execution were put on trial in Germany, the result being that, underneath a camouflage of impartiality in the trial, the men were whitewashed. This fact was enough to deter the Peace Conference from trusting Germany for any punishment of men responsible for causing the war and conducting it with barbarity.

Not until September 11 was announcement made of a swift catastrophe which had befallen the Italian superdreadnought *Leonardo da Vinci*, on August 4. Toward midnight on that date the darkened city of Taranto was suddenly made brilliantly light by tongues of flame coming from seaward. The whole population rushed into the streets in a state of panic and almost immediately there followed a series of terrific explosions that shook houses to their foundations and smashed in windows. From the shore awe-stricken spectators beheld a huge fire raging from one of the magazines in the center of the *Leonardo*. Tons of metal and débris were hurled high into the air by the force of the explosions. A large quantity of shells which had been laid ready for the next day's gun practise were the first to explode; they tore a hole some 40 feet square in the right side of the vessel. With a view to averting further disaster the Marquis Galeazzo Sommi Picenardi, her commander, gave orders to open the bulkheads and scuttle the ship. In accomplishing this and other acts, 21 officers and 227 members of the crew forfeited their lives. The remainder of 13 officers and 929 men got safely to land, many wounded men being brought off by torpedo-boats, while the others were picked up while they were swimming ashore. With hundreds of search-lights converging upon her from other warships anchored in the neighborhood, the *Leonardo* slowly rose by the stern, snapped her anchors one by one and sank to the bottom. As the depth of the water where the warship sank was only about 42 feet, hopes were entertained that the battleship might be saved by constructing a dry dock around her. In any case it would be possible to save her thirteen 12-inch guns, besides 38 guns of smaller caliber and much of her material. An inquiry held by the Italian Admiralty

altogether excluded the theory of internal combustion as the cause of the disaster, and also that of an external attack by the enemy. In the summer of 1919 this great ship was being raised. It was then currently stated in Italy that the sinking had been due to treachery on the part of a priest, whose position was so important in Italy that nothing could be done to punish him.

In August a statement was given out by the German Admiralty comparing the losses of the German navy with those of navies opposed to it. According to this estimate, the British and French had lost seventy-two battleships and cruisers and the Germans twenty-five. Reckoning in tonnage, the losses of the Allies were said to be almost eight times as great as the German losses. The figures as quoted were found by some critics to be incomprehensible, because the total German tonnage was given as 62,687, which was considerably less than the combined tonnage of, say, the *Lützow*, *Blücher*, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, to name only four of the twenty-five vessels admitted lost by the Germans themselves. There was not the slightest doubt that the British losses alone were vastly in excess of the German losses; that was the price the British had to pay for command of the sea. For two years the traffic of the Germans at sea had been virtually suspended. Only on rare occasions had a fleet, or a squadron of war vessels dared to venture beyond a protection of mine-fields near the German coast. The French and British fleet, on the other hand, had been free to go where they pleased; commerce, altho hampered by submarine attacks, was uninterrupted, and millions of troops had been transported to several parts of the world. For this freedom it was inevitable that a price should be paid, but the price was small, considering the helplessness at sea that had been imposed on Germany.

Hardly had speculation over the uncertain fate of a new merchant submarine named the *Bremen* that had been reported as on its way to America after the *Deutschland's* success, given place to items of later interest, than Germany sent to America another submarine as if to remind the world that the road between Germany and the United States was still open at least beneath the Atlantic. On October 7, at

2 o'clock in the afternoon, this submarine, the *U*-53, appeared in Narragansett Bay and made a three hours' call at Newport. Unlike the *Deutschland* and the *Bremen,* she was no peaceful trader, but a ship of war. Her presence in American waters gave added emphasis to the preparedness argument that the Atlantic was no longer a defense against European aggression on this continent. By international law the *U*-53 was privileged to remain for twenty-four hours in one of our neutral ports, but it stopt only long enough to deliver official mail for the German ambassador, Lieutenant-Captain Hans Rose being the only member of the crew who went ashore. This submarine was of the largest and newest type, more than two hundred feet in length and armed with torpedo-tubes and two guns of large caliber. Altho it had just completed a continuous voyage of seventeen days, it required no repairs, and no supplies for the return voyage were necessary.

After leaving Newport the commander placed his vessel in the main avenue of transatlantic traffic a few miles from the Nantucket lightship and waited for victims. The first ship stopt was the American *Kansan,* which encountered the submarine at half-past five but was not attacked. The British freighters, *Strathdene* and *West Point,* however, were sunk soon afterward, or as soon as their crews had entered life-boats. In the afternoon the submarine halted and sank the Newfoundland passenger ship *Stephano,* the British freighter *Kingston,* the Dutch steamer *Bloomersdijk,* and the Norwegian tank steamer *Christian Knudsen.* Each of the doomed ships received sufficient warning to ensure the safety in small boats of those on board.

The lives of all were saved because of the instant response of our destroyer squadron at Newport to wireless-calls. It would be impossible to say what the submarine would have done if help had not been at hand. There were not lacking instances elsewhere in which German submarines had left neutrals and non-combatants at sea in open boats. In this instance many Americans saw that our Navy had been forced to act as a tender to a commerce-destroying warfare which President Wilson had described as being "utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity." All were

saved, but the driving of helpless women and children into open boats, lowered in haste on the high seas, was far from being a process free from "jeopardy."

After her day's work in destruction, the *U*-53 disappeared. Conjecture and imagination played rather wildly about the questions whether this was a single spectacular raid or the beginning of an extensive commerce-destroying war just outside our three-mile limit; whether we were facing a practical blockade of our ports from beyond the three-mile limit, such as we had already warned Great Britain might amount to an unfriendly act; whether the *U*-53 had a supply-ship, possibly one of the monster German merchant submarines; whether she had a supply station on some remote, unoccupied island, or beach; even whether she was built in Germany or put together somewhere on this side of the water. Meanwhile, our Government received a memorandum from the Allies urging it "to take efficacious measures tending to prevent belligerent submarines, regardless of their use, to avail themselves of neutral waters, roadsteads, and harbors."

On October 19, the Order Pour le Mérite was awarded to Lieutenant-Commander Arnauld de la Perrière, commander of the submarine *U*-53, for his achievements in sinking 126 vessels totaling 270,000 tons. Among the ships destroyed by *U*-53 were a French and an English small cruiser. While assigned to the Mediterranean, Perrière had sunk a number of loaded transports, munitions-supply ships and eleven armed merchantmen. He was credited with having fought seventeen battles. In one voyage he destroyed 31,000 tons of shipping and brought home four cannon as prizes.

From the statements of American survivors it appeared that the British steamship *Marina,* outward bound from Glasgow to Baltimore, and carrying a general cargo, had been attacked without warning. American members of the crew said they saw two submarines, plainly visible from the bridge; one attacked from the starboard side, "while the other lay off some distance to port doing observation duty." It remained to be determined whether the *Marina* "attempted to escape, or whether she showed resistance." Upon the first point there was testimony as to the absence of warning,

showing that the attack was sudden and unexpected. As to the second, it was admitted that there was a small gun aboard but denied that any attempt was made to use it. This denial was supported by the statement that the attack had been made without warning. Our Government instructed its diplomatic representatives in Berlin and London to ascertain and report the facts with all possible haste. Members of the crew were known to have been from seventeen to thirty hours in open boats in a rough sea before they were landed. We had the pledge of the German Government, given as the result of the *Sussex* correspondence, that submarine warfare would be so conducted as not to involve the sinking of merchant ships without warning, or without providing for the safety of passengers and crew unless they tried to escape or offered resistance.

The submarine followed the ship's boats for half an hour after the *Marina* went down but offered no assistance. Altho a violation of Germany's pledge had officially been announced by the President as justification for an immediate break with Germany, American papers paid little attention to the *Marina*. For one thing, it was sunk on the eve of a Presidential election, when the public were otherwise occupied. Many conflicting elements appeared in connection with the incident and it threatened to fall into a technical discussion rather than a clean-cut issue. The *Marina* on her eastward trips had been carrying horses to be used by the British Government, and was described in the dispatches announcing her loss as a "horse transport." In Washington a tangled controversy was expected to grow out of the question whether Germany's pledges were broad enough to cover merchantmen carrying a defensive armament.

Less than a fortnight later a German submarine sank the American steamship *Columbian* off the coast of northwest Spain. The submarine compelled the *Columbian* to stop and lie to under surveillance from November 6 to November 8, when the storm subsided and the submarine ordered the crew to abandon the ship and then sank her. Late in November the new White Star Line steamship *Britannic*, serving as a hospital-ship for wounded soldiers of the Entente Allies, was sunk off the Island of Kea, southeast of Attica in the

Ægean. The loss of life was small. The *Britannic* was the largest ship then afloat, and was nearing completion for passenger service at the outbreak of the war, when she was requisitioned by the Government and converted into a hospital-ship. In company with the *Mauretania* and the *Olympic*, she had been engaged in bringing thousands of wounded from the Gallipoli peninsula after the evacuation of the peninsula by the Allies. She was the *Titanic's* successor in the White Star fleet. The *Britannic* was sunk by a mine. There were no wounded on board when she went down.

The loss inflicted on British shipping had been about 4 per cent. in numbers and 6 per cent. in tonnage, but these losses new construction had somewhat more than made good. The British marine in May, 1916, comprised eighty-eight vessels and 343,616 tons above the figures for 1914. Conditions were the same for other Allies. The Allies had lost 538 vessels, besides hundreds of trawlers, and neutrals 198, but while submarines were active, commerce was more than making the losses good. The submarines had destroyed some warships, but in their case also the additions made to fleets were greater than losses. Germany had not been able with all her resources to open the sea for herself, or to close it to her enemies. What was true of submarines was true also of Zeppelins and to a degree was true of some of the uses made of aeroplanes.

Neutrals had by no means been immune from attack. Those whose ports were near the field of naval warfare had had serious losses. Norway had 110 vessels of 150,624 tons sunk or otherwise destroyed or rendered useless, out of a total at the beginning of the war of 2,174 vessels of 2,529,188 aggregate tonnage. Sweden suffered less, losing 48 of 43,992 tons out of 1,462 of 1,122,883 tons. Denmark and Holland each suffered a loss of 29 vessels, but the losses of Holland in tonnage were more than twice as large as those of Denmark, her total tonnage being 84.934 and Denmark's 40,653. The United States suffered comparatively little, losing only 6 vessels of 10,377 tons total capacity out of 2,580 of 3,522,913 of the seagoing class. One had to remember, however, that in all these countries there had been

in the meantime a great deal of activity in shipyards in replacing destroyed vessels.

The publication in May by *Lloyd's Register* of Great Britain's mercantile gains and losses during the year 1915 provided an instructive commentary on the futility of Germany's aims at a destruction of Great Britain's maritime power. In the twelve months which closed on December 31, 1915, the register showed that, in spite of the precedence it had been necessary to give to warship construction over the building of mercantile vessels, the additions in the United Kingdom consisted of 655 steamers, having a gross tonnage of 1,461,816, and 152 sailing-vessels, of a gross tonnage of 61,924, an aggregate of 1,523,750 tons. Not all of these, however, were turned out by British shipyards, the proportion of new tonnage in the total being 51 per cent., practically the whole of which was built by the United Kingdom, the precise number of new steamers being 377, of 769,530 tons, and the number of sailing ships 61, of 8,791 tons. The acquisitions from foreign countries consisted of 77 steamers, of a tonnage of 101,351, and 15 sailing ships, of a tonnage of 7,139. Against these figures the country had to submit to the loss or transference of 741 steam vessels possessing a gross tonnage of 1,452,679 and of 334 sailing-ships of an aggregate of 82,222 tons, in all 1,534,901 tons, so that in the twelve months there was a net reduction of tonnage to the extent of only 11,151 tons represented by 268 vessels.

In the ensuing year, however, the situation changed somewhat for the worse. The British Government found that the demands upon the country's shipping resources called for an acceleration of the rate of construction. During 1915, it was possible to replace all losses, however caused, but in May, 1916, it was found that 43 per cent. of British shipping had been requisitioned by the Government for naval and military purposes and the requirements of the Allies, and another 14 per cent. had been allocated for the carriage of foodstuffs and raw materials for the British Government and the Allies, leaving only 43 per cent. to the British owner, and this amount under strict regulations as to its employment. Of a total of between 3,000 and 4,000 ocean-going vessels, over 500 had been dedicated to the exclusive

service of France, Italy, and Russia, and there had been thus far in 1916 a greater percentage of wastage compared with new construction. This was owing, in part, to the increasing ferocity with which the Germans carried on undersea depredations, but primarily to a shortage of labor and the prior claims of naval authorities. Freight charges already had risen to prodigious heights; a reflection of this was seen in the great cost of all the necessaries of life. In May, 1916, 500 new vessels were on the stocks in the United Kingdom, representing about 1,500,000 tons in carrying capacity. In addition to vessels being built in the United Kingdom, about 500,000 tons were being built in neutral European countries, and a still greater tonnage in the United States for Great Britain and Norway alone, which meant that, if Germany carried out her promise to the American Government in regard to the future conduct of her submarines, a very substantial addition to the sea-carrying capacity at the disposal of the Allied Powers would take place within a few months.

Under closest guard the undersea freighter *Deutschland,* laden deep with a cargo which her captain said was worth $10,000,000, including securities and precious stone, arrived, on November 1, in the Thames River, Connecticut, at the end of her second Atlantic voyage. Despite the fate of the *Bremen,* which had sailed but never reached her port, the fact that the *Deutschland* had made a voyage twice across the Atlantic proved the feasibility of underwater freight trade. With the early completion of the *Amerika,* sister ship to the *Deutschland* and *Bremen,* it was promised that there would be established a regular service from Bremen to New London, with sailings every forty days. The *Deutschland* was to return to Germany in a fortnight, and come back as soon as practicable. Her voyage over took twenty-one days. The joy of the Germans who went to New London to welcome the *Deutschland* was dampened by the announcement brought by her captain, Paul Koenig, that the *Bremen* had been lost at sea, but had not been sunk by an enemy.

During one week in April 30 vessels, with a gross tonnage of 85,045, were reported sunk by German submarines and

mines; 2,201,823 tons of shipping had previously been reported[8] as having been sunk. Between May 7, 1915, and May 7, 1916, 37 unarmed British merchantmen and 22 neutral vessels had been torpedoed without warning. Unusual activity on the part of the German submarines during October brought the total number of ships of all classes and types destroyed by mines, torpedoes, or other war causes, during twenty-seven months of hostilities, to 1,820, with an aggregate gross tonnage of approximately 3,328,584 tons. The loss during October was larger than in any one of the five preceding months, amounting as it did to 127 vessels with an aggregate gross tonnage of 227,116 tons, or more than twice the tonnage destroyed in July. Ten flags were represented in the October losses—a Roumanian ship appearing on the list of casualties for the first time. The following table showed the number of vessels and the tonnage destroyed during each of the six months of 1916, with late corrections of the September figures:

	Number	*Gross tons*
October	123	227,116
September	101	154,688
August	100	130,262
July	145	102,522
June	64	126,369
May	63	118,994
Total	600	859,951

Following close upon the great naval fight off Jutland, on May 3, 1916, came news of the sea-tragedy which cost Britain the life of her foremost soldier, Lord Kitchener. He had embarked for Russia in the armored cruiser *Hampshire* three days before the Jutland battle. About 8 P.M. that evening the ship sank in wild weather off the western coast of the Orkneys, from striking a mine that had been laid by a German submarine. Four boats left the vessel, but all were overturned. One or two survivors were washed ashore on a bleak and rugged coast. Of Kitchener and his colleagues no word was ever heard again.[9]

[8] In *Fair Play.*

[9] Principal Sources: *Fair Play, The Literary Digest, The Outlook,* New York; The *Daily Chronicle* (London); The *World, The Independent,* The *Evening Post,* The *Journal of Commerce,* The *Times' Annalist,* New York.

VI

THE "ANCONA" AND "SUSSEX" CASES AND GERMANY'S CONDITIONAL PROMISE TO THE UNITED STATES

November 8, 1915—October 28, 1916

IN any other times than these the horror of sending innocent women and children to the bottom of the sea would have appalled the world. But now, people had begun to look on such events measurably with calm. After the destruction of the *Ancona* in the Mediterranean on November 8, 1915, with a loss of 200 lives, people inquired only as to technical compliance with the precepts of international law, over which President Wilson had supposedly brought Germany to terms. It was not known whether there were Americans among scores of passengers drowned, or killed, or wounded by gun-fire from the attacking submarine in the *Ancona* case. The submarine flew a flag but whether Austrian or German was not known. The New York *Times* found it "hard to look upon the act in any other light than as one of wanton savagery, a continuation in the Mediterranean field of the policy of frightfulness and of butchery of innocent persons so long pursued by Germany in waters about the British Islands." Stupid as well as brutal, the New York *Evening Sun* called the attack, for it brought no military advantage, its only effect being to enhance Italian hatred of Austria and desire to defeat and punish her. By this futile deed the Austrian authorities once more drew down on their country and its allies "the anger and detestation of the whole civilized world."

News of the sinking caused a sensation in Washington where it was regarded as foreshadowing a new controversy between the United States and Austria similar to the critical dispute with Germany that followed the torpedoing

of the *Lusitania.* Before making any comment, however, officials awaited information on two points—whether the vessel was torpedoed without warning, and whether any Americans were among the victims. A difficult problem confronted the United States Government in the *Ancona* case, because of lack of definite information, and more particularly because the respective official statements from the Austrian and Italian Governments contradicted each other. Partial lists given out by the Italian steamship-line contained the names of nine Americans among some 200 missing. The State Department had only scattered reports, which, according to the New York *Sun's* Washington correspondent, did not "establish definitely how many Americans were on board or how many of them were lost, and contained no

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THE ITALIAN SHIP "ANCONA"

The *Ancona* was sunk by a Teutonic submarine, and was one of several ships, the loss of which occasioned correspondence between this country and Germany

information whatever on the vital question as to whether the *Ancona* was warned or whether flight was attempted."

Neither the Austrian account, which affirmed the warning, nor the Italian one, which denied it, could be taken as valid evidence by our Department of State. The Government conducted an inquiry of its own through its diplomatic and consular agents. The general press reports indicated a combination of stubborn recklessness on the part of the *Ancona's* captain, poor training and poor judgment among the vessel's crew, possibly with carelessness aboard the submarine, which

was said to have tried to frighten the *Ancona's* officials into haste in abandoning the ship. The Austrian official statement was found quite unconvincing by the New York *Evening Sun,* which asserted that it "conflicts with every particle of evidence already before the public." Other prominent papers declared that, even accepting the Austrian story at its face value, the attack on the *Ancona* was a wanton act of brutality. The official Italian version, contained in a communication addrest to all the neutral Powers, called the sinking of the steamer an "unparalleled atrocity." Tho the Austrian note did not definitely state that the submarine which sank the *Ancona* was Austrian, such an assertion was implied in the Austrian Government's assumption of responsibility. Austria had in her time written sharp-edged diplomatic notes—"Witness the formidable demand she made on Serbia in 1914" said the New York *Evening Post*—but it was "doubtful if she ever received one more curt or cutting than the American note of December 6 on the *Ancona* affair. In unofficial circles in Vienna it was referred to as "a note couched in terms of open insult." It substituted a "demand" for a "request," and the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* called it "in effect an ultimatum."

Most American newspaper-writers welcomed its peremptory tone as justified by the circumstances. Mr. Lansing's brief recital of the facts of the sinking, as obtained from survivors, was considered the official account of the event from the viewpoint of the United States. He said that "a submarine flying the Austro-Hungarian flag fired a solid shot" toward the *Ancona;* that thereupon the liner "attempted to escape, but, being overhauled by the submarine, she stopt; that, after a brief period and before the crew and passengers had been able to take to the boats, the submarine fired a number of shells at the vessel and finally torpedoed and sank her while there were yet many persons on board; and that by gun-fire and foundering of the vessel a large number of persons lost their lives or were seriously injured, among whom were citizens of the United States." A public statement issued by the Austrian Admiralty was held to confirm the essential points in this narrative. The submarine commander's act was characterized as "wanton

slaughter," but the United States preferred to believe he acted without authority. The American note proceeded:

"As the good relations of the two countries must rest upon a common regard for law and humanity, the Government of the United States can not be expected to do otherwise than to demand that the Imperial and Royal Government denounce the sinking of the *Ancona* as an illegal and indefensible act; that the officer who perpetrated the deed be punished, and that reparation by the payment of an indemnity be made for the citizens of the United States who were killed or injured by the attack on the vessel. The government of the United States expects that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the gravity of the case, will accede to its demand promptly, and it rests this expectation on the belief that the Austro-Hungarian Government will not sanction or defend an act which is condemned by the world as inhumane and barbarous, which is abhorrent to all civilized nations, and which has caused the death of innocent American citizens."

The Austrian reply, while justifying the commander of the submarine to a considerable extent, concluded with saying that the commander had failed to take into account the panic on the *Ancona* and the humane spirit of Austrian naval regulations. The United States Government was informed that he had been punished for thus exceeding his instructions. After pointing out why the Austrian Government did not consider itself necessarily liable to pay damages for the death of all the Americans lost from the *Ancona,* the note stated that the Government, because of regret for the loss of these lives and its great friendship for the United States, was willing to waive this point and extend indemnities even to those whose cause could not be definitely established. New Year's Day, 1916, was brightened for Americans by this note from Austria settling the *Ancona* case in accordance with President Wilson's demands.

Next day, however, news came of the sinking of the *Persia.* Not only were Americans on board the *Persia,* when she was torpedoed without warning, but among the missing was Robert Ney McNeely, the United States Consul at Aden. The *Persia* tragedy brought President Wilson back from his Virginian honeymoon, he having just married Mrs. Galt. The gravity of the *Persia* case was at once

emphasized by all Washington correspondents. The *Persia* was destroyed by an explosion off the Island of Crete in the eastern Mediterranean, and about 300 persons lost their lives. No submarine was sighted, but one officer saw what he thought to be the wake of a torpedo. With the sinking of the *Persia* there was a loss of $4,000,000 worth of jewels belonging to the Maharaja of Kapurthala, Grand Commander of the Star of India. The jewels had been in charge of members of his suite, the ruler of Kapurthala having intended himself to board the *Persia* at Port Said. The wealth of the Maharaja of Kapurthala was very great, his jewels alone had been estimated at $40,000,000; his rent roll at $900,000 a year; his entire annual income at $3,000,-



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THE PASSENGER-SHIP "PERSIA," SUNK IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

000. The Maharaja had made two visits to the United States, the first in 1893, the last in May, 1915. He had been educated in Occidental schools, was a remarkable linguist, and surprized Americans by his democratic manners. He had raised a dancing-girl by marriage to the rank of Maharanee.

On November 12 the sinking of the Italian steamer *Firenze,* of 3,973 tons, by an Austrian submarine, was made known. There were no Americans aboard the vessel. The *Firenze* was the best steamer belonging to the Compagnia Maritima and cost $1,000,000. She had left Syracuse, Sicily, for Alexandria, and when forty miles off the Egyptian

coast was bombarded by a submarine and obliged to halt when a shot struck her rudder. Five boats were lowered. Meanwhile the submarine continued to bombard the *Firenze* until she sank. The passengers comprised 19 Italians, 11 Egyptians, 2 Swiss, and 1 French.

The *Firenze* was steaming along in beautiful weather and with a calm sea when the submarine slowly rose and fired a gun. All the passengers and the crew, which was made up largely of East Indians, crowded to the deck. The submarine, showing the Austrian flag, came close to the steamer and destroyed the ship's steering gear by a shot. The commander of the submarine ordered that every one take to the boats, as the vessel was about to be sunk. Six boats were launched and in these every person found a place. Coming upon the heels of the *Ancona* disaster, the sinking of the *Firenze* created a profound impression in Italy. While the boats were being lowered one capsized, but all those in it were picked up by another boat and safely landed. The Oriental crew were so terror-stricken that they made a rush for the boats, but the officers were able to calm them. The survivors were out in the open sea all night and suffered intensely from cold, hunger, and thirst.

In Berlin, on February 11, was officially published a list of nineteen detailed cases, with the time, place and circumstance, of alleged violations of international law by British armed merchant-ships firing upon German submarines, and giving facsimiles of secret orders of the British Admiralty to attack submarines. These statements were preliminary to an important memorial, delivered at the same time to the diplomatists of neutral Powers. This memorial was accepted as a preliminary step in an intentional reopening of German submarine warfare against England in a sharper and more acute form than any that had before been known. All armed belligerent merchantmen were now to be considered auxiliary cruisers. The memorial warned neutral powers to keep citizens and property off such ships. Germany would assume no responsibility for the loss of life and property on such craft which would be sunk without warning.

Amid the tense feeling which still continued over delay

in ending our negotiations with Germany came news that Grand Admiral von Tirpitz had resigned. It was inferred from this that Germany had found that the policy of frightfulness d'd not pay. Tirpitz, the creator of the German navy, had apparently suffered the fate of a "dropt pilot." So, at least, various editorial observers interpreted his retirement, altho others augured from it no real change in the submarine policy of the Teutonic allies. Tirpitz was a veritable pillar of the empire. "Tirpitz the Eternal" had held office longer than any other imperial minister except Bismarck. The tragedy of his career was defined as having to his record, not the splendid fleet his genius had fashioned, but "the memory of the helpless victims he had sent to death." Some journals called his resignation a victory for the diplomatic methods of the Washington Administration. Not a few saw in it a triumph for "the German party that favored a conciliatory attitude toward the United States." Impenetrable mystery surrounded the departure of the Grand Admiral. Officially he had resigned because of ill-health, but the *Hamburger-Fremdenblatt* frankly stated that the malady from which he was suffering was "political illness."

Few doubted that his departure was the result of a serious Cabinet crisis. The *Kölnische Zeitung* remarked that his resignation "signalized the first serious crisis in Germany since the war began." Many German papers did not seem to know what to make of the situation, and frankly confest it. The *Berliner Abendpost,* without mentioning the Admiral's name, made its opinion clear enough by printing a long leading article on the life of Themistocles, telling of his creation of the Athenian fleet, and his banishment by ungrateful fellow citizens after he had saved his country. Led by the *Kölnische Zeitung,* the chief organs insisted that the departure of Tirpitz would in no way affect the vigorous prosecution of submarine warfare. This unanimity, backed by official assurances, was suggestive when one turned to non-German American papers, where was exprest a belief that Tirpitz's determination to pursue his mode of warfare despite American protests, was accountable for his disappearance from the political stage. He had apparently been sacrificed to American opinion. In that case the destruc-

tion of the *Lusitania* had been morally disavowed and in a dramatic manner.

On March 24 an English Channel steamer, the *Sussex*, was damaged while on her way from Folkestone to Dieppe. Opinion among passengers was divided as to whether she was hit by a mine or a torpedo. The explosion took place just ahead of the captain's bridge and tore the front part of the steamer to pieces, killing or injuring eighty persons on board. Many were wounded severely by flying splinters. Some 250 survivors were landed in France and between ninety and 100 in Dover. She had on board 386 passengers and about fifty men were in the crew. Twenty-five Americans were on board and some were injured, but none was lost. This event added new complications to our submarine case against Germany. Feeling in this country over Germany's violation of her promise became once more intense.

Whatever might prove to be the fact in the particular case of the *Sussex*, or any other sunken steamer, it had now been clearly demonstrated that several merchant vessels had been recently sunk by German submarines without warning and when unarmed. There had been no sign of any attempt to ascertain whether they were armed or not. Four such had been sunk in that way within two weeks, while sailing between the United States and Great Britain. Three of these were the *Englishman*, from Avonmouth to Portland, Maine; the *Fenay Bridge*, from Philadelphia to an English port, and the *Manchester Engineer*, from Galveston to Edinburgh. These may or may not have had Americans on board as passengers or members of crews; the ships may or may not have been carrying contraband; but they were unarmed, and were struck without warning, without examination, and without chance of escape.

The sinking of the *Sussex* promised to bring to a final head the long dispute between Germany and the United States over the use of submarines. It was more than once rumored from Washington that our government was about to break off diplomatic relations with Germany on the ground that she had violated the pledges she had given after the sinking of the *Lusitania* not to attack liners without warning. But the evidence of German responsibility at first was

not so complete as to make sufficiently clear ground for a severance of relations or going to war. Nobody on board the *Sussex* saw a submarine or a periscope, altho the sinking occurred in the afternoon of a clear day. The captain and several others, however, reported having seen the wake of a torpedo a few seconds before the explosion. When he saw this he had given orders to turn the ship, but this was done too late to dodge the missile.

The *Sussex*, a regular packet steamer, was unarmed and carried no munitions. Two of the Americans on board



THE "SUSSEX" AFTER SHE WAS TORPEDOED

were wounded. Fragments of metal found on board the *Sussex* and supposed to have come from the torpedo, were sent to Washington for examination. They were of phosphor-bronze, a metal not used in any torpedoes except German makes. Against this evidence came a positive denial from the German Government that the *Sussex* was sunk by a German torpedoed. All the German craft which might possibly have been involved in an attack had made their reports and from them it was certain that no German submarine or warship was responsible. This assertion was regarded by many American editors as a virtual admission of guilt

couched in a form so planned as to lead to a further exchange of notes and a further postponement of the issue. Some remarked that the well of German explanation appeared to be running dry at the same time that the stock of American patience was approaching exhaustion. Even the New York *Evening Post*, which had avoided violence of language in discussions of the war, declared that the story on its face was "entitled to little more than contemptuous rejection."

The German note, which was dated April 10, set forth that the ship encountered in the Channel on March 24 was a long, black craft without a flag, having a gray funnel, small gray forward works, and two high masts. The German commander "reached the definite conclusion that it was a war-vessel, and, indeed, a mine-layer of the recently built English *Arabic* class." Consequently he attacked the vessel. The torpedo "caused such a violent explosion in the forward part of the ship that the entire forward part was torn away to the bridge." This particularly violent explosion warranted the conclusion that "great amounts of munitions were aboard." The German commander at the time made a sketch of the vessel which he had attacked. This picture was offered as further evidence that the ship attacked was not the *Sussex*.

Wide dissatisfaction was exprest all over the country at this attitude of the German government. On the anniversary of the battle of Lexington, which opened the Revolution, President Wilson laid before a joint session of Congress our case against Germany's submarines, and announced that he had dispatched a virtual ultimatum to the German Government. Our Government declared that "unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger- and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether." When Germany's reply was published, it conceded the point claimed, but was considered so "shuffling," "arrogant," and "offensive" in tone as to call out in various

quarters scathing criticism. The concession was embodied in the following order, issued to German naval forces:

"In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant-vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war-zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance."

This concession was preceded in the note by a lengthy arraignment of our neutrality and followed by an admonition that, if the United States now failed to make England observe the rules of international law, the German Government would be facing a "new situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of action." It was this part of the reply that inspired most bitter criticism. The note "can be accepted only after a total but specific rejection of all the conditions that the Imperial Government seeks to impose on the United States," declared the New York *World,* a paper in close sympathy with, if not in the councils of, the Wilson Administration.

Our Government in reply declared that "a scrupulous execution" henceforth of the new policy of the Imperial Government "would remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany," but "in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it can not for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way, or in the slightest degree, be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants." Responsibility in such matters was declared to be "single, not joint; absolute, not relative." This note was regarded in many quarters as completing a diplomatic victory for the United States Government. Germany soon afterward acknowledged that it actually was one of her submarines that torpedoed the *Sussex* and that the commander had been "appropriately punished." What the character of that punishment was, there was much de-

sire in America to know. An inquiry on the subject was sent to Ambassador Gerard but whatever the reply it was not made public.

The weakening of the British merchant marine by the demands of war was by this time being seriously appraised by different journals. They agreed that only about 40 per cent. of the tonnage available before the war was now at the command of commerce. According to the London shipping periodical, *Fair Play,* the British Government had requisitioned about 50 per cent. of it; 6 per cent. had been lost through attacks during the war, and the efficiency of the fleet had been decreased by from 5 to 10 per cent. The London *Nation* estimated that at least 3,500 vessels had been put out of commission for merchant purposes. Between 700 and 800 neutral and Allied ships had been lost. The rest had been taken for military purposes. The pressure upon freightage was seriously felt. The cost of living had risen about 50 per cent. Articles by no means luxuries such as paper were difficult to supply. The effect upon prices all over the world had become notorious.

Of 736 merchant ships destroyed by a submarine or a mine since the beginning of the war, 198 were neutral vessels. This meant that for every eleven Allied vessels lost, four neutral ships had been destroyed. Norway had lost more than one and a half times as many as France and one-fifth as many as Great Britain. In tonnage the disparity was probably greater, since the average British craft was larger than the Norwegian. At the beginning of the war Norway's merchant marine was just a little less than one-tenth that of Great Britain. From this it was assumed that the Norwegian merchant marine had suffered as heavily in proportion as the British.

The Spanish port of Cartagena was surprized in June when a German submarine, *U*-53, appeared in that harbor at four o'clock in the morning, and made straight for the interned German steamer *Roma,* where she unloaded thirty-five boxes of medical supplies for German refugees from Kamerun who were being cared for in Spain. Then the submarine, on being ordered to come alongside the Spanish cruiser *Catalona,* did so, and salutes were exchanged with

the cruiser and forts. Germans in Cartagena soon swarmed to the harbor bringing gifts for the crew and flowers to decorate the *U*-boat. Her commander, Lieutenant von Arnauld, said he had come to bring a letter from Kaiser Wilhelm to King Alfonso, which the German Ambassador's secretary came down on a special train from Madrid to receive. The missive was an official one and was said to contain thanks for the treatment German soldiers and civilians from German African colonies had received in Spain. Next morning the *U*-53 left the harbor under escort of a cruiser. At the three-mile limit, beyond which Allied warships awaited her, the submarine gave cheers for Spain and then dived.

Late in October the German campaign against merchant vessels was in unabated operation. Ten more vessels had been sunk by October 24, five of them Norwegian, four British, and one Danish. The crews were saved. By October 26, nine more Norwegian steamers, valued at more than 5,000,000 kroner (about $1,851,850), had been sunk. The relations between Norway and Germany had come to a critical state, and they entered upon a new phase when a declaration by the Norwegian Government was issued that navigation of Norway's territorial waters would be forbidden to all foreign submarines of whatever nationality and whatever character. A similar declaration had been made some months earlier by the Swedish Government and was not resented by Germany. Germany chose, however, to resent violently the declaration made by Norway, presumably because navigation through Norwegian territorial waters was of greater value to German submarines in attacking Russia's Archangel trade, and perhaps of some value to those attempting to cross the Atlantic. Accordingly, a German note, almost an ultimatum, was dispatched to the Norwegian Government. Pending the reply to it, German submarines had been running amuck among Norwegian trading vessels, sinking and capturing them almost as if Germany and Norway were already at war. Norway was perhaps the most pro-British country on the Continent. She was bound to Great Britain by many ties of sentiment, commerce, and common interests.

On October 28 the sinking of six more steamers, and one sailing vessel was announced. Four of the vessels were Norwegian, one was Swedish, and two were British. The number of hostile and neutral ships sunk by the sea forces of the Central Powers, according to Berlin statistics, from the beginning of the war until October 12, was 1,253, of 2,569,500 tons, but of these only 200 neutral ships of 276,528 tons were sunk for carrying contraband of war. The neutral tonnage was 10 per cent. of the hostile tonnage. Norway in October took a firm stand against treating submarine torpedo-boats as vessels of war entitled to prey on commerce, the ground being that they could not comply with the established rules of naval warfare and the recognized principles of humanity. It was said in behalf of the Norwegian Government that this stand had not been taken in response to a memorandum from the Entente Allies, but was taken independently in defense of Norway's rights at sea and in waters contiguous to her shores, because her subjects had suffered terrible losses, not only in vessels and cargoes, but in the lives of passengers and crews.

The ground taken was precisely that so earnestly insisted upon by the United States Government. Christiana declared that $27,000,000 worth of Norwegian shipping had been sunk and that 149 lives had been lost in consequence of the *U*-boat activities. Norway had not sufficient power for self-defense or for effective reprisals.[10]

[10] Principal Sources: *The Literary Digest;* diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Germany; The *Times,* The *Tribune,* New York.

VII

GERMANY'S FIRST YEAR OF "FRIGHTFULNESS" AND THE AMERICAN DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR

February 1, 1917—February 1, 1918

IN December, 1916, the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, with a mandate from the Kaiser, had proclaimed in the Reichstag Germany's willingness to enter into peace negotiations with the Entente Allies. He got little in reply save Allied determination to continue the war until a decision had been reached. Then, at the end of January, as a bolt from the blue, came Germany's announcement of a "war zone" around the British Isles, along northern France, and in the Mediterranean, from which even neutral shipping was barred. Neutral ships, including one of our own, might enter Falmouth once a week, but could enter no other British port, and must follow a lane prescribed by Germany. "Frightfulness" was the word for the intensified submarine warfare, now to be undertaken by Germany in an effort to starve Britain into making peace. How this policy led at once to the severing of diplomatic relations by the United States with Germany, and how two months later it led Congress to declare war on Germany, has already been set forth in considerable detail in Volume IV of this history.

At that time the British had actually hoped to get the German submarines under control in six weeks, and the Germans expected to have Great Britain practically starved out in about the same length of time. Neither expectation was even remotely justified. The chief factor in the problem remained steadily unknown, that is, how many submarines could the British sink or capture. The British Admiralty from the first had pursued a policy of silence on this point, probably thinking it would have a more depressing effect upon the German mind to send out submarine after submarine and never hear from them, than to have their fate

definitely known. It was rumored after some weeks that the British had captured or sunk more than a hundred. German navy yards were supposed to be turning them out at the rate of one a week or faster. Prince von Bülow said that the German and Austrian submarines in February numbered 220, but a French naval officer, Admiral Degouy, estimated them at only 150. New shipbuilding in the United Kingdom in 1915 had amounted to 650,000 tons., in 1916 to 541,000 tons, and in 1917 to 1,163,000 tons. The total tonnage of British shipping was still between twelve and fifteen millions.

The British gave to the press on February 20 an official statement to refute an assertion made in Berlin that the British had concealed the losses of Allied and other shipping during the first two weeks in which the submarine blockade had been in effect. The totals of departures and arrivals did not include fishing vessels, coastwise, and local coastwise traffic, or craft of under 100 tons burden. Omitting these and comparing totals of those sunk with the totals of arrivals and departures, "the widely advertised campaign of ruthless murder on the high seas, on which Germany embarked, has resulted in the loss of less than one ship for every hundred which arrived or left British ports during the two weeks from February 1 to February 14." On February 21 new sea regulations were announced by Great Britain for tightening the blockade of the Central Powers to a point of almost complete isolation. It was the most drastic step the British had ever taken on the sea. Scandinavian countries were affected greatly, since they were unable to trade with Germany without running the risk of the seizure of ships and cargoes. As Germany's submarine blockade prevented them from dealing with England and her Allies, they were shut off from the sea on all sides and had to remain self-supporting until the war ended or the regulations on either side were raised. Britons who had advocated "an air-tight blockade" as an important factor in winning the war now had their strongest wishes realized.

Before a crowded special session of the House of Commons on February 23, Premier Lloyd George outlined some long-expected economic measures for meeting the menace to

Great Britain's food supply. Enormous sacrifices, he said, had to be made by the British people. If the people were not ready to accept "drastic measures," then disaster was before them. His program was placed under two heads, first to increase home food-production and, second, to curtail non-essential imports. Under the first he outlined plans for speeding up the farmer by guaranteeing him good prices for his commodities over a period of years, thus inviting him to plow and sow every inch of available land. Under the

"ALL SHIPS MET WITHIN THAT ZONE WILL BE SUNK"

This German decree, which ended friendly relations with the United States, was also applied to the Mediterranean, with the exception of waters bounding the Spanish coast and a safety zone extending along the African coast and thence to Greece

head of curtailment of imports, he said he expected to reduce the demands on cargo-space by several million tons. Foodstuffs, of which 16,000,000 tons were imported the year before, would be cut down nearly a million tons by lopping off certain luxuries. Paper users, who had been considerably curtailed already, would henceforth have to get along with half the supply they were now receiving. Savings could be effected in the imports of ore, which had amounted to 8,000,000 tons annually, and in lumber, which were then 4,000,000 tons. Ultimate success depended upon the solution of tonnage difficulties. Before the war British tonnage had been just adequate, but since that time there had been an enormous increase in the demand for tonnage. More than 1,000,000 tons had been allocated to France alone, and a very considerable amount to Russia and Italy. In addition a considerable amount had been sunk. For some time there had been a shortage of tonnage required for the general needs of the nation, and a slight shortage in tonnage for military purposes. The nation should realize absolutely what the conditions that confronted them were. "We have to deal," he said, "ruthlessly and promptly with the tonnage problem by measures which impose great sacrifices upon the country."

Lloyd George did not hesitate to speak of the menace in terms that would give satisfaction in Berlin. The situation was grave and counter-measures must be drastic. He emphasized the fact that, thus far, no short and ready way of dealing with the *U*-boats had been found. The Government was only "hopeful" of finding the remedy. In the meanwhile the safest procedure was the obvious procedure: to build more ships, to restrict food consumption, to increase home production. That Great Britain could draw more food from her own fields had been shown by the fact that home-grown wheat had increased by 70 per cent. in three years. The principal obstacle had been fear on the part of the farmers of a sudden collapse of prices with the cessation of war, and consequent loss of capital invested in the necessary changes in production. It had been long recognized that the remedy lay in a guaranty of minimum prices to the farmer for a number of years. On the side of con-

sumption the first economics were to be made in brewing and distillery trades.

Plainly the British Government did not mind lending comfort to the enemy if at the same time it could arouse its own people to the needs of the situation. If anything, Cabinet Ministers and Parliament, before this, had not hesitated to exaggerate for the commendable purpose of whipping up popular imagination. The British practise in this respect had been just the opposite of the German. At Berlin, since the beginning of the war, there had seldom been an official intimation that things were not going precisely as they should. On February 29, from every quarter in Great Britain, staggering totals of a new war loan contribution offered a convincing reply to the question whether the people were supporting the war. Bonar Law's announcement that $5,000,000,000 had been collected from many million subscribers was calculated to dishearten the Germans as much as it heartened Britain and her Allies.

"We stake everything," had said the German Chancellor when declaring unrestricted submarine warfare, as Germany's answer to the Entente attitude toward a negotiated peace. The results of the first month of the campaign were well worth noting as indications of Germany's probable success or failure. One million tons a month had been looked for in Germany as the "wreck-crop" of her submarine harvesters, but this estimate exceeded the actual returns. February was a short month, but this did not justify a 40 per cent. discrepancy. The first month ended with a total of 187 ships, aggregating 497,087 tons lost, as follows: British, 115; American, 2; other neutrals, 48; other belligerents, 20; not identified, 2. The New York *Times* printed this table of losses for five months:

	Entente		Neutral	
1916	*No. of Ships*	*Tons*	*No. of Ships*	*Tons*
October	146	366,500	72	87,000
November	152	230,000	68	82,000
December	125	235,000	37	60,000
1917				
January	170	336,000	58	103,500
February	134	368,274	54	97,496

While this attrition was serious, it was not serious enough to effect paralysis in Great Britain before her expected offensive on land for this year on the Western Front began. Using British Admiralty figures, the New York *Evening Post* calculated that the daily average of *U*-boat "frightfulness" was 17,000 tons in February as against 12,500 in December. Against such a drain England could not cope indefinitely, but if the process of British collapse could be greatly prolonged, "public opinion in Germany would have to be prepared for another disenchantment." Among German officials, however, there was still supreme confidence in the success of the submarine campaign. Vice-Admiral Capelle, now head of the German navy in succession to Tirpitz, told leaders of the Reichstag on February 14 that the results achieved had "surpassed expectations." He declared them "very satisfactory"; there was "no reason to reckon with the loss of even one *U*-boat since the beginning of the unrestricted submarine warfare"; there was "practically no shipping in the North Sea"; neutral shipping was clearly "as good as stopt." Capelle began his administration as he finally ended it—as a "fool's paradise" optimist.

Apart from the destruction of the Cunarder *Laconia,* which was regarded as the first "overt act" in Germany's relations with the United States after relations were severed, the most important event of the week ending February 28 was the destruction, or wrecking, of seven Dutch cargo vessels as they were leaving England. These neutral ships were bound for neutral ports, were unarmed and were either in ballast or carrying cargoes of grain consigned to the Dutch Government. What enraged the people of Holland most of all was the fact that the Dutch captains believed they had a safeguard from Germany to sail. German authorities said the Dutch ships had only a "partial" safety assurance for sailing at the time when they did—they would have had "full" safety assurance if they had sailed at a much later date, the idea being that, when they sailed at the earlier date, they encountered a submarine whose captain had not received special orders. As a result of the sinking of these ships, Holland was in such a condition as to contemplate laying up her merchant ships altogether in

order to escape the danger of having them sunk. Dutch shipping had been of great service in getting supplies to England and her allies, but Holland had an undoubted right as a neutral to keep up her trade subject to established rules and to be defended against submarine attacks. The position of Holland became one of great difficulty. A cartoon represented a towering German, armed with a bludgeon, saying to a Dutch dwarf: "Vot you means by being so leetle!"

A comparison between this submarine campaign and the campaign of two years before made it plain that the perils to merchant shipping had become much greater. Ruthlessness was supposed to have reached its height when the *Lusitania* was sunk, yet the total number of ships destroyed in the following eight weeks hardly exceeded the number of neutrals alone that were destroyed in the four weeks of February, 1917. Another important point was that, if the Germans succeeded in compelling neutrals to remain in harbor, the primary purpose of their campaign would have been virtually achieved. About 300,000 tons of cargoes on ships of neutral registry had been almost at once tied up in New York harbor as a consequence of the decree. In all there were tied up fifty-three steamships of American, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, and Dutch registry. Fourteen of these in ordinary circumstances would have carried passengers and United States mail. Holland more than any other neutral felt the effect. Twenty-five vessels flying the Dutch flag and laden with grain and other foodstuffs for Holland, that were to have sailed before February 1, were detained in New York or Halifax. Eventually the number in New York was reported as about eighty. The entire fleet of six American Line vessels was lying in New York. Passenger traffic to Europe except such as was carried on vessels of the Entente Allies and Spain, was for a time practically suspended.

On the other hand, it was evident that the proclamation of the new danger zones had not wrought such a sudden change as many enthusiasts in Germany expected. The losses of tonnage exceeded 322,000 in January and 346,000 in December; hence the increase in February, notwithstanding the enormous extent of the prohibited area and the

avowed indifference to neutrals, had not been much more than 140,000 tons. Many German writers amused their readers with calculations designed to demonstrate the inevitability of British downfall, but as there were many factors of which they could not have exact knowledge, it was idle to set any value on their reasonings. Percentages, reckoned on the sizes of commercial fleets before the war, led to no useful conclusion unless conditions in the shipyards were understood, and the possibilities of replacing lost tonnage taken into account.

Berlin gave out on March 18 a statement that the results of the first month of intensified *U*-boat war had "satisfied the most optimistic expectations." A total of nearly 800,000 tons of merchant shipping destroyed was named as representing "a full month's work." These figures were more than 300,000 tons in excess of those given out by Great Britain. Meanwhile a large amount of new tonnage was on the stocks building for the British mercantile marine. From February 1 to March 10 no British ships had been in any way blockaded in British harbors. On March 10 a visit to the docks of London, Liverpool, and Manchester, undertaken with a view to observing how the blockade had affected them, showed that "business as usual" was the rule. There had been no apparent slackening of trade at any point, and the slight holding up of neutral shipping had not had reflection in weekly tonnage and trade reports. Figures of arrivals and departures made a favorable comparison with the figures of three months or a year before. In each port stocks and foodstuffs stood at better than a peace-time basis.

There was evidence, however, that the British Admiralty was taking up the submarine question with renewed energy. The arming of merchant ships was going on under rush orders at every port, and few British ships were leaving without guns and gun-crews. March as a whole witnessed a decided falling off from the pace set in February. This was accounted for by the fact that in the early part of the month the submarines were back in port refitting. At best Germany was far from the million tons of British shipping per month upon which the new ruthlessness had set its heart. After two months the profest purpose behind Ger-

many's proclamation of an intensified ruthlessness had failed; the shortening of the war, through the speedy starvation of England, was not in sight.

In the beginning the *U*-boats were to win the war, and for that reason Bethmann-Hollweg had not hesitated to "stake our all" on them. But it was not long before qualifications of this statement began to be filed. England was not to be quite starved, but was to be brought to a pitch of privation which would make her amenable to reason. Next it was discovered that the submarine could not end the war, but that it would help to do so by hampering the Allied campaign on land. Steadily the starvation of England had faded into the background of the German mind. Open skepticism was exprest late in March by Captain Persius, the naval critic of the *Berliner Tageblatt*. His hope and belief was that by an average loss of half a million tons of shipping per month Great Britain in a few months could be brought to realize that a continuation of the war would be unprofitable, tho this result, he declared, had not been attained.

Interesting at this time were the published figures of our own foreign commerce. Exports to the Allied nations in February, in spite of the sharpened submarine warfare, amounted to $367,000,000, as compared with $309,000,000 in February, 1916. This increase, however, was chiefly to Canada, Russia, and France. Shipments to the United Kingdom dropt from $160,000,000 to $144,000,000 for the month. Shipments to France, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, had reached $3,138,000,000 in an eight months' period, as against $1,922,000,000 in the preceding fiscal year. Part of the increase was due to increases in the prices of many commodities, but there had also been a marked expansion in bulk. The figures indicated that the *U*-boat campaign had struck the United Kingdom heavily, but had had little effect on the trade of other nations.

The sinking early in April of two Belgian relief ships, at least one of them by a submarine's torpedo without warning, while in a "safe route," emphasized our Government's official assertion that the Imperial Government did not keep its word, but had repeatedly broken promises or agreements

that were written, signed, and certified. One of these ships was the *Trevier,* torpedoed on the 4th near the coast of Holland. Again, as in the case of the *Haelen,* two weeks before, the submarine had shelled passengers who sought safety in a lifeboat. But while seven of the *Haelen's* men were killed, the *Trevier's* sailors were living, altho eight of them had wounds. The other ship was the *Felstein.* Both had cargoes of wheat for the suffering Belgians, and carried written guaranties of immunity given by the Imperial German Government. When the United States Minister, Brand Whitlock, and the American members of the Relief Commission, following the severing of our relations with Germany, were withdrawn from Belgium late in March, our Government had said, in an explanatory statement, that several of the Commission's ships had been sunk without warning and "in flagrant violation of the solemn engagements of the German Government." In his memorable address to Congress, on the 2d, asking for a declaration of war on Germany, President Wilson referred to this repudiation of written pledges in the following terms:

"Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, tho the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself, and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with reckless lack of compassion or of principle."

On March 15, a few days after the sinking of two other relief ships, the German Government had assured the Relief Committee that it had communicated with the commanders of all submarines and instructed them not to molest any such vessels. After that date each relief ship was to carry a written, signed, and certified guaranty of safety as received from the German Government with photographs of that Government's sailing directions, and was to be plainly marked by broad side-cloths, pennants and deck banners. In spite of this four of them had been attacked and two sunk with loss of life. With the loss of the Norwegian steamship *Camilla,* the sinking of which without warning was announced early in April, four other Belgian Relief ships had

been torpedoed within four days. They were carrying a total of 17,000 tons of foodstuffs. Since February 1, seven Relief ships had been torpedoed. Three others had been fired on but escaped. All the Relief ships sunk were torpedoed without warning in broad daylight, bore full markings, and had safe-conduct passes issued by the German Government. All were outside the war-zone, on a line guaranteed by the German authorities as safe for the Commission's vessels.

For the tenth week of unrestricted warfare figures indicated a monthly loss of about 300,000 tons. The daily sailings and departures from British ports were "absolutely normal," and the proportion of *U*-boat hits to misses was about the same. Everything indicated that there had been exaggeration in the number of submarines which Germany had at her disposal when she began the new warfare, and the number of new boats she turned out. The American steamer *Rockingham* was sunk by a German submarine late in April and thirteen men were missing. Two boats, containing thirty-three men, were picked up, one by a patrol vessel. The boat containing the thirteen missing men had not been heard from. Early in the war, when known under the name *Nebraskan,* the *Rockingham* had been torpedoed but not sunk. A long controversy had ensued between the United States and Germany, the latter finally admitting that a submarine made the attack. The *Rockingham* carried forty-nine men, including many Americans. The crew numbered thirty-six and the naval contingent consisted of a lieutenant and twelve men. The value of the ship and her general cargo was $3,250,000.

The torpedoing of the British transport *Transylvania,* formerly an Anchor liner, in the Mediterranean on May 4, with the loss of 413 lives, was officially announced on May 24, and from Paris came news that the French liner *Sontay* had been torpedoed in the Mediterranean on April 16, with the loss of forty-five lives. Both these tragedies had occurred during the period of greatest *U*-boat efficiency. The *Transylvania* was carrying troops presumably for or from Saloniki. Of the military passengers, twenty-nine officers and 373 men of other ranks were lost, together with the

ship's captain, an officer, and nine men of the crew. The *Sontay* was bound for Marseilles from Saloniki with 344 passengers. Captain Mages went down with the ship which sank rapidly in a heavy sea, but the prompt and skilful launching of the boats saved most of those on board. The sailing of the *Transylvania* from New York had been canceled in May, 1915, when she was taken into the service of the British Admiralty. Her movements had not been reported since she transported troops to Gallipoli. She was built in 1914. She was the fifth steamer of the Anchor Line fleet to succumb to the German *U*-boat. The others were the *California*, the *Caledonia*, the *Columbia* (renamed the *Columbello* by the Admiralty) and the *Cameronia*.

"And now the Americans," said a German headline announcing the entrance of an American destroyer flotilla into active warfare under Admiral Sims in British waters on May 4. The German public was expected to rub its eyes and ask if these were the Americans who, according to assurances by the Government and Berlin editors, could not possibly get to Europe before the war had been won by *U*-boats. After England's "contemptible little army" of August, 1914, had come the first installment of a mythical American force soon to be found as disappointingly unmythical as the British army had turned out to be uncontemptible. Another German metaphysical certainty thus went to swell the rubbish-pile of unfulfilled German prophecies. That doubt was rising in the heart of Germany as to the certain success of her submarines was plainly evidenced in a renewed outbreak of ferocity of which Swedish merchant ships now became the victims. Simple enough had been the prospectus of the new "frightfulness" that had issued from Berlin three months before: neutrals were to be frightened from the seas; Allied merchant fleets were to be depleted; England was to be starved, and America was to come in too late. America, however, was not coming in too late, and Allied ships continued to come and go, while England had a half a year's food assured to her. The only visible sign of "enrapturing" success was seen in Spain, Norway, and Sweden, neutral countries that were steadily being goaded into enmity to Germany.

Miscalculation in the submarine program on which German strategists had staked the destiny of their empire was becoming more and more manifest. The sinkings had fallen off, the campaign had no visible effects commensurate with the tonnage sunk, and there was plenty of food in England. Meanwhile famine was coming on apace in the "flatlands of Europe," so that an agricultural expert in Bavaria recommended red clover and alfalfa for human food. In spite of tremendous losses in British shipping, things were going on much as before. The period in which the *U*-boats were to humble England was three months. The quarter-year had passed and another had begun and yet the people of England were still supplied with food. The Britons' last hour remained as distant as it was at first. A quick decision had been vital to Germany before the United States could take the field, but our destroyers, only a month after we declared a state of war to exist, were already in the North Sea and giving effective aid. England would have food enough to get along until the fall, even if the rate of sinkings were doubled, and in the fall, besides the seized German ships, there would be new vessels at sea under the Stars and Stripes.

Great Britain had been long content to let the world think the Prussians were having it pretty much their own way with submarines, but she had contended that the submarines had scored few successes that conformed to the usages of civilized warfare. It was now nearly two years since they had sunk a British man-of-war of any importance. Preying upon fishing smacks, trawlers, Atlantic liners and the merchantmen of all nations, they had added a new chapter to naval history. It was not known how many submarines the British had sunk or destroyed. It might be 100, or 200, or even 220. They had come out and they had not returned. There was no one in Germany, and perhaps not half a dozen people in England, who knew what had become of them. All that the Germans were able to infer was that somehow or other their boats had been lost. How or where they could not tell. They were faced with a blank wall of possibilities that they had no means of verifying. Weeks had to elapse before they could be sure

that a submarine which they thought was operating in a certain area had not been captured or sunk, and that another would have to be dispatched to take its place. The British were confident that the Germans could attempt nothing and could invent nothing that they could not eventually find the means of countering.[11]

Brazil's break with Germany, following that of China early in April, was described by an American writer as meaning "another debt item on the German balance-sheet." The submarine investment was rapidly proving a losing enterprise for her. It had brought the United States into the war; had now caused Brazil to break off relations, with a declaration of war, eventually to follow; while other South American republics were growing more and more bitter in their attitude to Germany. All the while the main object profest—that of starving England into surrendering after six weeks or two months of sinking everything in sight—"was seen to be less and less attainable." After two months and a half England was fighting with more energy than ever, and her carriers of food and munitions sailed the seas. A sober stock-taking by the Germans would have shown them that of all their blunders since August 1, 1914, the ruthless use of submarines was the worst. Even the afterthought argument that, at any rate, German tonnage would be ready for instant and advantageous use after the war was made to appear futile, because her enemies were seizing German ships all over the world. As private property they might be paid for, some day, but Germany could be deprived of their use. A German technical publication had admitted that, if the submarine campaign failed, Germany was "lost." Germany to this writer was already lost, and yet was "looking on while nation after nation arrayed itself against her." Even German pride and unyielding devotion to the Fatherland could not forever be blind to "the mounting proof that Germany could not hope to win."

An air, sea, and under-sea running battle at dawn between Teuton and British, French, and Italian naval forces took place on May 15 in the Straits of Otranto, in which fourteen British drifters and three Italian craft were sunk.

[11] Sidney Brooks in *The National Geographic Magazine.*

The British cruiser *Dartmouth* was torpedoed and two of the Austrian vessels were damaged. The Allies had recently been active in the lower Adriatic in clearing out Austrian submarines, submarine-bases, and mines. British warcraft and mine-sweepers, called drifters, had joined in the operations. In the fight of May 15, Austrian light cruisers and destroyers, in a dash from their base at Cattaro, had attempted to break the line of British guard-craft, and succeeded in sending fourteen of them to the bottom before the main Allied flotilla could reach the scene. The British ships *Bristol* and *Dartmouth* steamed to the rescue and pursued the attacking squadron to its protected lines, withdrawing before approaching Austrian battleships. The *Dartmouth* received a torpedo from a German submarine but failed to sink and reached port safely, tho the loss of one British cruiser was claimed by the Austrians, as well as the destruction of Italian destroyers, three merchantmen and twenty armed trawlers. During the chase a battle in the air between Austrian and Italian fliers developed over the speeding warships. Italian airmen declared that their bombs set one of the Austrian cruisers afire. On May 18 a number of Japanese gunboats arrived at Marseilles to aid in the war on German submarines and convoy French merchantmen. The arrival of these warships marked the first active participation by Japan in the struggle in European waters.

The American armed merchant liner *Mongolia* early in June had a remarkable encounter with a submarine. Sixty Red Cross nurses and a large number of American surgeons were among the *Mongolia's* 250 passengers. When the vessel was about two hundred miles off Falmouth three torpedoes were fired at her. The *Mongolia* replied with four shots. Neither the liner nor the submarine was damaged, but for a time the American ship was believed to be doomed, as there was a suspicion that she had entered a nest of undersea craft. Altho at first not even a periscope was seen, everybody was ordered to the decks, life preservers were adjusted and the boats were prepared for lowering. After the first shot Captain Emery Rice swung the *Mongolia* around, pointing her bow in the direction from which the attack had come. Soon a periscope was sighted at a distance of about

1,500 yards, and fire was then directed upon it. The *Mongolia's* passengers, their life-belts buckled about them, hung over the vessel's railings and shouted "Get 'em! Get 'em!" as the vessel's guns belched fire. Finally a British destroyer appeared on the horizon, sighted by the submarine and the American vessel simultaneously. The *U*-boat dived, not to appear again, while aboard the *Mongolia* there was a lively celebration as the warship drew nearer. The gray destroyer searched for the German craft for a time, with her bugler standing on deck, sounding the notes of "The Star Spangled Banner" and "God Save the King."

When the destroyer came alongside the *Mongolia,* the latter's enthusiastic passengers united in a mighty cheer. The British boat encircled the American vessel three times, while the latter's passengers rushed from port to starboard and back again, unwilling to take their eyes off her even for a moment. The destroyer stuck close to the American vessel during the rest of the voyage. Falmouth was reached the next morning. The first torpedo had passed some 200 yards on the port side of the *Mongolia's* stern. The submarine then launched a second torpedo and ten minutes later a third, but neither came near. The *Mongolia* had more than one encounter with submarines after America entered the war. She had drawn first blood in the conflict between the United States and Germany in April when, sighting a *U*-boat, her gunners, under Lieutenant Bruce Ware, fired a six-inch shell at the periscope before the enemy-craft could launch a torpedo. Her captain was killed. American destroyers, by this time, were credited with having helped materially in keeping the submarine menace down and making the patrol more effective.

On June 5 British naval forces carried out three successful operations. Zeebrugge was subjected to a bombardment declared by correspondents to have been the most formidable of the war. The German base at Ostend was also attacked with "good results," according to the Admiralty. Again a fleet of light cruisers and destroyers, in a running battle with six hostile destroyers off the Belgian coast, sank one by gunfire, severely damaged a second, and drove the rest to the safety of their own mined waters. The

ADMIRAL SIMS
Under Admiral Sims American destroyers rendered notable service in overcoming German *U*-boat warfare

British forces were reported to have emerged from all three operations unscathed. "There were no casualties on our side," said the Admiralty statement. A notable reduction in shipping losses had been due in part to an intensified defense, in part, also, to a natural fluctuation in the German effort as *U*-boats put back to port for rest and replenishment. There still remained reason for confidence. It was plain that the German maximum could not long be maintained and a change of tone was noticeable in the German press. There was less Pan-German assurance, whether sincere or profest, and there was, indeed, an intimation that the German people would have to wait for their *U*-boat victory till October or later. Actually the indicated British losses during the month had been less than the losses for November, December, and January.

Hindenburg's prediction on July 3 that Germany's enemies would be forced to make peace in the not too distant future if the Germans held their ground until the submarine had done its work, received an impressive reply in the weekly figures of sinkings issued on July 4, when the total was the smallest in several weeks. The conclusion had now been reached that it would be impossible for the submarines to maintain an average of sinkings which would have anything like a fatal effect on the overseas communications of the Allies. The weekly summary showed fifteen British merchant ships of more than 1,600 tons sunk, and five vessels of less than that tonnage. Eleven fishing vessels were lost. In this period the arrivals at British ports were 2,745 and the sailings were 2,846. Sixteen British merchant ships were attacked unsuccessfully. Hindenburg's phrase, "if we hold our ground until the submarine war has done its work" now had a pleasant sound to the British naval ear, which was firmly convinced that the submarine war had failed, and on its success Hindenburg had had to pin his remaining faith of winning the war. Anti-submarine measures were constantly growing in effectiveness. Pursuit had become so effective that a *U*-boat now showed its periscope in Channel waters only at the greatest risk.

Capelle now put forth another of his optimistic statements in the Reichstag. The Navy, he said, had the fullest con-

fidence in the future of the submarine campaign. "The continuously increasing enemy efforts to overcome the submarine danger by counter measures," he gravely declared, "are more than equalized by the continually growing number of submarines set in operation against the enemy. Submarine losses now, as hitherto, are kept within moderate limits, and all reports to the contrary are untrue. There is not the least reason for doubting the success of the submarine war." Dr. Karl Helfferich, now Secretary of the Interior, at the same time produced figures to show that as a result of the submarine war within a predeterminable period England's available tonnage would be inadequate to her needs. The British Admiralty report showed, however, that on only three previous occasions had so small a number of ships of over 1,600 tons been reported sunk. In the next week only 17 British merchant vessels were sunk, of which 14 were over 1,600 tons. Every other feature of the situation was favorable. What the figure seemed to show was that the task the Germans had undertaken was beyond their reach. The destruction of 1,000,000 tons of shipping monthly was necessary to the achievement of their ends. The loss was serious enough, but nothing like the total Capelle claimed had been reached. Thenceforth all statements by Capelle were heavily discounted.

In the weekly statement issued September 12, only twelve vessels of more than 1,600 tons were reported sunk. This was the smallest number since the beginning of ruthless *U*-boat warfare. The report was somewhat weakened, however, by the fact that, among the losses for the week, was so large a ship as the *Minnehaha* and members of her convoy. Large ships had been sunk before this, however, and the figure of only twelve large vessels destroyed was a reassuring one. What made the week's report all the more favorable was that the French had lost only one large ship, as against three in the preceding week and five in one bad week some time before. The British merchant ships of 1,600 tons and over sunk by mine or submarine during the week reported on September 19 numbered only eight.

While the decline in the shipping loss had been substantial, the situation continued to call for the kind of activity

demanded by a great emergency. America's opportunity for service lay immediately and urgently in the direction of putting down the submarine menace. The number of German submarines in the Atlantic ocean probably never exceeded twenty, and the number operating in the North Atlantic off the British coast did not exceed ten. These figures, however, did not include submarines engaged exclusively in mine-laying. It was estimated in British naval circles that Germany had not built as many as 300 submarines altogether, and that only about 150 of all conditions were in existence in September, 1917. The *U*-boat was of delicate mechanism, and needed frequent repairing, which, in the main, explained the small number still operating. Most of the boats had to be repaired or replenished constantly and so were out of commission. Another reason was the difficulty in getting crews and keeping them going. The work was so hard and the danger so constant that officers and crews wore out. After a few months men lost their appetites and could not sleep. Another difficulty, and one constantly increasing, was the shortage of material for torpedoes. The multiplication of destroyers, due in large part to American arrivals, had greatly increased the nerve-racking character of submarine duty. *U*-boat navigators had become deathly afraid of destroyers, with their speed, guns, and depth-bombs. It was the presence of destroyers and other patrol boats in force in the English Channel that explained the immunity transports had enjoyed. They had carried millions of soldiers back and forth between France and England without serious loss.

How the German commander of a submarine sank the British steamship *Belgian Prince,* on July 31, and afterward made thirty-eight seamen stand on top of his *U*-boat while he submerged it, drowning all but four, was narrated in September by one of the survivors, William Snell, 23 years old, of Newport News, who was cook on the British boat and escaped because he had concealed a lifebelt beneath his raincoat. He was taken from the water unconscious the next morning after the sinking of the British boat, at dusk. Snell was a negro, who formerly had played football at the Hampden Institute. Snell said that when the *U*-boat began

to move with the prisoners all on her deck, they thought they were going to be taken to prison, but the submarine began to go under, while the "captain laughed and mocked at us." Four men only managed to keep afloat during the night and were then saved by a British patrol which was chasing the submarine. All the others were drowned.

One serious aspect of the *U*-boat warfare was the heavy losses still shown in French ships, which fluctuated from week to week about an exceedingly high level. A September weekly report from Paris had announced seven ships of more than 1,600 tons destroyed. Proportionately this was an extremely bad showing. According to the Shipping Board's summary of the world's available tonnage for non-military purposes, Great Britain had something over 13,000,000 tons and France 1,600,000 tons, or less than one-eighth. Seven big ships lost by the French thus corresponded to more than fifty big ships lost by Great Britain. For the immediate purposes of the war, it presumably did not matter greatly from which of the Allies the *U*-boats took their toll, but it was inevitable that there should be some thought in France of her shipping conditions after the war. Unless there was a permanent decrease in French losses, the anti-submarine policies of the Allies would have to be altered with a view to greater protection for French shipping.

On October 17 the American army transport *Antilles,* homeward bound under convoy, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine in the war-zone. About seventy men were missing and probably lost. Army and Navy officers aboard and the ship's master were among the 167 survivors. The missing were members of the crew, three civilian engineers, some enlisted men of the Navy and sixteen of thirty-three soldiers returning home for various reasons. Neither the submarine nor the torpedo was seen and the transport, hit squarely amidships, sank in five minutes. This tragedy of the sea was the first in which an American ship engaged in war duty had been lost. It carried the largest casualty list thus far in the war of American lives and marked the first success of a German submarine attack on an American transport. That the loss of life was not greater was due to safeguards with which the navy sur-

rounded the transport service and the quick rescue work of the convoying warships.

By the end of autumn it was obvious that the German hopes had been shattered, altho the German people did not yet realize it. The discovery of this, however, could not be much longer delayed. Considering the nature of the exigency that had called forth this display of "frightfulness" and the expectations and promises that were adduced to justify it, the disillusionment, when it came, promised to be painful and profound. The net loss of British tonnage down to the beginning of the ruthless *U*-boat warfare on February 1 had amounted to less than 5 per cent., this after taking due account of ships completed since the outbreak of war, German ships seized and neutral vessels purchased. It was the absolute reduction in a period of two and a half years, in spite of all Germany's efforts with her cruisers, with armed merchantmen, with disguised raiders, and with submarines. More than this, the merchant service of Great Britain between the outbreak of war and the end of January, 1917, in spite of the wholesale withdrawal of vessels for war purposes and the losses it suffered at sea, had succeeded in bringing into home ports 70 per cent. of the weight of imports which would have come in a normal year. That is to say, while the tonnage entrances in the six months ending January 31, 1917, fell off, as compared with the corresponding peace period of 1914, by over 41 per cent., the decline in the weight of imports amounted to less than 30 per cent. From whatever point of view the question could be regarded, it was certain that Germany made a great blunder when she embraced the submarine as a weapon, but not yet would Capelle let her know it.

The warfare had to its record a sufficiently impressive tale of slaughter and destruction to make a long account against the country that had so arrogantly flouted all the conventions of international law, and the plainest dictates of humanity. The Central Powers had now practically united against them the rest of the civilized world. The submarine had become the agent of a world's destiny, the engine by which a circuit of sympathy was flashed around the globe, drawing to the standard of the Allies the support of nearly

every neutral nation which enjoyed freedom of movement. "Frightfulness" was not only a conspicuous failure in its immediate purpose, but had provided the means of forcing such a combination against Germany as to make certain her utter and irreparable defeat.

Striking statistics were given by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, in the House of Commons on November 1. He announced that between 40 and 50 per cent. of the German submarines operating in the North Sea, the Arctic, and the Atlantic since the beginning of the war, had been sunk. During the last quarter the Germans had lost as many submarines as they lost in the entire year 1916. But at the same time the Germans were building them faster than they had done hitherto. As regards the sinking of merchant tonnage, Capelle's published figures for August were 808,000 tons of all nationalities, but in reality they had sunk only a little more than half of that. For September the official figures were 679,000 tons, but they sank "far less than one-third of that amount of British tonnage, and less than one-third of that of all nationalities." The total net reduction since the beginning of the war from all causes in British tonnage on the official register in ships of over 1,600 tons was under 2,500,000 tons gross, or 14 per cent. At the outbreak of the war Germany owned over 5,000,000 tons of shipping. Now nearly half of that tonnage had been sunk, or was in the hands of the British or their Allies. She had had a 50 per cent. reduction to the British 14 per cent.

The week's record of submarine losses issued on November 7 was not only the best for British shipping since February, but probably for the Allies as a whole. Frequently a fall in British casualties had been offset by a large loss for the French and Italians. This week the French lost only one ship over 1,600 tons, so that for Great Britain and France the total loss was apparently not more than 40,000 tons. By this time it was plain that, in spite of fluctuations, the maximum was steadily declining. From this week's low point of eight large ships to the previous low point on September 16, also eight large ships, the high point was 17 ships. From September 16 back to July 8, the highest point was 21 ships. For preceding periods of fluctuation the high

points were, recessively, 27 ships and 40 ships. By dividing the record since April 1 into eight-week periods, it appeared that the weekly average during these periods was, successively, 23 ships, 18 ships, 15 ships, and for the latest two months, 12 ships. That the unmistakable decline had not been due to a slackening of German effort followed from Sir Eric Geddes's British statement that *U*-boats were being built faster than ever. Still faster, therefore, was anti-submarine defense being perfected. For America's obvious share in the result there was reason to be proud.

Only one British vessel of more than 1,600 tons was reported on November 14 as sunk by mine or submarine. Five vessels of less than 1,600 tons and one fishing-boat had been sunk during the same week. In November, Admiral von Tirpitz virtually admitted the failure of the ruthless *U*-boat campaign. Captain Persius, of the *Berliner Tageblatt,* made the same admission and scored those who were responsible for "piracy without mercy." This policy had been proving a failure since April, but it had been proving a worse failure in more recent weeks, when successive low records of sinkings by *U*-boats were made. It was now proving a worse failure than ever before. "Piracy without mercy" had succeeded only in bringing the United States into the war, and in arraying practically all the world in bitter hatred against Germany. The Kaiser, admittedly, had played this warfare as his last card to win the war and he, by this time, had lost.

As between the British and the Germans, in the war as a whole, no one could mistake the advantages that now rested with the former. The British had taken five German prisoners to the Germans' one British; five guns to the Germans' one; they had occupied more than a million square miles of German colonial territory, whereas the Germans had not reached a foot of British territory. They had banished the German flag from the sea. They had blockaded the German ports. They had destroyed the bases of German trade within the British Empire, in the Far East, and even in South Africa. Meanwhile the Germans had only succeeded in injuring the British to the extent of air-raids on non-combatants and loss of ships incident to the submarine

campaign. By every sign that one could adduce, the British had triumphed over the Germans so far as the war was a struggle between those two nations. After the Zeppelins failed, the submarine had been the last weapon the Germans had against the British.

While the bulk of British forces had been sent to France, and almost as many brought back, protected not by impenetrable walls but by exactly the same means that were employed in the protection of other shipping—only, of course, employed in a vastly greater amount—large British forces had been dispatched to Egypt, Gallipoli, East Africa, and other fields of war; wounded and war-worn men had been brought back to England, almost continuously within the zone of submarine attack and not for a few hours employed in the journey to and from France, but in voyages lasting days and weeks. The total number of Allied fighting men carried overseas and passing through the submarine zone in the course of the war had exceeded 13,000,000. Less than 3,500 had been lost, or about .025 per cent.[12]

Shortage of torpedoes was one of the most serious conditions which the *U*-boat now faced. German factories were unable to turn them out in sufficient quantities for the needs of the submarines, underwater craft being built faster than torpedoes could be made. An augmented destroyer-patrol was partly responsible for this; it had caused the submarines to use up more torpedoes than formerly and to return more frequently to their base. All *U*-boat commanders were now strictly "rationed" as to supplies of torpedoes and were not permitted to waste torpedoes on long "chance shots." The comparative immunity of American destroyers from torpedo-attack—despite the loss of the *Jacob Jones* and the slight disablement of the *Cassin*—had been noteworthy. The Germans hated destroyers as their worst enemies in their most fertile field of war-action. Scarcely one American destroyer had failed to have one or more German torpedoes fired at her, and yet only twice had torpedoes hit any of them. Americans and British attributed this immunity to the mobility of the destroyers, the alertness of American naval men, and their keenness in defensive tactics. Sharp lookouts

[12] Letter from Arthur Pollen in The *Times* (New York).

and skilful maneuvering had often enabled them to cheat the Germans of their prey.

On February 1, a year had passed since the German Government formally declared ruthless submarine warfare alike against enemies and neutrals. Sea traffic was to be stopt "with every available weapon and without further notice," but neither Great Britain nor France had been starved into submission or was in danger of being starved. The British had lost 1,033 vessels, of which 763 were of more than 1,000 tons, and 270 of less than 1,000 tons. The French and Italian losses were estimated at less than 1,000,000 tons, while the American losses were sixty-nine ships of 171,061 tons, the loss of life being in excess of 300. Against these losses, in addition to ships built during the year, were to be counted 686,494 tons of German and Austrian shipping seized by the United States and put into commission, including the *Vaterland,* rechristened the *Leviathan,* which was now carrying American troops and American supplies to France. American exports in the year had amounted to the unprecedented figure of $6,226,000,000, an increase of $745,000,000 while imports had mounted to $2,952,000,000, an increase of $560,300,000; American imports and exports together showing a total increase of $1,305,300,000. We had an army of a few hundred thousand men in France, and had not lost any men going east on transports—a statement true on February 1, but confronted on February 6 with the dismal news that the transport *Tuscania* had been sunk with 200 missing.

However critical the economic situation of Germany a year before, it was accepted as far more critical now. Except for the long blockade of Germany and her ports by the British Navy, no heavier blow had been dealt to German power than an embargo order of President Wilson which had made it impossible for neutrals after exporting food into Germany to replenish their own stores from the United States. The results of this order had been staggering and the effect was continuing. The *U*-boat campaign had, however, forced Great Britain and the United States to bend their energies to the construction of new vessels to replace the wastage, and the danger was not yet over, in spite of

the increased effectiveness of the anti-submarine campaign. Regardless of the total tonnage sunk, the experience of a year had proved that the *U*-boats could not win the war for Germany, and it was inconceivable that Germany could do as well in the future as in the past. Frightfulness in its mad undertaking to conquer the world had failed on the sea as on land. The world was still unconquered and autocracy still faced a democracy that was resolute and undaunted.

It was impossible to give exact figures of the tonnage destroyed in the twelve months. Possibly the loss of Allied and neutral vessels had been in the neighborhood of 6,500,000 tons, which was something less than 15 per cent. of their total tonnage. This was a liberal estimate, arrived at by taking the figures of Great Britain, the United States, France, Norway, and Spain as a basis. The total tonnage of the merchant fleets of Allied and neutral countries in 1916 was about 45,000,000 tons. Of this amount the Allied countries represented 35,000,000 tons. England and France in 1916 had a combined tonnage of more than 23,000,000, Norway and Spain more than 3,000,000, and the United States something over 9,000,000, including the vessels of the Great Lakes. Three of the countries—England, France, and Norway—were in the war-zone. Combined, they represented about half the world's tonnage that had been affected by the *U*-boat warfare. Their sinkings, figured in percentages, were almost identical. Great Britain had lost as many vessels as all the other maritime powers combined. The total number was 1,189. This did not include small fishing-vessels, of which about 167 were sunk. Norway came next with about 430, followed by France, with Sweden, Italy and Holland in the order named. The following table was based on government and unofficial reports, given out at various times:

Country	*No. of Ships*	*Tonnage*	*Country*	*No. of Ships*	*Tonnage*
Great Britain..	1,191	4,010,000	United States..	69	172,900
Norway	434	680,000	Spain	35	80,000
France	...	400,000	Russia	...	300,000
Sweden	309	200,000	Greece	...	90,000
Holland	...	175,000	Japan	...	30,000
Italy	...	210,000	Other neutrals.	...	200,000

With these figures as a basis, it was apparent that German naval authorities had undershot their mark of 1,000,000 tons of merchant vessels a month, by almost 50 per cent. The number of sinkings for the latest six months of 1917 was almost 50 per cent. less than for the first six months. From February 1 to August 1, 1917, about 1,100 vessels, or an average of 184 vessels a month, of British, Norwegian or American origin were sunk. During the six months ending on February 1, 1918, fewer than 600 vessels had been torpedoed, or an average of about 199 a month. The following table shows the number of American, British, and Norwegian vessels sunk each month since the beginning of the campaign:

Month	*British*	*American*	*Norwegian*
February	124	2	41
March	106	5	66
April	184	8	64
May	115	8	49
June	110	7	43
July	100	13	58
August	80	4	21
September	97	6	19
October	77	7	19
November	56	6	13
December	88	2	22
January	52	1	20

Announcement was made in Washington on January 29 that the total tonnage of former German steamships ready for the high seas service, most of which were now taking men and materials to France, was approximately 500,000. Among the number that had already arrived safely in Entente ports was the *Leviathan*. Besides the *Leviathan* there were fifteen other large German ships. Germany had been circulating reports to belittle to her own people the assistance given by this shipping to the Entente Allied cause and thus to create unjustified confidence in submarines. As a matter of fact, between 600,000 and 700,000 tons of former enemy shipping had become actively engaged or was just ready to carry over our Expeditionary Force. The *Leviathan* was capable of carrying up to 10,000 troops in a single voyage, but 8,000 was considered the largest number which could

be comfortably accommodated. Alterations made by American engineers had resulted in an increase of several knots in her speed. Her steam distribution had been found so inefficient that a large part of the boiler-power did not reach the engines. The greatest single factor which had operated for the quick return to service of the seized German ships was the use of new methods of welding in repairing the damage done the ship's engines by their German crews. These methods permitted the repair of the damaged engines without the necessity of removing the heavy parts.

Nothing, however, could obscure the fact that Germany's crowning act of barbarism, lifting her hand against the whole world, making no distinction between friend and foe, had accomplished appalling results. It had sent, by February 1, perhaps 5,000,000 tons of shipping to the bottom, much of which was under neutral flags. It had drowned some hundreds of unarmed persons, many of whom were subjects of countries with whom Germany was at peace. But what military results had been attained? At the end of twelve months England, with her face toward Germany, never stood more securely erect. France had seen the picked troops of Prussia and Bavaria giving way to her valor at Verdun and on the Somme. America had come into the fighting, bringing enormous resources. Food and ammunition supplies for the Entente had become assured. Nearly half a million American troops would soon be in France; that number would eventually be trebled, and would be followed by more if needed. Ships were being built to transport them and all necessary supplies.

By February 1, 1918, the fate of Imperial Germany was definitely sealed. She had acquired a load of taxation that would impoverish her people for years to come. The world's civilized States were looking down upon her as an outlaw among nations. A curse had been visited upon her, "even unto the third and fourth generations," as part of the heritage Prussianism had bestowed upon her. Captain Persius frankly admitted that the *U*-boat had been Germany's last card and that, while England might yet be forced by it to make peace, England could not be starved. Starvation he regarded as out of the question. Even in

official German quarters the starvation of England was no longer thought of. Many, however, believed that a reduction of British shipping was still possible to such an extent that she would not be able to continue the war with any hope of complete success. Some of the current German figures of tonnage destroyed by the submarine Captain Persius ridiculed. Had they been true, England by October, 1917, would not have had a single ship left for other than strictly war purposes. He pointed out that in 1914 the world's shipping had reached a total of about 49,000,000 tons, and now the figure was 42,000,000, "of which by far the greater portion was at the disposal of our enemies." He emphasized the fact that the Entente Powers were improving their means of defense and had greatly increased their activity in building. It was still "a very great task which lies before our *U*-boats to achieve the object of so reducing the shipping of our enemies that they will be forced to show their disposition for peace."

Strangely enough it was on this first anniversary of frightfulness that the *Handelsblad* of Amsterdam published a series of documents, obtained secretly from German archives, showing the reasons that had led Germany to adopt unrestricted submarine war. At the close of 1915, the German Admiralty had prepared a memorandum to show that unrestricted war would compel Great Britain to sue for peace within six months. The wording of the memorandum indicated that the Admiralty of its own volition had decided to adopt this warfare, but had next to convince the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor, and the Foreign Office of the certainty of good results on economic and general grounds rather than on military. The memorandum was based in its arguments on statistics of food-prices, and of freight- and insurance-rates in Great Britain. It pointed out the effects which even restricted submarine war had shown on the prices of essential commodities, on the balance of trade, and on the morale of the British people, and deduced from this that, with unrestricted warfare, England could hold out only for a short period.

The memorandum was submitted to Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, and to Dr. Karl Helf-

ferich, the Vice-Chancellor. The latter rejected it, on the ground that it was impossible to set a limit on England's staying power in the absence of any authentic estimates of stocks on hand, and also because he feared for the action which would result from neutrals and especially from the United States. The authors of the memorandum then pointed out the gravity of the internal situation in Germany and assured Dr. Helfferich that a desperate remedy was necessary. They reinforced their argument, as to the seriousness of the internal state of affairs, by calling in nine experts representing German finance, commerce, mining and agriculture. These men were invited to reply to three questions: First, what would be the effect on England of unrestricted submarine war? Second, what would be the effect on Germany's relations with the United States and other neutrals? Third, to what extent did the internal situation of Germany demand the use of this drastic weapon?

All agreed that England would have to sue for peace in six months at most. One said that England's supply of foodstuffs was smaller than it was in peace time, and therefore a ruthless *U*-boat war would probably accomplish the purpose in three months. Another said England's position was "very vulnerable, owing to her dependence on foreign capital and the absence of a spirit of self-sacrifice among the English," and thought six months "an excessive estimate." A third said that neutrals "despised restricted submarine warfare"; that every ship in British waters, enemy or neutral, "should be torpedoed without warning"; that the world respected "only those who in a great crisis know how to make the most unscrupulous use of their power," and that Germany's position in the world's markets after the war "would be all the stronger for her having convinced the world of her power." Again it was declared that "unrestricted submarine warfare would cause a wholesale flight of neutrals from the war zone"; that "their newspapers would abuse Germany, but they would soon tire"; that the chief danger was the United States, but that danger "would be less in proportion as Germany operated decisively and ruthlessly." Bitter feeling in the United

States after the war was not worth considering, "because if Germany succeeds she can dictate terms to assure favored treatment for herself," while if Germany was to throw away this opportunity "the passive approval of the United States would be of small practical value." A banker said he realized "how disastrous America's entry into the war would be," but insisted that a ruthless war was the only chance to defeat Great Britain and obtain a firm peace. Experts might differ as to the prospect of war with the United States, but none of them advised against the *U*-boat war on that account. All agreed that the internal situation demanded a drastic remedy and "the most drastic measures were advisable, owing to the feeling of the nation." It was quite possible that Germany "would be unable to hold out," and more drastic steps "should be taken before disorder and unrest arose in the agricultural districts." Each day's delay meant trouble and a few weeks' delay "might render even restricted warfare abortive of good results," because the great mass of people "were at the end of their resources." [13]

[13] Principal Sources: *The Independent,* The *Evening Post, The Literary Digest,* The *Times,* The *Evening Sun,* New York; The *Telegraaf* (Amsterdam); The *World,* The *Journal of Commerce,* The *Tribune,* The *Wall Street Journal,* New York.

VIII

IN THE SECOND YEAR OF "FRIGHTFULNESS"—THE ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND EXPLOITS—NET LOSSES OF SHIPS AND SUBMARINES

February 1, 1918—November 11, 1918

IMMEDIATELY following news of a marked decline in submarine sinkings, an announcement came on February seven, that the British steamship *Tuscania*, of the Anchor Line, then under charter to the Cunard Line, and serving as a transport for American troops, had been torpedoed and sunk off the coast of Ireland. The number of missing was at first reported as more than 200, out of a total of nearly 2,000 American troops on board, but later figures indicated that only 166 persons were missing, of whom 147 were Americans, and that 2,235 persons had been saved. Among the saved were 113 officers and 1,917 American foresters, engineers, supply trainmen, military police, and aero units, a total of 2,030. The total number of persons on the *Tuscania* was 2,401. The survivors were landed on the north coast of Ireland—at Buneranna, a point about ten miles north of Londonderry, and at Larne, about fifteen miles north of Belfast.

The *Tuscania*, a liner of 14,384 gross tons, was proceeding eastward strongly guarded, when she was attacked. Through the dusk of the oncoming night the shore line was then visible from the starboard side. From that direction, the lurking submarine discharged the torpedo that found its mark in the boiler-room. A second torpedo passed harmlessly astern. A British destroyer dashed toward the attacking submarine and dropt depth-bombs that resulted apparently in its destruction. The explosion of the torpedo caused a tremendous list, which made the launching of lifeboats and rafts extremely hazardous in the heavy sea and darkness. Almost all the loss of life and the injuries oc-

curred because of these conditions. There was no panic among the troops or crew. The stricken liner remained afloat for two hours. Many patrol-boats assisted destroyers in the work of rescue. The *Tuscania* was the first transport carrying American troops east to be sunk by a submarine. The astonishing thing about the disaster was that the loss of life was relatively so small. This spoke for the discipline on board and for the value of the convoy system, not only as a means of defense, but as a means of saving life after an attack. In January 1917, when two British transports were torpedoed in the Mediterranean, 718 lives were lost. With a convoy system much of this loss might have been prevented.

It had been the boast of the British Navy, and a proud boast it was, that, in the transportation of 400,000 Canadian troops across the Atlantic, not a life had been lost through submarine attack. That had been a piece of good fortune that could not be expected to last until the war ended. In eight months the United States had sent nearly as many soldiers to France as Canada had sent, and these were our first casualties. On the record made so far, the chances were therefore several hundred to one against any American soldier losing his life through the operations of German submarines. Whatever the losses, there could be no doubt as to what the moral effect would be. Loss of life is a sad thing for those to whom victims are related, but it might result in the saving of far more lives in the future for, if the Teutonic rulers supposed they could, by this kind of ruthlessness, lessen the power of America in prosecuting its part in the war, or deter it from its effort, they were adding only another to their many stupid blunders in their estimate of what the soul of man really is. This kind of warfare could only intensify American determination to do its utmost to destroy the power responsible for it. We had already done much to lessen the effect of *U*-boat warfare and were likely to do more in the great work of destroying the power of Prussianized Germany.

Current differences at this time between cheerful and pessimistic views entertained of the shipping problem arose from two causes. The weekly figures given out by the

THE "LEVIATHAN" ARRIVING IN NEW YORK HARBOR

Six tugs on board at the time the picture was taken. 2,000 men of the Twenty-seventh Division. The *Leviathan* was formerly the Hamburg-American boat *Vaterland*

British Admiralty did not show the amount of tonnage lost, and they took no account of ordinary marine casualties, which were abnormally heavy in war-times, with ships running into mined waters, without lights, and driven to the utmost of their power. The amount of shipbuilding in Great Britain during the war, including 600,000 tons out of 1,683,000 tons built in 1914, was 4,000,000 tons in round numbers. In 1908 the marine casualties for British ships were 253,000 tons, and in 1912 they were 281,000. Assuming that the marine losses during the war had been doubled; that is, were roughly 600,000 tons a year, the marine losses for the whole period of the war would have been on January 1, 1918, a little over 2,000,000 tons.[14] Exclusive of enemy ships, the world's tonnage to the end of 1917, according to Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, had fallen 2,500,000 tons from the beginning of the war. He declared that German statements of Allied shipping losses were grossly exaggerated—for January, 1918, the exaggeration had been 113 per cent. The amount of tonnage sunk in twelve months had been 6,000,000 instead of 9,500,000 as given in the German claim. The total of Allied and neutral tonnage was now 42,000,000 tons, a comforting figure, partly due, said Sir Eric, to new construction by the United States, and to the seizure of German ships. His figures were reached after deducting lake craft and a considerable number of small craft. Great Britain had lost on the average 260,000 tons monthly during the last quarter of 1917, and had built 140,000 tons monthly. British shipping had suffered most in the war, but the British had contributed to the war the greatest naval effort and had sustained the greatest attack. During the last quarter of 1917, the Allies were coming within an average of 100,000 tons a month of making their losses good. They were replacing 75 per cent. of the lost tonnage.

Publication on March 21 of certain long withheld British Admiralty figures showed exactly what the total of submarine losses had been up to January 1, 1918. Despite anti-submarine measures, undersea boats had been destroying ships twice as fast as the world's shipyards were building

[14] The *Evening Post* (New York).

them. From both enemy action and marine risk down to January 1, Allied and neutral shipping had lost since the war began 11,827,752 gross tons, while shipyards outside of the Central Powers had turned out 6,606,275 tons. But this loss, tremendous as it was, did not approach the German claims. With 2,589,000 tons of enemy ships added to Allied new construction in the war period (6,606,000 tons), the net loss to the world shipping, exclusive of that of Germany and her allies, was only 2,632,297. The maximum of losses had been reached in the second quarter of 1917, which was after unrestricted submarine warfare had drawn the United States into the struggle. In that quarter 2,236,934 gross tons of ships went down. Since that time the total had been reduced until in the fourth quarter of 1917, it was only 272,843. In the meantime the shipbuilding output had steadily curved upward. In the last quarter of 1917, it was 932,023 tons and at that time the enormous facilities of the United States had not begun to get into action.

So long as the British Admiralty adhered to its rule to publish only the number of British ships sunk by submarines and mines, without giving the tonnage, except to say that so many vessels over 1,600 tons and so many under 1,600 tons had been lost, the Germans had been perhaps warranted in making excessive claims. But charging them with exaggerations and specious statements could not satisfy the public. With a policy of secretiveness persisted in, the effect had been to impair confidence in the Admiralty's good faith. Now that the Admiralty had come out and published the exact figures, covering a period from the beginning of the war until January 1, 1918, the prospect of beating the submarines, or triumphing over the worst that they could do, seemed not half as black as it did before. While this showing as to net tons, 2,632,297, was reassuring, the submarine was still a menace, for it was sinking more ships than the Allies were building, and the output of yards in Great Britain was alarmingly behind estimates. The United States, however, had a shipbuilding program that promised not only relief, but defeat for the submarine campaign. For several months Great Britain had had to rely entirely on her own builders. The taking over in March 1918, of Dutch ships

by the United States, proved a great help, while from Japan a tonnage not negligible was expected.

The most notable naval undertaking since the battle of Jutland, fought on May 31, 1916, occurred April 22-23, 1918, at Zeebrugge and Ostend, when the British attempted a feat similar to that which Hobson during our war with Spain tried at Santiago, and the Japanese tried at Port Arthur. This was to block the entrances to the Bruges Canal and Ostend, which had served as nests for German submarines and torpedo-boats. For this purpose obsolete cruisers filled with concrete were run aground and sunk under command of Vice-Admiral Keyes. The enterprise was undertaken after weeks of preparation, and was an extremely daring one. It was carried out in waters filled with mines and along a shelving coast. Upon its success depended for weeks the course of future German submarine operations in the Channel and adjoining waters. The plan at Zeebrugge was, that, after an intense bombardment by monitors, the warship *Vindictive,* with auxiliaries, should run alongside the Zeebrugge mole and attack it with gunfire, storming and demolition parties being landed. Meantime, assisted by motor-boats, block ships were to make for the entrance to the canal, run aground and be blown up, while two old and valueless submarines, filled with explosives, were to run against the pile work connecting the masonry of the mole with the shore, and so cut the mole off. The net result at Zeebrugge was that the Canal entrance was effectually blocked, and a breach of 120 feet long was made in the viaduct connecting the mole with the land. At the same time the Ostend fairway was "inconveniently narrowed," altho not wholly blocked. Nearly three weeks afterward Ostend was more successfully attacked.

The Zeebrugge Canal was much more important to the German Navy's operations in the Channel than Ostend, as it was through Zeebrugge that *U*-boats, constructed at Antwerp, were brought to the coast, as well as munitions and general supplies for coast-defense. Zeebrugge harbor had long been dredged daily by two dredgers, a work made necessary by the perpetual shifting of the sand. One of these dredgers the British sank and the other they damaged.

With the breach made in the viaduct, sand under a southwest or westerly wind, would shift more rapidly and so obstruct navigation. The removal of the block-ships across the canal's mouth would be for the Germans a slow and delicate work, because the use of the necessary heavy charges would still further injure the canal's entrance walls. The block-ships had been so prepared as to give them high resisting power.

Afterward Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter, who commanded the *Vindictive,* gave a long account of the part taken by the *Vindictive* in the raid.[15] The chief purpose in the expedition, he said, was to distract the attention of the battery on the mole while the block-ships ran in, and especially the attention of a battery of 11-inch guns which occupied a commanding position at the tip of the mole. The *Vindictive* had been elaborately prepared for the business of landing soldiers on the mole, which was a solid work of stone, forty feet high and fifteen feet above the *Vindictive's* top deck at the state of the tide when the attack took place. A special superstructure over the upper deck and three long gangways had been provided in order to take men up to the level of the mole as soon as the *Vindictive* got alongside. According to plan, the ship ran alongside the mole, approaching it on the port side, equipped with specially built buffers of wood two feet wide. As there was nothing to tie to, the *Vindictive* merely dropt anchor, while the *Daffodil,* with her nose against the opposite side of the ship, kept her against the mole. In a fairly heavy sea, two of the three gangways were smashed, but the third held, and 500 men swarmed up on the mole. This gangway was two feet wide and thirty feet long. The men who went across included 300 marines and 150 storming seamen from the *Vindictive,* and fifty or so from the *Daffodil.* They carried hand grenades and Lewis guns. A hard hand-to-hand fight took place along the mole for two hundred yards toward the shore. As the *Vindictive's* bow was pointed toward the shore, the bridge got the full effect of enemy fire from shore batteries. One shell exploded against the pilot house, killing nearly all its ten occupants. Another burst in the fighting

[15] To an Associated Press correspondent.

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THE "MAURETANIA" CAMOUFLAGED
She could carry on each trip thousands of American soldiers

top, killing a lieutenant and eight men who were doing excellent work with two pompoms and four machine-guns. Only a few German shells hit the hull, because it was well protected by the wall of the mole, but the upper structure, masts, and ventilators, which showed above the wall, were riddled.

Twenty-five minutes after the *Vindictive* reached the wall, the first block-ship passed in and headed for the canal. Two others followed in leisurely fashion, while the men kept up the fight on the mole. One of the block-ships stranded outside the canal, but the two others got two or three hundred yards inside, where they were successfully sunk across the entrance. Air-observations showed that a clear break twenty yards in width had been made in the mole at the inner end, and that a sunken object blocked the greater part of the channel in the harbor of Ostend. Not only was the mouth of the canal at Zeebrugge blocked, but every gun on the mole was destroyed, sheds throughout its entire length were demolished and large stores of ammunition in sheds were blown up. Motor-boats destroyed every floating thing in sight, including two German destroyers and some submarines. The German Admiralty, however, claimed that only slight damage was suffered, and that German casualties were small, while, in addition to five British cruisers sunk near the coast—this statement let it be inferred that the Germans had sunk them—three destroyers and some motor-boats had been sunk. As for the mole, it had been "hit by a torpedo." Next day a German statement declared that German naval operations would not suffer from the event. Altho photographs showed that the light cruisers *Iphigenia* and *Intrepid* were sunk in the Zeebrugge channel just where they would block it, the Kaiser decorated all those concerned in German failure to foil the intruders. Admiral Schroeder received the order of the Swords of the Red Eagle of the First Class; Captain Schuette, commander of the batteries on the mole, twenty yards of which the British landing party blew up, got the Knight's Cross of the Royal Order of Hohenzollern with Swords; and to Chief Berlet of the Marines fell the Red Eagle of the Second Class. Everybody received a medal or a ribbon for this failure.

The great exploit was, in fact, a notable success. Photography did not lie in such matters, and photographs showed that the *Intrepid* and the *Iphigenia* reached the precise positions in the Zeebrugge channel that they were directed to reach and that the latter, in particular, lay with her bow and stern firmly wedged upon the shallows which uncovered at low water on two sides of the channel, and that she could not have been better placed to obstruct navigation. The *Intrepid* also lay almost athwart the channel, higher up, and much impeding the entrance and exit, while even the *Thaïs* lay directly in a position where she could do the port an injury. The effective action of the submarine, whose target was the shore end of the mole, was also attested photographically by a wide gap of 100 feet in that structure. All these obstructions to the channel could be removed in time, but there was not a shadow of doubt that the German flotillas at Bruges were for the time unable to use Zeebrugge as an outlet to the sea.

The blowing up of the shore-end of the mole by an old British submarine packed with explosives was one of the most impressive incidents of the battle. The young commander rammed his little ship well home in among the piles, fired her and then had five minutes to get clear with his three companions. But the motor of his launch broke down and the party had to row clear. Then the submarine blew up and with her all the Germans on the mole above her, while the little boat in which the British crew of the submarine escaped was nearly swamped by the force of the explosion. St. George's day, in 1918—that was the date of the exploit—promised to be remembered for a glorious feat of arms in British naval history. Two weeks after the attack, photographic and other evidence showed that the canal was still entirely blocked as a result of the British raid, and that it could not be used. German attempts to clear the waterway had as yet met with no success.

On May 9, British naval forces made another raid on Ostend, blocking the entrance to the harbor by sinking there the cruiser *Vindictive*. Since the attack on Zeebrugge on April 23 the *Vindictive* had been filled with concrete for this purpose. Ostend and Zeebrugge were connected by canals,

but unlike Zeebrugge, Ostend was not protected in the harbor by an armed mole. Only two short jetties projected out on the sides of the entrance to the channel, which was about 199 meters wide and 500 meters long. The *Vindictive* was sunk up the channel about 100 yards with her bows pointing toward the harbor. She probably had not blocked up the whole channel, but she had made it impracticable for big ships, tho smaller vessels might find a way out. The position in which the *Vindictive* lay was such that the natural action of the current would deposit silt and so promote the British purpose. The attacking force that arrived off Ostend Harbor at 2 o'clock in the morning was a squadron made up of the *Vindictive*, several destroyers, and a small number of motor-launches. The *Vindictive* had been shot full of holes and battered almost beyond recognition at Zeebrugge, but she was able to steer into Ostend in a businesslike and undramatic way. Before the enemy was wide awake her hull, packed with concrete, had been deposited in the chosen spot.

All that was romantic and adventurous of the British Navy lived again in the two exploits. It was a rebirth of the spirit of Nelson and Drake—of the spirit of our own Decatur in the war with the Barbary pirates. Such a spirit, once aroused, was infectious. Its exhilaration was felt wherever the spell of sea-power and sea-fighting persisted. The sunken *Vindictive* lay in the neck of the Ostend channel, at an angle of about forty degrees. A vessel 300 feet long lying at this angle did not effectively block a channel 320 feet wide, but it served a useful purpose in that a partial and serious blockade had been achieved. It would not prevent the egress of submarines, or entirely stop destroyers, but it would materially hamper both, while German light craft would not be able, when pursued by British forces, to rush at full speed into the harbor, as they had formerly done. The *Vindictive* went to her last berth 150 to 200 yards within the piers forming the entrance to the harbor, under a terrible fire from German naval guns and machine-guns. Altogether, 200 shells fell within a few yards of two of the escorting monitors, but neither was hit, nor did any casualty result. The weather was every-



ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND, AND THEIR RELATION TO ENGLAND



THE MOLE AND CANAL ENTRANCE AT ZEEBRUGGE

thing desirable until fifteen minutes before the *Vindictive* was sunk, when a fog reduced the visibility to a range of between 300 and 400 yards. While she was being abandoned, two motor-launches went alongside, under a heavy machine-gun fire, and succeeded in bringing off the men, including the wounded.

The same day that brought from England the report of the April sinkings, with their steadily declining ratio, brought news from one of our Atlantic ports of the arrival of the new American steam-freighter *Tuckahoe,* in cargo, forty-three days after her keel was laid. The two items represented the progress made on the two wings of the attack against the submarine pirates, as carried on by the navies of the Allied Powers and the United States, and by the shipyards of the non-Germanic world. Balancing submarine losses against new construction, the latest figures justified one in saying that the long-awaited turning-point in the struggle against the *U*-boat was close at hand. The formidable tonnage deficits of three years had reached the vanishing point and might utterly disappear before the end of June.

On May 25 news came that the British mercantile cruiser *Moldavia,* carrying American troops to Europe, had been torpedoed and about fifty American soldiers were reported missing. There were no casualties among the crew. Most of the American troops were killed by the explosion while in a compartment. When it was seen that the *Moldavia* was settling down, all on board were taken off by the escorting ship. The men lost all their belongings, but were supplied with new clothing at the different naval ports where they were taken. The *Moldavia* was torpedoed without warning. It was a moonlight night and, altho a good lookout was kept, the attacking submarine was not sighted before the torpedo struck. Most of the men aboard were in their hammocks when the explosion occurred amidship. The sailors and soldiers alike showed no panic. The vessel was struck below the bridge. She steamed ahead for some time after being struck and at first it was hoped that her watertight compartments would enable her to reach port. The *Moldavia* was of 9,500 tons gross and was owned by the

P. and O. Company. She was 520 feet long. She was the third transport carrying American troops to be torpedoed and the fifteenth troopship sunk by Germans. Of vessels carrying Americans, the *Antilles* had been the first to meet with destruction by a *U*-boat. She was sunk in October, 1917, when returning to this country from Europe, and seventy lives were lost. The second was the *Tuscania,* which was sent to the bottom off the north of Ireland in February, 1918. Then came the *Moldavia.* The only other serious attack made on American transports occurred in June, 1917, when vessels carrying some of the first expeditionary units under a convoy commanded by Read Admiral Gleaves, narrowly escaped disaster in the mid-Atlantic.

The American troop transport *President Lincoln,* of 18,168 gross tons capacity, sixth in size among the vessels that had been used for our army transportation, was attacked by a submarine on May 31 and sunk somewhere in the naval war zone. The *President Lincoln* was returning from European waters to the United States bringing wounded men home. The torpedoing occurred in broad daylight. Only members of the crew were lost; the wounded were saved. The *President Lincoln* was one of four German vessels that had been taken over by the United States and had not been renamed when the American flag was hoisted above them; the others were the *George Washington* of the North German Lloyd Line and the *President Grant* and *Pennsylvania* of the Hamburg-American Line. The *President Lincoln* lay for months at Hoboken before she was taken over and repaired for use as a transport.

At least fourteen American vessels were sunk late in May off the North Atlantic coast by German submarines. The largest was the Porto Rico liner *Carolina,* of 8,000 tons, which was attacked about 125 miles southeast of Sandy Hook. Besides the *Carolina* the victims included a tanker, the *Herbert L. Pratt,* the steamship *Winnconnie,* of 1,800 tons, and nine schooners. The crews were landed at Atlantic ports. Nearly all the schooners were sunk by a *U*-boat which had been lurking for days in the path of shipping off the Jersey coast and the Delaware capes. Stories told by skippers indicated that the commander of this submersible

was unusually humane for a German officer. In no instance, so far as known, was a lifeboat shelled and in all cases reported the crews had an opportunity to escape, or were taken aboard the submarine, where some of them were kept prisoners for eight days before they were turned adrift to be picked up by a passing vessel. The toll of dead and missing first stood at fifty-eight, all being from the steamer *Carolina.* Sixteen perished when one of the ship's boats capsized in a storm after the vessel had been sunk. The *Carolina's* motor-lifeboat, carrying two women and thirty-three men, capsized in a squall off Cape Henlopen about 11 o'clock at night. Only nineteen lived through the experience. That their lives were saved was due to the presence of mind of Christian Nelson, an engineer of the *Carolina,* who directed the bailing out of the boat and the rescue of eighteen of his companions. Worn and bedraggled after spending forty hours without food in open boats at sea, thirty-six men who comprised the crew of the freighter *Texel,* which was sunk sixty miles off New York, drifted ashore at Atlantic City. They told how, out of a clear sea, the *U*-boat had poked her nose up out of the water at the right bow of the vessel; how the submarine commander, with a strange mixture of callousness and good nature had exprest polite and profane regret when he sank the ship and her rich cargo of sugar, after giving those on board an opportunity to take to their boats.

It was natural for Germany to do everything she could to interrupt the steady flow of American reinforcements to Europe. This was understood to have been the occasion for sending *U*-boats into our waters. The western offensive had become for her a battle against time. It would miss its mark if a decision was not reached before the arrival of our forces in sufficient numbers to turn the scale in France irreparably against Germany. As yet the *U*-boats had not sunk a single American transport outward bound, the convoy system having proved effective in the eastern half of the Atlantic. The German Admiralty's failure in those waters had driven it to extend its campaign into the western Atlantic, where hitherto less vigilance had been necessary.

The sending of *U*-boats over here was a part of Ludendorff's

great offensive in the west, begun in March, which aimed at bringing the war to an end this year without an actual defeat of the Teutonic Powers. Almost simultaneously with the beginning of Ludendorff's offensive this *U*-boat design against the shipping of the United States had set in. A considerable military force of Americans was then already in France, a steady stream was following, and with it munitions and supplies, some of which were to strengthen the British and French as well as support the growing force of Americans. Submarines in Europe were accomplishing little in causing actual hindrance to convoyed forces and supplies, and meanwhile the construction of new vessels was gaining upon the destruction of old ones.

Whatever the motives and the expectations were, the reaction in this country was not likely to afford Germany much comfort. It was true that the ports of New York and Boston were closed for a few hours when the presence of *U*-boats off our coast was first officially established, that New York City dimmed its lights as a precaution against bombing airplanes which might have arrived by the undersea route and that New Yorkers were instructed by the Police Department that, when sirens and whistles announced an air-raid, they should immediately open the windows of their homes or offices and go at once to cellars. But these precautions were not prompted by any sign or spirit of panic. Our psychological reaction was more truly revealed in the fact that, the day after the arrival of the *U*-boat became known, naval recruiting in New York passed all records since the United States entered the war, and on the same day New York made its first systematic effort to round up unregistered enemy-aliens. If Germany had hoped to cause the recall of some of our destroyers she was doomed to disappointment.

A bombardment of American ports by German guns as a feature of the *U*-boat campaign was now being promised by the German press. One paper referred to the campaign as a submarine obstruction to the transportation of American reinforcements to Europe "at a time when American reserves are the Allies' last hope." Large transportation was being checked, and American naval forces were "power-

less to prevent it." The German people were told that what had happened was "only the beginning." There would be scenes to "make the marrow of Wilson's bones turn cold." Americans were "trembling in fear of air-raids" and there was "a great panic throughout the country."

On June 27, when the German Foreign Minister began again to talk of peace, the British hospital ship *Llandovery Castle,* of 11,000 tons, bound from a Canadian port for England, was sunk without warning by a submarine seventy miles from the Irish coast and only 24 of 258 persons on board were reported saved. The first intimation the ship had of the presence of a submarine was a jar and the roar of an explosion from aft and then the lights went out. Many were killed in the engine-room. There was no response to Captain Sylvester's signals from the bridge after the torpedo struck. The *Llandovery Castle,* chartered by the Canadian Government, had been in service carrying wounded and sick from England to Canada for many months, and was then on her way to England. She had on board 258 persons, including eight men of the Canadian Army Medical Corps and fourteen women nurses. All lights were burning when the ship was torpedoed, including a huge electrical cross over the bridge and strings of white and green lights on either side. Red crosses on the sides of the vessel also were illuminated by electric lights. One of the small boats launched from the hospital ship and containing twelve nursing Sisters, capsized and the Sisters were drowned. The submarine was afterward observed attacking wreckage, on which might have been survivors and in a locality where it was likely some of the small boats were drifting.

The hospital ships *Dover Castle* and *Rewa* had also been torpedoed at night, the first named in the Mediterranean and the other in Bristol Channel. Both carried wounded, doctors, nurses, and attendants. It was impossible in any of these cases to mistake the ship for a warship at torpedo-range. Their Red Crosses illuminated sea and sky more brilliantly than any constellation could do and proclaimed their mission of mercy to Allied and enemy alike. The Germans did not even give warnings, but struck from the dark which was made blacker because the cross above decks and

repeated on the sides lit the night with an effulgence seeming like a celestial scene. An emblem sacred to civilized nations had meant nothing to the Germans, but an opportunity to add another atrocity to their record. Their Foreign Minister, only a few days before, had stood up in the Reichstag and spoken of a negotiated peace in "mutual confidence in one another's honesty and chivalry"; the same Germany, another of whose former Foreign Ministers, during the sitting of the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, on hearing what the terms to Germany might be, remarked that "we supposed we were dealing with gentlemen." The latter was Zimmermann, the author of those Mexican notes which, next to the *Lusitania* sinking, was the chief causes of America entering into the war.

Harrowing details were given on June 17, 1918, of the destruction of one of the largest and more recently constructed German submarines, one of the last to leave Zeebrugge before the entrance to the harbor was blocked by British forces on April 24. The *U*-boat struck a mine, and out of the crew of forty only two survived on reaching the surface after a terrible struggle with death for an hour and a half, twenty fathoms below the surface. Some of the crew committed suicide, having lost all hope of leaving the boat alive. The only chance of escaping was to force open the conning-tower and the forward hatches and trust to the compression of air in one part of the vessel to force each man, like a torpedo, to the surface. The air-pressure in the submarine had become so high that the great majority of the Germans could not keep their mouths closed. The comprest air shot them to the surface, and hardly had they reached the sea-level when the air-pressure burst their lungs, and about twenty of them sank like stones.

The United States cruiser *San Diego* was sent to the bottom of the Atlantic by a torpedo or mine ten miles southeast of Fire Island on July 19 with a loss of forty-eight persons. All the officers were saved. The vessel carried a complement of approximately 1,257 men. The steamship *Bussum* brought in 710, the *P. F. Jones* 88, and the *Malden* 380. These, with the thirty-one men who were taken ashore at Point o' Woods, made a total of 1,209 men accounted for.

The remainder of the ship's complement, forty-eight men, chiefly firemen, who were within fatal range of the explosion, or who were exposed to escaping steam, were unaccounted for. It was believed that these men were killed instantly when the *San Diego* was ripped along her keel from stern to the midship section. No torpedo or wake of a torpedo was observed. No submarine was seen, and the three merchantmen which went to the rescue of the sailormen were not molested by a submarine attack. A month later it became officially known that the ship was sunk by a mine.

News of *U*-boat depredations off Cape Cod supplied proof of continued enemy operations in American waters. In view of hundreds along the beach the submarine shelled and burned a tugboat and sank three barges without warning, wounded three of the crews, and dropt four shells on the mainland. The action lasted an hour and a half and was unchallenged except for two hydro-airplanes from the Chatham aviation station, which circled over the *U*-boat, causing her to submerge, only to reappear and resume firing. The barges were bound from Gloucester for New York and only one was loaded, her cargo consisting of stone. Of the forty-one persons, including three women and five children on board, three men were wounded.

On July 22 word came that the giant White Star liner *Justicia* had been torpedoed and sunk. The *Justicia* was formerly the Dutch steamer *Statendam*, taken over by the British Government on the stocks at Belfast, when nearing completion. She was of 32,120 tons gross. Four hundred of the crew of the *Justicia* were landed at an Irish port. The liner was sunk after a twenty-four-hour fight with submarines. The first torpedo struck the engine-room and the ship stopt. Several other torpedoes were fired, but only two of the missiles were effective.

Not even the heavy score made by *U*-boats in sinking the *Justicia* could do away with the fact of German submarine failure as a whole. The *U*-boats that had appeared off the New Jersey and Massachusetts coasts could be interpreted only as a sign of irritation in consciousness of defeat. The world had witnessed one long series of gross German miscalculations which would much sooner have effected

THE FRENCH CONFERRING DECORATIONS ON AMERICAN NAVAL OFFICERS

The scene is on board the American superdreadnought *Pennsylvania*, the flagship of our Atlantic Fleet. The Cross of the Legion of Honor is being conferred on the Americans

Germany's ruin except for one or two facts concerning which the German war-makers apparently did not make miscalculations—their own technical skill in making war, and more than that, the infinite patience of the German people with their military masters. They miscalculated as to Belgium; they miscalculated as to Great Britain; they miscalculated as to the soul of France; they miscalculated the *U*-boat war as to what that could do, and they miscalculated as to America. In the end the record became more complete, for even the infinite devotion, submissiveness, and credulity of the German people at last turned out a miscalculation, and the military caste was face to face with a revolution.

By the end of August, 1918, it was clear that the submarine situation had permanently changed. The barrier erected against it in the English Channel had become so formidable that activities came to an end. Operations from Flemish ports, moreover, had been rendered impracticable, owing to the successful exploits of the British at Zeebrugge and Ostend, and to the persistence of attacks on them by air and sea. Between March and July the British navy had disposed of fully one-half the submarine flotilla concentrated at Zeebrugge and Ostend. The Flanders coast had ceased to have any strategic importance for the enemy. To achieve this purpose the British army had made its attack on Passchendaele Ridge in the autumn of 1917, and just failed to succeed, but the British navy had since "done the trick." Whatever the Germans were fighting for on the Western Front, it was no longer for any strategic advantage that came from holding the Flanders ports.[16]

Official figures, made public in Washington on September 21, showed that from August, 1914, to September, 1918, German submarines had sunk 7,157,088 deadweight tons of shipping in excess of the tonnage turned out in that period by Allied and neutral nations. That total, however, did not mean depletion to that extent of the fleets of the Allied and neutral nations, because 3,795,000 deadweight tons of enemy ships had been seized by them in the meantime, so that actually the Allied and neutral nations on September 1, 1918, had only 3,362,088 less tons of shipping in operation

[16] The *Daily News* (London).

than in August, 1914. These details were issued to show that, with American and Allied yards under full headway, the danger of the German submarine starving Europe was now at an end. Since May, 1918, Allied construction had exceeded destruction. There were now 203 shipyards in the United States, 77 steel, 117 wood, 2 composite, and 7 concrete shipyards. Of these 155 were completed, 35 were more than half completed, and only 13 were less than half completed. The great plant at Hog Island was 95 per cent. completed and had been built in one year; its site when the United States entered the war was a swamp marsh. Every month of the year had added to the number of American shipways, until in September the impressive total was 1,020 —more than double the total of shipways in all the rest of the world. Of the 927 shipways of the Emergency Fleet Corporation of the Shipping Board, 810 were now listed as completed, and only 117 were to be added. There were 410 completed ways for the construction of wood, composite, and concrete ships. There were now approximately 386,000 employees in the shipyards, as against fewer than 50,000 in July, 1916.

Four ships, with more than 940 passengers, were sunk by the *U*-boats early in October—the United States transport *Ticonderoga*, with a missing list of 243; the Japanese steamship *Hirando*, with a list of 300, and an unconfirmed list of 481 from the *Leinster*, a Dublin mail-boat. The *Ticonderoga* went down 1,700 miles from our coast. The *Hirando* was torpedoed 300 miles south of Ireland. The Dublin mail-boat was sunk in St. George's Channel. Seventeen men, the sole survivors so far as known, of the crew of 330 of the transport *Ticonderoga*, which had left our coast for Europe late in September, arrived in the United States with a harrowing tale of torpedoeing. Nearly all of the seventeen were still suffering from unhealed wounds, inflicted when, on October 6, a German *U*-boat shelled the *Ticonderoga* unmercifully, after having fatally injured her with a torpedo. The *Ticonderoga* (formerly the German steamer *Camilla Rickmers*, of 5,580 tons) sailed with a convoy, but because of engine-trouble had lost her protecting companions. Several days later a torpedo hit her.

London newspapers were filled with indignant condemnation of the "cold-blooded murder and massacre" committed in the sinking of the *Leinster*, one of the most diabolical pieces of wickedness in the German record. Committed at the moment when Germany was talking peace, the immediate effect of this outrage was completely to defeat Germany's purpose. No notice would henceforth be taken of anything uttered or written by the new Chancellor, Prince Maximilian of Baden, except "unconditional surrender."

A notable combat with a *U*-boat occurred in the Adriatic during the raid made on Durazzo on October 6, 1918. The Allied forces included three Italian battleships and three British cruisers that crossed the Adriatic in line ahead, the battleships leading, with British mine-sweepers, Italian, British, and American destroyers and "chasers" ahead, destroyers and other lighter vessels on flanks and rear. Two enemy submarines fired, but fired only once, for fifteen or sixteen American chasers and other light vessels scurried down upon them, and disposed of both, as neither was sufficiently submerged to escape the depth charges dropt. Eleven chasers participated under command of Captain Nelson, acting as fringes to the main attacking party of British and Italian men-of-war. On nearing the enemy's coast all ships came under the fire of coastal batteries, but the chasers, by means of skilful zigzagging and rushing in under enemy fire, escaped without casualties. Chaser No. 129 sighted a submarine that was about to make an assault on the attacking Allied ships when it submerged, stayed so for a moment, then reappeared a short distance away from chaser No. 129, which, having seen the submarine go down, had made its course toward the place and dropt two depth-charges in a position which it thought was above the submarine. In the meantime the submarine had changed its course and a moment later its periscope appeared and then it submerged again. Chaser No. 129 now ran straight for it again and when directly over it, let go a depth-charge, followed by two more. Afterward seven large pieces of steel framework or plating came to the surface in a swirl of water and then sank. A gigantic globule of oil and water, which seemed to be almost boiling also made its appearance, for

twenty seconds, and then rose a steady stream of heavy black oil. During this engagement submarine chaser No. 129 was hampered by engine-trouble, but, in spite of being crippled, she was able to contribute to the general success of the maneuver. The submarine she sank would in all probability have torpedoed one of the large British or Italian warships. No. 129 was commanded by Maclear Jacoby, son of Prof. Harold Jacoby of Columbia University.

The output of world tonnage in the third quarter of 1918 exceeded the losses from all causes by nearly half a million gross tons. The United Kingdom built new shipping to the amount of 411,395 tons, the other Allies and neutrals 972,735 tons. The tonnage of merchant vessels completed in the United Kingdom and entered into service in October was 136,100. The total destruction wrought by German and Austrian submarines was in the neighborhood of 16,000,000 gross tons, distributed over the war-years as follows: 1914, five months, 681,363; 1915, 1,724,720; 1916, 2,797,866; 1917, 6,623,623; 1918, nine months, 2,998,063. Total, 14,825,635.

There were now under the British flag about 16,800,000 tons gross, or about 3,724,000 tons less than in 1914. The United States came next with tonnage of about 7,240,000 tons (4,980,000 tons sea, and 2,260,000 tons lake), or 2,953,000 tons more than in 1914. Japan had now a fleet of 2,108,000 tons, which showed an increase of 400,000 tons; France and Italy jointly had lost about 853,000 tons since the outbreak of war and owned only 2,500,000 tons between them. The neutral European countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Holland, and Spain) had lost, all told, no less than 1,549,000 tons since the outbreak of war, reducing their mercantile marine to 4,550,000 tons; other countries stood at about 2,392,000 tons, or a loss of 854,000 tons. Germany and Austria-Hungary, after deducting their losses by war-risk and adding the new tonnage building, had a fleet aggregating about 4,140,000 tons, or 2,047,000 less than they owned when the war broke out.

The truth about the extent of the German failure in submarine warfare became definitely known in July, 1919, when men learned how great a bluff Capelle, the German Minister

of Marine, had long been making. Three months before the armistice was signed Lloyd George had declared that the British Navy had positive evidence of the sinking of 150 *U*-boats, and three weeks later a list of their officers had been given to the British press. German authorities and newspapers had been vocal with positive denials of these statements. Their losses in *U*-boats had been "highly exaggerated." But now the *Vossische Zeitung*, in giving a full roster of German naval losses, showed that the British figures had been rather under than over the mark. The loss of 199 *U*-boats was admitted by that paper as of record. Of these 82 had been lost in the North Sea and Atlantic, and 72 off the Flanders coast—the latter figure, by the way, bearing out the British contention that the Channel patrol had been highly effective. Three more *U*-boats had been lost in the Baltic, 16 in the Mediterranean, 5 in the Black Sea, and 21 had been blown up or interned by their crews. Immediately after the armistice a London report set the total German *U*-boats sunk at 200, and the total built at 360. Thus closely had the Allied navies gaged their success in the submarine war.

As most *U*-boats during their voyages had carried as many men as could be crowded into them, the further announcement that 3,000 sailors had been drowned in the sinkings was not surprizing; but the darker tragedy was that the conditions of service on these vessels had become so nerve-wrecking that several thousand sailors lost their reason and were committed to insane asylums, which was an explanation of the mutinous spirit that had spread through the High Seas Fleet and at last destroyed its morale. The submarine campaign, therefore, was lost long before the Germans signed the armistice. Listening devices, depth-bombs, and the unerring guns of swarming destroyers had made each venture like a forlorn hope, and to find crews became the despair of the Admiralty. At the last only a few submarines were in commission, and it seemed futile to go on building them in quantities.

Shipping conditions had changed so radically since the beginning of the war that only four out of twenty-eight maritime nations still held their pre-war position in tonnage holdings, according to Henry C. Wiltbank in *The Rudder*.

Most remarkable of all was the showing made by the United States. At the outbreak of the war this country stood ninth in rank, with only 1,076,000 gross tons of steam ocean-going shipping. Altho nearly two-thirds of this tonnage was lost during the war, a greater proportionate loss than for any other country, the United States at the time of the signing of the armistice stood second in rank, with its holdings increased to 4,476,000 tons. To gain this position, Mr. Wiltbank said, the United States had passed Italy, Holland, the British colonies, Japan, France, Norway, and Germany in turn. In addition to more than quadrupling our holdings in the intervening period, our proportion of the world's trade fleet, which was only 2½ per cent. at the beginning of the war, had advanced to 11 per cent.[17]

(*The narrative covered under the heading "In the German Colonies and on the Sea," is continued in Volume X with an account of "Battles Between Warships and the Work of Commerce Raiders."*)

[17] Principal Sources: The *Evening Post,* The *Journal of Commerce,* The *Evening Sun,* The *Times,* New York; Associated Press dispatches, The *Tribune* (New York), The London *Times'* "History of the War."

ITALIAN, BALKAN, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIAN FRONTS

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THE GERMANO-AUSTRO-RUSSIAN BATTLEGROUND
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Germans and Austrian - Hungarians:
Railroads thus:
Forts thus:
Scale of Miles
0 50 100 150
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